



National Security Law Report

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New Targeting and Goals for National Security in Intelligence Matters

by John Patrick Quirk

Since the end of the Cold war, the old "criteria" countries of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Poland have given way to a new selection of criteria countries. While Russia and communist countries like China, Cuba, and North Korea are often adversarial to U.S. policy goals around the world, their intelligence services are now but a shadow of what they were in terms of a broad based attack on U.S. technology, military secrets, and defense policies. They are "still out there" to be sure, but the new trends in espionage focus on economic and corporate collection. In addition, the new countries engaged in espionage directed against the United States and against U.S. companies are current *allies*.

In a series of recent FBI reports and statements, as well as the FBI's overt Awareness of National Security Issues and Response (ANSIR) program alerts, a new list of super stars in espionage has been created. The criteria for these spies is almost exclusively economic, corporate, and technological collection. The end user in the old days of espionage were nations seeking the latest on codes, tanks, airplanes, submarines, and other military related secrets. The intelligence structure of the United States, for example, was designed for collection against Soviet Russia and its proxies, and U.S. counterintelligence was designed mainly against the theft of military and defense related secrets.

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Is Catastrophic Terrorism Just Strategic "Peanuts?"

by Patrick L. Moore

A disturbing element has begun to appear in discussions about terrorism, an apparent tendency to deny the seriousness of terrorism as a threat to national security – sometimes in almost jocular tones. A typical example of this fashion may be found in the May/June 1999 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "*Sanctions of Mass Destruction*," by John and Karl Mueller:

HOWEVER DRAMATIC terrorist attacks are, and however tragic for the innocent victims and their families, the total damage they have caused to date has been quite low and hardly constitutes grounds for panic and hysteria. On average, *far fewer Americans are killed each year by terrorists than are killed by lightning, deer accidents, or peanut allergies* [emphasis added]. To call terrorism a serious threat to national security is scarcely plausible.

Of course, the authors contended that they were not proposing "that terrorism be ignored." And, further, they suggested that they were aware that "the effects of terrorism stem less from its actual consequences than from the alarm it inspires." On the other hand, they did go on to propose that even in terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) (a highly unlikely prospect in any event, as they see it), the United States could successfully *absorb* the consequent casualties, *e.g.*, 40,000 to 70,000 deaths in a Nagasaki-size nuclear attack, or 3,000 to 8,000 deaths in a successful chemical attack. The result, they said, would be "terrible" but would "not threaten the end of civilization."

Nevertheless, the primary attention-getter for their opinions was the assertion that, since terrorism causes relatively few casualties and occurs in only a few cases overall, it is not really a matter of national security while, on the other hand, "economic sanctions" (the primary topic

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Even before the Berlin War came down, however, our allies started to get a jump on economic espionage. The new criteria countries are France, Brazil, Israel, Spain, Taiwan and Korea – and what looks like a joint European Economic Community collection apparati. Of all of these, France probably stands alone as the premier service conducting espionage against the United States. France – our oldest ally and our partner against communism – is under pressure from its hybrid relationship between country and company. Many of its companies are funded by the French government and thus when issues of taxation, unemployment and market share occur, the incestuous relationship reaches out for its government's spies to obtain needed information for France's companies.

In 1995, France's foreign intelligence service, the Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieur (DGSE, or General Directorate of External Security), started with an ambitious goal of training anywhere from 1200 to 2500 "corporate spies" at its main spy facility outside of Paris. DGSE officers who were traditionally posted under cover at the United Nations, French Embassies, consulates, and other French government facilities abroad are now serving as a new generation of DGSE *corporate spies* and are being placed in French companies abroad.

