Vertical Restraints and Collusion: Issues and Challenges
While cartels and vertical restraints have both been the object of intense scrutiny, research at the intersection of these two strands of the economics literature remains remarkably scarce.
Volume 83, Issue 1
While cartels and vertical restraints have both been the object of intense scrutiny, research at the intersection of these two strands of the economics literature remains remarkably scarce.
The role of vertical relationships in facilitating collusion is often obscured. This paper provides a typology for classifying and understanding how vertical relationships can support horizontal coll…
Vertical price restraints, such as maximum resale price maintenance, although considered welfare enhancing and per se not illegal under US jurisprudence, can sometimes facilitate horizontal collusion…
This article discusses the formation and collapse of the Secrétan Syndicate and the role of vertical restraints in enabling the cartel to survive. It also takes a broader look at commodity market cor…
Exclusion may be accomplished by a coalition of firms–frequently, a coalition of suppliers and customers–that share the benefits of exclusion. The coalition is held together by an interlocking lattic…
The Chicago School's claims of a crisis of excessive antitrust enforcement in the 1960s may have been overstated. Similarly, contemporary claims of inadequate antitrust enforcement may also be overst…
Antitrust law is the subject of substantial current controversy, criticism, and purposed reform but the thinking thus far has taken place in two separate conversations: one between conservatives and…
The circumstantial evidence a court may properly use to infer a horizontal agreement among the spokes in a hub-and-spoke conspiracy is substantially more limited than the circumstantial evidence used…
Employee convenants not to compete, which bar workers who leave their jobs from working for a competing employer for a period of time, should be subject to heightened antitrust enforcement.
In particular factual contexts, shareholders (common and non-common) can behave in ways that cause the firms in which they have an ownership interest to act anticompetitively.