

An Update on State RPM Laws Since *Leegin*

Michael A. Lindsay

Three years ago the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in *Leegin* overruled the long-standing federal per se rule against minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) agreements.¹ State laws on RPM agreements vary widely, and *Leegin* did not directly address the status of minimum RPM agreements under state law.² In 2007, *The Antitrust Source* published a chart providing relevant authorities for each of the fifty states. The chart was updated in October 2009,³ and it has remained available through *The Source's* home page since then.⁴

The Antitrust Source has updated the chart once again⁵ to reflect these significant 2010 developments:

California: The California Attorney General obtained a consent decree in *DermaQuest*.⁶ The complaint alleged a series of fairly clear RPM agreements. The "Distribution Agreement" provided that the distributor could not "resell Product in a price structure that yields a Product price at ultimate retail sale below Dermaquest's Suggested Retail Price"; the "Reseller Agreement" provided that resellers could not "resell Products in a price structure that yields a Product price at resale below DermaQuest's Suggested Retail Price."⁷ The consent judgment enjoined violations of the Cartwright Act, and it specifically required Dermaquest to inform its resellers that it was "immediately, unilaterally disavowing all parts of DermaQuest's distributor or resale agreement with you that purportedly obligated you to maintain certain resale prices for DermaQuest products."⁸

Kansas: The Kansas Supreme Court heard argument in *O'Brien v. Leegin* in September 2010. The lower court had held that under state law, the rule of reason applied to vertical minimum RPM agreements. The Kansas Attorney General filed an amicus brief urging per se treatment for RPM agreements.⁹ In the oral argument, the justices asked questions about whether the Kansas statu-

¹ *Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.*, 551 U.S. 877 (2007), *overruling* *Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons*, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).

² Michael A. Lindsay, *Resale Price Maintenance and the World After Leegin*, ANTITRUST, Fall 2007, at 1, 32 (2007), available at http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/Antitrust_Lindsay_Fall07.pdf.

³ A short article accompanied the updated chart and described developments in the two years before the update. See Michael A. Lindsay, *State Resale Price Maintenance Laws After Leegin*, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2009, <http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/09/10/Oct09-Lindsay10-23f.pdf>.

⁴ Michael A. Lindsay, *Overview of State RPM*, <http://www.antitrustsource.com> [under References].

⁵ The updated chart is appended to this article and also is also available at www.antitrustsource.com [under "References"].

⁶ Final Judgment Including Permanent Injunction (consent judgment), *People v. Dermaquest, Inc.*, Case No. RG 10497526 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County Feb. 23, 2010).

⁷ Complaint ¶¶ 11, 12, *People v. DermaQuest, Inc.*, Case No. RG 10497526 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County Feb. 23, 2010).

⁸ *Dermaquest* Final Judgment, *supra* note 6, ¶ 4(b). See also *id.* ¶ 3 ((enjoining violations of CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16720(a), 16720(d), and 16720(e)).

⁹ See Brief for the State of Kansas as Amicus Curiae, *O'Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Products Inc.*, File No. 08-101000-S (Kan. filed Aug. 12, 2010).

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tory term “arrangement” requires an agreement and whether a unilateral policy is actionable; whether the plaintiff was asserting a horizontal claim (and whether the state statute distinguishes between vertical and horizontal agreements); whether a class could properly be certified; whether Kansas has a “reasonableness” standard that differs from the “rule of reason” standard applied under the Sherman Act; why Leegin cares about maintaining minimum resale prices; and what role market power should play in the analysis.¹⁰ The Kansas Supreme Court had not issued its decision when this article went to press.

New York: The New York Attorney General brought suit against Tempur-Pedic, alleging that Tempur-Pedic’s Retail Partner Agreement included contractual prohibitions on discounting.¹¹ The case was brought under section 369-a of New York’s General Business Law, commonly known as the Donnelly Act, which provides that “Any contract provision that purports to restrain a vendee of a commodity from reselling such commodity at less than the price stipulated by the vendor or producer shall not be enforceable or actionable at law.”¹² Tempur-Pedic maintains that it has a unilateral RPM policy, not RPM agreements.¹³ Tempur-Pedic also argues that section 369-a merely makes RPM agreements unenforceable, not illegal (and actionable).¹⁴

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Other Post-Leegin Developments. The Eleventh Circuit also addressed the Tempur-Pedic policy in December 2010, and although its opinion does not deal with state law, it does discuss one of the *Leegin*-related issues dealt with in the article accompanying the original version of this chart: dual distribution.¹⁵ In *Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic International, Inc.*,¹⁶ the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a consumer challenge to Tempur-Pedic’s practices under Section 1 of the Sherman Act for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The complaint had raised both a vertical agreement (between the resellers and Tempur-Pedic as manufacturer) and a horizontal agreement (between the resellers and Tempur-Pedic as competing retail vendor). In a 2–1 decision, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the vertical claim for failure to adequately allege a product market and failure to allege actual or potential harm to competition.¹⁷

Because Tempur-Pedic also sold products directly to consumers through its Web site, the plaintiff had alleged that Tempur-Pedic’s practices were a horizontal agreement as well. The *Jacobs* court also affirmed dismissal of the horizontal claim. The court noted that both the Eleventh Circuit and other courts have tended to view dual-distribution agreements as vertical, rather than horizontal.¹⁸ The court did not have to firmly decide whether the RPM was horizontal or vertical, how-

¹⁰ See Recording of Oral Argument, *O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods. Inc.*, File No. 08-101000-S (Kan. Sept. 17, 2000), available at <http://www.kscourts.org/kansas-courts/supreme-court/archive/archived-arguments-September-2010.asp>.

¹¹ Verified Petition, *People v. Tempur-Pedic International, Inc.*, 400837/10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. County filed Mar. 29, 2010).

¹² N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 369-a (2009).

¹³ Respondents Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Verified Petition at 1–2 and Memorandum of Law in Support of Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss at 20–25, *People v. Tempur-Pedic International, Inc.*, 400837/10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. County filed Mar. 29, 2010).

¹⁴ Memorandum of Law in Support of Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss at 8–18, *People v. Tempur-Pedic International, Inc.*, 400837/10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. County filed Mar. 29, 2010).

¹⁵ Lindsay, *Resale Price Maintenance and the World After Leegin*, *supra* note 2, at 35.

¹⁶ File No. No. 08-12720 (11th Cir. 2010), available at <http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200812720.pdf>.

¹⁷ *Id.*, slip op. at 18.

¹⁸ *Id.*, slip op. at 22 & n.15.

ever, because the court found that the plaintiff had failed to plead sufficient facts from which to infer agreement, rather than (at most) conscious parallelism.¹⁹

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The developments of 2010 demonstrate that state RPM law remains unsettled. The California Attorney General has signaled that it takes RPM seriously and will bring an enforcement action in appropriate circumstances, but *DermaQuest* is a consent judgment, not a precedent. The New York Attorney General has sent a similar signal but has a battle on its hands. We can look forward to the Kansas *O'Brien* decision for an indication of how a state appellate court will assess its own state law in light of *Leegin*. ●

¹⁹ *Id.*, slip op. at 27–28. *Jacobs* was decided by a divided panel, although the dissent focused on the *Twombly* pleading standard, rather than on the substantive law.

