Introduction
Gulbahar Haitiwaji, an engineer and member of the Chinese Uyghur minority group, received a call from her employer asking her to visit a police station in Kunlun to complete paperwork for her retirement pension. Upon her arrival, she quickly discovered the employer’s purported request was a trap. Chinese authorities showed Haitiwaji a photograph of her daughter participating in a Uyghur demonstration in France and accused Haitiwaji’s daughter of being a “terrorist.” Haitiwaji was detained, a bag was placed over her head, and her ankles were chained. For five months, Chinese police officers repeatedly interrogated her, subjecting her to a variety of punishments. In one instance, she was chained to her bed for twenty days.
After her initial detention, Chinese authorities transferred Haitiwaji to a “school” on the outskirts of Karamay. The facility was surrounded by barbed wire and lacked any semblance of civilized life—there were no mattresses, toilet paper, sheets, sinks, or showers. Haitiwaji’s captors provided “students” a bucket to use as a toilet and constantly surveilled them as cameras lined the walls. Haitiwaji wondered if her husband and daughters knew where she was or whether she was even alive. Haitiwaji and her fellow detainees were subjected to eleven hours per day of Chinese language instruction, forced to shave their heads, interrogated, physically abused, and even forcibly sterilized. “I owe it to those who languish there still to speak to you now,” Haitiwaji explained to the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party.
Since 2014, China has arbitrarily detained more than one million Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang region. Despite first denying the existence of such camps, Chinese government officials have now acknowledged their existence but insist they are “vocational education and training centers” used to educate members of the minority group in Mandarin and Chinese laws, as well as to “nip terrorist activities in the bud.” A report from the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights found descriptions of detentions in so-called “Vocational Education and Training Centers” frequently “marked by patterns of torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman[,] or degrading treatment or punishment.”
These “re-education” efforts frequently include forced labor. The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) estimates that “100,000 Uyghurs and other ethnic minority ex-detainees in China may be working in conditions of forced labor following detention in re-education camps.” “[U]nder the guise of ‘poverty alleviation,’” Uyghurs are forced to work for little or no pay, are not allowed to leave, and are required to “learn Mandarin and undergo ideological indoctrination.” A report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute states that between 2017 and 2019, 80,000 detained Uyghurs were sent to factories and the goods they made exported around the world.
Forced labor conditions are not confined to the Xinjiang region. The Chinese government’s official data on labor transfers show that an estimated 28,000 and 32,000 people were transferred to other parts of China in 2018 and 2019 respectively, exceeding the goals of Xinjiang authorities. This exercise is lucrative for the organizers who are compensated roughly $43 for each worker they transfer outside of Xinjiang. Advertisements for Uyghur workers have appeared online with one claiming the ability to supply 1,000 Uyghur workers aged sixteen to eighteen, reading, “[t]he advantages of Xinjiang workers are: semi-military style management, can withstand hardship, no loss of personnel . . . Minimum order of 100 workers!”
The use of Uyghur labor has been linked to several known global brands including Apple, BMW, Nike, and Volkswagen. The DOL’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs’ (ILAB’s) 2022 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor lists “artificial flowers, Christmas decorations, coal, fish, footwear, garments, gloves, hair products, polysilicon, nails, thread/yarn, and tomato products” as goods from countries that ILAB “has reason to believe are produced by child labor or forced labor.”
The U.S. government has responded by enacting the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA). The legislation strengthens existing prohibitions on importing goods made in whole, or in part, with forced labor under § 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (Tariff Act). The UFLPA has substantially affected the behavior of U.S. firms, which are increasingly shifting their supply chains away from Xinjiang and China more generally. However, goods made with Uyghur forced labor are still making their way into the U.S. market. The continued importation of goods produced by people subjected to inhumane conditions is, in large part, aided by inadequate U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) enforcement of trade laws for those imports as a result of another section of the Tariff Act—Section 321.
