September 21, 2011

Andrew R. Davis
Chief of the Division of Interpretations & Standards
Office of Labor-Management Standards
U.S. Department of Labor
200 Constitution Avenue, NW, Room N-5609
Washington, D.C.  20210


Dear Mr. Davis:

On behalf of the American Bar Association (“ABA”), I write to express our serious concerns over the above-referenced proposed rule (the “Proposed Rule”) that would substantially narrow the U.S. Department of Labor’s (“Department”) longstanding interpretation of what lawyer activities constitute “advice” to employer clients and hence are exempt from the extensive reporting requirements of Section 203 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (“LMRDA” or “Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 433 (1982). By expressing concerns over the Proposed Rule and urging the Department to reconsider, the ABA is not taking sides on a union-versus-management dispute, but rather is defending the confidential client-lawyer relationship and urging the Department not to impose an unjustified and intrusive burden on lawyers and law firms and their clients.

As more fully explained below, the Department’s current broad interpretation of the advice exemption—which excludes lawyers from the Act’s “persuader activities” reporting requirements when they merely provide advice or other legal services directly to their employer clients but have no direct contact with the employees—should be retained with respect to lawyers and their employer clients1 for several important reasons. In particular, we support the current interpretation of the advice exemption and oppose the Department’s Proposed Rule to the extent it would apply to lawyers representing employer clients because:

- The Department’s longstanding interpretation of the “advice” exemption provides a useful, bright-line rule that is consistent with the actual wording of the statute and Congress’ intent,

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1 Although the ABA supports the Department’s traditional broad interpretation of the advice exemption with respect to lawyers providing advice and other legal services to their employer clients, the ABA takes no position on the Department’s proposed narrowing of the advice exemption as applied to non-lawyer labor consultants providing persuader services to employers. Unlike labor lawyers, non-lawyer labor consultants have no confidential relationship with their employer clients and are not subject to the extensive state court regulation and disciplinary authority that covers all licensed attorneys.
while the new proposed interpretation would essentially nullify the advice exemption contained in the statute and thwart the will of Congress;

- The Department’s Proposed Rule is inconsistent with ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 dealing with “Confidentiality of Information” and with the many binding state rules of professional conduct that closely track the ABA Model Rule;

- The Proposed Rule could seriously undermine both the confidential client-lawyer relationship and the employers’ fundamental right to counsel; and

- The scope of the information that the Department’s Proposed Rule would require lawyers engaged in direct or indirect persuader activities to disclose encompasses a great deal of confidential financial information about clients that has no reasonable nexus to the “persuader activities” that the Act seeks to monitor.

To avoid these negative consequences, the ABA urges the Department to preserve its existing, well-established interpretation of the advice exemption under Section 203(c) with respect to lawyers representing employer clients and continue to exempt lawyers from the disclosure requirements of Section 203(b) when they provide advice or other legal services to their employer clients designed to help the employer to lawfully persuade employees as to unionization issues but the lawyers do not directly contact the employees to persuade them regarding these issues.

The Department’s Proposed Changes to the “Advice” Exemption

Under Section 203(b) of the LMRDA, employers and labor relations consultants are required to file periodic disclosure forms with the Department describing any agreements or arrangements with employers where the object is directly or indirectly to (1) “persuade employees to exercise or not to exercise, or persuade employees as to the manner of exercising, the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing…” or (2) “supply an employer with information concerning the activities of employees or a labor organization in connection with a labor dispute involving such employer, except information for use solely in connection with an administrative or arbitral proceeding or a criminal or civil judicial proceeding.”\(^2\) Section 203(a) imposes a similar reporting requirement on employers that have entered into these agreements or arrangements.\(^3\)

Section 203(c) of the statute, however, contains the following broad “advice” exemption:

Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to require any employer or other person to file a report covering the services of such person by reason of his giving or agreeing to give advice to such employer or representing or agreeing to represent such employer before any court, administrative agency, or tribunal of arbitration or engaging or agreeing to engage in collective bargaining on behalf of such employer…\(^4\)

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\(^2\) See LMRDA, Section 203(b), 29 U.S.C. § 433(b).
\(^3\) See Section 203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 433(a)(4).
\(^4\) Section 203(c), 29 U.S.C. § 433(c).
In addition, Section 204 of the LMRDA specifically exempts lawyers from having to report “any information which was lawfully communicated to such attorney by any of his clients in the course of a legitimate attorney-client relationship.” The Department has acknowledged that this provision exempts lawyers from disclosing any information protected by the attorney-client privilege and that the provision demonstrates Congress’ intent “to afford the attorneys the same protection as that provided in the common-law attorney-client privilege, which protects from disclosure communications made in confidence between a client seeking legal counsel and an attorney.”