Overview of State RPM*

Michael A. Lindsay

STATE	LEGISLATION	LITIGATION
AL	<p>AT: ALA. CODE § 8-10-1 (2009) (providing civil penalty where a person or corporation “engages or agrees with other persons or corporations or enters, directly or indirectly, into any combination, pool, trust, or confederation to regulate or fix the price of any article or commodity”); ALA. CODE § 8-10-3 (declaring it illegal for “any person or corporation . . . [to] restrain or attempt to restrain, the freedom of trade or production, or [to] monopolize, or attempt to monopolize”).</p> <p>IB: Ala. Code § 6-5-60(a) (2009) (providing for the recovery of damages caused by “an unlawful trust, combine, or monopoly, or its effect, direct or indirect”).*</p> <p>* Note: ALA. CODE § 6-5-60(a) is not, strictly speaking, an <i>Illinois Brick</i> repealer statute because the statute was enacted in 1975, two years before the Supreme Court’s decision in <i>Illinois Brick</i>.</p>	<p>H: <i>City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems.</i>, 158 F.3d 548, 555 n.8 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding that federal antitrust law “prescribes the terms of unlawful monopolies and restraints of trade” under Alabama law (citing <i>Ex parte Rice</i>, 67 So. 2d 825, 829 (Ala. 1953))).</p>
AK	<p>AT: ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.562 (2009) (declaring unlawful “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce”).</p> <p>IB: ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.577 (2009) (authorizing attorney general, as <i>parens patriae</i>, to secure monetary relief “for injuries directly or indirectly sustained by persons by reason of any violation of” state antitrust laws).</p>	<p>H: <i>Alakayak v. B.C. Packers, Ltd.</i>, 48 P.3d 432, 448 (Alaska 2002) (holding that federal cases construing the Sherman Act § 1 “will be used as a guide” for Alaska antitrust claims); <i>see also West v. Whitney-Fidalgo Seafoods, Inc.</i>, 628 P.2d 10, 14 (Alaska 1981) (finding that Alaska legislature intended Alaska courts to look to Sherman Act for guidance).</p>
AZ	<p>AT: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1402 (2009) (declaring unlawful “[a] contract, combination or conspiracy between two or more persons in restraint of, or to monopolize, trade or commerce”).</p> <p>H: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1412 (2009) (providing legislative intent that “courts may use as a guide interpretations given by the federal courts to comparable federal antitrust statutes” and that “[t]his article shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the [antitrust] law” among the states).</p>	<p>H: <i>Bunker’s Glass Co. v. Pilkington PLC</i>, 47 P.3d 1119, 1126-27 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that Arizona appellate courts “typically” follow federal antitrust case law and that 44-1412 permits, but does not require, courts to look to federal case law, rejecting <i>Illinois Brick</i>), <i>aff’d</i>, 75 P.3d 99 (Ariz. 2003).</p>
AR	<p>AT: ARK. CODE. ANN. § 4-75-309 (2009) (declaring it illegal “to regulate or fix, either in this state or elsewhere, the price of any article of manufacture, mechanism, merchandise, commodity, convenience, repair, any product of mining, or any article or thing whatsoever”).</p> <p>IB: ARK. CODE. ANN. § 4-75-315(B) (2009) (authorizing attorney general, as <i>parens patriae</i>, to secure monetary relief “for injury, directly or indirectly sustained” because of violations of state antitrust laws).</p>	<p>H: <i>Ft. Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Kelley</i>, 127 S.W. 975, 982 (Ark. 1910) (finding the state antitrust law did not apply to a contract with maximum resale restraint on natural gas because the law “was to prevent a combination among producing competitors to fix the prices to the detriment of consumers” and the contract would not be to the detriment of competitors).</p>

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Abbreviation Key: **AT** = Antitrust Provisions; **PF** = Price-Fixing Provisions/Cases; **H** = Federal Harmonization Clauses/Cases; **IB** = *Illinois Brick* Repealer Statute

* This chart is an updated version of the one that accompanied the article by Michael A. Lindsay, *State Resale Price Maintenance Laws After Leegin*, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2009, <http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/09/10/Oct09-Lindsay10-23f.pdf>. *The Antitrust Source* would like to continue to publish timely updates to this chart. If you become aware of a case or statute that should be added, please contact *The Source* at antitrust@att.net.

Overview of State RPM

STATE	LEGISLATION	LITIGATION
CA	<p>AT: CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16726 (2009) (providing that “every trust is unlawful, against public policy and void”); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16720(A) (defining a trust as a combination “[t]o create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce”).</p> <p>PF: CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16720(b) (2009) (defining a trust as a combination “[t]o limit or reduce the production, or increase the price of merchandise or any commodity”); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16720(d) (defining a trust as a combination to “fix at any standard or figure, whereby its price to the public or consumer shall be in any manner controlled or established, any article or commodity of merchandise, produce or commerce intended for sale, barter, use or consumption in this State”); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16720(e) (defining a trust as a combination to “agree in any manner to keep the price of such article, commodity or transportation at a fixed or graduated figure” or “establish or settle the price of any article, commodity or transportation between them or themselves and others, so as directly or indirectly to preclude a free and unrestricted competition among themselves, or any purchasers or consumers in the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity”).</p> <p>IB: CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16750 (providing that a cause of action may be brought by any person injured by an antitrust violation, “regardless of whether such injured person dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant”).</p>	<p>H: <i>Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc.</i>, 49 Cal. 4th 758, 233 P.3d 1066, 111 Cal. Rptr. 3d 666 (Cal. 2010) (noting that in 1975, “federal antitrust cases were treated as ‘applicable’ and ‘authoritative’ on Cartwright Act questions”); <i>State of California ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Texaco, Inc.</i>, 46 Cal.3d 1147, 1164 (1988), <i>overruled in part on other grounds by statute</i> (“Our Supreme Court has noted that “judicial interpretation of the Sherman Act, while often helpful, is not directly probative of the Cartwright drafters’ intent”); <i>Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson</i>, 549 P.2d 833, 835 (Cal. 1976) (recognizing that a “long line of California cases” has recognized that federal cases interpreting the Sherman Act are applicable to state antitrust cases because “both statutes have their roots in the common law”); <i>Freeman v. San Diego Assn. of Realtors</i>, 77 Cal.App.4th 171, 183, fn. 9 (1999) (federal precedent should be used “with caution”).</p> <p>PF: <i>Chavez v. Whirlpool Corp.</i>, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 175, 179-80 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (applying <i>Colgate</i> doctrine to hold that supplier’s unilateral exclusion of distributor did not violate Cartwright Act); <i>see also</i> <i>Mailand v. Burckle</i>, 572 P.2d 1142, 1147-48 (Cal. 1978) (finding resale price maintenance to be per se violation of state antitrust statute because it is a per se violation under the Sherman Act and “federal cases interpreting the Sherman Act are applicable in construing the Cartwright Act”); <i>Harris v. Capitol Records Distrib. Corp.</i>, 413 P.2d 139, 145 (Cal. 1966) (finding that vendor’s resale price maintenance scheme violated the Cartwright Act and the Sherman Act); <i>People v. Dermaquest, Inc.</i>, Final Judgment Including Permanent Injunction (consent judgment), Case No. RG 10497526 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County Feb. 23, 2010) (enjoining violations of CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16720(a), 16720(d), and 16720(e); requiring manufacturer-defendant to inform resellers that defendant disavows “all parts of . . . distributor or reseller agreement . . . that purportedly obligated you to maintain certain resale prices”).</p>
CO	<p>AT: COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-4-104 (2002) (declaring illegal “[e]very contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce”).</p> <p>PF: COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-4-119 (2002) (instructing courts that they “shall” use “comparable” federal court decisions as guidance).</p> <p>IB: COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-4-111(2) (2002) (authorizing attorney general to bring a civil action on behalf of any public entity “injured, either directly or indirectly, in its business or property by reason of” an antitrust violation).</p>	<p>H: <i>See Pomerantz v. Microsoft Corp.</i>, 50 P.3d 929, 933 (Colo. App. 2002) (applying <i>Illinois Brick</i> indirect purchaser rule reasoning; recognizing legislative intent to use federal interpretations to construe state law); <i>see also</i> <i>Confre Cellars, Inc. v. Robinson</i>, No. 01 N 1060, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26843, at *62 (D. Colo. Mar. 6, 2002) (federal antitrust cases “provide substantial guidance” to courts interpreting the Colorado statute).</p>

