During my time at the Division I have had a lot of opportunities, which I am very grateful for, to have worked with different parts of the Antitrust Division and different parts of the DOJ, which I think is an experience that people don’t always get as a trial attorney, where your focus is rightly on working on your cases. Frankly, before I served as counsel to the AAG I had no idea what happened above my level. I did not know how chiefs or the Division’s senior leadership thought about broader decision making, enforcement priority setting, and that type of thing. Having exposure to some of that higher-level thinking and having opportunities to engage with different parts of the Department and different parts of the federal government has informed how I do my current job and also helped me think about how to be an effective leader, having worked with a number of people across my time at the Division who I consider incredibly effective and inspirational leaders.
They are all different. There is not one model—people say that you need to have your own style in the courtroom; there is not one perfect Platonic ideal of a trial lawyer. The same is true for a leader. You have to be authentic to yourself. I think that can be difficult sometimes as a woman in this profession because there are frankly not a lot of examples to follow, so at various times I have sought out strong female mentors and role models, and I think that has also been very helpful to me in my career.
RENEE TURNER: I wanted to talk about efforts to incentivize disclosure and uncover new cases. Earlier this year, Manish Kumar and Maria Jaspers released a YouTube video encouraging individuals to report antitrust violations, and this video followed a speech that you gave in New York last fall about the Division’s efforts to incentivize disclosures outside of leniency. Can you tell us how effective those efforts have been in uncovering new antitrust cases?
EMMA BURNHAM: Those outreach efforts from my perspective seem to be having a positive impact on our enforcement. Historically we relied substantially on the leniency program and on pure citizen complaints coming from those outside the conspiracy, but we were not getting a lot of corporate victims coming in, people who are in a position to be able to spot some of the red flags but have reasonable concerns about sticking their heads up. You don’t want to upset your vendors or suppliers when you rely on them for your livelihood and for the success of your company. We have done a lot of thinking about ways to make it a more effective value proposition for companies to come in as a victim.
For companies that don’t have experience working with the Department of Justice it can be a very scary thing to say, “I’m going to open up my business, executives, and employees to scrutiny by the Antitrust Division,” but we really are here to help, especially when these are crimes that are affecting companies’ bottom lines. Sometimes explaining that we are in a position in certain circumstances not only to take that lead and be able to investigate but also to take steps to ensure that the company receives appropriate restitution and is made whole can be a useful thing for companies to take into account when they are deciding whether to come forward.
We also have been giving a lot of thought to the confidentiality assurances that we provide. Obviously there are some necessary limits on that when we are at the litigation stage and we may have discovery obligations, so we cannot provide a blanket guarantee all of the time that information provided by a corporate victim or the identity of the corporate victim is always going to be protected, but we can take every necessary step to keep that confidential. I think focusing more on that has provided some clarity and confidence in our process, so we are seeing more of those tips and leads coming in through corporate victims.
RENEE TURNER: Talking about leniency, in the spring of 2022 the Division announced a number of updates to its policies. What is your take on how those changes are working in practice, and should we expect to see any additional changes soon?
EMMA BURNHAM: Stepping back, when we went through the process in 2022 of making updates to the leniency policy we thought very hard about those updates and there was a rigorous internal process, talking to and conferring with the case teams that had worked with leniency applicants in recent years, scrutinizing the issues that arose both in the investigation and in litigation arising out of the leniency application, and thinking about what we could do to better incentivize the kind of self reporting that ultimately resulted in strong admissible evidence in litigated cases or in successful resolutions against the applicant’s co-conspirators. The changes that we made were focused on addressing those real-world issues.
Since then we have been continually taking stock of how that worked in practice. It takes a while to find out, and many of the leniency applicants we have worked with over the past few years are applicants that came in under the prior policy, which we continue to apply for companies that came in under the old policy, so there is no ex post facto issue.
That said, the applications we have received under the new policy I do think have had the feature that we were looking for--allowing us to pursue more covert investigative steps.
There are several updates we made to the policy that I consider key, and one of those is the change from a requirement that an applicant terminate its participation in the conspiracy to the requirement that the applicant report that conspiracy to DOJ. That allows us to catch conspiracies that are ongoing and to take covert steps such as consensual recordings. We have continued to use that technique, and I think that results in some of the most persuasive types of trial evidence.
