Interview with FTC Commissioner Joshua D. Wright
Commissioner Josh Wright covers the waterfront in this candid, wide-ranging interview. Topics include the scope of Section 5 of the FTC Act, patent assertion entities, standard essential patents, preliminary injunction standards in merger cases, the role of efficiencies and non-competition factors in merger reviews, reverse payment settlements, the FTC’s recent data broker study, data security standards, and fencing-in relief in deceptive advertising cases.

Interview with Xu Kunlin, Director General of the Bureau of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Under the National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China
In this follow-up to our 2011 interview, Director General Xu, the head of the Chinese agency responsible for pricing-related anticompetitive conduct, offers his thoughts on the NDRC’s recent enforcement activities, policy drafting and revisions, and future initiatives.

Weathervanes, Lightning Rods, and Pliers: The NDRC’s Competition Enforcement Program
Nate Bush analyzes the underpinnings of the 2013 surge in investigations of both Chinese and foreign companies under China’s Anti-monopoly Law. The change, he explains, was the result of the time needed to develop internal capacity and promote public awareness of competition law principles and the renewed interest of the Chinese leadership in market-oriented reforms and streamlining the bureaucracy.

You Had Me at Hyphen: A Review of Daniel Crane’s Antitrust
Readers beware. Steven Cernak’s delightful review of Daniel Crane’s Antitrust is sure to persuade even the most seasoned antitrust practitioner to buy this book.
Interview with Joshua D. Wright, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission

Editor’s Note: Joshua D. Wright was sworn in as a Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission on January 11, 2013, to a term that expires in September 2019. Prior to joining the Commission, Wright was a Professor at George Mason University School of Law and held a courtesy appointment in the Department of Economics.

In this interview with The Antitrust Source, Commissioner Wright discusses the scope of Section 5 of the FTC Act, patent holdup, patent assertion entities, the role of efficiencies in FTC investigations, reverse payment settlements, the Roberts Court’s antitrust decisions, the FTC’s recent data broker study, and data security standards.

Editorial Chair Darren Tucker conducted this interview for The Antitrust Source on May 30, 2014.

THE ANTITRUST SOURCE: Before joining the Commission, you wrote about the importance of evidence-based antitrust analysis.1 What does this mean and how does viewing enforcement through this lens affect how you look at cases as a Commissioner?

JOSHUA WRIGHT: Evidence-based antitrust is a particular methodological commitment to thinking about decision-making by antitrust agencies and courts. Evidence-based antitrust is, at its core, about harnessing the best available economic theory and evidence to improve decision-making about specific enforcement matters, policy decisions, resource allocation, agency design, and other critical decisions. The central idea is to wherever possible shift away from casual empiricism and intuitions as the basis for decision-making and instead commit seriously to the decision-theoretic framework applied to minimize the costs of erroneous enforcement and policy decisions and powered by the best available theory and evidence.

There is not much disagreement that economic evidence is quite valuable in the context of resolving a particular dispute about, for example, whether a proposed merger will substantially lessen competition. Evidence-based antitrust encompasses a commitment to using the best available economic theory and empirical evidence to make that decision; but it also stands for a much broader commitment to structuring antitrust enforcement and policy decision-making. For example, evidence-based antitrust is a commitment that would require an enforcement agency seeking to design its policy with respect to a particular set of business arrangements—loyalty discounts, for example—to rely upon the existing theory and empirical evidence in calibrating that policy. I’ve written some about my views of what an evidence-based perspective on loyalty discounts would look like2—but the critical point is that the existing economic literature makes avail-

1 See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright, Abandoning Antitrust’s Chicago Obsession: The Case for Evidence-Based Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 241 (2012).

able important information concerning the probability that loyalty discount arrangements are pro-
competitive or anticompetitive and that information is fundamental to designing an enforcement
strategy that makes consumers better off.

An evidence-based antitrust policy informs the way that an antitrust agency ought to think
about its activities: what types of cases to bring, how many of those to bring, what mix of cases
to bring, and what areas of conduct need more study.

So, the bulk of the evidence on exclusive dealing, to give one example, shows the practice is
generally procompetitive. We may not be able to estimate with precision how likely any one
instance of exclusive dealing is procompetitive. But the best available theory and evidence tells
us that it's much more likely than not to be procompetitive than anticompetitive. That is a simple
piece of information—but a powerful one for structuring enforcement decisions and policy.

Understanding even roughly or intuitively and, in some cases more precisely, both the proba-
bility of anticompetitive harm for a given practice and the magnitude of the potential harm can be
incredibly helpful in allowing an agency to allocate resources, make better enforcement decisions,
improve our advocacy and research efforts, and help us get cases right more often than we would
otherwise do.

**ANTITRUST SOURCE:** You’ve spoken more on the need for the Commission to put out a policy state-
ment on the scope of its authority to challenge unfair methods of competition under Section 5 than
on any other topic. Why is this subject so important to you and why do you think the FTC has not
put out a policy statement similar to the one it did for unfair acts or practices?

**JOSHUA WRIGHT:** Let’s begin with the reasons why setting forth a formal policy statement defin-
ing the Commission’s authority to prosecute unfair methods of competition under Section 5 is such
an important topic.

The first reason is that, from an economic perspective, this is an area that is incredibly impor-
tant to our competition mission. It is sometimes pointed out that standalone Section 5 cases are
a small part of what we do. That is certainly true by volume. We obviously do more merger investi-
gations than we do standalone Section 5 investigations. But activity levels alone are not a fruit-
ful way of thinking about a competition agency’s output and performance. Instead, if you look at
the consumer savings that the agency reported arising from our competition mission over the past
five years, a significant portion of those consumer savings—roughly one-third—come from stand-
alone Section 5 cases. Even more dramatically, if you look at consumer savings from unfair meth-
ods of competition cases as a percentage of our non-merger enforcement, nearly 75 percent of
those savings are attributable to standalone Section 5 cases. I think most people would consid-
er those to be significant figures, and they certainly are large enough to render it inappropriate to
dismiss the Section 5 debate as a small-stakes affair.

Standalone Section 5 cases clearly are an important part of our portfolio. I think that alone is
an important enough reason for the Commission to think long and hard about steps to improve
both process and substance as they relate to unfair methods of competition enforcement.

Another very important reason why the Commission’s Section 5 unfair methods of competition
enforcement requires agency guidance is that a vague and undefined Section 5 authority, when
combined with the administrative process advantages the Commission enjoys, gives the
Commission such significant advantages in conduct investigations that questions of procedural
fairness and substance are implicated. The historical data show that the Commission will nearly
invariably conclude its Section 5 process by issuing a judgment against the prospective defen-
dent. As a result, the vast majority of our Section 5 enforcement results in agency settlements. This shift to a more regulatory regime raises the real concern that we might be preventing conduct that might not be found anticompetitive, and indeed might be procompetitive, if push came to shove in a true adversarial proceeding.

These procedural advantages would be less of a problem if Section 5 unfair methods had a clear definition. But it does not. The unbounded nature of Section 5 invites more questions than it provides answers as to its scope, and as many definitions as there are Commissioners, and often more. Within the past 40 years, Section 5 has been understood by commissioners to cover anything from harms to the environment or employee-employer relationships to simply harm to a competitor. There has long been a consensus that these types of harms lay far outside the scope of the traditional antitrust laws.

The combination of process and substance problems gives rise to serious concern that the agency has in its power a tool that is unavailable to the DOJ or private parties, that is boundless in its reach and scope, that the agency has used to evade proving consumer harm, and that can reach conduct that is arguably procompetitive.

People do not debate too vigorously that the extension of Section 5 beyond the traditional antitrust laws might be useful in areas like invitations to collude. But the FTC has also used Section 5 in areas that are far more controversial, including loyalty discounts and seeking injunctions to remedy the infringement of standard essential patents. These are much more complex topics and, more importantly, conduct that can be both procompetitive and a fundamental part of a well-functioning competitive economy.

There has been a one hundred year natural experiment to evaluate the results of the Commission’s Section 5 unfair methods of competition jurisprudence and the results are in. We do not have much to show in terms of enforcement success, influence upon antitrust law, or any of the goals Congress set forth when it originally contemplated the unfair methods authority. The best that proponents of the status quo or an even more expansive use of the Commission’s Section 5 authority can do is to argue that we will do better. Perhaps we will. But one hundred years is long enough to carry on without a statement that sets forth the bounds of the agency’s approach to Section 5 unfair methods of competition enforcement and if we do not set forth such a statement on our own, I suspect that Congress or the courts will do it for us.

**ANTITRUST SOURCE:** In June 2013, you released a proposed policy statement outlining your views as to how the Commission should use its unfair methods of competition authority. Some have asserted that your Section 5 policy statement covers no more than what’s already condemned under the Sherman and Clayton Act, plus invitations to collude. Do you think that’s a fair characterization? And if not, can you provide examples of conduct that would violate Section 5 under your policy statement but not the Sherman or Clayton Act?

**JOSHUA WRIGHT:** My statement articulates and proposes two necessary conditions that must be satisfied in order for an act or practice to constitute a standalone violation of Section 5. The first is that the conduct must cause harm to competition as that concept is understood by the

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traditional antitrust laws, namely the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. That requirement simply requires parity between the definition of economic harm that lies at the heart of Section 5 and the traditional antitrust laws.

The second necessary element is that the conduct alleged to violate Section 5 must lack cognizable efficiencies. To be clear, those requirements would only apply to standalone Section 5 unfair methods of competition cases. The FTC could continue to prosecute, as it and the DOJ have done successfully, conduct with both anticompetitive effects and cognizable efficiencies as violations of the traditional antitrust laws.

This definition would have some bite. For example, the Intel case alleging that vertical restraints and loyalty discounts violate Section 5 standalone violations would not survive the second requirement—the efficiencies screen—because discounts have obvious intuitive procompetitive benefits.

The definition would leave intact the FTC’s ability to prosecute nearly all private invitations to collude. However, at least some public invitations to collude would be ruled out by my proposed definition because it is well understood that they can involve cognizable efficiencies.

But in terms of what the agency has done over the past 20 years in Section 5 standalone cases, by my count, about 70 percent of what we have done in those cases would satisfy the elements in my proposed policy statement. What we are really talking about then is the other 30 percent. And the question is not whether the FTC can bring those cases at all, but rather whether the FTC should do so under Section 5 as a standalone violation or under the Sherman Act. Shrinking the scope of what is understood to be a standalone Section 5 violation would force the FTC into federal court (or administrative litigation) on a Sherman Act-based theory of anticompetitive harm requiring proof of anticompetitive effect. That is perfectly appropriate. We do that and win in appropriate cases. The DOJ does that and wins too.

I do not think Section 5 was designed as an avenue for an enforcement agency to evade the burden of proof articulated by the Supreme Court that a plaintiff must show an anticompetitive effect in order to prevail on a traditional antitrust claim. My personal belief is that Section 5 standalone violations have been used by the FTC historically to evade the requirement to show competitive harm in cases like Intel. However, whether I am correct about that or not, there is certainly a perception—and it is a perception I think is accurate—that Section 5 has been employed in cases where the ability of the agency to demonstrate competitive harm by the preponderance of the evidence is dubious.

There is also the perception—again accurate in my view—that Section 5 creates a real wedge in enforcement reach between the FTC and DOJ. Take the simple example of asserting an injunction over a FRAND-encumbered SEP. No federal court has ruled that such conduct violates the antitrust laws without proof of deception. But the FTC has settled cases alleging that the same conduct violates Section 5. The ability to enforce one’s property right is too important an issue to be determined by the luck of agency draw. I think that that perception, combined with those process advantages that give the agency an unfair advantage in extracting consents, is the cause of the Section 5 problem and precisely why previous Commissions, commissioners, Congress, and academics remain interested in the agency setting forth some boundaries and providing some guidance with respect to its authority.

You asked for examples of conduct other than invitations to collude that might fit the definition of a standalone Section 5 violation as defined in my proposed policy statement. Let me give you two examples that are in the statement. I think the first is well understood. The second may not be.

The first is that the no-efficiency screen would not rule out any cases based upon a theory of deception in the standard-setting process. Under my proposed policy statement, deceptive con-
duct that results in the acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power would still be viable Section 5 cases.

A second example would be—and I think this is an area that has been underappreciated and that would actually expand the definition of economic harm in a way that I think most economists would agree with—in the first prong of economic harm, the plaintiff can prevail by showing the acquisition of market power without a demonstration of preexisting monopoly power as would be required under a Section 2 monopolization theory.

Steve Salop recognized this point in his article responding to my proposed Section 5 statement and applauded the expansion as consistent with modern economics.4 I do not think it is a point many of the other critics who mistakenly believe my proposal would kill Section 5 enforcement entirely have picked up on quite yet. Now, to be clear, one would still need real proof of anticompetitive effect under any theory of harm. The point is that there is a general movement in antitrust law toward favoring proof of actual effects over using unreliable proxies like market shares to predict effects wherever possible. We have seen that in the merger area most prominently. But there is no reason why that approach—which is economically sound—should not be used with respect to the traditional antitrust laws and Section 5 where appropriate. That addition to the Section 5 statement had in mind tying together Section 5 unfair methods of competition analysis with the analytical framework we rely upon when we employ the rule of reason. In this case, where there is proof that the conduct alleged to constitute a standalone violation of Section 5 harmed competition and caused anticompetitive effects as traditionally understood under the antitrust laws, my statement would do away with the unnecessary step of demonstrating the defendant had a market share large enough to establish monopoly power as we might see required in traditional monopolization cases.

ANTITRUST SOURCE: Would you be willing to accept a Section 5 policy statement with a broader reach than your proposed statement, if that resulted in unanimity on the Commission?

JOSHUA WRIGHT: Absolutely. When I first launched the idea of issuing my own policy statement, one of the things that I said is that my articulation of a proposed policy statement defining the contours of what constitutes an unfair method of competition under Section 5 is meant to be an invitation to a discussion. It was meant as an entry into the marketplace of ideas. I stand ready and willing to discuss alternative options and ideas concerning policy statements that would precisely define our Section 5 authority.