France, with a population of about 59 million, has many successful industries: computers, telecommunications, automaking, space, aerospace, helicopter manufacturing, high-speed trains, avionics, and defense. It also has traditional industries of luxury goods such as fashion, perfume, and wine. The new officers being trained not only learn about traditional spy tradecraft, they also study marketing, product development, research and development, and the latest U.S. technology. The courses almost seem like they come from the Harvard Business School or University Marketing Departments. Routing switches for the Internet, databases and fiber optics, the latest robotics, medical devices, and pharmaceuticals are all key targets of French intelligence. French targeting is brilliant, and it is directed against major U.S. industries that have a relationship to French industries. Whereas countries used to issue a targeting list each year on the latest tank development or submarine missile, French companies such as Alcatel, Elf-Aquataine, French Telecom, and Thompson Computers issue their own shopping list which is sent off to the DGSE for evaluation and eventual operational plans.

Some 75% of all French espionage is directed against French-like industries in the United States: telecommunications, computers, software, hardware, and anything that helps *employ* French workers and makes a profit for French parastatals. The FBI has long been onto the French and stung several French DGSE operational groups

in the United States. However, the particular methods of criminal investigation the Bureau uses make it difficult because France is an *ally*. Tougher policies, better penetration of the DGSE, and overall new national security policies are needed. In addition, the FBI should receive more funding to re-tool our counterintelligence capabilities against our allies.

If France were alone in spying, one might say its only one country spying against select U.S. industries. However, France is part of the European Economic Community (EEC), and more EEC resources are likely to be targeted against America. In 1999, the EEC formed an "All European" police force (talk is of an All European Intelligence Service) largely for economic collection against U.S. companies and other countries that have top technology. EEC members are already conducting economic espionage and economic warfare. If the EEC combines economic espionage with the power of trade restrictions and protective tariffs, then EEC nations can protect their own membership and grow at the expense of the United States.

On February 25, 2000, the EEC accused certain intelligence assets of the United States (NSA, CIA, and the FBI) of electronic spying against European targets. However, these allegations are unfounded. U.S. intelligence agencies are forbidden by U.S. law from turning over their counterintelligence work products to U.S. companies. And the Europeans know it. Their accusations are a ruse for their own counterintelligence efforts and their expansion of

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Book Review



The Soul of Battle: From Ancient Times to the Present Day, How Three Great Liberators Vanquished Tyranny

by Victor Davis Hanson
Free Press (1999)

Pages: 544 Price: \$30.00

Reviewed by Professor Edgar H. Brenner

In "The Soul of Battle" Professor Hanson tells the story of three brilliant and effective generals who lead civilian armies (as distinguished from mercenary troops) to free slaves and to destroy evil governments. The hallmark of these three generals is that they commanded large civilian armies, engaged in vast flanking movements in hostile territory, and avoided frontal assaults against fixed positions, thus saving the lives of their own troops and often the enemy. These criteria exclude many well-known generals of antiquity and modern times, such as Alexander, Hannibal, Julius Caesar, and Napoleon, who led mercenary troops in wars of conquest and subjugation.

The first of the three illustrious general is the Theban, Epaminondas, (418? – 362 B.C.), who was also a statesman and philosopher. His well-trained Hoplites (Greek farmer-soldiers) in unusually deep Phalanx formations soundly defeated the Spartan invaders of Attica, in the 370 B.C. battle of Leuctra (The Leuctra battle occurred 34 years after the end of the Peloponnesian Wars and prior to the Macedonian conquest of Greece.)

Following his victory, Epaminondas led his 70,000 soldiers across the Isthmus of Corinth into the Peloponnese, home of the Spartans, which had not been invaded for 500 years. In 370 and 369 B.C., with little loss of life, he demoralized the Spartans, freed their Helot-Messenian slaves, and created fortified cities, including the rebuilt city of Messene and the new city of Megalopolis, from which the liberated Messenians could continue to defend their freedom from Spartan domination.

When Epaminondas returned to Thebes he was victim of jealousies and petty charges similar to those that Sherman and Patton were to face years later. Epaminondas

also faced capital charges, one "that he had allowed the Spartans to escape destruction by not burning down their city" (p. 105). Epaminondas responded that he would "gladly suffer execution" (p. 105), if the following text were inscribed on his tombstone:

Epaminondas had forced the Thebans against their will to torch Laconia, which had been heretofore untouched for 500 years; he resettled Messene after two hundred and thirty years; he united and organized the Arcadians into a league; and he gave back to the Greeks their autonomy. (pp. 105-06).