This Comment explores Section 321 of the Tariff Act—often referred to as the “de minimis threshold”—which exempts products from paying tariff duties and from being subject to formal entry procedures necessary to prevent the importation of illegal or dangerous products. Currently, the manner in which CBP enforces the law inadvertently exacerbates forced labor abuses in foreign countries; it also allows for the importation of counterfeit products that could pose public safety risks, impairs the United States’ efforts to re-shore or near-shore manufacturing, and is exploited as a convenient channel to import narcotics like fentanyl and other dangerous substances.
However, the de minimis threshold does provide American industry, CBP, and consumers several important benefits. For example, the law is crucial for small businesses and other U.S.-based companies that require product returns from abroad to be economically competitive. A consortium of business groups—spearheaded by express shippers like United Parcel Service (UPS), FedEx, and Amazon—intensively lobby against any modifications. The consortium contends the de minimis threshold is a “vital . . . tax exemption” that “reduces inflationary pressure and supply chain delays” and “allows CBP to concentrate limited resources where they make the most impact.” Businesses also contend that eliminating the exemption altogether would be prohibitively expensive, raising costs to businesses and consumers alike.
The law must strike a balance to ensure the efficient facilitation of trade while preventing dangerous and unethically produced products that promote forced labor, distort trade, and harm American consumers from entering the United States in violation of existing laws.
Part I explains the de minimis process and how CBP’s enforcement efforts fall short, allowing goods made in whole or in part with forced labor to enter the country. Part II offers a brief history of Section 321, starting with the legislation’s enactment. Currently, Section 321 exempts goods valued under $800 from standard tariff duties and allows CBP to apply less formal entry procedures to such goods. Part II explores the original congressional intent behind the exemption and how those initial objectives have been co-opted by special interests in the express shipment industry to greatly expand the threshold, thereby harming both U.S. consumer and national interests. Part III details the arguments on both sides of the de minimis debate, separating fact from fiction and summarizing the legislative solutions introduced in both chambers of Congress. Finally, Part IV recommends the Secretary of the Treasury issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), which would ensure effective enforcement of our trade laws under Section 321 by segmenting out the apparel sector, prohibiting the use of the exception absent the use of a contract carrier, and imposing additional and substantial penalties for repeat violators.
I. The De Minimis Process
A. Current Process
De minimis is Latin for “so small or unimportant as to warrant little or no attention,” yet the threshold is the subject of heated debate. In Congress, members of all political affiliations have pointed out potential problems with the heightened de minimis threshold. Congressman Jason Smith (R-MO), Chairman of the U.S. House Ways and Means Committee, critiqued the de minimis threshold’s current construction, calling it a “free trade agreement for China.” Similarly, Congressman Earl Blumenauer (D-OR) agreed, “this loophole is swallowing the exception in ways that are detrimental to American business and the safety of American consumers,” because CBP exercises a lesser degree of scrutiny for de minimis shipments compared to formal imports. The private sector has also expressed concern—Kimberly Glas, CEO of the National Council of Textile Organizations (NCTO), called de minimis “a classic example of the government’s left hand not working in concert with the right.”
Over two million small parcels enter the United States every day. With roughly 90% of all shipments imported into the United States falling below the $800 threshold, de minimis shipments accounted for roughly 85% of total import transactions in 2022. De minimis shipments have increased by a staggering 410% in just seven years. In fiscal year (FY) 2020, over $67 billion in packages were admitted under Section 321, exempting those imported products from applicable import duties and formal CBP scrutiny. Since 2020, as the pandemic-induced surge in e-commerce abated, the value of de minimis imports decreased to a little over $46 billion in imports in FY 2022. China is the foremost user of the provision, accounting for over $9 billion in imports in FY 2022.
Many products are imported under the de minimis threshold using the “release from manifest” process. Typically the express shipper or carrier provides the bill of lading (or a manifest listing each bill of lading), which is the sole documentation required. Thus, CBP determines whether the goods can be released based solely on very limited and inadequate information. Importantly, “the transmitted data often does not adequately identify the entity causing the shipment to cross the border [such as the seller or manufacturer], the final recipient, or the contents of the package.”
CBP has the authority to seize any shipment that violates customs regulations or other related laws by issuing a Withhold Release Order. In the forced labor context, when investigating a specific entity, CBP must show a reasonable likelihood of forced labor, which can require tracing goods from a specific production facility all the way to a U.S. port of entry. Under the “release from manifest” process, this information is simply unavailable, making consistent, effective enforcement almost impossible.