Overview of State RPM

STATE	LEGISLATION	LITIGATION
CT	<p>AT: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-26 (2005) (declaring unlawful “[e]very contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of any part of trade or commerce”).</p> <p>PF: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-28(A) (2005) (declaring unlawful contracts, combinations or conspiracies that “fix[], control[] or maintain prices, rates, quotations or fees in any part of trade or commerce”).</p> <p>H: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-44b (2005) (courts “shall” be guided by federal interpretations).</p>	<p>H: <i>Miller’s Pond Co., LLC v. City of New London</i>, 873 A.2d 965, 978 (Conn. 2005) (Connecticut courts follow federal precedent where the federal statute parallels the Connecticut statute but not where the text of Connecticut’s “antitrust statutes, or other pertinent state law, requires us to interpret it differently”); <i>see also</i> <i>Vacco v. Microsoft Corp.</i>, 793 A.2d 1048 (Conn. 2002) (referring to CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-44b and following <i>Illinois Brick</i> in finding that “the legislative history makes clear that the legislature intended to [give] Connecticut an [antitrust] [l]aw, similar to the existing [f]ederal [antitrust] law in every respect.”) (quoting 14 H.R. Proc., Pt. 9, 1971 Sess., p. 4182) (Statement of Rep. Neiditz) (brackets in original); <i>Westport Taxi Serv., Inc. v. Westport Transit Dist.</i>, 664 A.2d 719, 728 (Conn. 1995).</p> <p>PF: <i>Elida, Inc. v. Harmor Realty Corp.</i>, 413 A.2d 1226, 1230 (Conn. 1979) (finding purpose of CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-28 (d) was to codify per se violations of the Sherman Act).</p>
DE	<p>AT: DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 6, § 2103 (2009) (declaring unlawful “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce”).</p> <p>H: DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 6, § 2113 (2009) (requiring that statute “shall be construed in harmony with ruling judicial interpretations of comparable federal antitrust statutes”).</p>	<p>H: <i>Hammermill Paper Co. v. Palese</i>, No. 7128, 1983 Del. Ch. LEXIS 400, at *12 (Del. Ch. June 14, 1983) (declaring it “manifestly evident” that state antitrust laws should be construed in harmony with federal antitrust law).</p>
DC	<p>AT: D.C. CODE § 28-4502 (WEST 2009) (“Every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce all or any part of which is within the District of Columbia is declared to be illegal.”).</p> <p>H: D.C. CODE § 28-4515 (WEST 2009) (“In construing this chapter, a court of competent jurisdiction may use as a guide interpretations given by federal courts to comparable antitrust statutes.”).</p> <p>IB: D.C. CODE § 28-4509 (WEST 2009) (“Any indirect purchaser in the chain of manufacture, production, or distribution of goods or services, upon proof of payment of all or any part of any overcharge for such goods or services, shall be deemed to be injured . . .”).</p>	<p>H: <i>Peterson v. Visa U.S.A., Inc.</i>, No. Civ. A. 03-8080, 2005 D.C. Super. LEXIS 17, *9 (D.C. Super. April 22, 2005) (citing D.C. CODE § 28-4515) (“The [D.C. Antitrust Act] allows “a court of competent jurisdiction . . . [to] use as a guide interpretations given by federal courts to comparable antitrust statutes.”).</p>
FL	<p>AT: FLA. STAT. § 542.18 (2009) (declaring unlawful “[e]very contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce”).</p> <p>H: FLA. STAT. § 542.32 (2009) (describing legislative intent that “due consideration and great weight” be given to federal antitrust case law when interpreting state antitrust statute).</p>	<p>H: <i>Duck Tours Seafari, Inc. v. Key West</i>, 875 So. 2d 650, 653 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“Under Florida law, ‘Any activity or conduct . . . exempt from the provisions of the antitrust laws of the United States is exempt from the provisions of this chapter [542]’”); <i>see also</i> <i>Parts Depot Co., L.P. by & Through Parts Depot Co. v. Fla. Auto Supply</i>, 669 So. 2d 321, 324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing that state courts “rely on comparable federal antitrust statutes” to construe state statute and recognizing Florida statute to cover horizontal and vertical restraints).</p>
GA	<p>AT: GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-2(a)(2) (2009) (declaring unenforceable “contracts in general restraint of trade”).</p>	<p>H: <i>Calhoun v. N. Ga. Elec. Membership Corp.</i>, 213 S.E.2d 596, 602-03 (Ga. 1975) (the test for all restraints of trade is whether the restraint is “injurious to the public interest”).</p>

Overview of State RPM

STATE	LEGISLATION	LITIGATION
HI	<p>AT: HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-4(a) (2009) (declaring unlawful “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce”).</p> <p>PF: HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-4(b)(1) (2009) (no person, partnership, trust or corporation shall “[f]ix, control, or maintain, the price of any commodity”; engage in activities “with the result of fixing, controlling or maintaining its price”; or “[f]ix, control, or maintain, any standard of quality of any commodity for the purpose or with the result of fixing, controlling, or maintaining its price”).</p> <p>H: HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-3 (2009) (requiring Hawaii antitrust statute to be “construed in accordance with judicial interpretations of similar federal antitrust statutes”).</p> <p>IB: HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-13(a)(1) (2009) (providing that “indirect purchasers injured by an illegal overcharge shall recover only compensatory damages, and reasonable attorney’s fees”).</p>	<p>H: Courbat v. Dahana Ranch, Inc., 141 P.3d 427, 435 n.6 (Haw. 2006) (recognizing that federal interpretations guide the construction of Hawaii statutes “in light of conditions in Hawaii.” (quoting <i>Ai v. Frank Huff Agency</i>, 607 P.2d 1304, 1309 n. 11 (Haw. 1980))); <i>see also Island Tobacco Co. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.</i>, 627 P.2d 260, 262, 268 (Haw. 1981) (federal rulings will not be “blindly accepted;” rather they will “serve primarily as guides to the interpretation and application of state law in the light of the economic and business conditions of this State”), <i>rev’d on other grounds, Robert’s Haw. School Bus, Inc. v. Laupahoehoe Transp. Co., Inc.</i>, 982 P.2d 853 (Haw. 1999).</p>
ID	<p>AT: IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-104 (2009) (declaring unlawful “[a] contract, combination, or conspiracy between two (2) or more persons in unreasonable restraint of Idaho commerce”).</p> <p>H: IDAHO CODE ANN § 48-102(3) (2000) (providing the statute “shall be construed in harmony with federal judicial interpretations of comparable federal antitrust statutes”).</p> <p>IB: IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-108(2) (2000) (authorizing the attorney general, as <i>parens patriae</i>, to bring a cause of action “for injury directly or indirectly sustained” because of any violation of state antitrust laws).</p>	<p>H: Afton Energy v. Idaho Power Co., 834 P.2d 850, 857 (Idaho 1992) (recognizing that federal antitrust law is traditionally “persuasive” guidance, although not binding (quoting <i>Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co.</i>, 646 P.2d 988, 994 (Idaho 1982))).</p> <p>PF: K. Hefner v. Caremark, Inc., 918 P.2d 595, 599 (Idaho 1996) (requiring vertical price fixing restraint to fix prices for unrelated third parties in order for a per se rule to apply).</p>
IL	<p>AT: 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/3(2) (2009) (declaring unlawful any “contract, combination, or conspiracy with one or more other persons [to] unreasonably restrain trade or commerce”).</p> <p>PF: 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/3(1)(A) (2009) (declaring unlawful “any combination or conspiracy with . . . a competitor . . . for the purpose or with the effect of fixing, controlling, or maintaining the price or rate charged for any commodity sold or bought by the parties thereto, or the fee charged or paid for any service performed or received by the parties thereto”).</p> <p>IB: 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/7 (2009) (providing that “No provision of [the Illinois Antitrust] Act shall deny any person who is an indirect purchaser the right to sue for damages”).</p>	<p>H: People v. Crawford Distrib. Co., 291 N.E.2d 648, 652-53 (Ill. 1972) (declaring that federal antitrust precedent is a “useful guide to our court”).</p> <p>PF: People v. Keystone Auto. Plating Corp., 423 N.E.2d 1246, 1251-52 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (reciting legislative intent of 3(1)(a) to conclude that statute does not proscribe vertical price fixing agreements between buyers and sellers); <i>Gilbert’s Ethan Allen Gallery v. Ethan Allen, Inc.</i>, 620 N.E.2d 1349, 1350, 1354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (ruling that vertical price-fixing agreements are to be tested under rule of reason because “per se” violations are normally agreements between competitors or agreements that would restrict competition and decrease output” and also recognizing that federal case law is instructive but not binding), <i>aff’d</i>, 642 N.E.2d 470 (Ill. 1994); <i>but see New York v. Herman Miller, Inc.</i>, No. 08-2977 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 21, 2008) (Stipulated Final Judgment and Consent Decree) (post-<i>Leegin</i> challenge to minimum RPM agreement under federal, New York, Michigan, and Illinois law).</p>