Hanson tells us that Epaminondas walked out of the court chamber and that all charges were dismissed without a vote of the jurors (p. 106).

The second General, William Tecumseh Sherman (1820 – 1890), played a major role in the successful conclusion of the Civil War. In September 1864 Sherman captured Atlanta, which was a great morale boost for the north and contributed significantly to Lincoln's election victory in November. In addition, Sherman's troops were given home leave permitting them to vote, most of them for Lincoln.

Thus the scene was set for Sherman's march to the sea. He burned Atlanta and on November 15, 1864, he cut off contact with his Atlanta base and with 62,000 troops, in two columns 60 miles wide, left a path of destruction from Atlanta 400 miles to Savannah, Georgia. The Army lived off the land, foraging for food and commandeering horses, mules, cattle and wagons. The homes and barns of the slave-owning class were burned. Many slaves were freed. In the forty days it took to reach Savannah, the Army suffered minimal casualties: 100 dead, 700 wounded, and 1,300 captured (p. 235). Hanson asserts that Sherman's Army did not abuse civilians. With the fall of Savannah, the Union forces captured vast military supplies and cotton.

One Southern force managed to escape from Savannah and General Sherman pursued them north, successively capturing Columbia, the capital of South Carolina, and Raleigh, the capital of North Carolina. These Confederate forces surrendered to Sherman shortly after Lee surrendered to Grant at Appomattox.

The enduring significance of Sherman's march to the sea, the capture of Savannah, and the pursuit northward of the southern troops, was that it became clear by early 1865 that the North would win the Civil War. It was also clear that there would not be a negotiated settlement with the Confederate States that would preserve the institution of slavery.

The third General is George S. Patton (1885 – 1945), most famous for his command of the United States Third Army in France and Germany in 1944 and 1945. Patton did not take part in the June 6, 1944 landing in Normandy. Though he had been a brilliant commander in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, he had been relieved of command because of the publicity given the famous incident when he slapped an enlisted soldier that he believed to be malingering.

After the D-Day landings, the Allied beachhead remained small and precarious through June and July. Patton arrived on the scene in late July, and deserves most of the credit for leading the breakout which made possible the rapid advances that led to the liberation of Paris and the driving of the Germans back into Germany. Patton's armored forces moved great distances, outflanking the Germans, liberating territory, and freeing Nazi slave laborers.

Hanson argues that if Patton had been given additional supplies and gasoline, he might in August of 1944 have closed the Falaise Gap through which most of the German Army escaped from Normandy and returned to Germany to reorganize and fight again. If Patton had been given greater freedom of action and support, Hanson suggests that the war against Germany might have been won in the fall of 1944, not in May of 1945.

Patton will be remembered for his pivotal role in the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944. He moved his troops 100 miles north of his original position in a snow storm to relieve Bastogne and to attack the German flank from the south. His ability to respond in an emergency confirms Patton's competence as a field commander. Hanson tells this story well (p. 305-28).

Hanson's conclusion as to what unites the three generals is worth noting. He states:

Sherman, we forget, really was a professor and college president, just as Epaminondas was a philosopher and Patton both an author and a dynamic lecturer. Sherman quite literally was teaching history in February 1861 and leading men into battle at Bull Run less than six months later. Of all the major Civil War generals in the field, Sherman was the best educated and most voracious reader; that Epaminondas and Patton both were better read than any generals of the respective ages indicates that success for a great march into enemy territory is impossible without a man of genius, experience – and wide learning – at its head. (p. 226).

What is the reaction to Hanson's bold thesis? With the decline in classical education it is unlikely that many

readers of his book could previously have identified Epaminondas. The classically educated Patton as a young man greatly admired Epaminondas (p. 283). The praise of Epaminondas by virtue of the passage of time is not controversial. Quite different is the praise of Sherman, which many will find difficult to accept. Patton has always had staunch admirers and fierce detractors. That divergence of opinion will continue.

