Testimony of

JAMES E. FELMAN

on behalf of the

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

before the

UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION

for the hearing on

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

regarding

THE DODD-FRANK ACT

and

THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT

Washington, D.C.

February 16, 2011
Chair Saris, and distinguished members of the United States Sentencing Commission:

Good morning. My name is James Felman. Since 1988 I have been engaged in the private practice of federal criminal defense law with a small firm in Tampa, Florida. I am a former Co-Chair of your Practitioners’ Advisory Group, and am appearing today on behalf of the American Bar Association for which I serve as Liaison to the Sentencing Commission and as a Co-Chair of the Criminal Justice Section Committee on Sentencing.

The American Bar Association is the world’s largest voluntary professional organization, with a membership of nearly 400,000 lawyers (including a broad cross-section of prosecuting attorneys and criminal defense counsel), judges, and law students worldwide. The ABA continuously works to improve the American system of justice and to advance the rule of law in the world. I appear today at the request of ABA President Stephen Zack to present to the Sentencing Commission the ABA’s position on the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. This position, as with all policies of the ABA, reflects the collaborative efforts of representatives of every aspect of the profession, including prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, professors, and victim advocates.


The ABA is keenly interested in the topic of today’s hearing – the implementation of the Congressional directives in the Dodd-Frank Act and the Patient Protection Act relating to the sentencing of federal securities fraud, bank fraud, and health care fraud offenses. Our interest in these topics is only a part of our broader concerns regarding the economic crimes guidelines as a whole, especially in cases involving high loss.
As the Commission is no doubt aware, the advisory federal guidelines for the sentencing of high-loss economic crimes have been criticized in recent judicial decisions as “patently absurd on their face,”1 “a black stain on common sense,”2 and, ultimately, “of no help.”3 The result of relentless upward ratcheting, the present guidelines for high-loss economic crimes routinely call for sentences at or near life without parole for defendants who typically have no criminal history. These guidelines are merely advisory, however, and some judges opt instead to impose significantly lower sentences. Other judges adhere to the guidelines and mete out the sentences called for by them. To some, this looks like the disparity the guidelines were created to avoid – a regime in which the punishment turns as much on the philosophy of the sentencing judge as it does on the facts of the offense. To others, it reflects the birth of a common law of sentencing as the courts evaluate the extent to which guideline sentences serve the purposes of sentencing in individual cases. Under either view, the present guidelines in high loss cases appear to be broken. The ABA believes they should be fixed.

Just two days ago our House of Delegates passed a new Resolution urging the Commission to complete a rigorous and comprehensive assessment of the Guidelines for all economic crimes – particularly those involving high loss amounts – to ensure that the Guidelines for such crimes are proportional to offense severity and that they adequately take into consideration individual


culpability and circumstances. The Resolution contains the specific suggestion that the Commission should amend these guidelines to re-evaluate the emphasis on both monetary loss and multiple specific offense characteristics that, in combination, tend to overstate the seriousness of some offenses. The Resolution calls on the Commission to place greater emphasis on mens rea and motive in relation to an offense, the defendant's role in the offense, whether and to what extent the defendant received a monetary gain from the offense, and the nature of the harm suffered by victims of the offense. Finally, the Resolution urges the Commission to examine the ways that states with sentencing guideline systems address economic crimes.

Thus, we are interested in not only the matters addressed to the Commission by the recent legislation, but also the broader issue of the guidelines for economic crimes as a whole. We do not believe this broader review of these guidelines can be completed in the small window of time remaining in this amendment cycle. We believe the Commission would be best served by deferring action on at least the directives in the Dodd-Frank Act until the next amendment cycle, and to use the opportunity presented by those directives to engage in a searching and comprehensive review of the economic crime guidelines using both this amendment cycle and the next.