Overview of State RPM

STATE	LEGISLATION	LITIGATION
IN	<p>AT: IND. CODE § 24-1-2-1 (2006) (declaring illegal “[e]very scheme, contract, or combination in restraint of trade or commerce, or to create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce”).</p> <p>PF: IND. CODE § 24-1-2-1 (2006) (declaring illegal “[e]very scheme, contract, or combination . . . to deny or refuse to any person participation . . . or to limit or reduce the production, or increase or reduce the price of merchandise or any commodity”).</p>	<p>H: Deich-Keibler v. Bank One, No. 06-3802, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 15419, at *10 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting practice of construing IND. CODE § 24-1-2-1 in light of federal antitrust case law); Rumple v. Bloomington Hosp., 422 N.E.2d 1309, 1315 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (recognizing that Indiana antitrust law is modeled after section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act and has been interpreted consistent with federal law interpreting it).</p> <p>PF: Ft. Wayne Cleaners & Dyers Ass’n. v. Price, 137 N.E.2d 738 (Ind. Ct. App. 1956) (affirming judgment against defendant dry cleaner association for vertical minimum price fixing).</p>
IA	<p>AT: IOWA CODE § 553.4 (1997) (providing that “[a] contract, combination, or conspiracy between two or more persons shall not restrain or monopolize trade or commerce in a relevant market”).</p> <p>H: IOWA CODE § 553.2 (1997) (requiring courts to construe Iowa statute “to complement and be harmonized with the applied laws of the United States which have the same or similar purpose as this chapter” but not “in such a way as to constitute a delegation of state authority” to the federal courts).</p>	<p>H: Max 100 L.C. v. Iowa Realty Co., 621 N.W.2d 178, 181–182 (Iowa 2001) (recognizing that Iowa Competition law is “patterned” after federal Sherman Act and that IOWA CODE § 553.2 “explicitly requires” state courts to consider federal case law and construe state law “uniformly with the Sherman Act”). <i>But cf. Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 646 N.W.2d 440, 446 (Iowa 2002)</i> (finding that “Congress intended federal antitrust laws to supplement, not displace, state antitrust remedies” and that IOWA CODE § 553.2 does not require “Iowa courts to interpret the Iowa Competition Law the same way federal courts have interpreted federal law,” thus rejecting <i>Illinois Brick</i>).</p>
KS	<p>AT/PF: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-101 (2009) (declaring unlawful and defining trusts as any “combination of capital, skill, or acts, by two or more persons” carried out for the purpose of, <i>inter alia</i>: restricting trade or commerce; increasing or reducing the price of goods; or preventing competition).</p> <p>PF: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-112 (2009) (declaring unlawful “all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts or combinations between persons, designed or which tend to advance, reduce or control the price or the cost to the producer or to the consumer of any such products or articles”).</p> <p>IB: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-161(B) (2009) (providing that a cause of action “may be brought by any person who is injured in such person’s business or property by reason of” an antitrust violation, “regardless of whether such injured person dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant”).</p>	<p>H: Bergstrom v. Noah, 974 P.2d 520, 531 (Kan. 1999) (finding federal antitrust case law “persuasive” but “not binding” on the interpretation of the Kansas antitrust statute).</p> <p>PF: Joslin v. Steffen Ice & Ice Cream Co., 54 P.2d 941, 943 (Kan. 1936) (holding that resale price maintenance scheme by ice cream wholesaler violated KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-112); O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods. Inc., No. 04 CV 1668, slip op. at 14 (8th Judicial Dist., Sedgwick County Kan. July 9, 2008), appeal pending (applying rule of reason to vertical minimum RPM claim) (“Whether competition is regulated by a contract dictating who can provide a service in a given territory (as in <i>Okerberg v. Crable, 341 P.2d 966 (1959)</i>) or by all agreement to set retail prices for manufactured goods (as is claimed in this case), the impact to the consumer is not sufficiently dissimilar to justify differing legal analyses.”).</p> <p><small>* <i>O’Brien v. Leegin</i> was transferred from the Kansas Court of Appeals to the Kansas Supreme Court. The case was argued on September 17, 2010, but no decision has been issued. The Kansas Attorney General filed an amicus brief urging per se treatment for RPM agreements. See Brief for the State of Kansas as Amicus Curiae, <i>O’Brien v. Leegin Creative leather Products Inc.</i>, File No. 08-101000-S (Kan. filed Aug. 12, 2010).</small></p>
KY	<p>AT: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.175 (WEST 2009) (declaring unlawful “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust and otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce”).</p>	<p>H: Mendell v. Golden-Farley of Hopkinsville, Inc., 573 S.W.2d 346, 349 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (applying federal antitrust case law to interpret Kentucky statute but noting that federal law is not binding).</p>

Overview of State RPM

STATE	LEGISLATION	LITIGATION
LA	<p>AT: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:122 (2009) (declaring illegal “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce”).</p>	<p>H: <i>Free v. Abbott Lab.</i>, 982 F. Supp. 1211, 1214 (M.D. La. 1997) (recognizing that “Louisiana courts routinely look to federal anti-trust jurisprudence as ‘a persuasive influence on interpretation of our own state enactments’” (citing <i>La. Power & Light v. United Gas Pipe Line</i>, 493 So. 2d 1149, 1158 (La. 1986))); <i>see also Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp.</i>, 637 F.2d 1001, 1003, 1005 n.6 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding state antitrust statute was fashioned after federal statute and noting in dicta that vertical price restrictions are per se illegal, relying on federal law).</p>
ME	<p>AT: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 10, § 1101 (2009) (declaring illegal “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trusts or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce”).</p> <p>IB: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 10, § 1104(1) (2009) (providing a right of action for any person “injured directly or indirectly in its business or property by any other person or corporation by reason of” an antitrust violation).</p>	<p>H: <i>Davric Maine Corp. v. Rancourt</i>, 216 F.3d 143, 149 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that the Maine antitrust statutes parallel the Sherman Act, “and analyzing state claims according to federal law” (quoting <i>Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt., Inc.</i>, 998 F.2d 1073, 1081 (1st Cir. 1993))).</p>
MD	<p>AT: MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 11-204(a)(1) (WEST 2009) (prohibiting any “contract, combination, or conspiracy” that unreasonably restrains trade).</p> <p>PF: MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 11-204(b) (WEST 2009) (defining any “contract, combination, or conspiracy that establishes a minimum price below which a retailer, wholesaler, or distributor may not sell a commodity or service” to be an unreasonable restraint of trade or commerce).</p> <p>H: MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 11-202(a)(2) (WEST 2009) (declaring legislative intent that courts “be guided by the interpretation given by the federal courts to the various federal statutes dealing with the same or similar matters”).</p> <p>IB: MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 11-209(b)(ii) (WEST 2009) (providing that the State or any political subdivision thereof may maintain an action for damages stemming from an antitrust violation “regardless of whether it dealt directly or indirectly” with the defendant).</p>	<p>H: <i>Davidson v. Microsoft Corp.</i>, 792 A.2d 336, 340–41 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (citing MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 11-202(A)(2) when applying <i>Illinois Brick</i> indirect purchaser rule to state statute); <i>see also Purity Prod., Inc. v. Tropicana Prod., Inc.</i>, 702 F. Supp. 564, 574 (D. Md. 1988) (finding that the Court’s application of the Maryland Antitrust Act “should be guided by the Court’s similar interpretation of the federal antitrust statutes).</p>
MA	<p>AT: MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 93, § 4 (2009) (declaring unlawful “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce”).</p> <p>H: MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 93, § 1 (2009) (requiring the Massachusetts antitrust laws to be “construed in harmony with judicial interpretations of comparable federal statutes insofar as practicable”).</p>	<p>H: <i>Ciardi v. F. Hoffmann La Roche, Ltd.</i>, 762 N.E.2d 303, 307-08 (Mass. 2002) (reconciling state antitrust law with <i>Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois</i>, 431 U.S. 720, 729–736 (1977) because MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 93, § 1 requires state courts to harmonize state antitrust law with comparable federal law); <i>see also C. R. Bard, Inc. v. Med. Elec. Corp.</i>, 529 F. Supp. 1382, 1391 (D. Mass. 1982) (noting that sections 4 and 5 of the Massachusetts Antitrust Act are “directly comparable” to sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act).</p>