Is Hanson's treatment of Grant fair? Arguably not. Grant is given no credit for long flanking movements deep in hostile territory. Yet Grant's Vicksburg campaign in 1863 demonstrated just such accomplishments. Grant moved his army down the west bank of the Mississippi River from north of Vicksburg to south of Vicksburg. He crossed the Mississippi and proceeded east, capturing Jackson, Mississippi. He was then free to turn west and lay siege to Vicksburg. The campaign ended with the surrender of Vicksburg on July 4, 1863.

By contrast, when Grant moved south toward Richmond in the spring of 1864, he did not have great freedom of maneuver. Unlike Sherman who burnt Atlanta and could then ignore it, Grant had to protect Washington, D.C. This meant essentially keeping his army between Lee's army and Washington, D.C. Grant deserves more credit than he gets from Professor Hanson.

Applying the lessons of the past to more current events, Professor Hanson contends that the Persian Gulf war should have ended in Baghdad with Iraqi infrastructure destroyed and its army and military culture "humiliated" (p. 410-11). This "may well have been the only way to rid the world of a great evil, and to justify such an extraordinary muster" (p. 411). At that point he suggests that we could have just left Baghdad and not have become bogged down in an overseas war (p. 411).

Readers may object to Professor Hanson's redundant style of writing. He tells his readers the same thing over and over again with minor variations. It is as if lecture notes, yellow with age, are being recirculated as text, but not edited for conciseness or to eliminate repetition. Professor Hanson is clearly enthusiastic about his subject and that enthusiasm is infectious. However, it occasionally leads to hyperbolae.

It is best to regard *The Soul of Battle* as a valuable reinterpretation of Epaminondas, Sherman, and Patton, and to read it as such. I was pleased to learn more about Epaminondas' accomplishments and to see generals Sherman and Patton get the credit from Hanson that I have long felt they deserved.

Professor Brenner is Co-Director of the Inter-University Center for Legal Studies, Washington, D.C. AB

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of their article) causes far greater losses than terrorism and are thereby more significant. Whatever their conclusions may be on the effects of economic sanctions, their claims as to the nature and consequences of terrorism are representatively symptomatic of a *risque* disregard for the dangers of terrorism, and in particular, catastrophic terrorism.

To begin with, whatever they said in their asides, the fact is that the authors ultimately ignored the true purpose of terrorism, which is, as Lenin said, “to terrorize.” Accordingly, a logical appeal to minimal casualties disqualifying terrorism as a national security threat is a serious category error. Fear, not blood, is the primary objective or goal of terrorism. It is fear, and the progeny of fear – *e.g.*, paralysis, submission, retreat and isolationism – which terrorism is meant to produce.

Secondly, the authors ignored what I call (borrowing from economics) the “unintended consequences” of terrorism, *i.e.*, the unexpected or unpredictable dangers which arise from the *reaction* of the target country to terrorism when a successful attack has been made. The best and most obvious examples of these secondary effects of a terrorist incident would be the First and Second World Wars and the Bolshevik Revolution.

World War I was instigated by one terrorist with a pistol when he killed two celebrity, political targets. Gavrilo Princip shot the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife on June 28, 1914. Four years later, at least 37 million people were dead from direct causes of the war and another 20 million from the Influenza epidemic spread by the massive movement of populations and armies brought on by the war. All Princip wanted was to advertise and reverse the Austrian annexation of Bosnia. Unfortunately, when dealing with the interactions between states and the pressures of public opinion, “stuff happens.” Various discontents and future policy predictions coalesced around this terrorist event and the momentum for war among the European powers became inexorable.

The Great War of 1914-1918 brought on the fall of the Romanovs (not to mention the Hapsburgs and the Hohenzollerns) and the rise of Communism in Russia and all that that entailed. After a short hiatus from 1918 to 1939, the fighting in Europe resumed and did not end until the Red Russian empire had advanced its frontier to the middle of Germany and another 55 million people (give or take several tens of millions) were dead. And all this stemming from *one teenager wielding a pistol* to commit an act of terrorism.