II. A Brief History of the Economic Crime Guidelines

The upward ratchet of the guidelines for economic crimes began at the beginning – with the initial set of guidelines. Unlike the penalties for most offenses, which the initial Sentencing Commission pegged to match pre-guidelines practice, the Commission specifically elected to increase the penalties for economic crimes in the initial 1987 guidelines over the pre-guidelines practices of the judiciary as a whole. While citing no data demonstrating these initial increased

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\(^4\)See U.S.S.G. Ch. 1 Pt.A. The other exception was in drug cases, where the Commission was driven
penalty levels were inadequate, the Commission waited only two years before revising the penalties for economic crimes upward again through a new loss table.\textsuperscript{5} The Commission added numerous aggravating specific offense characteristics from 1989 to 2001,\textsuperscript{6} when it again adopted wholesale increases through yet another new loss table.\textsuperscript{7} Further, a series of high profile corporate scandals drove the Congress to enact the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which in part directed the Commission to ratchet up the penalties for high-loss economic crimes yet again. The Commission dutifully did so in 2003.\textsuperscript{8} A result of these numerous increases in guideline penalties is that a typical officer or director of a public company who is convicted of a securities fraud offense now faces an advisory guidelines sentence of life without parole in virtually every case.

\begin{align*}
\text{Base offense level, } \S2B1.1(a)(1): & \quad 7 \\
250 \text{ or more victims, } \S2B1.1(b)(2)(c): & \quad +6 \\
\text{Sophisticated means, } \S2B1.1(b)(9): & \quad +2 \\
\text{Officer or director, } \S2B1.1(b)(17)(A)(i): & \quad +4 \\
\text{Role in the offense, } \S3B1.1(a): & \quad +4 \\
\$7 \text{ million loss, } \S2B1.1(b)(1)(K): & \quad +20^{9} \\
\text{Total offense level:} & \quad 43 \text{ (life)}
\end{align*}

The advisory guideline sentence will be life without parole for virtually any employee convicted of a serious securities fraud causing more than $100 million of loss:

\textsuperscript{9}A $7 million loss is rather easy to achieve in securities fraud cases because it is often equated with the drop in market capitalization that follows the disclosure of the fraud.
250 or more victims, §2B1.1(b)(2)(c): +6
Sophisticated means, §2B1.1(b)(9): +2
Substantially jeopardizing corporation, §2B1.1(b)(14)(B): +2
$100 million loss, §2B1.1(b)(1)(N): +26
Total offense level: 43 (life)

Thus, virtually any defendant in the cases featured in the media run-up to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act will now face an advisory range of life without parole.

III. Recent Judicial Criticism of the Economic Crime Guidelines

Faced with such “advice,” a number of judges have understandably declined to follow it. In United States v. Adelson, for example, Judge Rakoff of the Southern District of New York was confronted with a defendant convicted of joining a conspiracy “initially concocted by others” to materially overstate a public company’s financial results and thereby artificially inflate the price of its stock.10 Adelson’s guidelines score was level of 46 – three levels “off the chart” – and called for a sentence of life imprisonment. Even the government “blinked at this barbarity,” but was unable to make a specific sentencing recommendation.11 For Judge Rakoff, this circumstance exposed “the utter travesty of justice that sometimes results from the guidelines’ fetish with abstract arithmetic, as well as the harm that guideline calculations can visit on human beings if not cabined by common sense.”12 Given that Adelson had not originated the fraud, presented an “exemplary” past history, and appeared “extremely unlikely” to recidivate, and coupled with the “considerable evidence that even relatively short sentences can have a strong deterrent effect on prospective ‘white collar’

11 Id. at 511-13.
12 Id. at 512.
offenders,” the court sentenced Adelson to three-and-a-half years imprisonment and ordered restitution in the amount of $50 million. Along the way, Judge Rakoff explained that he had jettisoned the advisory guidelines range because “the calculations under the guidelines have so run amok that they are patently absurd on their face.”

Another example is United States v. Parris. In that case Judge Block in the Eastern District of New York sentenced two defendants to five years’ imprisonment “in the face of an advisory guideline range of 360 to life.” The offense – a “pump and dump” stock manipulation scheme – scored an offense level 42 based on upward adjustments for more than $2.5 million of loss, more than 250 victims, sophisticated means, officer/director status, role in the offense, and obstruction of justice. Quoting Judge Rakoff in Adelson, Judge Block described this guidelines scoring as the “kind of ‘piling-on’ of points for which the guidelines have frequently been criticized.” The court noted that there were no valid grounds for downward departure from the guidelines and thus, but for their advisory status, it “would have been confronted with the prospect of having to impose what I believe any rational jurist would consider to be a draconian sentence.” Even the government agreed that “many reasonable sentences would fall outside” the advisory guidelines range.

