**Sovereignty & Independence: The Mainland China-Taiwan-United States Triangle**

by Richard E. Friedman

In September and October, 1999, National Strategy Forum President Richard E. Friedman traveled to Taipei, Taiwan, at the invitation of Taiwan authorities. His purpose was to study the current state of relations between Taiwan and Mainland China. The following is a summary of his observations.

Tension between the People’s Republic of China (“Mainland China”) and the Republic of China (“Taiwan”) continues to escalate with the threat of military action initiated by Mainland China against Taiwan.

U.S. President Nixon’s 1972 “Shanghai communiqué” established the principle of “One China, two systems” which has been the norm for international politics and U.S. policy affecting Taiwan ever since. Subsequently, the Republic of China was denied membership in international organizations, including the United Nations, where statehood is a prerequisite of membership. Only 27 states recognize Taiwan as a state entity.

In 1972, Taiwan was ruled by Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang (“KMT”) party that had fled mainland China in 1949 after losing the civil war with the Chinese communists. In 1979, President Carter established formal diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China.

**A Report on Document Exploitation in Bosnia and NATO’s Stabilization Force**

by Robert N. Davis

Naval reservist Robert Davis was deployed to Bosnia from January - October 1999 where he served as the Officer in Charge of the document exploitation mission assigned to NATO’s Stabilization Force. This article is his report to the Standing Committee.

**Background**

The Naval reserve intelligence command in New Orleans, Louisiana called me in mid-December 1998 to notify me that I was being recalled to active duty for nine months for duty in Sarajevo. This is what I train for, and I immediately contacted my law school dean informing them that it would be necessary for me to take a nine-month leave of absence. The support from the Dean and the law school community was tremendous.

I reported to Norfolk, Virginia in January 1999 for in-processing and then proceeded to the Joint Analysis Center, Molesworth, United Kingdom. After two weeks of training in England, I reported to Rhein Main, Germany for NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) training, and then I deployed to Sarajevo, Bosnia as part of the U.S. National Intelligence Center (USNIC) support element to SFOR. My initial assignment was as the Chief of the Compliance Assessment Team (CAT) at the USNIC. The CAT is assigned the responsibility of investigating criminal linkages between the military, government, and organized crime in Bosnia.

After only three weeks as the CAT Chief, I was assigned to serve as the Officer in Charge of the document exploitation mission at Task Force Eagle, Tuzla, Bosnia. Task Force Eagle is the base camp for the United States run Multinational Division North (MND(N)) sector of Bosnia.

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Taiwan declared its policy to become a democracy in 1979 — a goal that was fully achieved in 1986. Now, the 22 million people of Taiwan enjoy a model democracy, with a large middle class, politically stable democratic institutions, and a flourishing economy. Mainland China — with a population of 1.3 billion — has also made great progress in providing food, clothing, and shelter for its people, but it is still wedded politically (if not economically) to its communist origins. Mainland China is an authoritarian state and has not declared a policy of democratization.

Taiwan unilaterally declared in 1991 that the civil war with Mainland China was ended, and renounced any intention of retaking Mainland China by the use of force. Talks between Mainland China and Taiwan began in 1991, focusing on low-level logistics issues. In 1998, President Clinton visited Mainland China and signaled a new U.S. policy of "strategic engagement" with Mainland China. This was regarded as a major shift of U.S. policy favoring Mainland China, abandoning the carefully crafted balance of U.S. policy that had prevailed since 1972. Taiwan and its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region, including Japan, Korea, and India, believe that the U.S. has opened the way for Mainland China to become the sole superpower in the region.

Mainland China and Taiwan differ on the meaning of the "One-China" principle. Mainland China contends that it has sovereignty over all of China, including Taiwan, and that Taiwan is a renegade province of Mainland China.

The essence of Taiwan's rationale is that it is a democracy; that Mainland China is and for the foreseeable future will remain, an authoritarian state; and, that any future union with a non-democratic Mainland China would demolish Taiwan's hard won democracy. Taiwan's policy has been that a prolonged status quo leading to reunification would be acceptable to both sides, subject to Mainland China's progressive transition to a democratic state.

Mainland China's passion regarding Taiwan is based on more than pride and nationalism. Mainland China believes that it has made a reasonable accommodation by proposing "one country, two systems" as the basis for reunification — neither side should interfere in the other's affairs, provided that Taiwan does not seek to assert statehood. Mainland China regards a declaration by Taiwan that it is a separate and independent sovereign state to be accorded international recognition as justification for military action to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China. Mainland China believes that political negotiations should continue; an agreement should be reached ending the state of hostility; that continuing political differences should not interfere with economic cooperation; and, that Chinese cultural traditions would be enhanced by reunification. Mainland China regards its policy initiatives towards Taiwan as credible and says that the West must recognize that this is an internal issue that should not be internationalized.

Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui has made two recent statements challenging Mainland China's "One-China" principle, and it is these remarks that touched off the current escalation of tensions.