Overview of State RPM

STATE	LEGISLATION	LITIGATION
MI	<p>AT: MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.772 (2009) (declaring unlawful any “contract, combination, or conspiracy” that is “in restraint of, or to monopolize, trade or commerce in a relevant market”).</p> <p>H: MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.784(2) (2009) (declaring intent of legislature that “in construing all sections of this act, the courts shall give due deference to interpretations given by the federal courts to comparable antitrust statutes, including, without limitation, the doctrine of per se violations and the rule of reason”).</p> <p>IB: MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.778 (2009) (providing that the state, any political subdivision, or any other person “threatened with injury or injured directly or indirectly” by an antitrust violation may bring an action for damages and injunctive relief).</p>	<p>H: Little Caesar Enters. v. Smith, 895 F. Supp. 884, 898 (D. Mich. 1995) (finding no practical difference between federal and state vertical price fixing claims because “Michigan antitrust law is identical to federal law and follows the federal precedents”).</p> <p>PF: New York v. Herman Miller, Inc., No. 08-2977 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 21, 2008) (Stipulated Final Judgment and Consent Decree) (post-<i>Leegin</i> challenge to minimum RPM agreement under federal, New York, Michigan, and Illinois law).</p>
MN	<p>AT: MINN. STAT. § 325D.51 (2009) (declaring unlawful every “contract, combination, or conspiracy between two or more persons in unreasonable restraint of trade or commerce”).</p> <p>PF: MINN. STAT. § 325D.53, SUBDIV. 1(1)(a) (2009) (declaring unlawful any “contract, combination, or conspiracy . . . for the purpose or with the effect of affecting, fixing, controlling or maintaining the market price, rate, or fee of any commodity or service”).</p> <p>IB: MINN. STAT. § 325D.57 (2009) (providing a cause of action and treble damage remedy for any person or governmental body that is “injured directly or indirectly” by an antitrust violation).</p>	<p>H: Lorix v. Crompton Corp., 736 N.W.2d 619, 627–29 (Minn. 2007) (Minnesota generally follows federal law but rejects <i>Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters</i>, 459 U.S. 519 (1983)); see also <i>State v. Humphrey v. Road Constructors</i>, 1996 Minn. App. LEXIS 597 at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing that “Minnesota antitrust law is to be interpreted consistently with the federal courts’ construction of federal antitrust law” (quoting <i>State v. Alpine Air Prods.</i>, 490 N.W.2d 888, 894 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) <i>aff’d</i>, 500 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. 1993))</p> <p>PF: State v. Alpine Air Prod., Inc., 490 N.W.2d 888, 894 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding vertical minimum price fixing agreement a per se violation and recognizing that Minnesota courts consistently interpret state law in harmony with the federal courts’ construction of federal antitrust law) (citing <i>Keating v. Philip Morris, Inc.</i>, 417 N.W.2d 132, 136 (Minn. App. 1987) and <i>State v. Duluth Board of Trade</i>, 121 N.W. 395, 399 (Minn. 1909)), <i>aff’d</i>, 500 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. 1993).</p>
MS	<p>AT: MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-21-1(a) (2009) (declaring unlawful any trust and defining trusts as a “combination, contract, understanding or agreement” that would be “inimical to public welfare and the effect of which would be . . . to restrain trade”).</p> <p>PF: MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-21-1(c) (2009) (defining a trust as a combination, contract, understanding or agreement that would, among other things, “limit, increase or reduce the price of a commodity”).</p> <p>IB: MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-21-9 (2009) (providing a right of action for any person injured by a trust or combine, “or by its effects direct or indirect”).</p>	<p>H: Futurevision Cable Sys., Inc. v. Multivision Cable TV Corp., 789 F. Supp. 760, 780 (D. Miss. 1992) (dismissing state law violations because the federal law violations failed) (citing <i>Walker v. U-Haul of Mississippi</i>, 734 F.2d 1068, 1070 n.5 (5th Cir. 1984) (treating Mississippi and federal antitrust claims as “analytically identical”)), <i>aff’d</i>, 986 F.2d 1418 (5th Cir. 1993).</p>

Overview of State RPM

STATE	LEGISLATION	LITIGATION
MO	<p>AT: Mo. REV. STAT. § 416.031 (2009) (declaring unlawful “[e]very contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce” and defining a trust as lease or sale “of any commodity . . . for use, consumption, or resale within this state, or fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for such sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of trade or commerce in this state”).</p> <p>H: Mo. REV. STAT. § 416.141 (2009) (requiring that state antitrust statute “shall be construed in harmony with ruling judicial interpretations of comparable federal antitrust statutes”).</p>	<p>H: <i>Hamilton v. Spencer</i>, 929 S.W.2d 762, 767 n.3 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing that Mo. REV. STAT. § 416.141 requires Missouri antitrust laws to be harmonized with federal law and therefore citing federal precedent to limit indirect purchasers’ standing to sue); <i>see also</i> <i>Stensto v. Sunset Memorial Park, Inc.</i>, 759 S.W.2d 261, 266 (Mo. App. 1988) (state antitrust laws should be harmonized with federal antitrust laws).</p>
MT	<p>PF: MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-205 (2007) (declaring it unlawful for a person or persons to enter into “an agreement for the purpose of fixing the price or regulating the production of an article of commerce” or to “fix a standard or figure whereby the price of an article of commerce intended for sale, use, or consumption will be in any way controlled”).</p>	<p>H: <i>Smith v. Video Lottery Consultants</i>, 858 P.2d 11, 12-13 (Mont. 1993) (recognizing that MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-205 is “modeled after § 1 of the Sherman Act,” but broader and therefore prohibits unilateral horizontal refusals to deal).</p>
NE	<p>AT: NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-801 (2009) (declaring illegal “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce”).</p> <p>H: NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-829 (2009) (mandating that courts “shall follow the construction given to the federal law by the federal courts” when any provision is the same as or similar to the language of a federal antitrust law).</p> <p>IB: NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-821 (2009) (providing a right of action for any person injured due to an antitrust violation, “whether such injured person dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant”).</p>	<p>H: <i>Heath Consultants, Inc. v. Precision Instruments, Inc.</i>, 527 N.W.2d 596, 601 (Neb. 1995) (explaining that the “legal reality” is that “federal cases interpreting federal legislation which is nearly identical to the Nebraska act constitute persuasive authority”); <i>see also</i> <i>Arthur v. Microsoft Corp.</i>, 676 N.W.2d 29, 35 (Neb. 2004) (interpreting NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-829 to require courts to look to federal law unless federal interpretation would not support the state’s statutory purpose).</p> <p>PF: <i>State ex rel. Douglas v. Associated Grocers of Nebraska Coop., Inc.</i>, 332 N.W.2d 690, 693 (Neb. 1983) (citing federal precedent as authority that “[b]oth horizontal price-fixing among wholesalers and vertical price-fixing between wholesalers and retailers are presumed to be in restraint of trade and are per se violations” of state antitrust laws).</p>
NV	<p>AT: NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 598A.060 (WEST 2009) (declaring unlawful several categories of activities that constitute a “contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade”).</p> <p>PF: NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 598A.060 (WEST 2009) (enumerating unlawful activities including “price fixing, which consists of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging or stabilizing the price of any commodity or service”).</p> <p>H: NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 598A.050 (WEST 2009) (declaring provisions “shall be construed in harmony with prevailing judicial interpretations of the federal antitrust statutes”).</p> <p>IB: NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 598A.210 (WEST 2009) (providing a right of action and treble damage remedy for “any person injured or damaged directly or indirectly” by an antitrust violation).</p>	<p>H: <i>Boulware v. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res.</i>, 960 F.2d 793, 800–01 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding Nevada statute adopts by reference applicable federal antitrust case law).</p>