Another change we made to the policy that I have seen bear fruit is the requirement that to receive a conditional letter, an applicant must not only provide a plan for restitution but also must take other necessary remedial measures and institute a compliance program if they didn’t have one or improve a preexisting compliance program. I think every tool we can give to the compliance professionals and every way in which we can incentivize better investments in compliance improves not only our enforcement ability but also deters the conduct from occurring in the first place, which is our ultimate goal. I think the absence of those requirements created a funny gap where companies that were the best corporate citizens, the ones that caught the conduct and reported it, did not have the incentive to then improve their compliance program or to undertake remedial measures to make sure that the conduct that had occurred did not continue to create harm. I think that has been an effective change.
I also think that the updates we made to the frequently asked questions (FAQs) have had the intended effect of increasing access to justice in the sense that we are seeing a wider range of defense counsel come in, including folks who do not have a lot of experience with the Antitrust Division’s leniency policy but do have a broader set of experience with different types of voluntary self-disclosures or cooperation in different white-collar contexts. We are all about competition here, and the more lawyers we have out there working with potential leniency applicants, the more effective our enforcement is going to be.
ERIC LIPMAN: I am going to turn to more specifics about the Criminal Enforcement program’s strategies and priorities and start by asking if in your time you have seen any significant shifts in the industries or sectors where these criminal antitrust violations are more prevalent, and if so, how do you guys tailor your enforcement efforts to get at those industry-specific concerns?
EMMA BURNHAM: When I started at the Antitrust Division ten years ago we were in the middle of a massive investigation into price fixing in the auto parts industry, which took a lot of resources from the Criminal Enforcement program. It was an almost all-hands-on-deck experience for us and resulted in a lot of incredible general deterrence, but when that and some of our other long-running, high-profile investigations ended, I think there was a need to refocus our attention and an opportunity to do so in a deliberate way.
One of the things that has been so key about taking proactive steps to complement the leniency policy with other types of investigations--whether those are investigations spurred by our own in-house economists noticing nonsensical pricing patterns in key industries, complainants coming in off the street, corporate victims, referrals from other law enforcement agencies, referrals from the FTC or the Civil Enforcement program of the Antitrust Division, and referrals from U.S. Attorneys’ office and other main Justice components—is that it allows us to focus strategically on particular industries. I mean that as opposed to taking a reactive approach where enforcement is based on leniency applications. One of the things that invariably results from reactive investigations is our priorities are in a way being set by the applications we receive.
Over the past few years we have investigated a range of anticompetitive conduct in various facets of the healthcare industry, for one. We continue to focus on this industry because, of course, it is extremely important to have competition in those markets. We have brought a wide array of cases in healthcare, including addressing labor-market collusion—for example, a case awaiting trial against a health care staffing executive accused of conspiring to fix the wages of nurses in Las Vegas—as well as, for example, cases against generic drug manufacturers for fixing prices for critical medications and against providers of cancer treatments for market allocation.
Another industry that has been in increasing focus over the last, say, five years, is the public procurement space. That is one area we have been increasingly concerned about. One Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development study found that something like 20 percent of public spending is siphoned off by fraud and collusion. That is an enormous tax being paid by the American taxpayer and is something that threatens our national security directly, so I think it would be incredibly irresponsible of us if we were not devoting a substantial portion of our enforcement resources to prosecuting cases in that space. That is what you saw starting in 2019 when the Procurement Collusion Strike Force (PCSF) was created. Over the last few years we have expanded the reach of the PCSF into the global sphere, so we are increasingly focused on U.S. spending for operations abroad, including military spending overseas, and I do not see that enforcement priority shifting anytime soon.
Those are two good examples of an answer to the second part of your question about how we take our resources and deploy them in particular sectors.
The Criminal Enforcement program has four offices around the country. We have something like 120 prosecutors spread out across those offices, and they focus on conduct that is occurring in their geographic territories and also matters of national or international scope, but they are not assigned particular topical areas or industries.
One model we have been increasingly experimenting with is something that the PCSF epitomizes, the coordinated interagency strike-force model that allows us to be a little bit more flexible and move resources around and prioritize partnerships with other law enforcement agencies that are focused on the same mission. We also recently created a taskforce that is focused on healthcare collusion and monopolization. That is a taskforce that has both a civil and criminal component to it.
Another feature of the Antitrust Division is that there is this dividing line between civil enforcement on the one hand and criminal on the other, and people think about these as two discrete silos in a lot of ways. I think the taskforce model can be effective in making sure that we at the Antitrust Division are thinking about all of the enforcement tools at our disposal and using them in a coordinated way consistent with our parallel-proceedings policy and considering all of the potential remedies and charges available to us.