Similarly, the courts have found that in adopting Section 204, Congress intended to accord the same degree of privilege as that provided by the common law attorney-client privilege.

Over the years, both the federal courts and the Department have noted that a “tension” exists between the broad coverage provisions of Section 203(b) of the LMRDA requiring disclosure of persuader activities and the Act’s broad exemption for “advice.” Since at least 1989, however, the Department has broadly interpreted the “advice” exemption under Section 203(c) to generally exclude from the rule’s disclosure requirements any advice or materials provided by the lawyer or other consultant to the employer for use in persuading employees, so long as the consultant has no direct contact with the employees. This interpretation had its origins in the Department’s previous 1962 interpretation of the rule contained in the so-called “Donahue Memorandum.” The Department also has long taken the position that when “a particular consultant activity involves both advice to the employer and persuasion of employees” but the consultant has no direct contact with the employees, the ‘advice’ exemption controls.

In its Proposed Rule, the Department has proposed major changes to its longstanding interpretation and application of Section 203 that would require lawyers who both provide legal advice to employer clients and engage in any persuader activities to file periodic disclosure reports, even if the lawyer has no direct contact with the employees. These reports, in turn, would require lawyers (and their employer clients) to disclose a substantial amount of confidential client information, including the existence of the client-lawyer relationship and the identity of the client, the general nature of the legal representation, and a description of the legal tasks performed. The lawyers also would be required to report detailed information regarding the legal fees paid by all of the lawyers’ employer clients, and disbursements made by the lawyers, on account of “labor relations advice or services” provided to any employer client, not just those clients who were involved in persuader activities.

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7 See, e.g., Humphreys, Hutcheson and Moseley v. Donovan, 755 F.2d 1211, 1216-1219 (6th Cir. 1985).
10 See Proposed Rule at 36181, referencing the Donahue Memorandum.
11 Id. at 36191.
The ABA’s Concerns Regarding the Department’s Proposed Rule

The American Bar Association opposes the Department’s proposal to narrow the traditional scope of the “advice” exemption, which would have the effect of requiring many lawyers and their employer clients to report sensitive and confidential client information that has not previously been subject to disclosure. Instead, the ABA urges the Department to retain the current, longstanding interpretation of the exemption with regard to lawyers who provide advice and other legal services directly to employer clients but have no contact with employees, for several important reasons.

1. The Department’s longstanding interpretation of the “advice” exemption provides a useful, bright-line rule that is consistent with the actual wording of the statute and Congress’ intent, while the new proposed interpretation would essentially nullify the advice exemption contained in the statute and thwart the will of Congress.

The Department’s longstanding interpretation of the advice exemption is much more consistent with the plain language of the LMRDA and with Congress’ intent in adopting the statute than the new interpretation outlined in the Proposed Rule. While the overall purpose of the Act was to require those acting as “persuaders” to publicly disclose these activities, the main purpose of Section 203(c) dealing with “Advisory or Representative Services” was to exempt lawyers who provide legal advice to their employer clients or represent them before a court, administrative agency or arbitration tribunal. As the Sixth Circuit further explained in the case of Humphreys, Hutcheson and Moseley v. Donovan, "the majority of courts…[have found] the purpose of Section 203(c) is to clarify what is implicit in Section 203(b)—that attorneys engaged in the usual practice of labor law are not obligated to report under Section 203(b).” Therefore, the key issue in determining whether a lawyer is subject to the Act’s reporting requirements is whether the lawyer is acting as a persuader or whether

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12 For over 50 years, the ABA has opposed measures similar to the Department’s Proposed Rule. In 1959, the ABA House of Delegates adopted a formal resolution which provided in pertinent part as follows:

Resolved, That the American Bar Association urges that in any proposed legislation in the labor-management field, the traditional confidential relationship between attorney and client be preserved, and that no such legislation should require report or disclosure, by either attorney or client, of any matter which has traditionally been considered as confidential between a client and his attorney, including but not limited to the existence of the relationship of attorney and client, the financial details thereof, or any advice or activities of the attorney on behalf of his client which fall within the scope of the legitimate practice of law…

While the Proposed Rule that is now under consideration is only designed to increase the obligations of employer-side labor lawyers—and not union-side labor lawyers—to report confidential client information to the Department, the ABA would be equally opposed to any similar future attempt by the Department or any other agency to force union-side lawyers to disclose any confidential client information.