I have been particularly pleased that, as we sit here today, four of the sitting Commissioners have discussed publicly their views on Section 5 and its scope. Commissioner Ohlhausen endorsed a Section 5 unfair methods definition similar to mine in its treatment of economic harms and offering some variation on the appropriate treatment of efficiencies.5 Both Chairwoman Ramirez and Commissioner Brill have acknowledged that the standard they favor for Section 5 is

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4 Steven C. Salop, Guiding Section 5: Comments on the Commissioners, 9 CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 1 (Sept. 2013).
similar to the traditional rule of reason. The gap between the substance of these positions is much narrower than generally appreciated. Chairwoman Ramirez and Commissioner Brill have also argued that relying upon consents to inform the public about the scope of Section 5 is an adequate substitute for agency guidelines. I disagree with that point. And I believe everyone sees the potential value of guidelines. Guidelines have been an integral part of our enforcement approach in both our consumer protection and competition missions. There is no reason guidelines should not play a role in Section 5 enforcement. Another underappreciated benefit of guidelines is that a precise definition of the Commission’s unfair methods authority might well give the agency greater confidence—confidence that has for good reason been quite absent historically—to litigate appropriate Section 5 cases.

I want to underscore the degree of consensus that has emerged on substantive standards for standalone Section 5 claims because I think that point has also been underappreciated by some commentators. From a historical perspective, it is actually quite remarkable how much consensus there is today. There is now a consensus that, as under the rule of reason, Section 5 unfair methods should require economic harm that is of the type traditionally understood by the antitrust laws and that Section 5 is an antitrust statute not meant to get at noneconomic concerns.

There was not agreement on even that point 20 years ago. Each commissioner who has spoken on the issue of Section 5 has also articulated a framework consistent with the notion that efficiencies must be included in that framework and that guidelines could have some value. I think those are, to me, the building blocks for what could be a unanimous statement.

Let me turn to the substance of my proposed policy statement and the efficiencies screen that would constitute the second element of an unfair methods offense. Some critics have made the rather colorful point that even a dollar in efficiencies would be sufficient to defend a standalone Section 5 claim. A subset of these critics has followed that argument to the erroneous conclusion that the Commission could not pursue cases where the conduct resulted in net competitive harm so long as there was a single dollar of cognizable efficiencies. It is true that the Commission, under my statement, could not pursue such cases as standalone violations of Section 5. Indeed, that is what the no cognizable efficiencies test means. But the implication that the Commission could not bring these cases under alternative theories is mistaken and quite clearly rejected in the policy statement itself. In cases where the Commission has reason to believe that conduct generates more competitive harm than efficiencies it can and should pursue those cases under its theory of choice under the traditional antitrust laws in federal court or in administrative litigation. If we have a case with economic evidence consistent with that theory, we will prevail. We are perfectly capable of doing so. The DOJ does the same thing. I do not think that this agency needs any extra help when it goes into federal court in these cases to win. I think we have all the tools required to do it and to win cases on the same footing as the DOJ.

ANTITRUST SOURCE: In a recent speech, you observed that the FTC has departed from what you

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call the "symmetry principle." What did you mean by that, and what problems might this cause?

**JOSHUA WRIGHT**: The recent speech I gave in New York was based in large part upon a paper I co-authored with Judge Ginsburg that discusses what we describe as the symmetry principle. The speech explored the possibility that some recent FTC actions in particular have deviated from it.

The symmetry principle is an idea embraced by the 1995 IP Licensing Guidelines that antitrust agencies will treat intellectual property rights and real property rights within the same analytical framework. It does not mean—and the ‘95 Guidelines make this quite clear—that the agencies must ignore important differences and facts between contexts or investigations involving the use of real property rights that might result in antitrust violations and the use of intellectual property rights that might result in antitrust violations.

There will always be different and important factual considerations in investigations involving IP on the one hand and real property rights on the other. The symmetry principle implies the same framework ought to be applied to analyze problems involving intellectual property rights and problems involving real property rights.

The ‘95 Guidelines embrace that principle. I think that principle is an important one. The primary reason the symmetry principle is an important one is that antitrust economics has developed a sound analytical approach to the context of largely real property cases that respects and understands the rule of property rights in a competitive economic system. We have developed a set of tools, both in theory and empirics, of evaluating potential antitrust claims.

I think those efforts have been highly successful. One needs only to compare the body of antitrust law from the 1940s and ‘50s to the present to have some sense of the magnitude of improvement that has occurred. Asymmetries in analyzing real property and intellectual property invite what I think of as intellectual shortcuts to handling disputes involving IP. I worry about the use of intellectual shortcuts to handle and think about these problems because there is an abundance of intuitions and hunches about the competitive effects of IP out there.

There is a body of literature on the potential for patent holdup. There are excellent theory papers that describe when and how and under what conditions too many patents might result in a problem, too few patents might result in a problem, and low- or high-quality patents might result in competitive problems. These are important contributions to our economic knowledge, but the state of empirical literature now is not at which we can have any confidence in these intuitions as a matter of policy. That is to be expected in some ways. The literature is young. But as of now, there is a lot of theory and not a lot of empirical evidence.

Those debates, to me, are much like the antitrust debates in ‘70s and ‘80s. There are lots of theories and not much empirical evidence from which to make decisions. That is precisely the sort of area where you worry about intuitions substituting for full analysis. And that is the primary concern with deviations from symmetry. I don’t think one needs to go very far in the legal scholarship or economic scholarship or even agency documents to find examples of strong intuitions about the virtues of intellectual property substituting for what I would think is the analysis we might do in the real property context.

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I worry that we develop these shortcuts by way of an asymmetrical approach. Now, I would also worry if the shortcuts ran in the other direction, that is, if we were to say real property rights never generate problems because real property is different and less likely to generate problems. That would also be a mistake. Right now, that is not the policy concern.

The policy concern right now is that there is no shortage of calls for skepticism about licensing, assertion of patent rights, acquisitions involving IP rights, activities where there is an invitation to deviate from what is a well-developed analytical framework that we’ve applied for real property rights now over a century. I worry that those short cuts are going to lead us down the wrong path by inviting a weaker form of analysis.

The second problem with deviating from symmetry is a simple one. It is that any such deviation is inconsistent with the 1995 Guidelines. If we would like to deviate from what is in the 1995 Guidelines as an agency or as a pair of agencies, it falls upon the agencies to articulate the reasons why and subject those reasons to scrutiny from the outside bar, the business community, and the public at large. Instead, deviations from the 1995 Guidelines occur through Section 5 settlements, and they are particularly dangerous when they occur in this manner.

ANTITRUST SOURCE: You have stated on several occasions that you think the FTC may have gone too far in some recent cases involving alleged breaches of licensing commitments to a standards development organization, including N-Data, Bosch, and Motorola. When, if ever, do you think that an alleged breach of a licensing commitment should raise concerns under the antitrust laws or Section 5?

JOSHUA WRIGHT: The breach of a FRAND commitment or a licensing commitment, without more, does not violate the traditional antitrust laws.

Further, breach of a FRAND commitment or an agreement with a standard-setting body should also not violate Section 5 of the FTC Act as an unfair method of competition. The Commission certainly found that such conduct did violate Section 5 in N-Data.\(^9\) I believe that settlement is misguided and that the logic behind it is mistaken.\(^10\)

However, let’s begin with the federal antitrust claims. Consider first a hypothetical “pure breach” of contract case—that is, there is no deception alleged—wherein a patent holder is alleged to breach a FRAND commitment and that the conduct violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act. As with any monopolization claim, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the patent holder has acquired or maintained monopoly by virtue of its actions. It cannot merely be the case that a lawful monopolist raises its prices by virtue of some conduct, not even by virtue of bad conduct.

In the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in NYNEX, we had a defendant that was able to successfully raise price, and allegedly, there was anticompetitive effect. It was a lawful monopolist that had monopoly power that enabled it to raise its prices prior to its allegedly bad act. There was no disagreement that price has gone up. And it did so through evading regulatory requirements—certainly not good conduct. And the Supreme Court unanimously held that conduct to be outside the scope of Section 2. The D.C. Circuit apparently agrees with this interpretation, as it held that NYNEX applies with equal force to deception-based claims, and concluded that: “an oth-

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\(^9\) Negotiated Data Solutions LLC (N-Data), No. 051-0094 (Jan. 23, 2008).

otherwise lawful monopolist’s use of deception simply to obtain higher prices normally has no particular tendency to exclude rivals and thus to diminish competition.”11

The logic is relatively straightforward. The antitrust laws do not apply to all increases of price. The Sherman Act is not a price regulation statute. The antitrust laws govern the competitive process. The Supreme Court said in *Trinko* that a lawful monopolist is allowed to charge the monopoly price. In *NYNEX*, the Supreme Court held that even if that monopolist raises its price through bad conduct, so long as that bad conduct does not harm the competitive process, it does not violate the antitrust laws. The bad conduct may violate other laws. It may be a fraud problem, it might violate regulatory rules, it may violate all sorts of other areas of law. In the patent context, it might give rise to doctrines like equitable estoppel. But it is not an antitrust problem; antitrust cannot be the hammer for each and every one of the nails that implicate price changes.

The Supreme Court’s teachings on that point, including *Trinko* and *NYNEX*, apply with equal force to claims that a breach of contract allowing a patent holder to raise its price violates the Sherman Act. The burden of proof a plaintiff must satisfy in such a case is to demonstrate that the breach resulted in the acquisition of market power that did not exist but for the breach.

That was certainly not the approach the Commission took in *N-Data*. In *N-Data*, the patent holder had agreed to a nominal $1000 royalty rate, and seven years later asked to increase it to FRAND. This was not a FRAND holdup that resulted in a claim for a supra-competitive rate. This was a movement from a $1000 nominal rate that essentially no one paid to a FRAND rate. There was no evidence in the record that it harmed competition and certainly not any evidence that would support a traditional antitrust claim.

In my view, the appropriate way to deal with patent holdup cases is to require what we require for all Section 2 cases. We do not need special antitrust rules for patent holdup; much less for patent assertion entities.12 The rule is simply that the plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct results in the acquisition of market power, not merely the ability to extract existing monopoly rents. This is precisely the distinction the D.C. Circuit focused upon in *Rambus*; and I think it was correct to do so.

That distinction between extracting lawfully acquired and existing monopoly rents and acquiring by unlawful conduct additional monopoly power is one that has run through Section 2 jurisprudence for quite some time.

To be clear, I have no analytical problem with cases alleging that deception that results in the acquisition of market power violates Section 2. The D.C. Circuit in *Rambus* has laid out a standard that I think is a reasonable one for how a plaintiff would need to prevail on such a claim.

But in the absence of allegations of deception, the attempt to extend the antitrust laws to breach of contract disputes involving patent royalty rate negotiations threatens to convert antitrust law—a body of law designed to govern the competitive process—into one forced into micro-managing negotiations and regulating prices. It is important to note that no federal court since *Rambus* has taken the view that breach alone is an antitrust violation. No single federal court has endorsed that claim, and I think that is consistent with decades of antitrust jurisprudence, holding wishful thinking from those who would like antitrust law to play a greater role in governing patent holdup aside.

**ANTITRUST SOURCE:** There have been calls from some in the antitrust community, including current and former government officials, for standards development organizations to provide greater

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11 Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

clarity to their intellectual property policies to reduce the likelihood of holdup or other concerns. What are your thoughts on these efforts?

JOSHUA WRIGHT: I have written elsewhere that I am a little disappointed in those efforts. Let me explain why. It is certainly the case that a number of agency officials and chief economists in particular have called for standard-setting bodies to “correct” the problem of patent holdup by making SSO contract terms more precise, defining FRAND more clearly, spelling out when patent holders will be able to pursue injunctions and when they will not more clearly, and delineating patent disclosure rules more clearly. The call has been for more complete, more precise contracts, and that this would limit the problem of patent holdup.

The patent holdup literature obviously has its roots in the more general holdup literature beginning with Armen Alchian, Ben Klein, and Oliver Williamson. And it is well understood in that literature that there was a trade-off between additional contractual specificity, which might reduce the probability of holdup in some cases, with the cost of writing those terms, and also that additional terms can sometimes create the potential for holdup. The notion that there are trade-offs that transacting parties face when they consider how complete to make the contract is one that is at the heart of this patent holdup literature but seems to have been ignored when we moved from real property to intellectual property rights in thinking about patent holdup.

Now, that is not to say that patent holdup is not a problem. Holdup can be a problem. The economic forces underlying opportunism and holdup are real. But what the holdup literature from Alchian, Klein, and Williamson taught primarily was how transacting parties respond to the threat of holdup by designing a contract to minimize its incidence. Transacting parties have the incentives to avoid holdup, and they design contracts to minimize that probability. Now, sometimes it happens, and there is an important question about what body of law is most appropriate to deal with that. The answer traditionally has been contract law. In patent holdup cases, contract law or patent law are two bodies of the law available to deal with holdup. However, in a similar vein to the real property context, the standard-setting bodies and their members have every incentive to design contracts to minimize the probability of holdup.

Again, minimizing the probability of holdup does not mean that it is zero. Holdup can happen. It will be observed in the wild from time to time, and there is again an important question about whether antitrust has any role to play there. My answer to that question is yes in the case of deception that results in market power. Otherwise, we ought to leave the governance of what amount to contracts between SSO and their members to contract law and in some cases to patent doctrines like equitable estoppel that can be helpful in governing holdup.

Therefore, I think the question of whether patent holdup is a serious problem, and whether antitrust agencies ought to go out to standard-setting bodies and give them free advice on how to write their contracts in order to minimize the probability of holdup is not something that we generally do.

There are many contracts out there, important ones that govern important relationships. But to me it is quite an odd thing for an agency to be going out and giving advice to sophisticated parties on how to design their contracts. Perhaps I would be more comfortable if there were convincing and systematic evidence that the contracts were the result of market failure. But there is not such evidence. This is a question that I took up recently in a paper that I am working on now with my economic advisor, Joanna Tsai.13

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We collected and analyzed actual SSO contracts and how they evolved over time to go out and try to test what happens with these contracts in the wild and asked a number of what we hope are interesting and policy-relevant questions. Is it true per patent holdup theory—or at least the theory that it is a dominating concern in the design of these contracts—that the contracts are unresponsive to market changes? Are they dominated by patent-holders as opposed to implementers? Do the changes all work in favor of the patent-holders over time? What we found thus far is that, as one expects in a competitive ecosystem of diverse players, these contracts change all the time and they change in lots of different directions. Some of the changes are what we might think about as in favor of giving more room to run for patent-holders, some are not. Some are more restrictive and go in the direction of more specificity.

There is still a lot of empirical work to be done in this area to better understand these contracts and how they change over time, but I am befuddled by claims that there has been an empirical demonstration of these contracts as somehow evidence of a market failure. By traditional measures that industrial organization economists would use to think about market failure, I don’t think we have any evidence of that of that so it is a little bit puzzling that we have had as many both scholars and antitrust agency officials as active as they have been in asserting that there is a problem here.