I am not making any announcements, but I would not be surprised if we continue to deploy similar models in other industries and areas of focus for us.
ERIC LIPMAN: Following up on that a little bit, AAG Kanter recently described the Division as a whole’s case-selection methodology with the acronym HIPS, standing for high-impact programmatically significant. How does that influence the kinds of cases that the Criminal Enforcement program is prioritizing?
EMMA BURNHAM: We in the Criminal Enforcement program also like to keep our hands on our HIPS. We do think about our strategic priorities and setting them both internally and conveying them externally, so industries that are of a particular focus for us in addition to healthcare and procurement include the food supply chain and agricultural industries. It also includes the tech space, including collusion that is facilitated by price-setting algorithms.
For many years—and we do not anticipate this changing—this has included the shipping industry and all aspects of the supply chain because that is a place where we have had a number of successful investigations over the years and that is an area where various price shocks to the market based on external events can have ripple effects or can create conditions that facilitate or mask collusion, so that is something we are always attuned to. Those are just some of the areas we consider HIPS.
That does not mean, though, that we do not bring other types of cases. There are no hard and fast metrics when it comes to the types of cases we take, and I believe it is very important to be enforcing the antitrust laws at all levels of the economy and all parts of our country. We have investigations in Puerto Rico, in Mississippi, and I think covering the full range from the West Coast to the East Coast and all parts in between focusing both on areas where there are particularly vulnerable victims and areas where there are industries that have outsized importance to our economy or national security.
We also have been exploring more partnerships with other U.S. Attorneys’ offices and with state Attorneys General to serve as a force multiplier in our ability to adequately address collusion at various levels of the economy.
ERIC LIPMAN: You may have anticipated my next question, but given the large workload that you have described and your anticipated caseload coming up, do you think that the Division and the Criminal Enforcement program specifically has sufficient resources and sufficient staff to pursue all the cases it considers important?
EMMA BURNHAM: No. If we had more resources, could we do more? Yes, absolutely. It is an interesting question of what is the optimal level of enforcement foradequate general and specific deterrence. That is the ultimate question. I don’t know the answer. Fortunately it is up to Congress and not up to me what that level is. We take the resources we are given and try to do the most we possibly can, and that is I think why the PCSF-type model is so important. At the end of the day having strong partners who can work with us on investigations and also on the litigation phase helps us to do more with a finite amount of resources.
RENEE TURNER: I would like to transition to litigation and talk about some challenges and maybe evidentiary hurdles in some recent cases.
Many of us are aware of the complexities and challenges in the labor market litigation. How has the Division adapted its strategies and tactics to enhance its success in proving violations in that sector?
EMMA BURNHAM: Going back to something I said earlier, in the process of making updates to our leniency policy, we took a look at the types of evidence that were effective and those that were less effective in our jury presentations across all our recent cases, including those charging labor market collusion. We found some trends that resulted in the tweaks we made in 2022 to the policy. I am thinking most specifically about the prompt reporting requirement.
Particularly in situations of bilateral conspiracies where we are relying on immunized cooperator testimony to prove the existence of the agreement and that the defendant joined it, juries tend to be more skeptical, but when we have recordings or text messages, real-time evidence that takes jurors inside the conspiracy, that can be extremely valuable.
We also have been increasingly focused on making sure that the integrity of our process is maintained and that we are receiving full cooperation and full and complete responses to our subpoenas and our legal process. The topic of ephemeral messaging and what retention and production requirements companies have has been an increasing focus both for us and for other federal agencies. If we are not given the evidence of real-time communications, that can hamper our ability to put on a strong case, so we are going to take every step possible to make sure that we are able to get that kind of evidence and able to present it to a jury.
I don’t think those issues are specific to the labor market cases. I think it is a broader, more generally applicable point, but that is also the answer to your question about the labor market trials.
RENEE TURNER: I wanted to next talk about the criminal monopolization cases. What factors contributed to filing the first criminal monopolization case in over fifty years, and how does the Division approach these cases differently from traditional antitrust violations like price fixing or bid rigging?
EMMA BURNHAM: When AAG Kanter first arrived at the Antitrust Division he spoke a lot about making sure that we were using all the tools in our toolkit, and we took a look at Title 15 and thought: What happens if you turn the page past Section 1? Oh, look, there is another criminal felony statute on the books; why haven’t we enforced that in half a century?
