Volume 85, Issue 2
Professor Kovacic’s essay frames five questions about the design and operation of U.S. enforcement institutions and provides insight on institutional design and implementation; it concludes by introd…
Professor Bartholomew examines the interaction and interplay between U.S. federal, state, and private antitrust enforcers and suggests how their relationships could be improved for better outcomes.
Professors Froeb, Kobayashi, and Yun consider how innovations in enforcement emerge through economic work within the existing framework of antitrust enforcement institutions.
Professor Graef uses experience in the European Union and the United States to consider enhancements in frameworks that create a multiplicity of enforcement agents and to draw insights for improving…
Professor Hay and Thomas Turgeon study the current generation of Big Tech antitrust cases as focal points for considering the wisdom of the existing distribution of antitrust enforcement by U.S. anti…
Keith Klovers offers three concrete suggestions for reforming the FTC’s administrative adjudication (Part 3) mechanism.
This article examines the intellectual and political influences that induced the DOJ and the FTC to retreat from expansive enforcement programs that had prevailed in many areas of antitrust law from…
Professor Baker’s essay describes a “settlement” political economy theory involving an informal or tacit political settlement by which political competition among interest groups leads to an antitrus…