I do not think it has been demonstrated. To the contrary, the evidence seems to show that while holdup can occur, like breach of contract occurs in the real world, its incidence is consistent with what we expect to see in a normal competitive marketplace and does not suggest systematic market failure.

**ANTITRUST SOURCE:** Despite calls by some for greater antitrust scrutiny of patent assertion entities, you have urged restraint and said that so far “there is precious little reliable empirical data on the costs PAEs impose upon practicing entities.” 14 What are the key things you would like to learn from the FTC’s 6(b) study of patent assertion entities and how might these affect your views on the merits of antitrust enforcement in this area? 15

**JOSHUA WRIGHT:** First, let me say, I think that the use of 6(b) in the patent assertion entity area is precisely the type of activity that the FTC is well suited to do, to contribute an evidence-based antitrust policy. We have the expertise in the building in terms of both analyzing the data and understanding the competition problems to understand patent assertion activity. As I have mentioned a couple of times, the empirical literature involving competition and IP rights is thin. I think it is an important and valuable activity for the agency to understand and describe what’s going on in some of these spaces, including patent assertion, and one that I certainly support and think is worthy of the agency’s time and resources.

What I hope to learn, I think at this stage, is what the relevant research questions are. I also want to be realistic about what can be demonstrated and what cannot be given existing data. I think that there is some temptation in the empirical patent literature to go after only the $64,000

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questions. Can I come up with a testable hypothesis that will tell me once and for all whether PAEs are good or bad? Are we for them or against them?

That is not a productive approach to economic research. At a minimum, it leaves the policy debate in a state of play with an unacceptably high ratio of theory to data. PAEs are diverse. In some circles, even the definition of a PAE cannot be agreed upon. But even if we agree upon one, what we are talking about and we really should be talking about is not a business model or the merits of a business model. That is not what antitrust agencies do. We think about conduct and we think about whether the conduct results in or has implications for market power. And here I think there is some attraction to the idea of research questions that either declare PAEs meritorious and worthy of our applause or condemn them, in large part because of the growing IP skepticism in the ranks of the legal academy. I do not think we have enough evidence to shed light upon the question of whether PAEs increase or decrease welfare.

And for that reason, some of the literature that is out there attempts to address whether the win rate in litigation for PAEs is too high or too low without identifying a useful benchmark. Other stock market event studies show not much more than that litigation is really expensive, but they offer sweeping policy conclusions about the inefficiency of enforcing property rights without considering the benefits of the same. Some also have other methodological issues. But the main point is that much of this literature, in my view, is not focused on the right questions.

I think the right approach—and the approach that the FTC is taking—with the 6(b) study is a more incremental and modest one. That is, there is not much understanding at the descriptive level of what is going on with patent assertion behavior. The study will focus upon questions such as: Are PAEs different from other NPEs in terms of assertion activity? How are they different and when are they different? What types of patents generate those differences? I think there are important descriptive questions, including how they are organized, and it is helpful to have questions like these answered to get a descriptive feel for these entities and their activities.

Our job is to put real and useful information to inform the policy debate into the world, and I think that is an approach that we are taking, and I think it is the right approach.

What I would like to see is a reliable understanding of the universe in which PAEs operate and the sorts of activities they engage in. Once that is described and analyzed, there might be further research that can take next steps and discuss welfare implications and the like. But, I think the first step is to do something modest, but do it really well. And I expect that that is what we will have.

ANTITRUST SOURCE: For many years, there have been concerns about diverging standards and procedures for the FTC and DOJ to obtain an injunction against an unconsummated merger. Do you agree with the calls for applying the traditional equities test to the FTC and barring the FTC from pursuing administrative litigation in HSR merger cases?

JOSHUA WRIGHT: I do agree and support the general attempt to equalize the standards for PIs between the FTC and DOJ. Let me say, I recognize there are some potential benefits to Part III merger litigation. Specifically, that approach offers the Commission the opportunity to employ its expertise to write an opinion to influence the court of appeals and inform antitrust jurisprudence more generally. I certainly believe that there is some merit in that approach and I readily recognize that limiting the agency’s ability to proceed in Part III merger cases comes at the cost of restricting its ability to influence the development of law in that particular manner.

I support efforts to equalize the PI standards nonetheless. One reason is that there are many other ways than writing the opinion in Part III merger cases for the agency to influence the law. The
competition agencies, for example, have been very successful with guidelines. The FTC and DOJ have also been very successful in taking advantage of amicus opportunities in federal district court, circuit courts of appeal, and at the Supreme Court. We would have to rely more heavily upon those methods of influencing the law rather than having the Commission write its own opinion under many of the proposals to equalize PI standards, including the SMARTER Act. Those alternatives mitigate the losses from restricting the Commission’s ability to write opinions in Part III.

On the other hand, I think there are real and substantial gains from eliminating even the perception that exists that the standard that might be applied to one’s merger is different depending on whether one draws the FTC or DOJ. It is simply a perception that should not be allowed to continue to exist, much less to influence merger enforcement and even the decision to merge. These recent efforts in particular are an approach to both recognizing that problem, as did the Antitrust Modernization Commission, and to doing something about it.

ANTITRUST SOURCE: In the recent Ardagh case, you issued a dissenting statement lamenting that receiving credit for efficiencies in merger review is often difficult at the FTC and asserting that the burden of proof for establishing efficiencies should be in parity with the burden for establishing anticompetitive effects. In your view, what standard is the FTC applying today when evaluating merger efficiency claims and how does that differ from the optimal standard?

JOSHUA WRIGHT: I want to focus upon what I viewed to be a disparity in the standards applied by the Commission in evaluating competitive effects evidence. The crux of the dissent is the concern that it appears the Commission applies different standards evaluating anticompetitive effects evidence than it does when evaluating evidence of efficiencies. In other words, the Commission appeared to tolerate much greater uncertainty in crediting economic evidence supporting the plaintiff’s prima facie demonstration that a merger substantially lessens competition while holding evidence tending to show efficiencies to a greater standard of precision.

The central problem is that in an effects-based antitrust regime, economic sense requires parity between the standard being applied by the Commission to credit economic evidence establishing likely anticompetitive effects on the one hand and efficiencies on the other.

In Ardagh, the Commission alleged in our complaint in federal court that the cognizable efficiencies associated with the proposed merger were approximately zero. Based upon my own review of the evidence at the time we voted out that complaint, I found that allegation totally implausible. While I concluded that there was some plausible evidence of unilateral anticompetitive effects that should be credited given the economic evidence, the evidence also demonstrated that the cognizable efficiencies passed on to consumers significantly outweighed any evidence of anticompetitive effects by a ratio of six-to-one. To be clear, it is not unreasonable to disagree about the magnitudes of harm or efficiencies estimates. I have no quarrel with that sort of disagreement, which is standard fare in antitrust analysis and economics generally. Estimates and analyses are rough and come with standard errors and methodological caveats for a reason. However, in this particular instance, given my own review of the evidence, I found it fairly implausible that one could agree that there was reason to believe the proposed transaction would gen-

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erate approximately zero dollars in efficiencies unless one were applying a different standard to efficiencies evidence than one applied to evidence establishing likely anticompetitive effects. In my view, the application of asymmetrical standards was the only way to reconcile such stark differences in analyses and I remain of that view.

Ardagh aside, that analysis raises an important general issue worthy of serious discussion: the lack of clear guidance on how the agency thinks about and should think about efficiencies analysis in practice. I cite in the dissent evidence from an excellent paper by Malcolm Coate and Andrew Heimert, which highlights the substantial disagreement and differences within the agency on when to credit efficiencies. For example, there are considerable differences between when the Bureau of Economics and the Bureau of Competition are willing to credit efficiencies as cognizable and verifiable.

Let me repeat that it has been my experience that agency staff, both lawyers and economists, do think about efficiencies seriously. However, when one observes such significant disagreement on the magnitudes of efficiencies—disagreement among Commissioners or disagreement between BC and BE staff—or when one observes fundamental disagreements concerning the evidence required to conclude a proposed efficiency is cognizable under the Guidelines, it suggests to me that we can do better in terms of providing some contours and some guidance on what efficiencies mean in practice.

I hope the notion that there should be symmetrical burdens in analyzing all types of competitive effects evidence is an uncontroversial one for those who support economically rigorous effects-based antitrust regimes.

ANTITRUST SOURCE: To stay on the topic of efficiencies a bit longer, you have also argued in favor of giving more consideration to out-of-market efficiencies and fixed cost reductions in merger review. In your view, when should the agencies give consideration to these and how much weight should they be given compared to incremental cost reductions in the relevant market?

JOSHUA WRIGHT: I have written that the agencies ought to give equal weight to out-of-market efficiencies that are cognizable and otherwise satisfy all of the requirements of the Merger Guidelines. There are jurisdictions around the world—such as Germany and Canada—that take this approach.

One of the useful and positive contributions of the 2010 Merger Guidelines is a clear movement away from arbitrary non-economic distinctions and towards competitive effects. Downplaying market definition and the role of inferring competitive effects from market structure and instead placing greater emphasis upon effects is a move toward a more sophisticated, evidence-based approach. Getting away from predicting competitive effects by counting the number of firms with our fingers and instead relying on more modern economic tools is a marked improvement. I think the overall contribution of the 2010 Guidelines is to move incrementally toward a true effects-based regime.

However, most if not all of the incremental changes in the 2010 Merger Guidelines were focused upon sharpening theories of competitive harm and better understanding how to identify

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the potential anticompetitive consequences of mergers. For example, the 2010 Merger Guidelines updated the guidance provided by the agency on how it approaches unilateral effects. The new Guidelines don’t really touch, much less update or refresh in any significant way, agency thinking with respect to efficiencies or entry. The supply side was left alone, or maybe left behind, and I think there remains significant work to be done there.

The case for crediting out-of-market efficiencies is considerably stronger under the new Guidelines. The 2010 Merger Guidelines embrace narrower markets with circles drawn around where we are able to identify unilateral price effects. There is nothing wrong with this approach from an economic perspective. But, on the other hand, there is no reason to think that the efficiencies generated by a merger must be, or are even likely to be, passed on to consumers in the same narrowly drawn market where the Commission alleges anticompetitive effects. Indeed, as markets are drawn more narrowly, the likelihood that efficiencies become “out-of-market” increases, and an agency concerned with the overall consumer welfare implications of a proposed transaction needs to respond to that possibility. When combined with the arbitrary rule in Philadelphia National Bank prohibiting counting benefits outside of the relevant market, the modern approach inadvertently puts a thumb on the scale against mergers. The approach also makes arbitrary choices about which consumers’ welfare to protect and which to ignore.

The problem can be remedied by rejecting the Philadelphia National Bank rule. Now, the Supreme Court has to do that. But the agency can do more than a footnote considering the possibility of out-of-market efficiencies that are “inextricably linked.” There is no economic reason to exclude benefits the agency considers cognizable and otherwise satisfy the requirements of the 2010 Merger Guidelines simply because the consumers reaping those benefits fall outside arbitrarily drawn markets. We have no reason to favor one set of consumers over another as an agency and no basis in economics to do so. We as an agency should not be in the business of saying, this consumer counts and that one does not because one falls inside a SSNIP test and the other does not. Our mission is to protect all of the consumers, not those that fall within an arbitrary SSNIP.

Many jurisdictions around the world recognize that in a variety of ways. I think one intermediate step that could be taken and one that I write about in a paper with my adviser, Jan Rybnicek, is loosening the “inextricably linked” language in the Guidelines on the treatment of out-of-market efficiencies.19 There are a number of ways to do this that we discuss in that article, but I think that would be a reasonable first step.

To change subjects a bit, another area in efficiencies analysis that should be modified is the treatment of fixed cost efficiencies. There is considerable economic evidence that fixed costs do in fact influence pricing, at least under some conditions, and should be taken more seriously and certainly not reflexively rejected. We could easily remedy this problem with an analytical update to the 2010 Merger Guidelines that covers the supply-side.

**ANTITRUST SOURCE:** In the FTC’s review of the Google/DoubleClick transaction, there were calls for incorporating privacy considerations into merger analysis. The FTC declined to do so,20 yet


there have been renewed calls on the FTC to take privacy and data security into consideration in merger analysis, for example in the Facebook/WhatsApp merger. Are there circumstances where non-competition concerns, such as privacy, should play a role in merger analysis?

JOSHUA WRIGHT: No. I think that there is a great danger when we allow competition law to be unmoored from its relatively narrow focus upon consumer welfare. It is the connection between the law and consumer welfare that allows antitrust to harness the power of economic theory and empirical methodologies. All of the gains that antitrust law and policy as a body have earned over the past fifty or sixty years have been from becoming more closely tethered to industrial organization economics, more closely integrating economic thought in the law, and in agency discretion and decision-making. I think that the tight link between the consumer welfare standard and antitrust law is what has allowed such remarkable improvements in what effectively amounts to a body of common law.

Calls to incorporate non-economic concerns into antitrust analysis, I think, threaten to undo some, if not all, of that progress. Antitrust law and enforcement in the United States has some experience with trying to incorporate various non-economic concerns, including the welfare of small dealers and worthy men and so forth. The results of the experiment were not good for consumers and did not generate sound antitrust policy. It is widely understood and recognized why that is the case. Now, to be clear, I do not mean to say that privacy has no place in antitrust at all. In some cases, we can think about privacy as a form of non-price competition. Some of the calls for incorporating privacy and related concerns into merger review, I think, fall into that category. If there is a coherent theory on how or why a merger changes incentives to compete on that particular non-price margin, there is no reason that standard economic tools cannot incorporate that issue. On the other hand, when advocates use antitrust law to achieve policy goals without a coherent antitrust-relevant theory about why a particular merger will impact privacy, those arguments should be rejected out of hand.

In any event, the most important consideration in evaluating any argument about a merger’s impact on a non-economic concern—whether the concern is privacy, protecting small business, a company being “too-big-to-fail,” or any other type of non-consumer welfare based concern—is to keep that analytical framework focused upon economics, competition, and consumer welfare. We have developed analytical tools to assess a merger’s likely impact upon consumer welfare, and our success rate—blocking mergers that threaten to harm consumers and allowing those that do not—is much better than it was in the ‘60s. Those gains have provided substantial benefits for consumers and the antitrust community, and the agencies in particular ought to be very careful not to give up an inch of that hard-fought territory.