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13 Id. at 514-15.
14 Id. at 515.
15573 F.Supp.2d 744, 745.
16 Id. at 747-48.
17 Id. at 745 (quoting Adelson, 441 F.Supp.2d at 510).
18 Id. at 750-51.
19 Id. at 751.
fashioning a reasonable sentence, the Court stated it “would have much preferred a sensible guideline range to give me some semblance of real guidance.” The Court found no such help in the present guidelines, observing that “we now have an advisory guidelines regime where, as reflected by this case, any officer or director of virtually any public corporation who has committed securities fraud will be confronted with a guidelines calculation either calling for or approaching lifetime imprisonment.” Instead of being guided by the guidelines, the Court assembled a lengthy compendium based on submissions from the parties listing sentences in other high-loss cases.20 After a lengthy discussion of what is essentially an emerging common law of high-loss economic crime sentences, the Court concluded that a sentence of five years’ imprisonment was sufficient to achieve the purposes of sentencing.

Another recent case illustrating the overkill of the present high-loss guidelines is United States v. Watt. Judge Gertner in the District of Massachusetts was presented with a 25-year-old first offender who pled guilty to what was reportedly the “largest conspiracy to commit identity theft in American history.”21 The government had resolved the matter by permitting Watt to plead guilty to a single count carrying a five-year statutory maximum penalty.22 Watt, who received no financial benefit from the crime, sought probation, while the government urged the maximum possible five-year sentence. As Judge Gertner sought to determine the sentence sufficient but not greater than

20 *Id.* at 756-63. The compendium includes 34 cases with loss amounts ranging from $6 million to $14 billion and sentences ranging from probation to 25 years’ imprisonment.


22 This means of case resolution is the likely norm going forward in such cases. Where the guidelines routinely call for a lifetime of imprisonment, a significant portion of the sentencing function is transferred to the prosecutors who select the statutory maximum penalties of the counts to which the defendant will be permitted to plead guilty.
necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing, she specifically noted that “[t]he Guidelines were of
no help; if not for the statutory maximum, the Guidelines for an offense level 43 and criminal history
I would have called for a sentence of life imprisonment.”23 Given Watt’s zero gain from the offense,
his lack of any criminal history, and the court’s belief that he was unlikely to recidivate, Judge
Gertner sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment and $171 million of restitution.

A number of similar cases did not result in published decisions. In United States v. Ovid,24 the
defendant faced an advisory guidelines range of 210-262 months, but the district court imposed a
sentence of 60 months (with the agreement of the government) based on factors not considered by
the guidelines. Ovid did not set out in his business to commit fraud; he contributed more of his own
funds to the company than he took out of it, and did not commit the fraud for his own personal gain.
In United States v. Ferguson, the district court in Connecticut imposed sentences ranging from one
year and one day to four years on five defendants whose guideline ranges included the possibility of
life imprisonment and who were convicted of fraud leading to over $500 million in loss.25 In United
States v. Stinn, a former CEO of a public company faced a guidelines range of life imprisonment but
was sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment in the Eastern District of New York.26 A defendant
who caused approximately $25 million in losses was sentenced by the District Court in the Eastern
District of Missouri to one year and one day in United States v. Turkan.27 In each of these cases the

232010 WL 1676439 at *1. See also id. at *4 (“It should be noted that the Guidelines are almost
irrelevant here, to the extent that they are completely trumped by the maximum sentence.”).


courts found significant mitigating circumstances not otherwise taken into consideration by the guidelines.

IV. The Dodd-Frank Act and the Patient Protection Act

Congress has recently called for yet more upward ratcheting of the penalties for economic crimes. In the recent health care reform law the Congress directed the Sentencing Commission to amend the definition of loss to provide that “the aggregate dollar amount of fraudulent bills submitted to the Government health care program shall be prima facie evidence of the amount of the intended loss by the defendant.”