13 Humphreys, Hutcheson and Moseley v. Donovan, 755 F.2d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1985).
14 Id. at 1215 (agreeing with precedents issued by the 5th and 4th Circuits regarding Congress’ intent with respect to Section 203(c) of the LMRDA). Although Humphreys Court concluded that the attorney plaintiff in the case, who was making speeches directly to employees urging them to vote against union representation, was acting as a persuader and must file disclosure reports, it added that attorneys engaged in the usual practice of labor law and confining themselves to the activities of Section 203(c) need not report under the statute. Id. at 1216.
the lawyer is providing legal advice or otherwise engaged in the practice of law.\textsuperscript{15}

For many years, the Department has distinguished between lawyers who are subject to the Act because they engage in direct persuasion activities—such as personally meeting with, speaking to, or writing to employees in an effort to persuade them regarding labor organization issues—and lawyers who are exempt because they have no direct contact with employees but merely provide advice and other legal services to their employer clients, even if an object of that advice is employee persuasion.\textsuperscript{16} At least one federal circuit has approved of this approach as a reasonable and rational interpretation of Congress’ intent with respect to the scope of the advice exemption under the Act.\textsuperscript{17}

The Department’s traditional broad interpretation of the “advice” exemption—which exempts lawyers who provide legal advice or other legal services \textit{to help their employer clients to persuade employees} but have \textit{no direct contact with employees}—is entirely consistent with the plain wording of the statute and with Congress’ intent as explained above. When an employer retains a lawyer to advise and assist the employer in its disputes with its employees, including with regard to helping the employer to persuade employees as to organizational rights, the lawyer will ordinarily be asked to provide legal advice and other legal services to the employer that constitute the practice of law. So long as the lawyer limits his or her activities to providing advice and materials directly to the employer client and does not contact the employees directly, the Department should continue to deem these legal services to be exempt “advice” or “representation” under Section 203(c), and not reportable “persuader activity” under Section 203(b) of the statute.

The ABA also submits that the Department’s traditional broad interpretation of the advice exemption as applied to lawyers representing employer clients provides an appropriate and rational bright-line test that harmonizes the broad coverage of the persuader activities rule in Section 203(b) with the equally broad advice exemption in Section 203(c) far better than the Department’s new proposal. Section 203(c) clearly contemplates that at least some of the “advice” that a lawyer provides to the employer client will be designed to help the employer to persuade employees on unionization issues. This is self-evident because if all of the lawyer’s advice to the employer client were unrelated to persuader activities, it would not be covered by the statute at all, with or without an advice exemption, and no exemption would be needed.

The Department’s current bright-line test—which exempts lawyers from the rule when they provide advice or other legal services to their employer clients that helps \textit{the employer} to persuade employees on unionization issues so long as the lawyer has no direct contact with the employees—preserves the effectiveness of both Section 203(b) and Section 203(c). The current test ensures the vitality of both sections in the statute by exempting those lawyers who only advise their employer clients how the

\textsuperscript{15} As the Sixth Circuit noted in the \textit{Humphreys} case, “Congress recognized that the ordinary practice of labor law does not encompass persuasive activities.” Id. at 1216, fn. 9. Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has noted that Congress directed the “persuader” disclosure requirement in the Act to labor consultants, whose work is not necessarily a lawyer’s, and that while clients can direct lawyers to perform persuader activities, “for a legal advisor it would be extracurricular.” Id.

\textsuperscript{16} See footnote 8, \textit{supra}.

\textsuperscript{17} See, e.g., \textit{International Union}, 869 F. 2d at 617-619. As the Sixth Circuit notes in footnote 3 of \textit{International Union}, each of the leading federal court decisions cited by the district court merely confirm a lawyer’s obligation to report when engaging in direct persuasion activities with employees and do not address the threshold issue, as the Sixth Circuit does, of how to characterize activity not involving direct employee contact that can be viewed as both persuasion and advice.
clients can persuade employees on unionization issues, or who both advise their clients and provide
other legal services designed to help the clients persuade employees, while subjecting other lawyers
to the statute’s disclosure requirements when they engage in direct persuader activities by contacting
the employees.