ANTITRUST SOURCE: Under the FTC Act, the Commission can issue a complaint when it has “reason to believe” that a violation has occurred and that a proceeding would be in the public interest. What does this standard mean to you and what role does prosecutorial discretion play?

21 See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897) (antitrust law exists to protect “small dealers and worthy men”).
JOSHUA WRIGHT: The “public interest” prong of the standard does a lot of work when I am thinking about individual cases and enforcement decisions. I perceive the “reason to believe” prong of the standard in terms of a probabilistic assessment to require something less than more-likely-than-not that the conduct or merger will violate the law. However, when I am thinking about whether to vote for a complaint in a specific case, the public interest prong—the other part of the 45(b) standard that I equate with consumer welfare—is something to which I, as an economist, give great weight.

My own view is that I need to be fairly confident to have reason to believe that an agency action is in the public interest. I do have to have some real confidence that the proposed course of action is going to improve consumer welfare relative to the status quo and certainly that it will not make consumers worse off. A faithful application of that approach means that monopolization cases should face a higher bar than cartel cases because the latter involve a lesser risk that the enforcement action will generate false positives that will harm consumers.

ANTITRUST SOURCE: Before you became a commissioner, you claimed that “the culture of consent,” i.e., reliance on the consent decree as the principal means of enforcement, has led to a number of adverse consequences for settling parties, consumers, and the antitrust agencies themselves. You alluded to this concern in your Nielsen dissent, as well as in one of your prior responses. Could you expand on your concerns and explain how you would address this problem without diminishing the agency’s ability to obtain relief in as many cases as it now can through the use of consent decrees?

JOSHUA WRIGHT: It is certainly the case that both antitrust agencies—but I will just talk about the FTC—increasingly rely upon the consent process. Obviously, what the agency is able to achieve in a consent decree is the product of a bilateral negotiation between the firm and the agency. This occurs in the absence of litigated cases but yet can nevertheless result in the creation of a de facto standard. That is one potential issue with excessive reliance on consents.

To give some examples, we have consent decrees at the FTC that suggest that the assertion of an injunction by a standard essential patent holder alone violates Section 5 of the FTC Act as an unfair method of competition. There is no federal court that has endorsed this theory as a violation of the traditional antitrust laws or as an unfair method of competition. The settlement with Intel adopts a discount-attribution pricing rule. The settlement certainly raises questions about what the agency thinks is the appropriate standard for evaluating loyalty or bundled discounts.

We have consent decrees that occasionally incorporate additional relief even when there is no evidence demonstrating harm of the type the relief concerns. I believe the Commission’s recent consent in Graco is a good example of this phenomenon. There, we obtained a consent decree in a consummated merger case. I voted for the action because of convincing evidence of a Clayton Act violation. Graco employed exclusive dealing contracts, but we did not allege that the exclusive dealing contracts violated the antitrust laws or Section 5. However, as fencing-in relief


for the consummated merger, the consent included prohibitions on exclusive dealing and loyalty
discounts despite there being no evidence that the firm had employed either of those tactics to
anticompetitive ends. When an FTC settlement bans a form of discounting as standard injunctive
relief in a merger case without convincing evidence that the discounts themselves were a com-
petitive problem, it raises significant concerns.

In this case and others, policy is made through consent decrees that are individually negotiat-
ed with firms. I think two ways to minimize the cost of the culture of consent influencing agency
decisions in a negative way is, first, for commissioners themselves to be more active in their review
of consents, and second, for the Bureau of Economics, which is trained to think long and hard
about the incentive effects of orders, to be involved in the consent process earlier.

Economists can play a significant role in evaluating proposed consents but are often included
too late in the process and sometimes even after the consent is signed, sealed, delivered, and
ready for Commission vote. Economists are trained to evaluate whether the consent order is in the
public interest, how it will impact incentives, and how the marketplace might react to consents.

There are, of course, as you alluded to in the question, tradeoffs and costs associated with such
an approach, such as potentially decreasing the speed at which the agency works. That is impor-
tant, too. But these things need to be balanced. A third approach would be judicial review or some
sort of judicial approval mechanism for agency consents.

ANTITRUST SOURCE: In the aftermath of the Actavis decision, how should the FTC proceed in
addressing “reverse payment” settlements and, in particular, what features of a settlement strike
you as particularly problematic?

JOSHUA WRIGHT: I think Actavis is an important decision and I think very much correct in evalu-
ating reverse payment settlement agreements under the rule of reason. I think one of the impor-
tant benefits of evaluating conduct under the rule of reason—especially conduct the competitive
effects of which are not exhaustively understood—is that the rule of reason becomes a place
where we learn about those competitive effects over time. A lodestar principle of antitrust law is
that when presented with novel conduct we do not fully understand, we decline to use truncated
rules or truncated analysis. Instead we use the rule of reason and develop economic learning based upon experience. I think that is what is warranted here. I certainly support efforts of the
agency to challenge anticompetitive reverse settlements within the rule of reason framework.

You asked what sorts of considerations ought to be a part of that rule of reason analysis. In
Actavis, the Supreme Court certainly focuses intensely upon the size of the reverse payment.
Indeed, some commentators have suggested that evidence of a payment larger than anticipated
litigation expenditures should entitle the plaintiff to a presumption of illegality, shifting the burden
to the defendant to otherwise justify the settlement. This approach contemplates the post-
Actavis rule of reason taking the form of a quick look analysis.

28 Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Activating Actavis, ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 16. But see Barry C. Harris,
Kevin M. Murphy, Robert D. Willig & Matthew B. Wright, Activating Actavis: A More Complete Story, ANTITRUST, Spring 2014, at 83 (advo-
cating more traditional approach under the rule of reason that considers various factors in addition to anticipated litigation costs).
I have written elsewhere that I am skeptical the Court’s analysis leaves room for the quick look approach. The Court was invited to and rejected the opportunity to endorse a quick look for reverse payment cases. The Supreme Court chose the rule of reason. I think the idea that the Supreme Court was saying rule of reason while winking and meaning “quick look if it is a really big payment” is hard to square with the language in the opinion.

That said, what lower courts do with Actavis remains to be seen. The Court certainly talks a great deal about the size of the payment. That to me begs the question: the size of the payment relative to what? Is the appropriate benchmark litigation costs? If the payment is greater than litigation costs, then the size of the payment would be a factor that militates in favor of liability. Others have suggested other types of competitive benchmarks. I think there is now brewing an important economic debate over what inferences one can draw from the size of the payment. The inferences drawn about likely competitive effects in various models of reverse payments depend upon a number of assumptions about risk preferences, behavior, and the number of entrants. There are some very smart economists working on the problem and I think there is substantial work to be done in this area over the theoretical implications both with respect to what inferences can be confidently drawn from the size of any reverse payment and with respect to analyzing the welfare effects of reverse payment settlements more generally, including potential efficiency justifications.

ANTITRUST SOURCE: The Roberts Court has taken a number of antitrust cases. What do you think accounts for the number of antitrust cases the Court has heard and what are your key takeaways from the Roberts Court’s decisions?

JOSHUA WRIGHT: I think more than anything the frequency with which the Roberts Court has taken antitrust cases has more to do with the sheer number of Supreme Court Justices who are interested in antitrust. All of the former D.C. Circuit judges who are now Supreme Court Justices have written significant antitrust opinions.

Justice Thomas wrote an important merger decision when he was on the D.C. Circuit. Justice Roberts had some antitrust experience. Justice Alito has antitrust opinions. Justice Sotomayor has also written some important antitrust decisions on the Second Circuit. And Justice Breyer, of course, has written on antitrust both as a scholar and as a circuit judge. I think the activity level reflects the sheer breadth of interest across the political spectrum.

I think the cases have also been what one might describe as picking off relatively low hanging fruit. You have mostly super-majority or unanimous decisions with the exception of Leegin. And I think Leegin, which many commentators have pointed out, was a five-to-four decision not because of a robust debate about the competitive effects of resale price maintenance, but rather a debate about the power of precedent as it relates to Supreme Court decisions.

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30 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2337 (rejecting quick look approach “because the likelihood of a reverse payment bringing about anticompetitive effects depends upon its size, its scale in relation to the payor’s anticipated future litigation costs, its independence from other services for which it might represent payment, and the lack of any other convincing justification. The existence and degree of any anticompetitive consequence may also vary as among industries. These complexities lead us to conclude that the FTC must prove its case as in other rule-of-reason cases.”).
In terms of work that remains for the Supreme Court, I do believe the Supreme Court will eventually overturn the quasi-per se rule against tying that the Court lukewarmly affirmed in *Jefferson Parish*. That is one of the easy outdated rules that remains in the law. And I think the Supreme Court will eventually get to a merger case. There are a lot of things to clean up at the Supreme Court regarding merger doctrine. I think overturning the structural presumption in *Philadelphia National Bank* should be first on the Supreme Court’s list if its appetite for picking low-hanging fruit persists.

**ANTITRUST SOURCE:** In May, the FTC released a study of the data broker industry that called on Congress to enact legislation to enable consumers to learn more about the activities of data brokers and to obtain access to information about them held by these entities. Given the Commission’s finding that consumers benefit from many data broker activities and that many of the concerns identified in the Commission’s report do not appear to have ever occurred, why is legislation needed?

**JOSHUA WRIGHT:** It’s a good question. To start, the data report itself—much like our discussion of the 6(b) study of patent assertion entities—is a valuable exercise in getting descriptive data about the industry out into the world. That is certainly the reason I voted for issuing their report and I think the most important contribution that it makes. I understand there is a lot of interest in the recommendations that appeared at the back of the report.

My own view is that the report is certainly correct to point out that there are many benefits from the activity of data brokers. There is no real attempt to estimate either the incidence or the value of those activities or the incidence or value of the potential concerns. Again, many of which you correctly point out are raised as hypotheticals in the report.

I do not think the report should be read as offering an authoritative view on how frequently data broker activity generates costs or benefits or the relative magnitudes of the costs and benefits associated with data brokers. The staff did not ask the questions or do the work to be able to opine confidently about those issues. That is not a criticism. It was simply not the goal of the study. That said, staff were able to obtain some important information about what sorts of activities are going on in the industry and that is a positive contribution.

In terms of the legislative recommendations, a careful reader of the report will see that in the footnotes I have divorced myself from a number of recommendations, almost all of the recommendations that are outside of the disclosure context. I think one thing this report does successfully demonstrate is that consumers are generally and oftentimes unaware of how their data is being used, or sold, or to what uses it is being put when they agree to engage in commercial relationships. I think it is a relatively innocuous recommendation to suggest that Congress consider legislation that would result in disclosure and allow consumers to vote with their feet. The recommendations that I support all fall into that category.

The majority of the Commission supported a number of other recommendations, ranging from requiring a centralized Web portal that would provide for consumer access to data collected as

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32 See id. at nn. 85, 88, 96, 105.
w ell as an opt-out mechanism to requiring consumer-facing entities to provide notice that they
share consumer data with data brokers and provide consumers with the ability to opt out.\textsuperscript{33} For the
majority of these other recommendations, I simply do not think that we have any evidence that the
benefits from Congress adopting those recommendations would exceed the costs. It is not that I
think we did the work and I take a different view than the majority of the Commission. I just do not
think that we collected the data that would make me comfortable with those sorts of recommend-
ations.

I would need to have some confidence based on evidence, especially about an area where evi-
dence is scarce. I’m not comfortable relying on my priors about these activities, especially when
confronted by something new that could be beneficial. Before we make recommendations to
Congress, I would like to have evidence sufficient to show, or at least to believe, that the benefit
to consumers we represent as an agency from these recommendations exceed their costs. I do
not see anything in the report that would allow me to support those. The danger would be that we
recommend actions that either chill some of the beneficial activity the data brokers engage in or
just impose compliance costs that we all recognize get passed on to consumers.

So, before we impose that sort of tax we ought to know what we are getting in return for it. That
would be my approach, not just with the data broker report but with any recommendations made
without that sort of evidence.

**ANTITRUST SOURCE:** The FTC has been very active in the area of data security using its Section
5 authority. In light of concerns that have been raised by some in the business community about
the lack of standards, would you support more specific data security regulations or a statement
regarding the Commission’s use of Section 5 in data security matters?

**JOSHUA WRIGHT:** I am a fan of offering guidance in areas where it can be useful in spelling out for
businesses what they can and cannot do, what activities will or will not run afoul of Section 5.
Where there is demand for that, I think that the agency seriously ought to consider offering pre-
cisely that sort of guidance. There is a body of agency-negotiated data security settlements as
well as the Commission’s Policy Statement on Unfairness,\textsuperscript{34} which articulate cost-benefit and
negligence-style frameworks that I think are certainly sufficient to provide information to busi-
nesses about how the agency views their data security obligations. That said, I think it may well
be a useful and valuable exercise, not just for the business community but also for the agency, to
synthesize and offer high-level principles that would provide additional guidance. That is some-
thing that I would certainly be in favor of the agency considering and taking on.

**ANTITRUST SOURCE:** On January 7, 2014, the Commission announced five settlements with com-
panies involving allegations of deceptive marketing of nutritional and dietary supplements. The
agreements require the respondents to conduct two well-controlled human clinical trials before
making similar claims in the future. You issued a separate statement calling for “the Commission
to explore more fully whether the articulation and scope of injunctive relief in these and similar set-
tlements strikes the right balance between deterring deceptive advertising and preserving for con-

\textsuperscript{33} *Id.* at viii, 50–53.

JOSHUA WRIGHT: When I joined the Commission this was an issue that was somewhat new to me, but coming from an economics background has sensitized me to the idea that a reflexive approach in requiring two RCTs as fencing-in relief might not always be in the best interest of consumers. The reasons are two-fold. One reason is that we normally think of fencing-in relief as remedial relief that not only will stop a defendant who violated the law from again engaging in precisely the same activity, but also will prevent that defendant from engaging in similar activity related to those law violations. Fencing-in relief prevents them from slightly modifying their conduct and easily evading the provisions of the order.

However, remedial relief that requires that the defendant be in possession of a second RCT before that defendant can make a truthful claim in the future does more than just prevent the defendant from engaging in illegal behavior—it may actually harm consumers. For example, if the defendant wants to make a claim but cannot until he has the second RCT done, the delay between the first and second RCT also harms the consumer who is not getting the truthful information as soon as it is available. In some instances, whether in the first instance or after an order is imposed, competent and reliable scientific evidence will necessarily require more than one RCT. However, that is not always the case. So, we have to be really careful about imposing that requirement in orders.