Overview of State RPM

STATE	LEGISLATION	LITIGATION
NH	<p>AT: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 356:2 (2009) (declaring unlawful “[e]very contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade” and expressly making unlawful “fixing, controlling or maintaining prices, rates, quotations or fees in any part of trade or commerce”).</p> <p>H: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 356:14 (2009) (permitting courts to be “guided by interpretations of the United States’ antitrust laws”).</p>	<p>H: <i>Minuteman, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.</i>, 795 A.2d 833, 836 (N.H. 2002) (recognizing that it has “long been the practice” to rely on interpretation of federal antitrust legislation because the legislature “expressly encouraged a uniform construction with federal antitrust law”).</p> <p>PF: <i>Wheeler v. Mobil Chem. Co.</i>, Civ. No. 94-228-B, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16697, at *2–*3 (D. N.H. 1994) (relying on federal case law to apply rule of reason to nonprice vertical restraints under N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 356:14).</p>
NJ	<p>AT: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-3 (WEST 2009) (declaring unlawful “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce”).</p> <p>PF: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:4-1.1 (WEST 2009) (“Any contract provision that purports to restrain a vendee of a commodity from reselling such commodity at less than the price stipulated by the vendor or producer shall not be enforceable or actionable at law”).</p> <p>H: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-18 (WEST 2009) (requiring that act “shall be construed in harmony” with interpretations of comparable federal antitrust statutes to effectuate uniformity among the states “insofar as practicable”).</p>	<p>H: <i>State v. Lawn King, Inc.</i>, 417 A.2d 1025, 1032-33 (N.J. 1980) (relying on “persuasive” interpretations of federal antitrust laws to hold that vertical price restraints are per se violations but that nonprice vertical restraints are subject to the rule of reason); <i>see also Glasofer Motors v. Osterlund, Inc.</i>, 433 A.2d 780, 787 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) (New Jersey’s statute “to be construed in harmony with ruling judicial interpretations of federal antitrust statutes.”).</p> <p>PF: <i>Exit A Plus Realty v. Zuniga</i>, 930 A.2d 491, 497 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (post-<i>Leegin</i> reference to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:4-1.1 (declaring vertical price fixing agreements per se unenforceable), but without any discussion of <i>Leegin</i>).</p>
NM	<p>AT: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-1 (WEST 2009) (declaring unlawful “[e]very contract, agreement, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce”).</p> <p>H: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-15 (WEST 2009) (requiring that act “shall be construed in harmony with judicial interpretations of the federal antitrust laws” in order to achieve uniform application of the state and federal antitrust laws).</p> <p>IB: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-3 (WEST 2009) (providing a right of action and treble damage remedy for “any person threatened with injury or injured in his business or property, directly or indirectly,” by an antitrust violation).</p>	<p>H: <i>Smith Mach. Corp. v. Hesston, Inc.</i>, 694 P.2d 501, 505 (N.M. 1985) (recognizing that New Mexico courts look to federal antitrust cases “[i]n the absence of New Mexico decisions directly on point”); <i>see also Romero v. Philip Morris, Inc.</i>, 203 P.3d 873, 880 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (statute directs court to construe New Mexico statutes “in harmony with judicial interpretations of the federal antitrust laws”).</p>

Overview of State RPM

STATE	LEGISLATION	LITIGATION
NY	<p>AT: N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 340 (2009) (declaring unlawful “[e]very contract, agreement, arrangement or combination . . . whereby [c]ompetition or the free exercise of any activity in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state is or may be restrained”).</p> <p>PF: N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 369-a (2009) (“Any contract provision that purports to restrain a vendee of a commodity from reselling such commodity at less than the price stipulated by the vendor or producer shall not be enforceable or actionable at law”).</p> <p>IB: N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 340 (2009) (providing that a person who sustains damages as a result of an antitrust violation shall not have their recovery limited due to the fact that that person “has not dealt directly with the defendant”).</p>	<p>H: <i>Sperry v. Crompton Corp.</i>, 863 N.E.2d 1012, 1018 (N.Y. 2007) (noting that courts generally construe Donnelly Act in light of federal antitrust case law, but that it is “well settled” that New York courts will interpret Donnelly Act differently “where State policy, differences in the statutory language or the legislative history justify such a result.” (quoting <i>Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Abrams</i>, 520 N.E.2d 535, 539 (N.Y. 1988)); see also <i>Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Prod., Inc.</i>, 237 N.E.2d 223, 225 (N.Y. 1968) (recognizing that New York antitrust law was modeled on Sherman Act).</p> <p>PF: <i>Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Abrams</i>, 520 N.E.2d 535, 536–37 (N.Y. 1988) (recognizing that vertical restraints are not per se illegal under New York law but may be illegal if they unreasonably restrain trade); <i>Dawn to Dusk, Ltd. v. Frank Brunckhorst Co.</i>, 23 A.D.2d 780, 781 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965) (applying rule of reason to vertical price restraints); <i>New York v. Herman Miller, Inc.</i>, No. 08-2977 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 21, 2008) (Stipulated Final Judgment and Consent Decree) (post-<i>Leegin</i> challenge to minimum RPM agreement under federal, New York, Michigan, and Illinois law); <i>People v. Tempur-Pedic International, Inc.</i>, Verified Petition, Case No. 400837/10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Mar. 29, 2010) (alleging violation of N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 369-a (2009); seeking injunction against, and restitution and disgorgement for, “the unlawful practice of prohibiting the discounting of its products by resellers”).</p> <p>* The New York County Supreme Court heard argument on September 28, 2010, but no decision has yet been issued.</p>
NC	<p>AT: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1 (2009) (declaring illegal “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce”).</p>	<p>H: <i>Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. Morganton</i>, 386 S.E.2d 200, 213 (N.C. 1989) (finding that the Sherman Act is instructive though not binding when interpreting state antitrust statute) (citing <i>Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co.</i>, 194 S.E.2d 521, 530 (N.C. 1973)); see also <i>North Carolina Steel, Inc. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins.</i>, 472 S.E.2d 578, 582–83 (N.C. App. 1996) (noting extensive North Carolina history of reliance on interpretations of federal antitrust law), <i>aff’d in part and rev’d in part</i>, 496 S.E.2d 369 (N.C. 1998).</p> <p>PF: <i>North Carolina v. McLeod Oil Co.</i>, No 05 CVS 13975 (N.C. Super CL, Wake Co., July 30, 2007) (consent decree in case where state challenged minimum resale price agreements between gasoline distributor and resellers).</p>
ND	<p>AT: N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-08.1-02 (2009) (making unlawful a “contract, combination, or conspiracy between two or more persons in restraint of, or to monopolize, trade or commerce in a relevant market”).</p> <p>IB: N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-08.1-08 (2009) (providing that recovery for damages caused by an antitrust violation shall not be barred because of the fact that the person threatened with injury or injured “has not dealt directly with the defendant”).</p>	<p>No cases on point—statute only.</p>