In addition, the release from the manifest process does not provide CBP with the specific Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) classification that CBP has tied to Partner Government Agency (PGA) requirements—these are import laws enforced by other government agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), and Drug Enforcement Administration. Without the HTSUS code, it is extremely difficult for CBP to ensure every imported small package that enters the country complies with federal health, public safety, and intellectual property laws.
Those products subject to PGA requirements are ineligible to be cleared under the “release from manifest” process. In the past, imports entered the United States under the appropriate informal or formal entry process, and importers were required to file a Type 11 or Type 01 entry. These imports require additional data, which is transmitted to the partner government agencies to ensure compliance with health and safety laws. In 2019, however, CBP created the Entry Type 86 Test to “provide a less complex entry and release process for Section 321 low-valued shipments” and “expedite the clearance of compliant Section 321 low-valued shipments.” Roughly 43% of de minimis imports use the Entry Type 86 Test, a wholly voluntary method for importation. The test requires information like the ten-digit HTSUS code, the bill of lading or the air waybill number, entry number, planned port of entry, shipper name, address, country, consignee name and address, country of origin, quantity, fair retail value in the country of shipment, and Importer of Record number of the owner, purchaser, or broker when designated by the consignee. More data may be required depending on whether the shipment is subject to PGA data reporting requirements. The problem? CBP has reported “a lot of misclassification, . . . seeing values at zero or a dollar” and mis-manifesting. “We encountered silencers and [Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) violations], pharmaceuticals, [and] a lot of agriculture violations,” CBP’s Program Manager for the Cargo Conveyance and Security Division in the Office of Field Operations, James Moore, said. “[I]t is very concerning for us, and we really want to make sure that we are highlighting that there are some expectations with Entry Type 86,” Moore said.
In an attempt to address some of those informational gaps, CBP established the Section 321 Data Pilot. The voluntary program—consisting of participants like Amazon, eBay, and Zulily; carriers like FedEx, UPS, and DHL; and logistics providers like BoxC Logistics, XB Fulfillment, and PreClear—collects extensive information including, seller identification, shipment initiator information, shipper information, an enhanced product description, the link to product listing, product picture, merchandise or product quality and weight, the listed price on marketplace, HTSUS number, security scan images, consignee information, final deliver to information, and buyer information. In FY 2022, there were 161 million Section 321 Data Pilot transmissions.
The more information CBP has the better; additional data provides a better understanding of the risk profile an individual import poses and allows the agency to prioritize areas for enforcement.
B. The Apparel Sector’s Use of De Minimis
The apparel sector is uniquely subject to labor abuses. Some say “[v]irtually the entire apparel and footwear industry is tainted by forced Uyghur and Turkic Muslim [labor]” due in part to the region’s stranglehold on global cotton output, which accounts for more than 20% of the global market share. China is “the world’s central hub for making clothing.” From picking the cotton—a notoriously labor-intensive process—to producing the yarn and manufacturing the finished apparel, Uyghur labor is closely intertwined with all steps of production.
A report from the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party found that two Chinese companies with business models reliant on the de minimis threshold—Shein and Temu—account for approximately 600,000 packages shipped to the United States every day utilizing the de minimis threshold. Annually, that number equates to 210 million packages sent to the United States without paying duties or being appropriately scrutinized for forced labor abuses, IPR violations, public safety risks, or for the importation of other contraband. In FY 2023, more than 1 billion packages worth more than $50 billion were shipped to the United States utilizing the de minimis threshold. Therefore, Shein and Temu—two companies—account for over 30% of all de minimis shipments into the United States.