My view on this has evolved over time and while I am now generally comfortable with some form of fencing-in relief for a defendant that has engaged in deceptive advertising, I would disagree that the appropriate way to accomplish this is by “counting” the number of RCTs.

This brings me to my second point. Counting the number of RCTs is not the best way to look at the body of evidence. Not all RCTs are created equal. There are very good ones, but there are ones that are not so good. Counting them is a pretty noisy signal of the quality of substantiation. Rather than thinking about it in terms of just numbers, I think that—informed by expert opinion as to the amount and quality of evidence necessary—we ought to instead articulate remedial relief language flexible enough to consider the quality of all the evidence, how that evidence fits together and whether it is adequate to substantiate the claim going forward.

Finally, we should also take into account the facts of each particular case. If, for example, we are concerned, as we sometimes are, that the defendants have engaged in completely fraudulent activities, we should require fencing-in relief that is more directly tailored to solving that problem. In particularly egregious cases, the Commission should consider remedial relief such as bans. In other cases, for example where defendants have fabricated study data, the remedial relief should be crafted to prevent the defendants from engaging in that type of particular activity. These are ways to more directly get at the conduct that is at the root of the illegal activity.

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Interview with Xu Kunlin, Director General of the Bureau of Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Under the National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China

Editors’ Note: The Antitrust Source previously interviewed Director General Xu for the February 2011 issue.* Three years after the last interview, we followed up with DG Xu regarding NDRC’s recent enforcement activities, policy drafting and revisions, and plans for the future. We would like to express our thanks to DG Xu for sharing his views with us, and to Deputy Director Zhou Zhigao and other officials from NDRC for facilitating this interview.

—Fei Deng and Yizhe Zhang

THE ANTITRUST SOURCE: It has been three years since our last interview. Thanks for graciously agreeing to share your views with our readers again. We have seen that NDRC has been very active in the past year with quite a few enforcement activities and sizable fines. How have these cases come to NDRC’s attention? How does NDRC decide which cases to pursue?

DIRECTOR GENERAL XU KUNLIN: During the past few years, NDRC has investigated and imposed penalties in a number of price-monopoly cases. They came to our attention mainly by three means: (1) informant reports; (2) our taking the initiative to identify clues from the media reports and online information; and (3) companies involved voluntarily reported on the monopoly agreements they had reached.

At present, informant reports are the main source for case discovery. According to the Chinese Anti-monopoly Law (AML), the anti-monopoly enforcement agencies shall conduct necessary investigation into those reports that are in writing and contain related facts and evidence. This is our duty delegated by law.

ANTITRUST SOURCE: What do you expect to be NDRC’s areas of focus in the near future in terms of investigations?

DG XU: At present, investigated cases came to our attention mainly from informant reports. We will give priority to reports that have provided detailed and accurate evidence and information. Meanwhile, we also pay close attention to price-monopoly cases concerning people’s livelihood, so as to effectively safeguard consumers’ interest.

The Decision on Several Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform made at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) provides a mandate to “clear up and abolish various regulations and practices that impede the national unified market and fair competition, to prohibit and punish acts of any kind implementing preferential policy in violation of the law, and to combat local protectionism, monopoly and unfair competition.” NDRC will work in response to this mandate, and further strengthen law enforcement against abuses of administrative powers that eliminate or restrict competition.

ANTITRUST SOURCE: What work has NDRC done recently in terms of legislation and does NDRC plan to issue any regulations, rules, or guidelines in the near future?

DG XU: During the past year, to improve the procedures related to determining penalties for price-related violations and to protect the legitimate rights and interests of the punished, we focused on formulating and amending a series of rules and normative documents related to law enforcement procedures, including the Procedural Provisions on Administrative Penalties for Price-related Violations (Decree No. 22 of NDRC), the Provisions on Evidence for Administrative Penalties for Price-related Violations, the Model Texts of Administrative Penalties for Price-related Violations, the Provisions on File Management of Administrative Penalties for Price-related Violations, and the Rules for Investigation and Review of Price-related Violations concerning Administrative Penalties. These documents set forth comprehensive provisions regarding the procedures for determining the administrative penalties for price-related violations, including the procedures for case initiation, investigation and evidence discovery, review, hearing, discussion and others, making the law enforcement procedures for price-monopoly cases more transparent and efficient. In the near future, we will also promulgate the Measures for the Discretionary Power in Administrative Penalties on Price-related Violations. In addition, we conducted dedicated studies of issues related to the calculation of fines, leniency treatment, and suspension of investigation for anti-monopoly cases. In the future we will actively push forward relevant legislation work.

ANTITRUST SOURCE: How does the leniency program work for NDRC investigations? We understand that companies have sought leniency and received it after cooperating with NDRC’s investigation, but only after the investigation had been initiated. For example, two companies in the milk powder investigation received leniency in this fashion. Have there been any leniency applicants before the associated investigation was initiated? Does NDRC intend to release guidance regarding the leniency provision?

DG XU: As shown by the antitrust enforcement in various countries, leniency programs help to disband the monopoly agreements and improve efficiency in investigations. The Chinese AML also provides for a leniency program. In accordance with the AML and the Procedural Rules on Administrative Enforcement Against Price Monopoly, leniency treatment is applicable for a company only when the following two conditions are met: first, the company must take the initiative to report on the monopoly agreements it reached; second, it must provide important material evidence. The reporting company may be granted a reduction in or exemption from penalties only when both of these two conditions are met. In the infant formula case that we handled last year, we exempted some companies from the penalties, mainly for the reason that they met the above two conditions.

Generally speaking, in our law enforcement practices during the past few years, we have achieved positive results by applying the leniency program. To date, a precedent has been set in
that some companies were exempted from the penalties because they self-reported their violations before an investigation was initiated. Of course, at the present early stage, the provisions of the leniency program as stated in relevant laws and regulations are general. We are studying the issues with the goal of setting forth further detailed provisions so that the system is more transparent and the parties can have clearer legal expectations.

**ANTITRUST SOURCE:** On the calculation of penalties, we understand that Article 46 of the AML states that “where business operators reach a monopoly agreement and perform it in violation of this Law, the anti-monopoly authority shall order them to cease doing so, and shall confiscate the illegal gains and impose a fine of 1% up to 10% of the sales revenue in the previous year.” There are several terms here that may need further clarification. First, how has NDRC defined and calculated the “illegal gains”? Second, how does NDRC determine the percentage fine (from the range of 1% to 10%) to apply in a given case? Third, what does the “sales revenue in the previous year” refer to? Lastly, is there a plan to release some guidance on how the penalties are calculated?

**DG XU:** It is very complicated to calculate the illegal gains from monopoly conduct, and a common practice in many jurisdictions is to compare the prices before and after the monopoly conduct, or to compare the price in a monopoly market and that in a competitive market. However, in general, there is no method unanimously accepted in administrative and judicial enforcement across jurisdictions. Therefore, we can only address this issue on a case-by-case basis.

As to the size of the fine, NDRC has discretionary power in imposing administrative penalties. To protect the legitimate rights and interests of citizens, legal entities, and other organizations, we are formulating specific measures regarding the discretionary power in imposing administrative penalties, which are expected to be introduced in the near future.

The AML treats “the turnover for the previous year” as a basis for determining the fines. How to interpret this has a great impact upon the rights and interests of the punished parties. In the law enforcement during the past few years, we tended to strictly limit “the turnover for the previous year,” so as to prevent excessive penalties that may cause unnecessary impact upon the production and operation of the punished parties. But we also noticed that for cases in which price-related violations had continued for many years and in which the prices increased significantly, if we adopt a narrower reading of the “turnover” in determining the fine, it would be in favor of the law breakers. At present, we are studying the issues regarding anti-monopoly fines, and will push forward relevant legislation to provide further detailed regulations.

**ANTITRUST SOURCE:** What measures has NDRC adopted to allow a company under investigation to exercise its right of defense and to ensure transparency in investigation procedures? Does NDRC have a measure to protect confidential business documents and information from being released to other agencies or the public?

**DG XU:** In order to regulate the procedures for administrative penalties and protect the legitimate rights and interests of the parties, NDRC has formulated and amended a series of rules and normative documents. We believe that by way of improving the law enforcement procedures, the parties’ rights to make statements and put forward defenses can be better protected. For example, the *Procedural Provisions on Administrative Penalties for Price-related Violations* provide that before making a decision to impose administrative penalties, the anti-monopoly enforcement
authority shall notify the parties in writing of the contemplated administrative penalty decision and the facts, reasons, and basis supporting the decision, and inform the parties of their rights to make statements and put forward defenses. When an administrative penalty with a large fine is to be implemented, the parties shall have the right to apply for a hearing. If the facts, reasons, and evidence offered in the parties’ statements and defenses or by the parties during the hearing are well founded, they shall be accepted by the anti-monopoly enforcement authority. In addition, to ensure that the parties can fully exercise those rights, the Procedural Provisions on Administrative Penalties for Price-related Violations also provide that the anti-monopoly enforcement authority shall not increase the penalties on account of the parties’ statements, defense or the hearings.

As to the protection of business secrets, it is explicitly provided for by Article 41 of the AML that the anti-monopoly enforcement authority and its staff shall keep confidential the business secrets obtained in the course of law enforcement. Information and materials received during the AML enforcement will be strictly limited to the use for the AML enforcement.

ANTITRUST SOURCE: What is your view of the usefulness of economic analyses in antitrust investigations? Does NDRC have its own economists or consult with outside economists?

DG XU: During the anti-monopoly law enforcement, economic analysis plays a very important role. At present, our Bureau has many law enforcement officials who have an economics background. Meanwhile, during the anti-monopoly investigations, we will also engage external economists to participate in the case analysis and discussion. For example, there are many economists on the expert panel of the Anti-monopoly Commission of the State Council. We will solicit opinions on cases from relevant experts.

ANTITRUST SOURCE: Scholars around the world are expressing increasing concerns that patents are being transferred from operating companies to “patent licensing companies,” also known as “patent trolls,” for assertion against the operating companies’ competitors. This behavior, also called patent privateering, has the potential to drive up competitors’ costs and raise prices to consumers. Is the NDRC concerned about patent privateering?

DG XU: The Chinese AML specifically provides that “this law is applicable to the conduct of undertakings that abuse their intellectual property rights, eliminating or restricting competition.” Therefore, the Chinese AML prohibits any abuse of intellectual property by undertakings to eliminate or restrict competition. Compared with traditional operating companies, patent licensing companies are less restricted in exercising patent rights, which means it may be easier for them to abuse intellectual property rights and cause anti-competition concerns. We have also noticed that an increasing number of patents are being transferred from traditional operating companies to patent licensing companies. If patent licensing companies abuse their patent rights to eliminate or restrict market competition, harming consumer rights, we will conduct investigations in accordance with the law.

ANTITRUST SOURCE: What is your view on resale price maintenance (RPM)? Should a per se illegal rule apply or should it be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, weighing the potential anticompetitive and procompetitive effects? In the two RPM cases that NDRC has investigated so far, one with white liquor and the other with milk powder, did NDRC weigh the potential procompetitive effects against the anticompetitive effects? In practice, how does NDRC decide exemptions under Article 15 of the AML? Has NDRC ever granted exemptions?
DG XU: The AML has an explicit and clear provision regarding RPM: Article 14 in principle prohibits this kind of conduct, specifically indicating that in general RPM is illegal. Article 15 provides for exceptions, giving consideration to possible business rationales for imposing RPMs. Therefore, the approach of the AML toward RPM is “prohibition in principle, but with exceptions.” In our law enforcement, we have adopted this approach consistently in addressing RPM. During investigations, we give the investigated undertakings sufficient opportunities to defend themselves. If the investigated undertakings are able to prove that their RPM activities meet the conditions set forth in Article 15 of the AML, then we will exempt them from penalties in accordance with the law.

In the white liquor case and the infant formula case, we performed an in-depth analysis of the impact of RPM on market competition and consumer interest, and further analyzed the nature and degree of the suspected monopoly conduct. We treated these issues as important factors in considering different penalties.

In accordance with Article 15 of the AML, except for the circumstance listed in item (vi) “protecting legitimate interests in foreign trade and economic cooperation,” under which the undertaking can be exempted directly, under other circumstances listed in items (i) to (v), the undertaking needs to prove that the following three conditions are met simultaneously: first, the agreement reached falls within at least one of the circumstances mentioned above; second, the agreement reached will not substantially eliminate or restrict competition in the relevant market(s); third, the agreement reached will benefit consumers. The exemption can be granted only when these three conditions are met. So far there has been no case we have handled where any undertaking was granted exemption in accordance with Article 15 of the AML.

ANTITRUST SOURCE: What is your view of whether a request of antitrust immunity for airline business agreements and airline alliances should be considered and how such a request should be evaluated?

DG XU: We have noticed that business cooperation and alliances are increasing in the airline industry. Article 15 of the AML sets forth the circumstances under which horizontal agreements shall be exempted and that provision also applies to the airline industry. In other words, if the business cooperation or alliance conforms to the relevant provisions of the AML, the anti-monopoly law enforcement agency may choose to grant an exemption.

At present, NDRC has established a joint meeting and working mechanism with the Civil Aviation Administration of China and will carefully review the applications submitted by air carriers for exemption of their horizontal agreements, giving full consideration to relevant provisions in the AML and the characteristics of this industry.

ANTITRUST SOURCE: What do you think is the current status of the relationship between industrial policy and antitrust policy in China? Some commentators have suggested that the former dominates the latter. What’s your view? Do you think the relationship might change in the future?

DG XU: In light of the stage of its economic development and the actual characteristics of the economy, China keeps attaching great importance to the role of industrial policy in promoting economic development. For a long time, China has been implementing a series of industrial policies that have played key roles in advancing the adjustment and upgrade of industrial structures, and promoting economic transformation and development.

In accordance with the Decision on Several Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform made at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the
CPC, the market shall play the decisive role in resource allocation. Competition is the key driver of market resource allocation. Therefore, at the present new stage of economic development, in order to adapt to the requirements of reform of the economic structure and transformation of government functions, China shall gradually establish the fundamental role of competition policy. At present, we have entrusted relevant experts and scholars to conduct research on the relationship of industrial policy and competition policy as well as coordination between the two, to clarify relevant issues from a theoretical perspective, and to study the establishment of a mechanism of communication and coordination between industrial policy and competition policy.

**ANTITRUST SOURCE:** There have been reports that a number of eyeglass manufacturers have reduced their prices recently due to NDRC’s investigation. Are these price reductions commitments made as part of their settlements with NDRC? Will NDRC impose fines on all or some of these manufacturers?