The point is that events are not entirely, or even largely, predictable or controllable by sane and rational

authorities (even if they exist and are in charge) or even by the perpetrators (who seldom care about controlling events beyond their own immediate agenda). In victimized target countries, people perceiving themselves under threat or subject to “the straw that broke the camel’s back” may react variously, and not always rationally or proportionately. In merger and acquisitions law, there used to be a saying that a company under financial attack was “put into play.” If you made a tender-offer on a company, the odds were only 1 in 5 that, when the dust had settled, it would have the same management and owners as before the offer was made.

In 1914, Princip’s terrorist act in Sarajevo ended up putting all of Western Civilization and World History “into play.” The direct results were the dead and injured and physical destruction caused by the Great War itself. Even more than that, however, it more remotely set in motion a tragic series of events that led to the much greater cataclysms of WW II, Communist Russia, and the tragedy of the Holocaust.

Also, there is always the very serious chance of a terrorist attack “putting into play” important parts or aspects of a target society *domestically* even if its foreign affairs are not profoundly altered. These external and internal dangers cannot be dismissed as on the same level with, or lower than, reactions to “peanut allergies.” Such dangers would be logarithmically increased the larger and more gruesome were the number of casualties inflicted in any triggering terrorist event. If two gunshot murders could precipitate World War I and the Iliad of sorrow which followed it, what might the outrage over 50,000 to 100,000 charred nuclear attack victims or putrefying anthrax corpses evoke?

Furthermore, the chances of incurring mass casualties from terrorist attacks using WMDs are increasingly evident and rising. According to allegations by federal prosecutors in their indictment of Osama bin Laden, the world’s master terrorist has been trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, since at least 1993. While the problems of developing and deploying *nuclear* weapons may still, as yet, pose some insurmountable technical problems for extremists seeking to use them (unless, of course, aided by someone or some nation with the necessary technical expertise and wherewithal), the other less technical means of mass death are reportedly also being actively explored and exploited by terrorist groups. The relative ease of developing and producing chemical and biological warfare agents makes it more and more likely that a well-heeled terrorist outfit could have access to them independently.

This quantum leap in terrorist lethality by acquisition of WMDs is made even more likely by the danger of

terrorists working in concert with rogue states like the Peoples Republic of China, North Korea, Libya, Iraq, and Iran. U.S. nuclear weapons technology (especially the technology for miniaturized warheads or "suitcase bombs") has recently been severely compromised by Chinese espionage and must now be assumed likely to fall into the hands of those rogue nations who are "friends" to or apt to sympathize with terrorists and not us. Terrorists, it is feared, are also beginning to toy with anthrax. Smallpox could make a surprise and globally catastrophic comeback through terrorist use. Nerve gas (Saron) has already been used in terrorist attacks.

The classic example of the difference between a conventional terrorist attack and one using WMDs would be to posit the scenario of what if the World Trade Center bomb had been a 21-kiloton nuclear weapon (the size dropped on Nagasaki, as the authors suggest) which had taken out all of Manhattan south of Central Park and made the rest of the City of New York radioactive and terribly damaged? We would probably have had more killed than all the American KIAs in WW I and WW II combined. If terrorists did the same in a half dozen cities simultaneously, we could easily match the toll of the Holocaust in one morning. One successful attack scenario of that kind could qualitatively and quantitatively constitute the greatest defeat (by virtue of loss of American lives, property, and strategic prestige) in American history to date.

Aside from "terrible" casualties, such events would have other catastrophic consequences. There would likely arise questions of retaliation and counter-retaliation, with the real chance of continuous war against the terrorists and their accomplice nations. Even without a clear perpetrator being identified giving the chance of retaliation, a nuclear, chemical or biological terrorist attack would no doubt lead to drastic changes in laws, policies, and politics at home affecting the freedoms of everyone in the target nation.