President Lee stated in July, 1999 that Taiwan and Mainland China enjoy a "special state-to-state relationship". The underlying reasons for President Lee's statements are as follows.

First, they were intended to enhance the standing of the KMT candidate in the Taiwan presidential elections scheduled for March, 2000. Although many Taiwanese support the idea of ultimate Taiwan independence, they are apprehensive about upsetting the status quo and provoking Mainland China to initiate some form of military action against Taiwan. A temporizing policy of maintaining the status quo leading to indefinite, long-range reunification is palatable.

Second, President Lee believes that it is time to abandon the fiction that Taiwan is a non-state and that Mainland China and the international community must recognize that Taiwan is a de facto independent state. Accord-
ingly, negotiations with Mainland China must be based upon the principle that Taiwan is not subordinate to Mainland China, and that Taiwan and Mainland China share a common cultural and ethnic heritage. Thus, the statement “special state-to-state relationship” is an accurate descriptor of the negotiating relationship, one of parity.

Third, many Taiwanese believe that present U.S. policy favoring Mainland China tends to abandon Taiwan. The “special state-to-state” statement, although provocative to Mainland China, is designed as a wake-up call to U.S. policymakers to modify present policy and return to the long enduring balance position. Many Taiwanese were dubious about the propriety of President Lee’s first statement. There are mixed emotions in Taiwan: a hope that Mainland China will perceive the statements as campaign rhetoric and exercise restraint and a belief that the statements are true.

The ongoing tension between Mainland China and Taiwan has increased dramatically as a result of President Lee’s recent statement (Foreign Affairs, November – December 1999, pp. 9 – 14) wherein he describes Taiwan as having a new national identity, and that reality confronts the fiction that PRC has any right or imperative to claim sovereignty over Taiwan. This second, more pointed statement by President Lee carries with it a risk of further provoking Mainland China. It is too early to determine whether Taiwanese popular opinion supports President Lee’s second statement, or regards his statement as having gone too far.

The statement of President Lee, who will leave office next spring, may not necessarily reflect the policy of the Taiwan authorities. The prudent course would be for both Mainland China and Taiwan to reflect on the entirety of President Lee’s most recent statement and carefully assess its political implications.

There is potential for some sort of military action by Mainland China against Taiwan. One of the unknown elements is what the U.S. military response would be. Important constraints on Mainland China are the threat of near-term damage to its international standing and negative impact on its economy. The Chinese proverb is apt: “Fight no battle you cannot win.”

There are several options for Mainland Chinese military action. Invasion of the main island of Taiwan would be a difficult and bloody affair – Mainland China lacks amphibious landing ships, and Taiwan has sufficient airpower to repel an invasion of the main island of Taiwan. However, there are other military options. Invasion of Matsu or Jimmen, or lesser lightly-garrisoned Taiwanese islands is possible. Mainland China may launch missiles in the Taiwan Strait as it did in 1996 – an action that resulted in the arrival of U.S. aircraft carriers. A missile strike on Taiwan or its offshore islands would be a major escalation of the conflict.

Taiwan has no missile defense capability of its own. A naval blockade would be difficult for Mainland China to sustain or for Taiwan to repel and would be unlikely unless the Mainland Chinese leaders were sure the United States would not send the Seventh Fleet to disrupt it. The more likely scenario is close, harassing flights by aircraft of both sides over the Taiwan Strait.

The PLA, Mainland China’s military organization – a major political force within the country – has made recent bellicose statements. The PLA has prioritized building its missile force and actively opposes a proposed U.S. Theater Missile Defense System that would include Japan and Taiwan. Mainland China’s policy is that it will not remain idle if the U.S. fosters Taiwan’s separatist ambitions, or if Taiwan takes unilateral action toward de jure independence.

Richard E. Friedman, National Security Forum President and the Standing Committee’s Advisory Committee Chair.

The U.S. faces a policy dilemma: how to pursue closer relations (strategic engagement) with Mainland China and still protect Taiwan’s security. If Mainland China initiates military action against Taiwan, will the U.S. respond, and to what extent? Could the U.S. abandon a fellow democracy – one it has fostered – without suffering a major blow to its credibility?

The U.S. Congress is debating a Taiwan Security Enhancement Act that would allow the sale of additional weapons to Taiwan, including missile defense systems. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (“TRA”) was passed by a U.S. Congress unwilling to cede Mainland China-Taiwan policy to President Carter. The TRA is a U.S. domestic law – it does not have treaty status in international law. It affirms continuing U.S. interest in Taiwan’s security. As to U.S. response to Mainland Chinese military action, the legislative scheme is vague: it is not a U.S. commitment to use military force on behalf of Taiwan, but it emphasizes the U.S. interest in the security of Taiwan.
The expectation in Taiwan is that the U.S. would not respond with significant force. Taiwan recognizes that the U.S. military is over-committed. U.S. support would likely be limited to logistics and intelligence information gathering. Taiwan knows it would lose U.S. popular support should there be U.S. military casualties incurred defending Taiwan. 