**DG XU:** Due to public concerns regarding the price of eyeglasses, in the second half of 2013, based on reports from consumers, NDRC initiated an investigation into the primary lens manufacturers and discovered that some manufacturers had engaged in anticompetitive conduct by restricting the resale prices of downstream players, which lessened the price competition in the relevant lens market and harmed consumer interests. Based on the rule-of-law principle that “the law must be observed and strictly enforced and the lawbreakers must be held responsible,” the relevant local price authorities imposed administrative penalties on those companies in accordance with the AML. After becoming aware of the illegal nature of their pricing conduct, to reduce or eliminate the negative consequences of their illegal conduct, the companies concerned in the case took the initiative to undergo rectification measures such as lowering the factory prices of their mainstream products. To show their sincerity in rectifying their mistakes, the companies concerned made public announcements on their official websites for public supervision.

**ANTITRUST SOURCE:** What’s your view on how FRAND (fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory) royalty rates should be determined?

**DG XU:** The holders of standard-essential patents shall follow the principles of fairness, reasonableness, and non-discrimination in licensing. In standard-essential patent licensing, the role of the market mechanism is greatly constrained as the patent holders are able to control the licensing terms, including the patent royalty rates. To prevent the patent holders from abusing their patent rights, it is important to supervise and intervene, to the extent necessary, in their licensing activities and constrain their acts with objective requirements and the principles of fairness, reasonableness, and non-discrimination.

Without a doubt, it is a complex issue to abstractly discuss how to set fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory patent royalty rates. However, for a specific case with clear facts and sufficient evidence, it is quite clear whether the patent royalty set by the patent right holder is fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory because, although the fairness, reasonableness, and non-discrimination could not be accurately quantified, excessive unfairness, unreasonable, and discrimination would result in a change in the nature of the licensing conduct, and can be determined in a qualitative way. Therefore, if we view the FRAND principle from the perspective of anti-monopoly law enforcement, we will come to the following three conclusions. First, it is permissible and necessary for AML enforcement to intervene in the licensing terms, including royalty rates.
Otherwise, the FRAND principle will be rendered powerless and will not matter in practice. Secondly, the intervention by AML enforcement in patent licensing originates from the FRAND principle, but whether licensing conduct is anticompetitive shall be determined based on the specific provisions of the AML. Thirdly, whether the royalty rate is fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory should be analyzed and determined on a case-by-case basis in AML enforcement.

**ANTITRUST SOURCE:** Regarding the InterDigital (IDC) investigation, we have heard that IDC applied for and was granted suspension. How is an application for suspension of investigation evaluated? Would companies under suspension of investigation be subject to fines? If yes, how would NDRC calculate fines in such a case?

**DG Xu:** NDRC made the decision to suspend the investigation of IDC on May 22. The commitment system set forth in Article 45 of the AML aims to reduce the costs of AML enforcement and effectively resolve potential anticompetitive concerns. Therefore, with regard to the application for suspension of an investigation, we mainly consider the following two aspects. Firstly, it should be unclear whether the acts of the undertaking are anticompetitive and the case should be in a “suspected” status. If the evidence collected through investigation confirms that the acts of the undertaking are anticompetitive, or do not trigger anti-competition issues, this provision shall not apply. Secondly, the commitments made by the undertaking should be able to eliminate the consequence of the suspected monopoly acts and restore market competition. The determination of whether to suspend an investigation is made according to the specifics of the case. We made the decision to suspend the investigation of IDC based on the state of the investigation and the commitments made by IDC.

According to the AML, the investigated company shall not be subject to any penalty after the decision to suspend the investigation is made. However, if the investigated company fails to fulfill its commitments or triggers any other conditions prescribed by law, we will resume the investigation and may impose penalties.

**ANTITRUST SOURCE:** Is the pharmaceutical industry one of the areas that NDRC is investigating right now? What are some of the potential antitrust issues in this industry?

**DG Xu:** The issues existing in the pharmaceutical industry are major issues concerning people’s livelihood, and the pharmaceutical industry has always been the focus of our AML enforcement. In 2011, NDRC published its fines on two drug distributors in Shandong province, which acquired a market dominant position by exclusive distribution of Promethazine Hydrochloride (a type of medicine raw material) and resold it to downstream companies for an unfairly high price. The decision was well received by the public. Similar cases still exist in the Chinese pharmaceutical industry, and we always take them seriously, holding a zero-tolerance policy. At present, relevant anti-monopoly investigation is ongoing. In addition, abuse of dominance by pharmaceutical manufacturers with intellectual property rights and patented technologies, such as licensing at high royalty rates, refusal to license, compulsory grant-back, and imposing unreasonable trading conditions, is also the focus of our AML enforcement.

**ANTITRUST SOURCE:** Other jurisdictions are in the process of investigating price-fixing cartels in the auto parts industry. There have also been complaints domestically about cars and auto parts being too expensive in China. Has the NDRC started any investigation of the auto industry? Is the
investigation focused on the auto parts suppliers or are other channels of the auto industry being investigated as well? Is the investigation focused on horizontal or vertical issues? Is the investigation focused on foreign companies or domestic companies?

**DG XU:** We have noticed that the AML enforcement agencies of some other countries are conducting investigations into price collusion among auto parts manufacturers. In recent years, NDRC has been conducting anti-monopoly investigations of auto parts manufacturers regarding their reaching and implementation of horizontal monopoly agreements. We keep a close watch on anticompetitive acts that may exist in the entire car and auto parts industries, and have so far engaged in some investigations. We will conduct investigations and impose applicable penalties in accordance with the law regardless of whether the product at issue is the entire automobile or a part, the suspected price related violation is a horizontal agreement, vertical agreement, or abuse of dominance, or the manufacturers involved are domestic or foreign.

**ANTITRUST SOURCE:** China appears to have entered a golden era of online platform competition with large, well-funded entities. The market appears to be dynamic and many of these companies such as Tencent and Baidu provide free services. Does NDRC consider this space to be a priority for enforcement?

**DG XU:** Chinese Internet companies are growing rapidly, and many new business models are emerging in the Internet industry. However, some acts suspected of eliminating or restricting competition have occurred during the development of Internet finance, Internet media, Internet shopping and other new business models, which to some extent, have caused worry and concern on the part of the AML enforcement agencies.

To achieve the positive externalities of networks and attract more users, the Internet platform companies such as Tencent and Baidu often compete with each other by providing free services. We keep a close watch on this new competition model. If any anticompetitive acts are discovered, we will conduct investigations pursuant to the law and endeavor to maintain the fair market competition of the Internet industry.

Meanwhile, since the Internet platforms adopt the business model of providing free services, which is quite distinct from traditional business models, we will face many new challenges during our anti-monopoly investigations. For example, the features of two-sided markets or multi-sided markets will raise new considerations for the definition of relevant markets. SSNIP and other analysis tools need to be modified, or other measures focusing on the sales or profitability models will be used to define the relevant markets. Due to the broad scope of Internet users, the definition of the relevant geographic market will also need to reflect the new features. In addition, we also pay attention to the potential anticompetitive acts of abusing intellectual property rights in the Internet industry.

**ANTITRUST SOURCE:** Has there been any cooperation with other jurisdictions on investigations? Will there be further cooperation in the future?

**DG XU:** Since the AML came into force, NDRC has always attached great importance to international cooperation and communication in the anti-monopoly sector, and has signed cooperation memoranda with the anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies of the UK, the U.S., South Korea, and the EU to provide for the framework for cooperation and to establish a long-term cooperation...
mechanism. At the same time, by organizing or attending international seminars, paying mutual 
visits and other means, we have strengthened international anti-monopoly cooperation and drawn 
lessons and experience from the practices of agencies in mature market economies, so as to 
improve the capabilities and skills of Chinese anti-monopoly enforcement authorities.

We notice that with the deepening of economic globalization, more and more anticompetitive 
acts present international features including international cartels, abuse by multinational corpo-
rations of their market dominant positions, etc. It is very important for the anti-monopoly law 
enforcement agencies in different jurisdictions to enhance their information communication and 
law enforcement coordination. We will take the initiative to establish relevant communication and 
coordination mechanisms with the anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies of other jurisdic-
tions. If the time is right, we will also consider conducting joint enforcement to effectively regulate 
anticompetitive acts and maintain a sound market order with fair competition.

ANTITRUST SOURCE: Does NDRC have any plan to publish formally initiated investigations and the 
penalty decisions in order to increase enforcement transparency and improve compliance by 
companies through self-evaluation?

DG XU: We always believe that timely publication of information on anti-monopoly investigations 
increases law enforcement transparency, provides convenience for public supervision, and 
encourages lawful company operations. In recent years, NDRC and local anti-price monopoly law 
enforcement authorities have made public a large number of price monopoly cases, which 
received positive outcomes. In the future, we will continue to take the initiative to further our 
efforts in making public information about anti-monopoly law enforcement.
Weathervanes, Lightning Rods, and Pliers: The NDRC’s Competition Enforcement Program

By Nate Bush

For the first four years after China’s Anti-monopoly Law (AML) took effect on August 1, 2008, the antitrust enforcement program of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) seemed dormant, with few publicized investigations, only modest rulemaking initiatives, and little fanfare. That changed in 2013, as the NDRC’s Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau (PSAMB) pursued high-profile antitrust investigations of Chinese and foreign companies. PSAMB leaders have explained that it took time to develop internal capacity and promote public awareness of competition law principles. This surge in AML investigations, however, also reflects a broader effort by the NDRC to demonstrate leadership and retain clout in a period of renewed focus on economic reform.

The Weathervanes

The NDRC is among the most powerful organs of China’s central government, the hub of industrial policy and economic planning. During the final drafting of the AML, many observers expressed concern that one of the three agencies charged with enforcing China’s first comprehensive competition statute—heralded as a possible instrument of economic liberalization—would be the paramount planner. In an ironic twist, the AML took effect mere weeks before the global financial downturn in late 2008. Stabilization, stimulus, and industrial policy goals swiftly overshadowed the AML, and ensured the NDRC’s continued leadership during a period of “state capitalism” when centralized industrial policy and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) reigned.

By 2013, however, the winds were shifting in Beijing. The “fifth generation” of leaders of the People’s Republic took the helm of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in November 2012 and of the Chinese state in March 2013, with Xi Jinping’s becoming CCP Chairman and PRC President and Li Keqiang’s becoming Party Secretary of the State Council and Premier. The once-in-a-decade transition proved dramatic, punctuated by the trial of Bo Xilai on corruption and abuse of power charges. Throughout the bureaucracy, officials strove to decipher the new leadership’s policy directions, jockey for positions of influence, and avoid being tarnished in an ongoing anticorruption blitzkrieg. In the economic sphere, the new leadership signaled renewed interest in market-oriented reforms and streamlining the bureaucracy. The official communique of the Third Plenum announced the new direction to “let the market play the decisive role in allocating resources.” In December 2013, the State Council rescinded dozens of regulations, stripping the

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1 The New York Times has published a chronicle of the political and judicial developments surrounding the rise and fall of Bo Xilai at http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/b/bo_xilai/index.html.

NDRC of approval authority over a wide range of projects. The government has moved forward with a new free trade zone in Shanghai, experimenting with the administration of a discrete (albeit significant) commercial area based on dramatically reduced investment restrictions. It remains to be seen how far the new leadership will (or can) push economic reforms, but the shift in focus from the previous leadership is clear.

The NDRC responded to this climate change by evolving. While acknowledging that its powers to review and approve specific projects would be greatly reduced, the NDRC announced that it would restructure to concentrate on macroeconomic policy coordination and “regulation of operations.” In January 2014, NDRC Chairman Xu Shaoshi warned that “to allow the market to play a key role, a modern market mechanism must be further enhanced, a reform of price-forming mechanisms must be deepened, and monopoly and unfair competition should be prohibited,” alluding to the increased importance of the PSAMB.

The PSAMB was established in 2011 by renaming the existing Price Supervision Department and elevating it to “bureau” status. The bureau’s full name aptly describes its mission: it enforces the 1997 Price Law and addresses pricing-related violations of the AML rules against monopoly agreements and abuse of dominance. The Price Law establishes a framework for direct regulation of pricing for certain products, although prices for most goods and services are “determined autonomously by business operators and formed through market competition.” The Price Law also prohibits certain “aberrant” pricing practices, with rules against predatory pricing, price discrimination, and price fixing that are in many ways broader than analogous provisions of the AML.

PSAMB leadership recognizes the differences between the two laws and enforces them as complementary elements in a single enforcement program, often applying them concurrently to achieve desired outcomes in specific cases. Both laws were invoked in penalty decisions against suppliers of river sand for unfair pricing by dominant firms and hoarding, against a cartel of rice noodle producers, and against a cartel orchestrated by a trade association of paper producers. The NDRC also relied on the Price Law to impose penalties on foreign LCD Panel producers for price-fixing conduct that occurred before the effective date of the AML. The central

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2 See [Peter Martin, The Humbling of the NDRC, JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION CHINA BRIEF 14, no. 5 (Mar.6, 2014), available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42057&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=758&no_cache=1](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42057&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=758&no_cache=1).


7 Id. ch. 2.


PSAMB can conduct investigations directly, or can act through provincial development and reform commissions and local price bureaus to enforce the AML and Price Law.  

As the NDRC has recast itself as a macroeconomic policymaker and commercial regulator, the PSAMB has become more visible. The recent surge in PSAMB enforcement accompanied new initiatives to promote public awareness of the AML, the Price Law, and the PSAMB’s activities.

In January 2014, the PSAMB overhauled measures aimed at encouraging public complaints about unlawful pricing practices. The *Provisions on Handling Tip-Offs Against Price-Related Unlawful Practices* direct local and provincial bureaus to establish and publicize reporting hotlines for “whistleblowers” to report suspected “activities in violation of the laws, regulations, rules, and the provisions of other normative documents on pricing and charging fees.” These provisions outline standards for evaluating incoming tips, for advising complainants of the progress of the investigation, and for safeguarding the anonymity of whistleblowers. The measures also establish a system for mediating price-related disputes between complainants and companies accused of unlawful pricing practices. The *Provisions on Rewards for Tip-Offs Against Price-Related Unlawful Practices* establish procedures for rewarding reports of “price-related” unlawful practices with cash bounties of RMB100 to RMB10,000. To qualify for a reward, a whistleblower must disclose his or her identity and contact details when reporting the misconduct and provide detailed facts about the offence, the tip must involve a matter that was not previously known to the authorities, and the subsequent investigation of the matter must lead to verification of the allegation and imposition of penalties. The *Provisions on Handling Tip-Offs Against Price-Related Unlawful Practices* were formally issued pursuant to the Price Law and “other relevant laws and administrative regulations,” and both measures replaced much older rules. Nevertheless, the whistleblower and reward procedures might be fairly construed to cover tips of AML violations as well as Price Law violations. As a practical matter, any incoming tips are likely to be scrutinized under both the Price Law and the AML.