The apparel industry is also normally subject to “the stiffest tariffs.” In 2018, “[t]he average tariffs on the dutiable portions were 18.7% for knitted or crocheted clothing, and 15.8% for non-knitted or crocheted items—the two highest average rates out of [ninety-eight] broad import categories.” In addition, the recent explosion in de minimis volume is attributable, at least in part, to the development of business strategies built around the threshold. Such systems allow companies like Shein to undercut U.S.-based brick-and-mortar retail locations and reduce CBP scrutiny. The apparel industry is the best example of a sector that represents high costs in terms of lost duties, heightened risk for improper imports, and a profound drain on CBP resources. These disproportionate disadvantages stand in direct contrast to the threshold’s stated purpose because the agency must sift through a deluge of small packages, impairing CBP’s ability to prioritize high risk imports and, therefore, do its job.
II. History of Section 321 of the Tariff Act of 1930
A. The Passage of De Minimis
One of CBP’s stated mission priorities is to “[e]nable fair, competitive and compliant trade and enforce U.S. laws to ensure safety, prosperity[,] and economic security for the American people.” CBP frequently balances the speedy and efficient facilitation of trade with effective screening. Embodying this idea, coupled with the understanding that CBP resources are better allocated to high-risk areas rather than assessing every low-value product imported into the country, Congress enacted Section 321.
In 1938, with the passage of the Customs Administrative Act, Congress established the de minimis threshold as we know it. The law created three separate categories of imports with specific dollar thresholds that would be exempted from duties and formal customs procedures. There was a $5 threshold for “bona fide gifts” mailed from abroad, a $5 exemption for “articles accompanying” travelers for “household use,” and—most crucially for this Comment—a $1 threshold for “any other case.”
The Customs Administrative Act “authorize[d] existing practices under which collectors of customs disregard differences of less than $1 between the total duties or taxes deposited or tentatively assessed and the amount of duties actually accruing.” It also gave the “collectors” a great deal of authority “to admit articles free when the expense and inconvenience of collecting duty would be disproportionate to the amount of such duty.”
B. Congressional Hesitation to Increase the Threshold
In 1952, there were growing calls to increase the threshold. When Congress debated the Customs Simplification Act, one proposal suggested increasing the threshold for all three categories to $10. One comment from the National Retail Dry Goods Association, now known as the National Retail Federation, highlights the double standard the increased threshold would create that currently threatens the continued survival of certain domestic industries:
A European operator could place an advertisement in a newspaper or magazine in the United States and offer to sell gloves, handbags, slippers, blouses, skirts, sweaters, perfumes, costume jewelry, cosmetics, and a host of other items. These items could be priced upward of $10. Realize that the advertiser does not maintain any quarters in this country. He does not pay any real-estate, income, or other taxes. He does not pay any duties. He does not maintain a selling force. His only expense would be the advertisement.
The National Retail Federation was not alone in its staunch opposition. Stakeholders expressed their pointed concerns with how the increased threshold would benefit those countries with lower paid labor, leading to the outflow of jobs and domestic manufacturing capabilities. Mr. John G. Lerch—an attorney who appeared on behalf of several industries and as counsel to the Rubber Manufacturers Association, Inc.—stated, “if this provision is enacted into law with the reduced labor cost of foreign countries, it can be anticipated that great inroads will be made [by foreign competitors] in certain [U.S.] industries.” Mr. Lerch stated, “I am told that a skilled laborer [in Great Britain] gets about—the ratio is about [one] to [four]; in other words, [four] hours for [one] here.” The labor rates in Japan? “[Y]ou might say 1 to 25.”
Stakeholders were also worried about the effect it would have on domestic industry. Senator Edward Martin (R-PA) pointed out the impact the change would have on small businesses in “some little towns.” Mr. Lerch said, “in Pennsylvania we have 17,000 small industries, and that is really the backbone of our economy.”
Crucially, concerns mounted relating to the effect mail-order businesses could have on domestic industry. The President and Counsel for the American Watch Association submitted written testimony, arguing that “what we have stated concerning the direct purchase of watches by consumers from foreign suppliers applies with equal force to thousands of other items which could be imported [under the exception].” They continued, “[t]he business of all of the regular domestic manufacturers and producers, importers, wholesalers, and retail dealers [handling] such items, and hundreds of others, unquestionably would be adversely affected . . . .” This worry was also reflected by the House Ways and Means Committee, which stated in a report on the proposed increased threshold: “It is the desire of the committee that the Secretary of the Treasury shall exercise his authority . . . [to ensure] the section will not be subjected to abuses by mail-order businesses . . . .” While the bill did prohibit the use of de minimis for cash on delivery (COD) transactions, Harry Radcliffe, the Executive Vice President of the National Council of American Importers, said that did not go far enough as “there might be mail-order business, not necessarily on the basis of [COD]” and argued that the “section needs clarification because we do not believe that a loophole like that should go without being plugged up.” Unfortunately, the loophole was left unplugged, and Mr. Radcliffe’s worry was never addressed, leading to the current situation where foreign direct-to-consumer businesses maintain an advantage over those companies with American footprints.