Conversely, if the Department’s new proposed interpretation of the advice exemption were adopted
and a lawyer who only gives advice to an employer client in connection with the client’s persuader
activities, or who gives advice and provides other legal services in support of the client’s persuader
activities, were nonetheless subjected to the Act’s disclosure requirements, the advice exception in
Section 203(c) would be effectively written out of the statute and the Department’s persuader
activities rule. The ABA urges the Department to resist such an illogical interpretation that would
nullify the advice exception and thereby clearly thwart the will of Congress.

2. The Department’s Proposed Rule is inconsistent with ABA Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.6 dealing with “Confidentiality of Information” and with the many binding
state rules of professional conduct that closely track the ABA rule

The ABA also is concerned that by requiring lawyers to disclose confidential client information to
the government regarding the identity of the client, the nature of the representation, and details
concerning legal fees, the Proposed Rule is inconsistent with ABA Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.6 dealing with “Confidentiality of Information” and with the many binding state rules of
professional conduct that closely track the ABA Model Rule.\(^\text{18}\) ABA Model Rule 1.6 states that “a
lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives
informed consent…” or unless one or more of the narrow exceptions listed in the Rule is present.\(^\text{19}\)

The range of client information that lawyers are not permitted to disclose under ABA Model Rule 1.6
is broader than that covered by the attorney-client privilege. Although ABA Model Rule 1.6
prohibits lawyers from disclosing information protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work
product doctrine, the Rule also forbids lawyers from voluntarily disclosing other non-privileged
information that the client wishes to keep confidential.\(^\text{20}\) This category of non-privileged, confidential
client information includes the identity of the client as well as other information related to the legal

\(^\text{18}\) See ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6, and the related commentary, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_1
_6_confidentiality_of_information.html
See also Charts Comparing Individual Professional Conduct Rules as Adopted or Proposed by States to ABA Model

\(^\text{19}\) Although ABA Model Rule 1.6(6) allows a lawyer to disclose confidential client information “to comply with other law
or a court order,” nothing in the LMFDA expressly or implicitly requires lawyers to reveal client confidences to the
government. On the contrary, Section 204 of the statute expressly exempting “information which was lawfully
communicated to such attorney by any of his clients in the course of a legitimate attorney-client relationship” suggests that
Congress recognized and sought to protect the ethical duty that lawyers have to protect client confidences.

\(^\text{20}\) See, e.g., Alabama Ethics Op. 89-111 (1989) (lawyer may not disclose name of client to funding agency); Texas Ethics
Op. 479 (1991) (law firm that obtained bank loan secured by firm's accounts receivable may not tell bank who firm's
clients are and how much each owes); South Carolina Ethics Op. 90-14 (1990) (lawyer may not volunteer identity of
client to third party); and Virginia Ethics Op. 1300 (1989) (in absence of client consent, nonprofit legal services
corporation may not comply with federal agency's request for names and addresses of parties adverse to certain former
clients, since that may involve disclosure of clients' identities, which may constitute secret).
representation, including, for example, the nature of the representation and the amount of legal fees paid by the client to the lawyer. Because the Department’s Proposed Rule would require every lawyer who directly or indirectly engages in any persuader-related activities in the course of representing an employer client to disclose the identity of their clients, the nature of the representation, the fees received from the clients and other confidential client information, the proposal is clearly inconsistent with lawyers’ existing ethical duties outlined in Model Rule 1.6 and the binding state rules of professional conduct that mirror the ABA Model Rule.

3. **The Proposed Rule could seriously undermine both the confidential client-lawyer relationship and the employers’ fundamental right to counsel**

The ABA also is concerned that the application of the Proposed Rule to lawyers engaged in the practice of law will undermine both the confidential client-lawyer relationship and employers’ fundamental right to counsel. Lawyers for employer companies play a key role in helping these entities and their officials to understand and comply with the applicable law and to act in the entity’s best interest. To fulfill this important societal role, lawyers must enjoy the trust and confidence of the company’s officers, directors, and other leaders, and the lawyers must be provided with all relevant information necessary to properly represent the entity. In addition, to maintain the trust and confidence of the employer client and provide it with effective legal representation, its lawyers must be able to consult confidentially with the client. Only in this way can the lawyer engage in a full and frank discussion of the relevant legal issues with the client and provide appropriate legal advice.