There is, of course, a wide array of forms of health care fraud ranging from the billing for services that were simply not rendered, at one extreme, to properly billing for services actually rendered but accompanied by a false anti-kickback certification, near the other. Cases in the middle of this range include “upcoding” – billing for a more expensive procedure than the one actually performed. Evidently the intent of this new law is to treat some or all of these cases identically – as if no services were provided. Coupled with this potentially expansive new definition of loss, the law also provides for a new 2-level increase for losses between $1 million and $7 million, a new 3-level increase for losses between $7 million and $20 million, and a new 4-level increase for losses over $20 million. Thus the combination of the new loss definition and the new high-loss upward adjustments means that a hospital executive who approves the submission of $20M of bills for services actually rendered but obtained via the payment of unlawful kickbacks would likely face the following guidelines calculation:

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29 Bills submitted to federal health care programs routinely require the provider to certify that it has not paid any “kickbacks” to obtain the referral of the services. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b).
Assuming no prior record, this yields an advisory guidelines range of 21.8 to 27.25 years’ imprisonment. It is not evident why Congress believed health care frauds are any more serious than any other frauds, or why it believed the existing penalties for health care frauds were insufficient.\(^{30}\)

The ABA understands that the Commission faces few options in implementing this Act, but given our concerns we believe the Commission should adopt the narrower of the two options in defining “Government health care program.” We also believe the Commission should add an application note addressing the potential disparities that may be caused by the new definition of intended loss where the resulting offense level overstates the seriousness of the offense in light of the factors enumerated in Section 3553(a).

This past Congress addressed financial fraud penalties in the new Dodd-Frank Act, directing the Commission to revisit the penalties for both securities fraud and bank fraud to ensure that they fully reflect “the serious nature of [these] offenses,” the “need for an effective deterrent and appropriate punishment to prevent [these] offenses,” and “the effectiveness of incarceration in furthering” these objectives.\(^{31}\) The Commission should not read this provision as a mandate for the

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\(^{30}\)The law also directs the Sentencing Commission more broadly to “provide increased penalties for persons convicted of health care fraud offenses in appropriate circumstances,” but left it to the Commission to decide what such circumstances are. PPACA, § 10606(a)(3)(A)(ii), 124 Stat. 1007 (2010).

\(^{31}\)Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 1079A (2010).
penalties for securities fraud and bank fraud to be increased yet again. As with the health care law, it is not possible to discern why Congress believed that these two types of fraud are any worse than other frauds, or why it believed the existing penalties for these frauds are insufficient.

V. Recent Department of Justice Developments

The Department of Justice has recently announced that it is very concerned about the present state of affairs. In its recent annual report to the Sentencing Commission, the Criminal Division of the Justice Department openly acknowledged that there are “certain offense types for which the guidelines have lost the respect of a large number of judges . . . including certain frauds involving high loss amounts.” The letter calls for change, stating that the Commission “should conduct a review of – and consider amendments to – those guidelines that have lost the backing of a large part of the judiciary.” The Department has not, however, said much about what should be changed. After noting the “increasing frequency [of] district courts sentencing fraud offenders – especially high-loss fraud offenders – inconsistently and without regard to the federal sentencing guidelines,” the Department declares that the “sentencing outcomes in these cases are unacceptable.” The Department suggests the Commission “should determine whether some reforms are needed,” but the extent of specificity given consists of the single sentence: “Such reforms might include amendments to the sentencing guideline for fraud offenses, recommendations for new statutory

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33 *Id.*

34 *Id.*
The reference to “new statutory penalties” is presumably intended to suggest mandatory minimum penalties for certain economic offenses.

VI. The ABA’s Proposed Solution

The current state of affairs in high-loss economic crimes cases cries out for reform. One possibility, of course, is that the Department of Justice and the Congress will simply force higher penalties on the judiciary through mandatory minimum statutory penalties. But the ABA supports a different option – re-calibrating the guidelines for economic crimes in such a manner that the respect of the judiciary would be restored. The dynamic between the judiciary and the Congress/Sentencing Commission should be dialectic – a process of improvement through a synthesis of views. In simpler terms, if the guidelines made more sense the judges would be more willing to follow them.