No one had a great answer for that. People had a lot of ideas, but I never found a satisfactory answer, and it occurred to us that there are myriad reasons to make sure we are enforcing all of the laws that Congress wrote the way they wrote them, and in the case of criminal monopolization there are real enforcement aims that prosecuting that statute serves. If you look at the filed cases over the past few years, there are a few different examples of ways in which this was a helpful statute for us from an enforcement perspective.
One is the example of an attempted agreement to allocate the market that is not consummated, perhaps because the person who is being solicited to enter into the conspiracy knows better and does not in fact enter into the agreement. Under our old enforcement regime we were unable to prosecute that because Section 1 of the Sherman Act does not cover attempts, so this allows us to more effectively deter attempts in situations where the attempt is to, as in the example of United States v. Zito, allocate the market, or it could also be an attempt to fix prices or rig bids.
Another example is the case of United States v. Martinez, which is currently pending trial, so I won’t say anything about it beyond the fact of the indictment, but the charges there include a conspiracy to monopolize. If you take a look at the allegations in that case I think that one is pretty self-explanatory as to why we brought criminal monopolization charges. There, the indictment alleges the defendants conspired to fix prices, and conspired to monopolize the transmigrante forwarding industry through threats, intimidation, and acts of violence.
There you have the example of a conspiracy to monopolize, which really is an independent harm above and beyond just a conspiracy to allocate markets, rig bids, or fix prices. You also see that with the recent plea in United States v. Bird, where a former owner of contractor companies that provided fuel truck services to the U.S. Forest Service’s wildfire fighters pleaded guilty to conspiring to monopolize, rigging bids and allocating territories in violation of Sections 1 and 2.
I anticipate we will continue to bring these cases when the facts, law, and policy support it.
RENEE TURNER: It is my understanding that practitioners think the leniency policy is focused squarely on Section 1. Is that true, or does it also apply to Section 2?
EMMA BURNHAM: I believe we have an FAQ on this point (FAQ 12), but I am sure it gets buried somewhere in the thirty-five single-spaced pages. Section 2 can be covered by leniency if there is a Section 2 violation that is related to Section 1 conduct that is being reported--the same way that, for example, a wire fraud that is in furtherance of a Section 1 conspiracy would be included within the scope of the leniency letter. Monopolization would also be included within the scope of the leniency letter if it is integral to the section 1 crime.
If, for example, you have a market allocation and that is tied up in a conspiracy to monopolize the market, then that would all be covered under the leniency. By the terms of the policy it applies only to Section 1—you must report your involvement in a Section 1 crime to qualify for leniency—but we have a longstanding practice of also covering other crimes that occur in furtherance of the Section 1 conspiracy.
I think this makes sense. I don’t think we could have a leniency policy that applies to unilateral Section 2 conduct. The leniency policy is designed and calibrated to encourage self-reporting of a conspiracy such that we can prosecute co-conspirators. If there are no co-conspirators because it is unilateral conduct, then I don’t think a leniency policy would be particularly effective.
RENEE TURNER: Maybe that answers this question: Would the Division bring a criminal monopolization case based on unilateral conduct?
EMMA BURNHAM: I think the statutes clearly provide that we have the ability to do so. I cannot really opine on any particular fact patterns or particular investigations or matters, but I don’t think it is something I can categorically rule out. Like with our other criminal cases, we would be looking for the requisite intent and particularly egregious underlying anticompetitive conduct.
ERIC LIPMAN: I want to go back to something you mentioned earlier, algorithms. Given the increasing use of pricing algorithms and what I will loosely describe as “artificial intelligence” (AI) technology, how is the Division adapting its strategies to make sure that it is addressing potential antitrust concerns related to those technologies? Putting a finer point on it, are there specific types of algorithms or AI applications that you think raise particular concerns from a criminal antitrust perspective?
EMMA BURNHAM: In terms of how we investigate or think about price-setting algorithms or AI and how they can be used either to facilitate collusion by human people or what we do about a situation when the bots by themselves are colluding, I don’t think our investigation methods shift much if at all. We are still looking for evidence of an agreement at the end of the day and looking for witnesses who can tell us about that agreement, whether that is about their decision jointly as co-conspirators to use the same price-setting algorithm or whether it is a decision to each employ a similar algorithm in-house. At the end of the day we are looking for evidence that will get us inside the meeting of the minds.
We have hired data scientists and brought on specialists who can help us understand the code and the technical aspects. I don’t think that is irrelevant or unimportant in criminal investigations, but I don’t think it is necessarily always as critical as it is in a civil investigation, though those are capabilities that we have been focused on adding to our enforcement program as well.