Ultimately, in the 1953 amendment, Congress sided with domestic industry, increasing the thresholds for bona fide gifts and “articles accompanying, and for the personal or household use” of individuals arriving in the United States to $10, while leaving the threshold for the “any other case” category at $1.
C. The Eventual Heightening of the Threshold
The $1 de minimis threshold was left in place until 1978 when it was increased to $5 to “take account of inflation and increased costs in collection.” The House report stated, “[s]ince the express purpose of [S]ection 321 is to reduce administrative costs which are disproportionate to the revenue produced and to improve administrative efficiency, dollar limitations should be raised to accomplish this purpose in today’s economy.”
The threshold was increased again in 1994 with the passage of the Customs Modernization Act—expanding the de minimis level for “any other case” to $200. The increase was again necessitated by “inflation” as “the current amounts are not sufficiently high to permit the Secretary to meet the statutory goal of limiting expense to the Government disproportionate to the revenue that is collected.”
Potentially more important, the law’s implementing regulations allowed express shippers acting as consignees “to make entry of low-value exempt merchandise.” These regulations did away with the longstanding requirement that importers engage a customs broker. The implementing regulations—which the National Customs Brokers and Forwarders Association of America (NCBFAA) argued were arbitrary and capricious, allegedly conflicting with the statute—were upheld, in large part, due to the Treasury Secretary’s broad authority to issue rules under the statute. In addition, the NCBFAA argued that CBP “abrogated its responsibility to enforce laws relevant to the entry of merchandise into this country” when it promulgated regulations pursuant to the de minimis threshold. While the NCBFAA was ultimately unsuccessful, its worries foreshadowed the problems to come, claiming “this lax entry procedure will create difficulties for Customs relative to the enforcement of visa requirements for apparel, intellectual property rights for patents and copyrights, and antidumping and counter-vailing duty orders . . . . [It] will hinder the [FDA’s] enforcement capabilities as well.”
D. Increase to $800
The aforementioned warnings were ignored, and Congress increased the threshold to $800 in 2016 with the passage of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act (TFTEA). The $800 threshold is by far the highest of any U.S. trading partner: China (~$6.50); Mexico (~$50); and United Kingdom (~$168). The increase was largely pushed forward with extensive support from the express shipping community. In a Senate Finance Hearing, Mary Ann Comstock, Brokerage Compliance Manager for UPS, called de minimis “the most important [issue for] UPS.” Senator John Thune (R-SD) argued, “[w]hat this simply means is that if someone starts a small business selling goods on the Internet and he or she needs to import a component part in order to make a product, we are going to significantly reduce the paperwork and cost involved in doing so.” He said, “[t]his is the reason that online marketplaces such as Etsy and eBay, as well as express shippers like UPS and FedEx, are so supportive of this legislation.” Senator Thune seems to signal the end of traditional retailers, arguing, “[t]hese companies understand what millions of American entrepreneurs understand: The Internet truly is the shipping lane of the 21st century.”
UPS pushed for wrenching the de minimis loophole open even further, advocating for it to be indexed to inflation—something that Senators Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Thune supported. UPS argued that “the increase offers significant benefits to CBP.”
Yet, in the House report, David Aguilar, the Deputy Commissioner of CBP at the time, rebutted that proposition, stating, “[f]rom an operational standpoint, [] raising the de minimis to $1,000 or whatever it would be, does not really impact us operationally. [The] same amount of work basically will go into collecting either the $200 or the $1000. So, from an operational standpoint, it would stay neutral.”
