

continues to accrue DRCs and COLAs), allowing John to claim his spousal benefit of \$914. His spousal benefit includes an additional \$38 (determined by the excess of \$1,206 (50% of Maria's PIA of \$2,413) over \$1,168 (his PIA)). Alternatively, if he had waited until age 66, his FRA, to claim his benefits he would have received an unreduced spousal benefit of \$1,206 and his worker benefit could have continued to accrue DRCs up to \$1,542 (plus COLAs) at age 70. If Maria predeceases him, his benefit will increase automatically to the amount of the benefit she was receiving at her death, which could be as great as \$3,185 plus COLAs (if she deferred claiming her worker benefit to age 70).

Conclusions

Social Security retirement benefits will likely be an increasingly meaningful source of retirement income for millions of retirees. For too many women and people of color these benefits can mean the difference between life and death. Changes under the 2000 Senior Act and 1983 legislation as well as the declining length of marriage and the complicated facts and circumstances of many individuals and their current and former family units make the timing decisions even more complex. As tax professionals we should be conversant in strategies to maximize retirement income, which will be increasingly focused on Social Security benefits for millions of clients. Additionally, understanding these nuances will help us mitigate Social Security benefit confusion and misinformation when Social Security reform reemerges.

As Garrison Keillor has recognized, most people are above average

401(k) Follies: A Proposal to Reinvigorate the United States Annuity Market

By Paul M. Secunda*

One does not need to do anything but look around to see that the United States population is aging at an alarming pace. With the aging of America, more emphasis has been placed on retirement security. The three-legged stool of retirement security—personal savings, Social Security, and private pension accounts—is increasingly dependent on the private pension leg. This is because personal savings rates in the United States are near or at an all-time low, and Social Security, even if we assume it will remain solvent, merely provides a fraction of what most people need to live comfortably in retirement.

In the private pension world, the United States has recently emerged from a troubling move away from defined benefit plans (DBPs) (i.e., traditional pensions) to various forms of defined contribution plans (DCPs). Because employers are responsible for providing a defined benefit amount to employees at retirement under DBP arrangements, there is more regulation of these plans to ensure that the promised benefits are available upon retirement and plans do not default on their pension promises. For instance, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 provides for minimum vesting, benefit accrual, and funding standards for DBPs and sets up an insurance scheme, operated by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation in case of employer defaults.

On the other hand, employers are only responsible to contribute money to their employees' individual plan accounts under the DCP model and that is where their responsibility ends. Although DBPs historically were the retirement plan of choice, there has been a significant shift to DCPs by employers in recent years; DCPs generally cost less, place fewer obligations on the employer, and are portable from one employer to the next. For instance, from 1979 to 2001, the number of DBPs went from 139,489 to

51,000, while the number of DCPs went from 331,432 to 707,000.

Potential Problems for Retirees

This trend is troubling. Whereas the employer was responsible for providing the pension benefit to the employee upon retirement under DBPs, DCPs only require the employer to pay a defined amount into an employee's individual account. At that point, it is up to the employee to invest the pension funds in various financial instruments so that he or she will have sufficient funds available to last through retirement. DCPs thereby place the risks of longevity, investment return, inflation, and interest rates on the employee. Consequently, no guarantee exists that a participant will receive any specified amount of benefit at retirement and many baby boomers are waking up to this strange new world of being in charge of their future retirement.

The problem is exacerbated because most individuals with DCPs now find themselves enrolled in a 401(k) plan. Under a 401(k) salary deferral plan, which may include an employer matching contribution component, the employee directs the employer to divert a specified percentage of his or her salary

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into his or her retirement account rather than receiving it as cash compensation. The employer matching contribution provides incentive for employees to contribute greater amounts to these individual accounts. The Pension Protection Act of 2006 provides an additional mechanism for encouraging employees to save for retirement by permitting qualified automatic enrollment features. Such contributions, like other retirement plan contributions, provide the advantage of tax deferral for the employee, and tax is not paid on this income until such funds are distributed from the account.

Although one of the advantages of the DCP is that it is portable from employer to employer in our mobile economy, many disadvantages exist as well. Chief among these is the problem of “pre-retirement leakage.” Pre-retirement leakage occurs when an individual takes money out of the plan for qualified or unqualified reasons before reaching the minimum retirement age of 59½ years. Qualified reasons include hardship distributions for education or home purchases, and some 401(k) plans are also set up to provide qualified plan loans. Individuals also take money out of their 401(k) for unqualified reasons that lead to the double whammy of paying a 10% excise tax plus having the plan administrator withhold 20% of the distribution amount for federal income taxes. Treas. Reg. § 1.402(c)-2, Q&A-1(b)(3). The expense of premature withdrawals is even worse when one considers the time value of money. Money withdrawn may be, of course, invested, but that money is no longer able to grow tax-free.

Part of what makes DCPs easy for employers is part of the problem that makes them so dangerous to current and future retirees. Because employees can see their pension money in individual retirement accounts, they have a false sense of security of having an extra pot of money to pay off expenses in the here and now. Unlike traditional pension

plans, which could not be accessed until retirement age, 401(k) plans permit access which leads to bad retirement planning practices by many individuals. Many do not keep their money in these accounts until retirement. Even when they do wait, they take their distributions at retirement age in a lump sum. And rather than roll these amounts over into an IRA for further tax-deferred growth (at least until the required minimum distribution rules kick in), they place their investment money into normal investment and savings accounts. Not surprisingly, they are not doing a very good job of self-annuitizing—that is, providing an income stream for themselves for the rest of their lives. Indeed, it is not unusual in these days of the 401(k) to hear about older individuals not retiring at all, un-retiring, or working a second job as a grocery store bagger—not outcomes they envisioned doing in their golden years.