To answer the question about what are the types of algorithms we are most concerned about, I guess we could think about it as a very simplified three-part taxonomy of algorithmic collusion:
For step one, I can give you an example of a case that we filed in 2015, the U.S. v. Topkins case, which I believe was the first algorithmic price-fixing case, followed by cases against co-conspirators. Both the DOJ and the UK’s CMA brought enforcement actions. The conduct there was an agreement to fix the prices of what we call “wall décor”—other people may just call them “posters”—sold on Amazon Marketplace, and the defendant, who pleaded guilty, agreed with his co-conspirators to use commercially available algorithm-based pricing software to set their prices. Later, in 2016, a corporate co-conspirator resolved charges against it, and in 2019, a fugitive defendant pleaded guilty after being apprehended abroad and faced with extradition.
I think the landscape has changed a little bit since those cases, and we have tried to stay ahead of those trends so that we are ready to address them.
In stage one you have an independent agreement to fix prices and then you get the algorithm to cover it up or do it for you. Stage two is a situation of more tacit collusion. Without speaking to any particular matter, I will say that that price-setting algorithms can be used to facilitate tacit collusion, and could essentially constitute a hub-and-spoke conspiracy. That is something that could subject the members of the conspiracy to criminal prosecution.
Stage three I would say is what I call “when bots collude,” when you have algorithms on their own reaching the most efficient way of increasing prices, which is to agree to do so with your competitors by sharing competitively sensitive information. In that situation I think it is, at least in part, a question of compliance. You will see that the DOJ’s Criminal Division recently updated their guidance document on the Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs, and in that they include a number of questions that focus on the company’s use of AI and the responsibility that they undertake by deciding to use AI.
I think we have all been clear at the Department that “set it and forget it” is not an option. You have an ongoing obligation to test and monitor the AI to make sure that it is not running afoul of laws. I think that obligation is an extremely important one and one that at the Antitrust Division we are going to continue to emphasize in the context of avoiding a situation where your AI goes into price-fixing territory on its own.
At the end of the day, it is not really “on its own.” There has always got to be a person who is responsible for it, and it is incumbent on that person to take appropriate measures to make sure that they are not outsourcing illegal activity to a machine.
ERIC LIPMAN: A couple of quick follow ups before we turn away from the bots. Going back to something you said earlier in the answer, you have brought on data scientists and want people to help you understand how the code works, but then if I understood you correctly you said that stuff is not as important necessarily as it might be in a civil case. Is that simply because the agreement is the crime? Is that the theory behind that?
EMMA BURNHAM: I would be wary of bringing a criminal case to trial that is based solely on code, the same way we don’t typically bring criminal cases based purely on documents that we introduce through a law enforcement agent. We are trying to prove our cases to a jury of twelve laypeople beyond a reasonable doubt, and at minimum you need a competent expert to be able to explain what that code means to laypeople.
Possibly that is the next frontier. I am an admitted Luddite on this and many other topics. Never say never. It is not that that evidence is unimportant, but I think in an ideal case we are pairing it with other types of evidence as well.
ERIC LIPMAN: Last follow up on this point, when we are talking about the agreement between competitors to use a common algorithm—I think you said even similar algorithms could be sufficient—is in your view the agreement to use it enough, or does it have to go a step or half a step further and there has to be an agreement to abide by what it recommends?
EMMA BURNHAM: Whenever I am trying to sort through these questions about how do we apply our law to emerging technology or to a new industry, we tend to go back to case law and ask, what’s the analogy here? In that situation we often get arguments by defense counsel that we should not prosecute what appears to me to be a clear price-fixing conspiracy because the co-conspirators were able to cheat on it and because in some instances they did cheat on it. What to defense counsel looks like the agreement did not really exist because they did not have to follow it and sometimes didn’t, to me looks like great evidence that the conspiracy in fact existed because then what are you cheating on and why are your competitors getting mad at you?
I think that is a helpful analogy here. The fact that an algorithm is providing suggested prices, and possibly even suggested prices along with measures that make that the default price or encourage co-conspirators to follow that price, I do not think takes it out of per se territory, in the same way that an agreement where people do not always follow it does not take it out of heartland per se treatment either.
RENEE TURNER: I would like to transition to future enforcement priorities. Can you share with us the Division’s key criminal enforcement priorities for the coming year?
EMMA BURNHAM: We have several trials coming up, and of course a key priority for us is those trials. I think some of the industries I mentioned previously are going to be key enforcement sectors, again not to the exclusion of other enforcement actions, but they are areas that we are increasingly focused on.