Although the central PSAMB has expanded since late 2011 and plans further expansion, its headcount remains limited. In allocating limited resources, the PSAMB must consider not only its formal mandate, but also the institutional incentives of the NDRC within China’s nuanced political system.

**The NDRC is motivated to demonstrate to China’s senior leadership that it can operate as a competent, credible, and effective competition authority.** It must also demonstrate that its enforcement of the AML and the Price Law will advance the overall policy agenda of Xi Jinping. To do so, Chinese domestic audiences must see the PSAMB as pursuing enforcement actions that remedy commercial practices deemed harmful by average Chinese consumers, reinforce other key industrial policies or government initiatives, or otherwise exhibit the NDRC’s power vis-à-vis the rest of

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the bureaucracy. Perceptions of the PSAMB’s effectiveness among officialdom and the general public can bolster or erode the NDRC’s stature within the central government.

Enforcement risks seem greatest where AML or Price Law violations impact the daily lives of ordinary Chinese citizens or impede Chinese public policy goals. In the last 18 months, the NDRC issued high-profile decisions against privately owned Chinese companies large and small, state-owned enterprises, and multinational companies. In many of these decisions, the application of basic rules against cartels and resale price maintenance (RPM) has dovetailed with popular concerns of Chinese consumers, as well as other policy goals. The penalization of infant formula suppliers for RPM\(^\text{17}\) and the pending survey of pricing in the pharmaceutical industry\(^\text{18}\) resonate with public frustrations with health care costs (as do contemporaneous anticorruption investigations in the pharmaceutical sector.) Similarly, the penalization of two state-owned distilleries for RPM \(^\text{19}\) followed public attention to liquor and other hospitality costs amidst the crackdown on government largesse and corruption. \(^\text{19}\) Although it did not involve the AML, the PSAMB highlighted a recent sweep of domestic commercial banks for charging fees in violation of the Price Law and the Commercial Bank Law. Targets included China’s 5 major state-owned banks, 12 national commercial banks, 26 city commercial banks, and several village commercial banks and rural credit cooperatives. \(^\text{20}\) Like the NDRC’s ongoing investigation of Chinese state-owned telecommunications companies, this effort demonstrated the NDRC’s willingness to tackle state-owned enterprises. \(^\text{21}\) In addition, because provincial and local price bureaus report directly to provincial and local governments, regional enforcement actions may reflect regional political considerations as well as regional market conditions. For example, successive investigations of suppliers of sea sand and river sand for use in construction appear to have been prompted by the Guangdong government. \(^\text{22}\)

Meanwhile, the PSAMB’s recent suspension of its investigation of InterDigital and its pending investigation of Qualcomm both involve the licensing of foreign-owned standard essential patents (SEPs) for mobile telecommunications—an industry vital both to Chinese end-consumers as well as Chinese consumer-electronics companies. \(^\text{23}\) While these probes have revived concerns that Chinese antitrust rules might ensnare foreign patent holders for industrial policy or protectionist goals, they appear to focus (at least in part) on legal questions that remain controversial in the


United States, Europe, and many other jurisdictions—namely, the antitrust limits on the conduct of non-practicing entities and the enforcement of SEPs.

Suspensions that the NDRC’s overall industrial policy goals may impact its selection of targets and enforcement decisions are clearly warranted, but should be tempered. The text of the AML itself expressly directs the administrative enforcement agencies to consider national economic and technological development and other public interest goals, and the NDRC cannot ignore the broader policy directions and political climate within the government. That said, the NDRC now faces greater expectations than it has in the past to align its antitrust enforcement with the interests of Chinese consumers and market-oriented reform, so “industrial policy” is not necessarily the key determinant of all enforcement actions.

Significantly, the PSAMB is not required to publish all—indeed, any—of its enforcement decisions. The antitrust administrative agencies in China have the discretion to determine which investigations to disclose, which enforcement decisions to release, and how to articulate its factual findings and details. The underlying investigation records remain nonpublic. In 2013, the nationwide price authorities conducted 34,400 investigations and imposed sanctions totaling RMB3.125 billion, including restitution to consumers of RMB632 million, confiscated illegal gains of RMB907 million, and levied administrative fines of RMB1.58 billion. The vast majority of these cases (presumably local Price Law cases) remain unpublicized. This selective transparency allows the PSAMB to spotlight cases both to stress substantive legal lessons (e.g., “don’t collude with competitors”) and to underscore political themes (e.g., “the NDRC is protecting you”). But the selective transparency also presents an obstacle for analyzing the relative even-handedness or bias of the PSAMB’s overall enforcement program.

The Pliers

The PSAMB enjoys tremendous discretion in setting penalties and negotiating settlements with investigated parties. Penalties for monopolistic conduct under the AML include fines of 1 to 10 percent of the previous year’s turnover, confiscation of illegal gains, and orders to cease violations. Penalties under the Price Law include fines up to five times the value of any illegal gains, confiscation of illegal gains, suspension of business, and orders to cease violations.

The magnitude of these penalties underscores the value of leniency. The PSAMB has emphasized the principle of leniency in its competition enforcement program, rewarding voluntary disclosure, proactive remediation, and active cooperation with investigators by reducing or forgoing penalties. In a 2011 report, the PSAMB proclaimed that “the leniency principle shall be well-utilized and business operators shall be encouraged to voluntarily report the information regarding formulation of monopoly agreements and provide important evidence.”

At first blush, trumpeting leniency seems in step with the formal cartel amnesty or leniency programs in many other jurisdictions. These programs use concrete guarantees of a substantial reduction or elimination of penalties to create a race to be the first cartel participant (or one of the first in some jurisdictions) to disclose a previously undetected cartel and then assist the investigi-
gation. Upon closer examination, however, the NDRC’s current leniency practices are better understood as a discretionary policy to reward confessions and cooperation rather than a formal program of assured benefits for voluntary disclosure.

The notion of leniency in exchange for voluntary confessions and active cooperation with authorities is well-established in Chinese law. China’s Criminal Code allows criminal defendants to receive either “lesser punishment” (congqin g) at the lower end of statutory penalty ranges or “mitigated punishment” (jianqin g) below the relevant statutory penalty range in certain circumstances.28 A criminal defendant may receive “lesser punishment” or “mitigated punishment” if the defendant either voluntarily surrenders and provides a truthful account of the criminal conduct or discloses information on crimes by other individuals or provides significant information in support of other criminal investigations. However, the Criminal Code directs that if a defendant both voluntarily surrenders and provides significant information in support of other investigations, then the defendant shall be granted mitigated punishment or be wholly exempt from punishment.29

In this light, the AML’s “leniency” provision seems more like an extension of general principles of Chinese law than an adoption of foreign antitrust leniency or amnesty procedures. Article 46 of the AML simply provides that that “where business operators, on their own initiative, report information concerning the conclusion of monopoly agreements and provide important evidence to the Anti-monopoly Enforcement Authority, the Anti-monopoly Enforcement Authority may mitigate the penalty imposed or grant exemption from penalty after weighing the relevant circumstances.”31 Article 14 of the NDRC Rules for Procedures of Administrative Enforcement of Price Anti-monopoly repeats this language.32 Article 14 further provides that the first business operator to meet these conditions may be exempted from punishment, the second’s penalties may be reduced by more than 50 percent, and others’ penalties may be reduced by less than 50 percent.

Unlike most foreign antitrust leniency and amnesty procedures, the PSAMB’s leniency policies carry no firm assurances of reduced punishment for the first parties to disclose monopoly agreements. Instead, the PSAMB has the option to confer or withhold leniency throughout the investigation process, consistent with longstanding principles of leniency under Chinese law. PSAMB Director XU Kunlin confirmed this approach in a February 2014 press conference:

The bureau has discretion to adjust fines from 1% to 10%. In the future, we will set forth guidelines for using this discretion. Currently, our decision is made through certain procedures and in consideration


29 The Supreme People’s Court has issued an opinion stating that criminals who voluntarily surrender should generally receive leniency. See Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court Regarding Implementation of Strict and Lenient Criminal Principles (issued by the Supreme People’s Court on Feb. 8, 2010), available at http://www.hnly.gov.cn/portal/slgja/gafg/webinfo/2010/09/1285610921514017.htm.


31 AML, supra note 24.

with respect to the damage to the market, cooperation with investigation, active rectification, effect of rectification, and others. Therefore the discretion is restrained. For companies who actively cooperate with investigation, provide important evidence voluntarily, actively rectify, eliminate the negative effect, and restore the order of competition, such discretion is necessary. 33

Both domestic and foreign companies have received leniency in PSAMB investigations. In the 2010 rice noodle cartel case, 21 companies received fines ranging from RMB30,000 to RMB 100,000. However, 12 other companies that voluntarily cooperated with the investigation, provided significant information, and voluntarily remedied their conduct received only warnings. 34 In a 2013 cartel investigation of three crystal shops in Hainan province, two companies were fined RMB3.6M and RMB1.35M while the third (and largest) company was not penalized because it had voluntarily disclosed the cartel and provided significant evidence during the investigation. 35

Leniency principles also resonated in the 2013 decision fining six foreign companies under the Price Law for participation in an international LCD panel cartel. 36 The total fines were substantially lower than the maximum statutory fines under the Price Law of up to five times the illegal gains. In a press conference, an NDRC spokesperson explained that “all of these six producers have voluntarily surrendered. Therefore NDRC granted lesser punishment to each of them respectively to different extents, and the amount of fines are lighter.” 37 The spokesperson further emphasized the carrot-and-stick dynamics of leniency, explaining that the NDRC “used the continuous pressure of anti-monopoly investigation and the leniency policy to compel the voluntary surrender from the companies.” 38

In the 2013 investigation of nine infant formula suppliers for RPM, six companies were fined a total of RMB668.73M while three companies were exempt from penalties. 39 The NDRC notice suggests that fines were determined by the seriousness of each company’s misconduct, the extent of each company’s voluntary disclosure, cooperation with the investigation, and the extent of remediation. The NDRC calculated fines as a percentage of the prior year’s sales, imposing fines of 6 percent on one company for “serious illegal conduct” and “failure to take active remediation,” of 4 percent on one company found to have “failed to cooperate in the investigation” but which nevertheless took “active remediation,” and of 3 percent on four companies that both cooperated and actively remediated. No fines were levied on four companies that “took the initiative to report” the RPM practices to the NDRC, “provided key evidence,” and undertook remediation “on their own initiative.” 40 The notice does not clarify the relative weight of these factors, the grada-

33 Press Conference on Price Regulation and Anti-monopoly by NDRC, supra note 20.
36 See Six Overseas Enterprises Were Punished for Price Monopoly of LCD Panel, supra note 11.
38 Id.
39 See Biostime and Other Infant Formula Producers Were Fined for RMB 668. 73 Million for Constraining Competition in Violation of the Anti-monopoly Law, supra note 17.
40 Id.
tions in the seriousness of each company’s misconduct, or the specific steps deemed “failure to cooperate” with the investigation.

These decisions have not tracked the rigid penalty discounts prescribed for the first, second, and subsequent leniency applicants in the NDRC rules. Instead, the NDRC appears to apply the general principles of lesser penalty and reduced penalty common to Chinese criminal and administrative practice.

In June 2014, the NDRC released new guidelines for the imposition of penalties pursuant to the Price Law. The new rules describe five gradations of administrative penalties: immunity from punishment, mitigated punishment, lighter punishment, general punishment, and heavier punishment. Mitigated or reduced penalties may be applied, for example, when offenders take the initiative to eliminate or rectify adverse consequences of their actions, cooperate with the investigation, and correct improper conduct in a timely fashion. More severe penalties may be applied for violations with severe consequences, for repeat offenders, and for falsifying, destroying, or tampering with evidence. The new rules also provide benchmarks for the different gradations of penalties under the various penalty provisions of the Price Law. For example, “lighter punishment” is less than 40 percent of the maximum statutory penalty, general punishment is 40–60 percent, and heavier punishment is more than 60 percent. Although these new measures technically apply only to Price Law violations, they likely reflect the PSAMB’s approach to securing ongoing cooperation in AML investigations.

The PSAMB enjoys similar discretion in determining whether to “suspend” investigations based on remedial undertakings from the investigated parties. Article 45 of the AML authorizes the enforcement authority to suspend an investigation of monopolistic conduct “if the business operators under investigation promise to eliminate the effects of the conduct through taking concrete measures within a time limit prescribed” by the enforcement authority. A decision formally suspending an investigation must memorialize the specific commitments made by the business operators under investigation. Compliance must be monitored, and the investigation may eventually be terminated upon a determination that the business operators have “fulfilled their commitments.”

The PSAMB recently invoked Article 45 to resolve its high-profile probe of the InterDigital’s licensing of SEPs for telecommunications. The NDRC investigation followed a private action brought by Huawei. On February 4, 2013, the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court found that InterDigital, a licensor of SEPs for mobile phones, had violated the AML rules against “abuse of dominance” in the licensing and enforcement of SEPs. The court awarded Huawei RMB 20 million in damages, and ordered InterDigital to license the SEPs to Huawei at a court-determined royal-

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42 Id. art. 4.
43 Id. arts. 6–7.
44 Id. art. 8.
45 Id. art. 12.
46 Article 45 of the AML provides that the enforcement authority “shall resume” the investigation if: (1) “the business operators fail to fulfill their commitments,” (2) “material changes have occurred to the facts based on which the decision to suspend the investigation was made,” or (3) “the decision to suspend the investigation was made based on incomplete or untrue information provided by the business operators.” See AML, supra note 24, art. 45.
ty rate of 0.019 percent. This judgment was subsequently sustained on appeal. InterDigital’s petition to the Supreme People’s Court for a retrial of this case is currently under review.