Overview of State RPM

STATE	LEGISLATION	LITIGATION
OH	<p>AT: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.01(B)(1) (WEST 2009) (declaring unlawful any trust that is “[t]o create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce”).</p> <p>PF: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.01(B)(4) (WEST 2009) (declaring unlawful any trust that is “[t]o fix at a standard or figure, whereby its price to the public or consumer is in any manner controlled or established, an article or commodity of merchandise, produce, or commerce intended for sale, barter, use or consumption”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.02.</p> <p>(WEST 2009) (prohibiting any person from entering into a combination, contract or agreement “with the intent to limit or fix the price or lessen the production or sale of an article or service of commerce, use, or consumption, to prevent, restrict, or diminish the manufacture or output of such article or service”).</p>	<p>H: <i>Johnson v. Microsoft Corp.</i>, 834 N.E.2d 791, 794–795 (Ohio 2005) (recognizing that “Ohio has long followed federal law in interpreting the Valentine Act” because the state statute is patterned after the Sherman Act).</p> <p>PF: <i>McCall Co. v. O’Neil</i>, 1914 WL 1669, *4 (Ohio Com. Pl. Nov. 12, 1914) (interpreting statute to prohibit scheme to fix prices at which goods may be resold by the reseller); <i>see also</i> <i>Ohio ex. rel. Brown v. Andrew Palzes, Inc.</i>, 317 N.E.2d 262, 266 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1973) (interprets OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.01(B) as a per se bar to maximum resale price agreements).</p>
OK	<p>AT: OKLA. STAT. TIT. 79 § 203 (2002) (declaring unlawful “[e]very act, agreement, contract, or combination in the form of a trust, or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce”).</p> <p>H: OKLA. STAT. TIT. 79 § 212 (2002) (requiring that act “shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with Federal Antitrust Law” and applicable case law).</p>	<p>H: <i>Star Fuel Marts, LLC v. Sam’s E., Inc.</i>, 362 F.3d 639, 648 n.3 (10th Cir. 2004) (Oklahoma’s antitrust act is required by statute to be interpreted in accordance with federal antitrust case law).</p>
OR	<p>AT: OR. REV. STAT. § 646.725 (2009) (declaring illegal “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce”).</p> <p>H: OR. REV. STAT. § 646.715(2) (2009) (declaring legislative intent that federal court decisions interpreting federal antitrust law “shall be persuasive authority”).</p> <p>IB: OR. REV. STAT. § 646.780(1)(a) (2009 Update) (providing a right of action and treble damage remedy for antitrust violations, “regardless of whether the plaintiff dealt directly or indirectly with the adverse party”).</p>	<p>H: <i>Jones v. City of McMinnville</i>, No. 05-35523, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 11235 at *8 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that Oregon and federal antitrust statutes are “almost identical” and that Oregon courts look to federal decisions as “persuasive”) (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 646.715; <i>Or. Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc.</i>, 185 F.3d 957, 963 n.4 (9th Cir. 1999)), <i>cert. denied</i> 528 U.S. 1075 (2000); <i>see also</i> <i>Willamette Dental Group, P.C. v. Oregon Dental Serv. Corp.</i>, 882 P.2d 637, 640 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (with no reported Oregon decisions on point, “we look to federal decisions interpreting Section 2 of the Sherman Act for persuasive, albeit not binding, guidance”).</p>
PA	<p>No statute—common law remedies only.</p>	<p>PF: <i>Shuman v. Bernie’s Drug Concessions, Inc.</i>, 187 A.2d 660, 662 (Pa. 1963) (finding horizontal price-fixing agreements to be unlawful at common law and holding that vertical restraints that are the “incidents or fruits of an unlawful [horizontal] conspiracy . . . are infected with the illegality of the horizontal conspiracy and are hence unenforceable”).</p> <p>H: <i>Collins v. Main Lind Bd. of Realtors</i>, 304 A.2d 493, 496 (Pa. 1973) (court looks to United States Supreme Court case for guidance in determining whether an agreement unreasonably restrains trade).</p>

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STATE	LEGISLATION	LITIGATION
RI	<p>AT: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-36-4 (2009) (declaring unlawful “[e]very contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of, or to monopolize, trade or commerce”).</p> <p>H: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-36-2(b) (2009) (requiring that act “shall be construed in harmony with judicial interpretations of comparable federal antitrust statutes insofar as practicable, except where provisions of this chapter are expressly contrary to applicable federal provisions as construed”).</p> <p>IB: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-36-12(g) (2009) (providing that, in an antitrust action, the fact that a person “has not dealt directly with the defendant shall not bar or otherwise limit recovery”).</p>	<p>H: UXB Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Rosenfeld Concrete Corp., 599 A.2d 1033, 1035 (R.I. 1991) (statute requires court to interpret state antitrust statute in harmony with federal antitrust statutes).</p> <p>PF: Auburn News Co. v. Providence Journal Co., 504 F. Supp. 292, 300 (D.R.I. 1980) (reasoning that “vertical arrangements in general, often are competitive in effect” and therefore subject to the rule of reason), <i>rev’d on other grounds</i>, 659 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1981), <i>cert. denied</i>, 455 U.S. 921 (1982).</p>
SC	<p>AT: S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-3-10 (2008) (declaring unlawful arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts or combinations which “lessen, or which tend to lessen, full and free competition in the importation or sale of articles imported into this State or in the manufacture or sale of articles of domestic growth or of domestic raw material”).</p> <p>PF: S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-3-10 (2008) (declaring unlawful “arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts or combinations . . . which tend to advance, reduce or control the price or the cost to the producer or consumer of any such product or article”).</p>	<p>H: Drs. Steuer & Latham, P.A. v. Nat’l Med. Enters., 672 F. Supp. 1489, 1521 (D.S.C. 1987) (recognizing that South Carolina has “long adhered to a policy of following federal precedents” in antitrust cases), <i>aff’d</i>, 846 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting <i>In re Wiring Device Antitrust Litig.</i>, 498 F.Supp. 79, 87 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)).</p> <p>PF: Walter Wood Mowing & Reaping Co. v. Greenwood Hardware Co., 55 S.E. 973, 975–76 (1906) (analyzing vertical restraint under rule of reason analysis).</p>
SD	<p>AT: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-1-3.1 (2009) (making unlawful any “contract, combination, or conspiracy between two or more persons in restraint of trade or commerce”).</p> <p>H: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-1-22 (2009) (allowing courts to “use as a guide interpretations given by the federal or state courts to comparable antitrust statutes”).</p> <p>IB: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-1-33 (2009) (providing that “[n]o provision of this chapter may deny any person who is injured directly or indirectly in his business or property” by an antitrust violation).</p>	<p>H: Byre v. City of Chamberlain, 362 N.W.2d 69, 74 (S.D. 1985) (because of the similarity of language between federal and state antitrust statutes and because of the legislative suggestion for interpretation found in S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-1-22, “great weight should be given to the federal cases interpreting the federal statute”); <i>see also In re S.D. Microsoft Antitrust Litig.</i>, 707 N.W.2d 85, 99 (S.D. 2005) (reaffirming that “great weight should be given to the federal cases interpreting the federal statute” and citing <i>Byre</i> for the proposition that, when state courts lack precedent on an issue, they look to federal case law for guidance).</p> <p>PF: Assam Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 624 F. Supp. 411, 412–13 (D.S.D. 1985) (applying rule of reason to vertical territorial restraint and suggesting rule of reason is appropriate for all vertical restraints), <i>aff’d</i>, 798 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1986).</p>