Proposals for Change

Part of the solution to this growing retirement security problem is to require 401(k) plans to offer an annuity option in addition to the normal lump sum distribution. Although some 401(k) plans now provide for such an option, most currently do not. Unfortunately, many employees do not adequately understand the purpose of annuities and dismiss them as high-priced retirement luxuries. Yet, the Employee Benefit Security Administration is in the process of reexamining a role for annuities; a recent call for comments on how employers may be able to provide lifetime income options to their retirees received over 700 comments.

The annuity option permits individuals to purchase an insurance contract through their employer that will provide guaranteed income to them for the rest of their lives. This idea of attaching an annuity option to DCPs derives in part from the United Kingdom, where DCPs are becoming just as popular as in the United States. In the United Kingdom,

an annuity must be purchased with at least 75% of an individual's pension sometime between retirement and age 75. Although I think instituting mandatory annuities in this country is probably a non-starter given our well-known aversion to any government plan infused with “socialism,” I propose requiring annuities be one required distribution option for 401(k) participants. For reasons discussed below, I would also require employee education, pre-distribution, on the advantages of having an annuity over taking a lump sum, and require insurers to adequately disclose fees for their annuity products.

This annuity proposal is by no means fool proof. Many issues lurk just around the corner, including the lack of an adequate annuity market in the United States. The lack of an annuity market is tied to the relative expense of offering such annuities, as well as the illiquid nature of such investments (which means loss of control over income). In the United Kingdom, where retirement account holders must hold a certain percentage of their portfolio in annuities in retirement, the annuities market is more robust. Requiring annuities as a 401(k) distribution option may be the first step in overcoming the lack of an adequately competitive American insurance market. Additionally, I would suggest another innovation from Britain. Since 1978, DCP members in the United Kingdom have an open market option (OMO) for buying their annuities from a supplier other than their pension provider. Having 401(k) participants “shop around” for their annuities will likely generate downward pressures on the price of annuities. Finally, under this proposal, more employees will be likely able to afford annuities through their employers or under the OMO at institutional pricing rather than through retail pricing.

The education part of my proposal recognizes that annuity products are very complex and, consequently, insurers are able to charge exorbitant fees for them.

Their complexity also makes employees less likely to select them. Additionally, there is no current requirement to disclose the fees charged with the annuity option. This last shortcoming can be addressed by requiring fee disclosures for annuities similar to what will be required of 401(k) service providers under new Department of Labor fee disclosure rules. However, to be fair, not all the problems with annuities rest on insurer shoulders, as it is difficult to price an insurance product

when the data needed to make a reasonable calculation is not known. Of course, a defunct insurance company which charges too little for annuity products would do no one any good.

Conclusion

Even given potential issues with requiring an annuity option for 401(k) plans, the time has come to hedge as a society against the risk associated with the recent embrace of the 401(k) as the private retirement funding vehicle of

choice in the United States. The proposal described herein seeks to diminish the retirement security deficit through three interlocking regulatory parts: (1) a requirement to offer an annuity as part of 401(k) distribution options; (2) mandatory education pre-distribution on annuities; and (3) mandatory fee disclosure by annuity providers. These steps will likely reinvigorate the annuities market in the United States and help to bring an end to the 401(k) Follies.

Durable Power of Attorney, Health Care Power of Attorney, and Advance Directives

By Don R. Castleman*

Any discussion of retirement planning should address the situation that arises once we can no longer make decisions in our own behalf and someone else must do so for us. If we do not make provision for those circumstances while we are still competent to do so, it becomes necessary for the courts to do it and the costs and complications are significant. We can avoid those complications and costs with three relatively simple instruments: durable power of attorney; health care power of attorney; and advance directive (or “living will”).

Durable Power of Attorney

This document empowers an attorney-in-fact to handle financial and property transactions for the principal. Nearly all states have some form of statutory durable power. Unless the power is being granted for a specific transaction, the use of the statutory form is preferred because it will be recognizable by the institutions and agencies to which it may be presented (banks, motor vehicle division, etc.) without the necessity of review by their legal departments, legal advisors, etc.

There are a few issues that most statutory forms may not address, and the statutory form should be modified as follows:

a. Grant to the attorney-in-fact the authority to appoint a successor.

(This became very significant recently when a client, whose wife had slipped into the darkness of Alzheimer’s some years ago, was himself diagnosed with terminal cancer. Because the power she had granted to him while she was still competent included the power to appoint a successor he was able to substitute a daughter to take care of her affairs after his death. Without it, we would have had to have a court appointed guardian of the estate with considerable costs involved.)

b. Grant to the attorney-in-fact the authority to make gifts including gifts to the attorney-in-fact. This facilitates tax planning as well as probate avoidance opportunities. (For example, transfer title to the

automobile while the owner is still alive but is no longer driving, and it may not be necessary to open an estate administration at all, particularly when coupled with the use of inter vivos trusts.)

c. Grant to the attorney-in-fact the authority to add to or to create trusts of the assets of the principal. This will enable the creation of probate avoidance trusts.

In all jurisdictions, the power of attorney must, to be durable, include the statement that the power granted shall not be affected by the subsequent incompetency of the principal. In addition, most will allow the power to be made conditional upon the incapacity of the principal. It is better not to so provide because then one has to deal with the issue of what is sufficient to satisfy anyone dealing with the attorney-in-fact that the principal is in fact incapacitated. It is better, since the power of attorney is usually not effective until it is recorded, to simply place the executed power in a drawer until it is needed and then record and thereby activate the power.

Health Care Power of Attorney

This is also a statutory form and certainly should comply with and adopt the language of the statute to insure its effectiveness. There are no real issues with this document itself. The issues

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