Especially, then, because of the increasing chance of access to WMDs, the actual threat from terrorism is now at an all time high – and probably will remain at seriously high levels for the foreseeable future – even if its present body count and absolute incidence are down from historic levels.

Today's terrorists are more committed and at the same time less centralized than those of yesterday. In effect, at a time when they are potentially more deadly, more tenacious, and better supported by rogue well-wishers than ever before, they have a smaller "radar profile" and are harder to detect, predict, and interdict.

When finally thought through, glib dismissals such as the threat of terrorism as possibly less significant than "peanut allergies" reflect a failure of reality testing

which should not be allowed to sap the national will to fight, overcome and prevent this deadly menace.

Patrick Moore is an attorney and consultant in the Chicago area. He serves on the Editorial Board and Academic Advisory Board of the Chicago-based National Strategy Forum. Mr. Moore specializes in the study of the effects of war, terrorism and anti-democratic ideologies on Western law and civilization. AB

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intelligence collection against U.S. targets around the world. Former East Bloc members are being admitted each year with Russia and even some Mid-Eastern countries lobbying to be part of the EEC.

Although the United States currently has the advantage in terms of research and development budgets, unparalleled prosperity, and technological development, the theft of trade secrets and economic espionage can seriously damage U.S. companies in terms of our own growth, employment, and position of prosperity. When one looks at all the countries engaging in economic espionage against the United States, almost every U.S. advantage industry is targeted. Israeli, Brazilian, and Russian spies are all being augmented by better trained French, Spanish, Swiss, German and even British spies – all hungry for economic dominance and assets.

The United States now has a wide range of laws on the books that define economic espionage, but criminal prosecutions are rare and good spies are tough to catch. Moreover, what do we do to our allies when they are caught? It is truly a dilemma. U.S. counterintelligence in the United States has had to face State Department "no's" when it comes to planning a criminal prosecution of agents acting under the direction of an allied country.

Although intelligence officers are still housed in embassies and their own government facilities abroad, several new trends have taken place in Foreign Economic Espionage.

First, the Strategic Alliance: Many foreign companies opt for access by forming a *Strategic Alliance*. This now commonly used term calls for a contractual relationship between companies. It is often designed just to let a foreign company make a business arrangement in marketing or joint product development in non-sensitive areas. It amounts to letting the fox into the chicken coop.

Second, Competitive Intelligence Relationships: Many competitive intelligence firms have sprung up. These companies say they do soft overt studies, but foreign

intelligence services use them or completely fund them in order to do studies, penetrate, and position themselves to initially obtain overt information and then to obtain classified and proprietary information.

Third, Internationalization or the Global Marketplace: Recruitment of spies within a company still occurs, but the internationalization of business makes it possible for foreign officers to obtain jobs in companies in positions that may appear benign. However, through networking, social engineering, and technology, it is easier to have an insider feeding their country the latest development in chips, telecommunications, or corporate industry.

The old barriers of limited access and 25-mile limit restrictions on bloc countries have been replaced with intellectual property contracts, competitive intelligence studies, and strategic alliance agreements. While these are often masks for espionage, it is difficult for counterintelligence services to penetrate these organizations and target them for prosecution. Perhaps new laws are not the answer as much as educating business people to internal threats from those bearing contracts and seemingly marketing ideas.

Several years ago the United States considered creating a super Counterintelligence Service directed against all spies. It settled for a group in Washington composed of members of the counterintelligence services of the United States. It is mainly a clearinghouse and database for sources. The United States also decided during the Bush Administration, and later during the Clinton Administration, the only way to stay ahead in the spy game is to pump billions into research and development, thereby letting the spies steal "the old stuff" and making it difficult to get things into production. While this was in fact the case for the Russians, the French, Spanish, Germans, Japanese,

Koreans, and Taiwanese all have the ability to bring things out faster than former bloc countries.