By requiring lawyers to file detailed reports with the Department stating the identity of their employer clients, the nature of the representation and the types of legal tasks performed, and the receipt and disbursement of legal fees whenever the lawyers provide advice or other legal services relating to the clients’ persuader activities, the Proposed Rule could chill and seriously undermine the confidential client-lawyer relationship. In addition, by imposing these unfair reporting burdens on both the lawyers and the employer clients they represent, the Proposed Rule could very well discourage many employers from seeking the expert legal representation that they need, thereby effectively denying them their fundamental right to counsel.

4. **The scope of the information that the Department’s Proposed Rule would require lawyers engaged in direct or indirect persuader activities to disclose encompasses a great deal of confidential financial information about clients that has no reasonable nexus to the persuader activities that the Act seeks to monitor**

Finally, the ABA is concerned with the overly broad scope of the information that the Department’s Proposed Rule would require lawyers and law firms who are engaged in direct or indirect persuader activities to disclose on a periodic basis. The Proposed Rule provides that when a lawyer or law firm enters into an agreement with an employer to engage in direct or indirect persuader activities, the lawyer or law firm will be required to fill out both Form LM-20 (“Agreement & Activities Report”) and the related Form LM-21 (“Receipts and Disbursements Report”). Form LM-21 then requires all lawyers and law firms engaging in persuader activities to disclose all receipts of any kind received from all employer clients “on account of labor relations advice or services” and disbursements made in connection with such services, not just those receipts and disbursements that are related to
The scope of this disclosure requirement compels the disclosure of a great deal of confidential financial information about clients that has no reasonable nexus to the “persuader activities” that the Act seeks to monitor. In particular, the proposed disclosure requirement is excessive to the extent it would require lawyers who engage in any direct or indirect persuader activities to report all receipts from and disbursements on behalf of every employer client for whom the lawyers performed any “labor relations advice or services,” not just those employer clients for whom persuader activities were performed.

No rational governmental purpose is served by this overly broad requirement. By analogy, while law firms and lawyers who lobby Congress on behalf of clients must file periodic reports with the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate disclosing the identity of those clients, the issues on which they lobbied, and the dollar amount received for lobbying, the Clerk and the Secretary would never presume to require a law firm or lawyer to disclose extensive information regarding all of their other clients to whom they give advice on governmental issues, but for whom they are not registered lobbyists. Moreover, by discouraging lawyers and law firms from agreeing to represent employers, the overly broad financial disclosure requirement in the Proposed Rule also might have the unintended consequence of increasing the number of employers who, without advice of counsel, would engage in unlawful activities in response to union organizing campaigns and concerted, protected conduct by employees.

In our view, these required disclosures proposed by the Department are unjustified and inconsistent with a lawyer’s existing ethical duties under Model Rule 1.6 (and the related state rules) not to disclose confidential client information absent certain narrow circumstances not present here. Lawyers should not be required, under penalty of perjury, to publicly disclose confidential information regarding such clients who have not even engaged in or requested the persuader activities that the statute seeks to address. The ABA also concurs with the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals that it is “extraordinarily unlikely that Congress intended to require the content of reports by persuaders under § 203(b) and (c) to be so broad as to encompass dealings with employers who are not required to make any report whatsoever under § 203(a)(4).” Donovan v. Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d 964, 975 (8th Cir. 1985)

Conclusion

For all these reasons, the ABA urges the Department to reaffirm its longstanding interpretation of the advice exemption under Section 203(c) of the Act with respect to lawyers engaged in the practice of law and continue to exempt such lawyers and law firms from the disclosure requirements of Section 203(b) when they merely provide advice or other legal services to their employer clients in connection with the employer’s persuasion activities and the lawyers have no direct contact with the employees. In addition, for those lawyers and law firms that engage in direct persuader activities and are therefore subject to the disclosure requirements of Section 203(b) under the Department’s longstanding interpretation of the rule, the ABA urges the Department to narrow the scope of the information that must be disclosed under Form LM-21 so that disclosure is required only for those

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21 See Instructions for Department of Labor Form LM-21, at pages 3-5.
receipts and disbursements that relate directly to the employer clients for whom persuader activities were performed.

Thank you for considering the views of the ABA on these important issues. If you have any questions regarding the ABA’s position on the Proposed Rule or our suggestions for modifying the proposal, please contact ABA Governmental Affairs Director Thomas Susman at (202) 662-1765 or ABA Senior Legislative Counsel Larson Frisby at (202) 662-1098.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Wm. T. (Bill) Robinson III