The House report highlights additional benefits. It states, “[t]his legislation will not have a negative impact on security, as manifest information is required for all shipments, regardless of value. Manifest information for each shipment is analyzed for security threats and subject to CBP risk assessment and targeting prior to arrival in the United States.” The report continued, “because this change applies only to smaller and low-value shipments, there is no risk of a spike in commercial violations as a result of the change.”
The de minimis threshold, once only applicable to low-value goods, now inconceivably applies to a vast number of imports after being wrenched open by private interests. Thankfully, the TFTEA provides authority for the Treasury Secretary to issue rules closing the loophole and returning the functionality of the de minimis threshold to its original purpose.
E. Treasury Secretary’s Authority to Issue Rules
Given the lack of information that CBP can use to understand risk and prioritize areas for enforcement, it is incumbent upon the Treasury Secretary to leverage her broad discretion under the law to issue new rules, fill gaps in the statute, obtain more information from importers, and crack down on goods that pose problems related to human rights, intellectual property, and consumer health and safety.
The TFTEA, passed in 2016, amended the de minimis threshold and raised it to $800. The last line of the codified legislation provides that “[t]he Secretary of the Treasury is authorized by regulations to prescribe exceptions to any exemption . . . whenever he finds that such action is consistent with the purpose . . . or is necessary for any reason to protect the revenue or to prevent unlawful importations.” This language gives the Secretary broad authority to issue rules making changes to the legislation to deal with the unlawful imports that have been reported.
The explicit language of the statute follows similar language from Senate and House reports previously updating the threshold. In 1951, when Congress debated whether it should increase the de minimis threshold, it expressed its desire to give the Secretary the power to “reduce the allowable amounts and to prescribe exceptions when necessary to protect the revenue” to avoid spreading CBP’s human resources too thin. The Committee on Ways and Means went on to deputize the Secretary of the Treasury with authority to ensure Section 321 would “not be subjected to abuses by mail-order businesses engaging in the direct shipment of dutiable articles to purchasers in the United States.”
In addition, congressional misunderstandings have become evident over time. First, in 2016, Congress mistakenly believed that the increased threshold “would . . . free [CBP] up to focus on high-risk shipments if these amounts were made to be consistent.” The House Ways and Means Committee incorrectly assumed manifest information would be adequate. Second, the representatives believed shipments using the de minimis threshold would be truly de minimis. “Simplifying and streamlining the entry process for these low-value shipments will help to stimulate the economy, facilitate legitimate trade, and free CBP resources to focus enforcement efforts on high-risk trade.” The years following the increase have borne a different reality.
CBP has begun formulating an NPRM that will “integrate results from the 321 Data Pilot and the Type 86 Test into a new Section 321 entry process.” “The NPRM will implement new data requirements for de minimis shipments choosing to use the enhanced entry process, clarify eligibility requirements, and address trade liability.” Unfortunately, these proposed regulations will focus solely on what a future, expedited Type 86 Test would look like.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has also taken several steps to address problems borne from de minimis. First, CBP announced it will issue advisories of noncompliance to those “entry filers” providing limited identifiers. The advisory aims to address “vague” cargo descriptions that simply state “gift” or “parts.” Second, DHS outlined a plan aimed at “combat[ing] illicit trade and level[ing] the playing field for the American textile industry.” The enforcement plan includes “[c]racking down on small package shipments . . . by improving screening of packages claiming the Section 321 de minimis exemption for textile, UFLPA, and other violations.” According to DHS, the implementation of the plan has already begun; the Department launched fifteen Trade Special Operations “that focus on physical inspection of small shipments and cargo.” While the plan—“a strong step forward”—received commendation from NCTO’s President and CEO, Kimberly Glas, concerns related to enforcement remain, which necessitate regulatory action. To effectively enforce the nation’s trade laws, more information must be shared with CBP beyond a rudimentary obligation to provide more than a “vague” description of cargo. In addition, CBP must be deputized with the ability to impose material consequences to disincentive repeat offenders. CBP’s willingness to issue new regulations and its candid admission that the de minimis threshold is not working as intended present a unique opportunity to solve numerous challenges.