The NDRC initiated a separate investigation of InterDigital’s licensing practices in June 2013. On May 22, 2014, the NDRC publicly announced the suspension of the investigation based on remedial measures proposed by InterDigital. According to the announcement, InterDigital confirmed it had reached a licensing agreement with Huawei and committed to use the terms of the Huawei license as a reference for licenses to other Chinese companies. InterDigital specifically committed that it would “not charge Chinese enterprises discriminatory high-priced licensing fees, not bundle licenses for non-standard essential patents and standard essential patents, not request grant-backs of patents held by Chinese enterprises to IDC for free, and not litigate to force Chinese companies to accept “unreasonable” license conditions.” Accordingly, the NDRC suspended the investigation pursuant to article 45 of the AML, with the warning that the NDRC would actively monitor InterDigital’s compliance with these commitments, which largely extended the fruits of Huawei’s litigation to other Chinese licensees.

The threat of enormous penalties provides the NDRC with tremendous leverage in conducting investigations and negotiating remedial commitments. Accordingly, many multinational companies and foreign governments were alarmed by media reports in 2013 of the PSAMB’s expectations of prompt “self-criticisms” and “confessions” from companies accused of anticompetitive conduct and discouragement of the engagement of defense counsel in NDRC investigations. Subsequent public statements by the PSAMB appear to have moderated or clarified these positions, acknowledging the role of defense counsel in the investigation process.

Nevertheless, concerns persist that the PSAMB may not distinguish an “uncooperative” obstruction of a factual investigation into a challenged commercial practice (such as by refusing to provide documents, data, or access to witnesses) from an “uncooperative” zealous legal defense. The spread of penalties from 0 to 6 percent of turnover in the infant formula case confirmed the risks of being found uncooperative. Given these risks, the prospect of leniency can deter investigated parties from vigorously defending defensible conduct.

The PSAMB can exert this leverage to secure confessions and concessions from “cooperative” companies, but at the cost of retarding the overall development of China’s substantive antitrust law. Many of the unresolved questions under the AML pivot on the assertion and evaluation of defenses. Current rules and available precedent shed little light on the specific principles and methodologies for determining whether a restrictive practice may qualify for “exemption” from prohibition, and whether an alleged abusive practice by a dominant firm is “justified” or “fair.” The perils of being branded “uncooperative” may compel prominent Chinese enterprises and multinationals to capitulate instead of pushing untested defenses in high-stakes cases, resulting in skewed or unsound precedents. Moreover, these risks may actually deter companies from inquir-


49 See NDRC Suspended Price-Related Anti-Monopoly Investigation Against IDC, supra note 23.


52 See AML, supra note 24, arts. 15, 17.
ing about the lawfulness of specific practices (such as research consortia or other collaborations among competitors), because a good-faith inquiry might trigger a costly investigation with an uncertain outcome.

What compounds the risk is that novel issues may be first addressed at the local level, which may also lead to dubious precedents. For example, the first NDRC penalty decision under the controversial rule against “unfair” pricing by dominant firms involved allegations that a local supplier of river sand for use in construction had hoarded sand to increase prices artificially. The penalty notice raised serious questions about the soundness of the narrow geographic market definition and the standards for evaluating the “fairness” of the pricing. Replicating a similar approach in other cases might result in many companies with limited market power being held to the standards of conduct for dominant firms.

Article 53 of the AML allows aggrieved parties to challenge enforcement actions either through administrative reconsideration (essentially a de novo review by a superior department) or through administrative litigation in court. For example, the city government in Quanzhou, Fujian recently upheld a decision by the local Administration of Industry and Commerce to penalize a local TV broadcaster for bundling sales of cable TV set-top boxes with smart cards. Although several challenges to local PSAMB penalties under the AML have reportedly been lodged, no final decisions have been announced. Administrative reconsideration and administrative litigation might provide channels for correcting outlier decisions by local authorities; however, decisions made with active involvement and guidance from the central NDRC remain less vulnerable to challenge.

This more robust antitrust program clearly entails risks of penalties and settlements with foreign parties influenced by industrial policy or political concerns, but it also carries the prospects of broader enforcement against domestic private and state-owned companies in areas impacting Chinese consumers. PSAMB leaders have announced that additional implementing regulations are being drafted to address some outstanding questions, and the PSAMB remains active in multilateral and bilateral dialog with peers from other jurisdictions. So long as the country’s new leadership continues to emphasize market-oriented domestic reform, the PSAMB will have more meaningful incentives to use the AML to protect Chinese consumers and promote efficiency than it has had in the past.

Unless, of course, the winds in Beijing change direction again.

Book Review
You Had Me at Hyphen: A Review of Daniel Crane’s Antitrust

Daniel A. Crane
Antitrust
Aspen Student Treatise Series 2014

Reviewed by Steven J. Cernak

Many of us spend much of our careers trying to simplify and enliven complicated and dry antitrust concepts, whether in compliance presentations to clients or lectures to students (or, for some of us, both). I am often asked for recommendations for short books or articles that summarize and simplify these concepts while providing just enough context to make those ideas understandable. There are not many; most of the casebooks or treatises dive into the details of hundreds or thousands of cases while the articles focus on arcane topics like “multiple equilibria” or “endogenous compatibility choice.” A great new option for our inquisitive clients and flustered students is Antitrust from Dan Crane.

Crane is a professor and assistant dean at the University of Michigan Law School, where he teaches various courses in antitrust as well as first year courses like contracts. His long list of articles and books—ten written or edited in this year alone—shows that he can debate reverse payments and search neutrality and other specific antitrust topics with the best thinkers. In this book, however, he uses his prodigious talents to write for a different audience: an “Illyrian Renaissance Sheepherding Fiction major” (Crane’s hypothetical example of a student who has studied little, if any, economics) just entering the wonderful world of economics and antitrust. And Crane does a masterful job of shepherding that reader through key antitrust terms and concepts while avoiding the twin dangers of over- and under-simplification.

The result is an easy-to-read, relatively short soft cover book that assures the student (or client) that she can understand and even enjoy learning the basics and context of antitrust law. The writing style is breezy with liberal use of contractions and vernacular rather than the standard dialect of the antitrust faithful. Periodically, key antitrust concepts are described in humorous—and memorable—ways. For instance, the FTC’s recent non-enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act is described as “treating it like a crazy old uncle that one calls on his birthday but doesn’t invite to dinner.” Crane has a cogent discussion of both market power and monopoly power, and then writes that where “the dividing line [between them] falls is unclear—which is why antitrust lawyers can afford to charge lots of money for their services and drive BMWs.” (Probably the right reference for the antitrust community, even if some of us would have appreciated a Cadillac shout-out.)

Finally, just like the best children’s films, which aim their humor both at the youngest members of their audience and their parents, *Antitrust* has parts that will be appreciated more by antitrust veterans than neophytes. The first example, from the first paragraph of Chapter 1, inspired the title of this review:

(For the way, please, please, please don’t make the mistake of hyphenating antitrust—i.e., anti-trust—on your exam or in your brief. This is a clear marker to your professor or the judge that you’re an outsider to the field, that you haven’t learned the secret handshake. No one in the know has hyphenated antitrust for fifty years.)

This one caught my eye because, as even my kids know, my favorite epithet for an old-fashioned or misguided lawyer is “he probably still spells antitrust with a hyphen.” Each of my antitrust classes hears on the first day that antitrust has no hyphen; that students wanting a good grade will not write “anti-trust” on the exam; and that there has been a student in every survey class I have ever taught that, somehow, forgot that instruction. Now, I can cite to *Antitrust* for further support.

The other story that had me nodding and smiling describes the quixotic search for definitive antitrust rules:

Every year in my student evaluations, one or two students include a comment to the following effect: “I wish he had taught us more of the black letter law.” This is the marker of the student who has not “gotten it.” There is relatively little black letter law in antitrust law. (Some would say there is relatively little law in antitrust law.)

Antitrust clients also often seek such certainty—“so you’re saying that if our combined shares are X percent or below, the merger will be approved?” Crane uses gentle humor to tell both students and clients that *Antitrust* will be able to simplify the law but not reduce it to a formula.

Of course, the engaging writing style only keeps the reader reading; it is the outstanding substance that improves her understanding of the field. The core of the book, roughly chapters 4 through 13, cover the usual topics and in a standard order: horizontal and then vertical restraints, exclusionary practices, Robinson-Patman, mergers, and immunities. While that coverage is fantastic, it is the material that comes before and after it that not only helps the reader see the forest for the trees, but provides a map to get through the woods alive.

Chapter 1 covers antitrust’s foundational economic assumptions in a way that those sheep-herding fiction majors will understand. Yes, there is one graph showing the wealth transfer and deadweight loss from a price above a competitive level. But, it appears to be included not for the econ major readers but for the visual learners who need a pictorial complement to Crane’s explanation of the same topics. Many economic concepts key to antitrust law—competition, marginal costs, productive and allocative efficiency, barriers to entry, even Bertrand and Cournot competition—are not only explained, but their importance to the antitrust concepts to follow are foreshadowed.

Chapter 2, titled “Triage of Antitrust Problems,” is designed to get the reader to focus on the key questions (for example, “agreement or monopolization or merger?” “horizontal or vertical?”) and, therefore, to begin the antitrust analysis headed in the right direction. Having laid the economic and legal foundations in the first two chapters, *Antitrust*’s third chapter combines them to illuminate the key concepts of market definition and power. For the first concept, Crane explains

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2 In my most recent survey course, one smart-aleck—but smart—student began his response to the first exam question with “Anti-trust (b/c why not keep the streak going?).” He got an A.
and applies the analyses used in *Cellophane, Grinnell, and Brown Shoe*—in fact, his explanation of the infamous “Cellophane fallacy” is the clearest I have seen. For the market power explanation, Crane starts with the importance of market share and entry barriers, but then moves on to more complex yet still important concepts like power buyers, future capacity constraints, and changing demand. It is a credit to these foundational chapters that by the book’s discussion on page 37 about why demand elasticity might be important to market definition and power, the reader—even those shepherding fiction experts—will not only be comfortable with the concept, but will be able to apply it and explain its importance to the question at hand.

The final substantive section of the book is a glossary of what Crane calls “terms of art” or what I have called “cocktail party terms.” Some of the terms covered are basic: Sherman Act, horizontal, and interbrand, for example. Others are much more advanced: Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, double marginalization, and profit-sacrifice test. All of the terms are italicized when used earlier in the text. Each term’s explanation is brief and clear and puts the term in context to explain its importance. Because understanding and proper use of antitrust’s unusual vocabulary can be key to a good exam answer, accurate client advice, as well as a pleasant cocktail party conversation, the glossary alone might be worth the price of the book.

This focus on the introductory chapters and glossary is not meant to belittle the substantive chapters in between. They too walk the reader through complex and increasingly detailed topics in a friendly manner. For example, in Chapter 4 Crane has the reader focus on Sherman Act Sections 1 and 2 and Clayton Act Section 7; the horizontal/vertical distinction; and collusion, exclusion, and merger forms of conduct.

Crane’s substantive explanations include brief coverage of many of the key antitrust opinions likely to be covered in any survey course. However, that coverage is not there just to make this book a great companion for any of the much larger casebooks. Instead, the cases are used to illustrate how antitrust law would approach a complicated set of facts. For instance, the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in *Polygram* (or *Three Tenors*) is described in Chapter 4 to help explain modes of analysis like per se, rule of reason, quick look, and “inherently suspect.” Later in the same chapter, the facts are rewritten in “antitrust legalese” (“Horizontal competitors in a joint venture agree to suspend price discounting outside the joint venture for a limited time while jointly promoting the joint venture”) so that the reader can better focus on the aspects of the case that drive the antitrust analysis.

These core chapters also cover just enough old cases and history to provide context that makes the explanations more useful. This coverage of history is not unusual, given some of Crane’s prior writings. Still, the abbreviated historical references are in *Antitrust* not because Crane finds them interesting—though I am sure he does—but because they provide a context that will help the reader better understand some antitrust concept. So the history of the passage of Robinson-Patman and the decline in its enforcement are covered in just over a page. *Von’s Grocery, Philadelphia National Bank, and General Dynamics* are covered in a few pages, not as historical curiosities, but as counterpoints to modern merger analysis and as part of the explana-

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3 That is, terms that students and then practitioners should be comfortable using during (and even after) any of the law firm receptions at the ABA Antitrust Section Spring Meeting, described as “the antitrust community” by Edwin Rockefeller in *The Antitrust Religion* (2007), which was ably reviewed by Ky Ewing in the April 2008 edition of this publication. Ky Ewing, *A Challenge to Orthodoxy*, ANTITRUST SOURCE (Apr. 2008), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Apr08_EwingRev4_221.authcheckdam.pdf.

4 See *Antitrust Stories*, (Daniel Crane et al. eds., 2007), which has the backstories for 13 classic antitrust cases, and *The Making of Competition Policy: Legal and Economic Sources* (Daniel Crane et al. eds., 2012).
tion for the passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. Alcoa is linked a page later to Trinko to emphasize both that a Section 2 violation requires that the alleged monopolist is monopolizing and how difficult the conduct element can be to describe.

Certainly, magisterial treatises and casebooks, along with law review articles on, say, non-reservation price equilibria have their places and audiences. But so, too, do client alerts, blog postings, and op-ed pieces that help the laity understand and appreciate antitrust concepts. Perhaps we in the antitrust community have over-celebrated the former and neglected the latter. The public discourse on recent high-profile antitrust matters shows a public at best befuddled, if not downright hostile, to basic antitrust principles.5 And as reported in Antitrust’s introduction, even Justice Breyer, a former antitrust professor, got a good laugh during a recent oral argument by describing a mythical “great, wonderful, really original method to teach antitrust law that kept 80 percent of the students awake.” Perhaps those students would be alert, and members of the public sympathetic, if we spent more time explaining the importance of antitrust law to their everyday economic lives.

So, consider this positive review of Antitrust by Dan Crane as a small attempt to correct that imbalance. We should celebrate his successful attempt to boil down complex antitrust principles to understandable prose while showing their real-world importance. I am sure that many future Illyrian Renaissance Shepherding Fiction major readers of Antitrust will be intrigued by the subject and become great antitrust lawyers. Even those readers who do not join the antitrust community will have a much better appreciation of antitrust’s logic and importance. At least, they will never spell it “anti-trust” again.

5 Chris Sagers explored this issue and its possible causes in an as yet unpublished paper, tentatively titled “Apple, Antitrust, and Irony,” available at http://www.luc.edu/media/lucedu/law/centers/antitrust/pdfs/events/apple_antitrust_and_irony.pdf (presented at the 14th Annual Loyola Antitrust Colloquium, April 2014). My discussion here is informed by my exchange with Professor Sagers but the views are mine alone.