In terms of subject matter areas I expect that monopolization crimes will continue to be something we will be taking a close look at. Also in labor markets we continue to investigate both wage fixing and other agreements affecting terms of employment.
In addition to those, I think we are continuing to evaluate the effectiveness of our policies and programs and expect that we will be continuing to do more work to properly incentivize whistleblowers and corporate victim reporting. To us that is so important because, speaking about resource limitations and force multiplier effects, that really is the best way to make sure that we have eyes and ears on the ground and are tackling some of the biggest problems affecting the U.S. economy right now.
International cartel enforcement continues to be a priority for us. I just got back from a week in Mexico City at the ICN cartel workshop, which was an incredible opportunity to collaborate and share best practices with some of our international colleagues. We continue to cooperate with them on a number of investigations and active matters as well as on broader programmatic or policy issues, and, speaking personally, that has probably been the most rewarding part of the external-facing part of my job and continues to be a great source of intel and leads for us to pursue.
ERIC LIPMAN: You talked a little bit before about the strike-force model that you thought was going to become increasingly important. Other than that and some of the other strategic priorities that you have outlined, is there anything else that you can tell us that the Division has on the horizon in order to enhance those enforcement capabilities beyond what you might have considering your own personnel in a vacuum?
EMMA BURNHAM: Speaking of things I have learned from my international colleagues, a number of other enforcers have an in-house intelligence function that we are looking to create here at the Antitrust Division. Over the last year we have onboarded more than a handful of in-house investigators who are instrumental particularly in the early stages of an investigation in working with us and taking something that maybe looks like just an unusual price spike in an industry that does not appear to be explained by any external factors and converting that into something we can move forward with and partner with other law enforcement agencies on. That is one area we are focused on.
At the Antitrust Division we have long had a model of teams that include prosecutors, paralegals—we unquestionably have the best paralegals in the entire Department of Justice—and economists, and we work with law enforcement agents, but I am increasingly aware of the real need for additional skill sets, whether those are industry experts, behavioral psychologists, data scientists, or forensic accountants. We are looking to build out all of those capabilities to augment our classic model.
Does that answer your question?
ERIC LIPMAN: It does, and I am intrigued by the notion of sort of an antitrust profiler. It would be a good TV show.
EMMA BURNHAM: It would be a good TV show for—
ERIC LIPMAN: Antitrust geeks, right.
RENEE TURNER: This is my last question. It is more of a personal reflection. We understand that you were the first woman to be selected for your position and lead Criminal Enforcement at the Department, so obviously we congratulate you on that accomplishment. Earlier you were talking about not having many women to look up to at the Division. Could you share with us any advice you have for others who aspire to attain roles like yours?
EMMA BURNHAM: I will say my first boss at the Antitrust Division was a woman who has had a very successful career in this niche profession, so just to correct the record I have not lacked for strong female role models.
In terms of advice, mentors come in all sorts of unexpected places. It does not have to be somebody who looks or thinks exactly like you or shares your background. It can be helpful if it is someone who thinks just enough like you that they understand the kind of feedback that you can benefit the most from.
The best thing you can do as a young lawyer is to be wildly unafraid of critical feedback. One of the hardest things I have gone through over the years is that people can be unwilling to give truly candid feedback because they are afraid of hurting people’s feelings. If you want to be a successful lawyer, and maybe especially if you want to be a successful prosecutor, you cannot have feelings in the workplace—in the sense that you cannot have so much pride over your work that you are unwilling to accept that it could be better. Nothing is so good that it cannot be made better. The best mentors I have had are people who are willing to take the time to give me that type of feedback. I think at the end of the day that is the most important thing, especially when you are starting out in your career.
I now know that I know nothing, but when you start your career you think there will be a point at which you will become the type of person who knows everything. Be unafraid to accept that no one person is ever going to know everything and that it is okay to ask for help. Also, build out your network such that you have people who are not only mentors above you but mentors lateral to you in different parts of the profession and people who are junior to you. Especially as you get more senior in your career, having those relationships can be one of the most helpful things. Less-experienced attorneys can keep you fresh and thinking about new ways of doing things (and they can explain technology to you). Some people just look up and think that their mentor needs to be someone who is a few rungs ahead of them on the ladder, and this profession just does not work like that. The person you help out is probably going to be a person who is in a position to help you at some point in your career, so taking a long-term approach is important.
RENEE TURNER: Perfect. Thanks so much.
ERIC LIPMAN: Thank you so much, Emma. We really appreciate it.