There are a number of concrete steps the Commission could take to improve the economic crime guidelines. First, the reliance on loss as the primary measure of culpability needs to be reduced, as perhaps best described by Judge Lynch:

\[\text{Id.}\]
The Guidelines place undue weight on the amount of loss involved in the fraud. This is certainly a relevant sentencing factor: All else being equal, large thefts damage society more than small ones, create a greater temptation for potential offenders, and thus generally require greater deterrence and more serious punishment. But the guidelines provisions for theft and fraud place excessive weight on this single factor, attempting – no doubt in an effort to fit the infinite variations on the theme of greed into a limited set of narrow sentencing boxes – to assign precise weights to the theft of different dollar amounts. In many cases ... the amount stolen is a relatively weak indicator of the moral seriousness of the offense or the need for deterrence.36

In the initial 1987 guidelines, the amount of the loss could result in no more than a five-fold increase in the range of imprisonment. Under the current guidelines the loss can increase the range nearly forty-fold. The reliance on loss to drive sentencing outcomes is simply out of control.37

In addition to loss, the guidelines should look at the defendant’s actual and/or intended gain from the offense. There can be no question that the harm caused by an offense is an important consideration in determining culpability. But loss often does not tell the whole story without consideration of gain. There is a difference in culpability between an employee who goes along with a fraud simply to keep his job and earn his ordinary salary and an employee who conceives and executes a fraud with the purpose of putting the proceeds of it into his pocket. The current guidelines fail to draw these distinctions because they are indifferent to the defendant’s gain or lack


37The present loss table is also needlessly complex given the advisory status of the ending guideline calculation. There is no need for a table that slices loss sixteen different ways to afford judges appropriate advice in determining a reasonable sentence.
thereof. Many, if not all, of the cases where judges have found the current guidelines unhelpful present circumstances in which the defendant’s gain was either zero or quite small in relation to the loss. One possible approach might be to have both a simplified table for loss and a second fairly simple table for gain, with the adjustments from both tables applied cumulatively in appropriate cases.

The economic crime guideline should also be dramatically simplified to reduce and eliminate multiple upward adjustments that either singly or in combination, produce a “piling on” effect beyond their underlying rationale and often smack of double counting. A fraud that resulted in a $100 loss to 250 victims does not necessarily warrant a sentence six levels higher (roughly doubling the sentence) than a fraud that caused $25,000 loss to a single victim. Many, if not most, of the blizzard of specific offense characteristics added to the fraud guideline over the past two decades are superfluous and frequently fail to accomplish meaningful distinctions in relative culpability across a spectrum of defendants.

Instead of considering whether two levels should be added because a particular defendant’s theft happened to involve property from a veterans’ memorial, the guideline should attempt to focus on more meaningful issues. What harm was the defendant truly intending to cause? What was

38A defendant’s gain may be considered only if there was a loss that cannot reasonably be measured, such that the defendant’s gain is used to estimate the loss. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, Application Note 1(B).

39An offense with a large number of victims should be viewed more harshly than one with a small number of victims under some circumstances, but typically that would be so only where the harm caused to the large number of victims was highly significant to each or most of them. In any event, it is difficult to justify punishing otherwise identical frauds with the same loss and gain figures with more than a 25 percent variance based solely on the spread of the loss across a number of victims.

his motivation for committing the crime? Did the defendant initiate the scheme or did he join it in mid-stream under coercive circumstances? Did the offense risk or cause some significant non-monetary harm? Was the offense committed because of some extreme financial or other hardship? Did the defendant make significant efforts to limit the harm caused by the offense prior to its detection? How likely or realistic was it that an attempted offense would actually succeed? Did the defendant commit the offense in order to avoid a perceived greater harm?

The ABA encourages the Commission to take to heart the Congressional directive to revisit the penalties in securities fraud and bank fraud cases and the Department of Justice’s request to revisit the guidelines in high-loss cases as a whole. But in doing so, it should begin not simply with what it thinks Congress or the Justice Department want, but also with what the judiciary will respect and follow.

In closing, we appreciate the Sentencing Commission's consideration of the ABA's perspective on these important issues and are happy to provide any additional information that the Commission might find helpful. Thank you for the opportunity to address you all this morning.