As long as the United States prospers and more research and development money goes into new technological developments, the United States will probably stay ahead. However, some plans should be made in case of economic turndowns or a united Europe which may give us major competition. National security policy should look into educational awareness, better counterintelligence structure for our services, and tougher laws and responses for all who are caught spying against the United States – allies or not.

John Quirk is President of ProfileAll.Com, Inc. and author of over 10 books on the intelligence community and related topics. His email is IRGGlobal@aol.com. ABA

Call for Articles

The Standing Committee solicits your support in making the *National Security Law Report (N.S.L.R.)* as topical and informative as possible, and encourages you to contribute your thoughts for consideration by the editorial board. A short article of 600-900 words that highlights a current national security issue of interest to you or that reviews a book related to the field would serve as a welcome addition to this report. Your contributions will greatly strengthen the Standing Committee's ability to maintain a vigorous public forum for national security issues. Submissions should be forwarded to the *N.S.L.R.* editorial board via its Staff Editor, Holly Stewart McMahon, at the Standing Committee's address or natsecurity@abanet.org.

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
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FAX: (202) 662-1032

E-mail: natsecurity@abanet.org

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Book Review



Information Warfare and Security
by Dorothy E. Denning
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company (1999)
Pages: 522 Price: \$34.95
Reviewed by Walter Gary Sharp, Sr.

Information warfare is one of the greatest challenges facing the national security of our Nation, and this book is one of the finest introductions to information warfare in print. Regardless of your technical skills or national security prowess, whether you are in private industry or the government sector, *Information Warfare and Security* will be a valued addition to your library.

Dorothy Denning is Professor of Computer Science at Georgetown University and author of the well-respected *Cryptography and Data Security*. She is also the Director of the Institute for Information Assurance at Georgetown University. Professor Denning has authored over 100 papers on computer security, and has testified before the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives on many occasions. During her most recent testimony on May

23, 2000, she testified on the national security implications of cyberterrorism before the House Armed Services Committee's Oversight Panel on Terrorism.

Information Warfare and Security begins with an introduction to the basic concepts and principles of information warfare, and then provides a very detailed discussion of offensive and defensive information warfare in the context of teenage hacking, corporate intelligence, espionage, organized crime, and terrorism. Professor Denning has taken a very complex and misunderstood subject involving a diverse set of actors, targets, methods, technologies, outcomes, policies, laws, and motivations, and developed a framework for understanding how information warfare relates to information security and information assurance.

Information warfare is a dynamic threat that constantly changes. However, Professor Denning's easy to read and thought-provoking text gives the reader the tools to understand the nature of the threat so that he or she can understand vulnerability assessments and risk management analyses. For those in the government and interested in national security, Professor Denning's final chapter discusses generally accepted system security principles, critical infrastructure protection, and encryption policy in the context of defending our nation.

If you want to understand more about information warfare or computer security in a text that relies upon the expertise of the author and not hype to make it interesting, and if you want to understand why the United States has not seen an "electronic Pearl Harbor" yet, then Professor Denning's *Information Warfare and Security* is a must read.

Gary Sharp is a Principal Information Security Engineer at The MITRE Corporation and author of CyberSpace and the Use of Force. AB

Mark Your Calendar!

On January 26, 2001, Brigadier General Bruce M. Lawlor will address the Standing Committee on Law and National Security at our monthly breakfast program. General Lawlor currently serves as the first commanding general of Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) located at Fort Monroe, Virginia. JTF-CS is a standing joint task force assigned to U.S. Joint Forces Command. It provides command and control over Department of Defense consequence management forces in support of a civilian Lead Federal Agency following a weapon of mass destruction incident in the United States, its territories or possessions. More background information on JTF-CS and General Lawlor can be found at: <http://137.246.33.101/jtfcs/index.html>.

This breakfast program will be held at the University Club, 1135 16th Street, NW, Washington, D.C., from 8:00 am to 9:00 am. The charge is \$15.00. If you are not already on the Standing Committee's mailing list for the breakfast program, or would like more information, please contact the Committee offices at (202) 662-1035 or visit its Web site at: www.abanet.org/natsecurity/.