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STATE	LEGISLATION	LITIGATION
TN	<p>AT: TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-101 (2009) (declaring unlawful “[a]ll arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations . . . to lessen, or which tend to lessen, full and free competition in the importation or sale of articles imported into this state, or in the manufacture or sale of articles of domestic growth or of domestic raw material”).</p> <p>PF: TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-101 (2009) (declaring unlawful “all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations between persons or corporations designed, or which tend, to advance, reduce, or control the price or the cost to the producer or the consumer of any such product or article”).</p>	<p>H: Spahr v. Leegin Creative Leather Products, 2008 WL 3914461 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 20, 2008), appeal dismissed, File No. No. 08-6165 (6th Cir. Nov. 20, 2008) (recognizing argument that every Tennessee case decided under the Tennessee Trade Practice Act has relied heavily on federal precedent, but noting at least one circumstance where Tennessee Supreme Court has extended the reach of the TTPA beyond that permitted by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Sherman Act); Freeman Indus. LLC v. Eastman Chem. Co., 172 S.W.3d 512, 519 (Tenn. 2005) (declining to follow <i>Illinois Brick</i> when interpreting state statute and noting that Tennessee does not have a statutory “harmony clause” requiring courts to interpret the state antitrust laws consistently with federal law).</p> <p>PF: Spahr v. Leegin Creative Leather Products, 2008 WL 3914461 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 20, 2008), appeal dismissed, File No. No. 08-6165 (6th Cir. Nov. 20, 2008) (applying rule of reason to antitrust challenge of minimum RPM agreement under Tennessee state law).</p>
TX	<p>AT: TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.05(A) (2002) (making unlawful “[e]very contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce”).</p> <p>H: TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.04 (2002) (declaring that the statute “shall be construed in harmony with federal judicial interpretations of comparable federal antitrust statutes to the extent consistent with this purpose”).</p>	<p>H: Star Tobacco, Inc. v. Darilek, 298 F. Supp. 2d 436, 440 (E.D. Tex. 2003) (finding that the Texas antitrust statute is intended to be construed in accordance with federal antitrust statutes (citing Abbot Labs, Inc. v. Segura, 907 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. 1995) (Gonzalez, J., concurring)); see also Gonzalez v. San Jacinto Methodist Hosp., 880 S.W.2d 436, 441 (Tex. App. 1994) (Texas Antitrust Act “should be construed in harmony with federal judicial interpretations of comparable federal antitrust statutes”); Puentes v. Spohn Health Network, No. 13 08 00100, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 4131, at *15 (Tex. App. June 11, 2009) (cites <i>Leegin</i> for principle that a per se rule is appropriate only after courts have had considerable experience with the type of restraint at issue, and only if courts can predict with confidence that it would be invalidated in all or almost all instances under the rule of reason).</p>
UT	<p>AT: UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-914(1) (2009) (declaring illegal “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce”).</p> <p>H: UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-926 (2009) (declaring legislative intent that “the courts, in construing this act, will be guided by interpretations given by the federal courts to comparable federal antitrust statutes and by other state courts to comparable state antitrust statutes”).</p>	<p>H: Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1998) (citing and following statutory mandate to look to federal and state courts for guidance when construing Utah statute).</p>
VT	<p>AT: VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 9, § 2453(a) (2009) (declaring unlawful “[u]nfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce”).</p> <p>H: VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 9, § 453(b) (2009) (declaring that in construing the statute, “the courts of this state will be guided by the construction of similar terms contained in Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act”).</p> <p>IB: VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 9, § 2465(b) (2009) (providing that the fact that a person “has not dealt directly with a defendant shall not bar or otherwise limit recovery” for an antitrust action).</p>	<p>H: Elkins v. Microsoft Corp., 817 A.2d 9, 15–17 (Vt. 2002) (holding that “harmonization provision” requiring courts to look to regulations and decisions of the Federal Trade Commission and federal court decisions of the FTC Act does not require courts to look to other federal antitrust statutes or corresponding decisions, thus rejecting <i>Illinois Brick</i>); see also State v. Heritage Realty, 407 A.2d 509, 511 (Vt. 1979) (interpreting VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 9, § 2453(a) in light of federal case law to find that horizontal price fixing is per se unlawful).</p>

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STATE	LEGISLATION	LITIGATION
VA	<p>AT: VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-9.5 (2009) (declaring unlawful “[e]very contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce”).</p> <p>H: VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-9.17 (2009) (declaring legislative intent that act “shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purposes in harmony with judicial interpretation of comparable federal statutory provisions”).</p>	<p>H: Williams v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 651 F.2d 910, 930 (4th Cir. 1981) (recognizing statutory mandate to harmonize state law with federal interpretations of comparable federal antitrust statutes).</p>
WA	<p>AT: WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.030 (2009) (declaring unlawful “[e]very contract, combination, in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce”).</p> <p>H: WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.920 (2009) (declaring legislative intent that construction of act “be guided by final decisions of the federal courts and final orders of the federal trade commission interpreting the various federal statutes dealing with the same or similar matters” but that the act “shall not be construed to prohibit acts or practices which are reasonable in relation to the development and preservation of business or which are not injurious to the public interest, nor be construed to authorize those acts or practices which unreasonably restrain trade or are unreasonable per se”).</p>	<p>H: Blewett v. Abbott Labs., 938 P.2d 842, 846 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (recognizing that although federal antitrust precedent is only a “guide,” in practice Washington courts have uniformly followed federal precedent in matters described under the Washington antitrust laws and any departure from federal law “must be for a reason rooted in our own statutes or case law and not in the general policy arguments that this court would weigh if the issue came before us as a matter of first impression”).</p>
WV	<p>AT: W. VA. CODE § 47-18-3(a) (2009) (declaring unlawful “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce”).</p> <p>PF: W. VA. CODE § 47-18-3(b)(1) (2009) (deeming unlawful certain contracts, combinations or conspiracies including those with “the purpose or with the effect of fixing, controlling, or maintaining the market price, rate or fee of any commodity or service” or “[f]ixing, controlling, maintaining, limiting or discontinuing the production, manufacture, mining, sale or supply of any commodity, or the sale or supply of any service, for the purpose or with the effect of fixing, controlling or maintaining the market price, rate or fee of the commodity or service”).</p> <p>H: W. VA. CODE § 47-18-16 (2009) (declaring legislative intent that statute “shall be construed liberally and in harmony with ruling judicial interpretations of comparable federal antitrust statutes”).</p>	<p>PF: Kessel v. Monongalia County Gen. Hosp. Co., No. 33096, 2007 W. Va. LEXIS 52, at *27–*44 (W. Va. 2007) (holding West Virginia intended to codify existing federal per se violations when it enacted W. VA. CODE § 47-18-3 and setting forth factors for deciding whether to follow modern federal precedent when construing per se categories).</p>
WI	<p>AT: WIS. STAT. § 133.03 (2009) (declaring illegal “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce”).</p> <p>IB: WIS. STAT. § 133.18(1)(a) (2009) (providing a right of action and treble damage remedy for “any person injured, directly or indirectly, by reason of” an antitrust violation).</p>	<p>H: Emergency One v. Waterous Co., 23 F. Supp. 2d 959, 962, 970 (D. Wis. 1998) (noting that Wisconsin courts have “repeatedly” stated that federal antitrust law guides the interpretation of WIS. STAT. § 133.03 (citing Grams v. Boss, 294 N.W.2d 473, 480 (Wis. 1980)); <i>but cf. Olistad v. Microsoft Corp., 700 N.W.2d 139, 144, 154–55 (Wis. 2005)</i> (finding that one of the major objectives of revisions made to the state’s antitrust law in 1980 was to reverse the holding in <i>Illinois Brick</i>, and that Wisconsin’s antitrust laws are to be interpreted “in a manner which gives the most liberal construction to achieve the aim of competition”).</p> <p>PF: Słowiak v. Hudson Foods, Inc., No. 91-C-737-2, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9387, at *25–*30 (D. Wis. 1992) (holding vertical maximum price restraint lawful because there was no antitrust injury).</p>

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STATE	LEGISLATION	LITIGATION
WY	<p>AT: WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-101(a)(i) (2009) (prohibiting “any plan, agreement, consolidation or combination of any kind whatsoever to prevent competition or to control or influence production or prices thereof”).</p>	<p>PF: <i>Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co.</i>, 371 P.2d 409, 420 (Wyo. 1962) (declining to hold that Fair Trade Law’s authorization for resale price maintenance violates the state constitution but noting that it is “certainly out of harmony with its spirit”).</p>