Taiwan has all of the attributes of a state. Yet, through a series of political decisions, this recognition has been withdrawn by all but a few (and minor) states and by the international community. International law provides no clear consensus for resolution of the issue of reunification of Mainland China and Taiwan, and legal experts disagree on whether Mainland China may continue to threaten or use force to compel reunification. In practice, other territories – Bosnia, Slovenia, Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asian Republics – have successfully asserted their right to independence.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, except as authorized by the UN Security Council under its Chapter VII authority or in individual or collective self-defense as authorized by international law and recognized by Article 51 of the UN Charter. Mainland China’s position, however, is that it has sovereignty over all of China, including Taiwan, and that its use of forcible measures against Taiwan is within its domestic jurisdiction. International law suggests that secessionist movements violate the territorial integrity of a state, and are prohibited by international law.

The 1970 “Declaration on Remedies of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” reinforces that the threat or use of force to settle international disputes is a violation of international law. States should not engage in the threat or use of force to resolve international disputes, including territorial disputes. The threshold issue to be determined is whether a de facto entity (Taiwan) is protected under international law.

Taiwan has been a major investor in Mainland China and deserves a significant share of credit for Mainland China’s economic growth. There are more than 40,000 Taiwanese business entities operating in Mainland China, many located in provinces outside Beijing. The presence of these free enterprise businesses has accelerated economic reform in Mainland China and will be vital if it begins a transition to democratization.

Political tensions between Mainland China and Taiwan are becoming increasingly perilous. A new generation of leaders in Mainland China may take a long-term strategic view of the current situation and seek to constrain Mainland China’s hardliners, including the military establishment. The political will of the Taiwanese people will be expressed in the March, 2000 presidential election. Mutual trade and economic considerations may prevent further escalation of tension and provide a vehicle for a long-term solution. International law may provide an ingenious solution – perhaps a Compact of Federation that precedes reunification would serve as an attractive alternative to independence in the near-term. The coming U.S. presidential campaign may illuminate the complex issues involved and enable the new U.S. administration to seek a political balance point for the future.

Richard Friedman serves as the Chair of the Standing Committee’s Advisory Committee.

Document Exploitation...

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Tactical units operating within MND(N) acquired materials that needed examination. My job was to organize the document exploitation mission, acquire and process material, and then report our findings to the MND(N) and SFOR Commanders.

NATO first deployed an Implementation Force (IFOR) comprised of approximately thirty-four countries to Bosnia in December 1995 to implement the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Accords. This NATO-led Stabilization Force is IFOR’s successor, and it plays a key role in maintaining stability in the Balkan region. The SFOR mission emphasis is on creating a stable environment in Bosnia and eventual withdrawal of international troops. Total troop strength has been reduced to approximately 30,000. Of this total, approximately 6000 are Americans.

Professor Robert N. Davis was appointed to the Standing Committee this year.
The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is NATO’s highest authority and provides a forum for wide political consultation and coordination between the allies. Initially, the President of the United States indicated a one-year troop commitment. One year later, that commitment was extended for another year. The NAC extended the SFOR mission until benchmarks indicating progress toward establishing a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia are met. Those benchmarks include:

- maintaining the cease fire,
- keeping weapons in cantonments,
- police reform,
- judicial reform,
- establishing multi-ethnic institutions,
- electoral reform,
- democratization,
- minority refugee returns,
- freedom of movement,
- resolution of the Brcko issue,
- prosecution of war criminals, and
- developing a free market.

Based on my personal observations in Bosnia, the multinational force is making good progress in all areas, but achieving these benchmarks could take several decades.

General Observations

After nine months of on the ground experience in Bosnia, I also concluded that:

- we need to constantly reassess our progress and direction in Bosnia,
- we need to develop a general foreign policy framework for this period of transition from the cold-war to nation building,
- the military is performing a civilian agency mission,
- the Bosnia economy is stagnant,
- the legal system in Bosnia needs major reform,
- crime and corruption dominate the Bosnian economy,
- a decrease in the military force structure hurts soldiers and their families, and
- NATO colleagues perceive the United States implementation of foreign policy as odd but super powerful and highly respected.

Legal Duties

Although I was assigned to Bosnia to serve as an U.S. Naval intelligence officer and not a member of the Navy’s Judge Advocate General’s Corps, I was also assigned other collateral duties because of my legal education and training. In Bosnia, for example, I had the privilege to serve as a judge on the SFOR Republic of Srpska (Serbia) Claims Tribunal. The Claims Tribunal was established by SFOR to address a variety of claims by Serbian civilians against SFOR. The Claims Tribunal included two Serbian judges, one German judge, and two United States judges. The Claims Tribunal serves a very important political purpose because it is an attempt to demonstrate that the rule of law applies to both civilians and the military. Most of the cases I heard involved traffic accidents and property damage. Traffic accident claims in Bosnia are interesting because of a poor highway infrastructure and the willingness of local drivers to take chances on the roads. Many cases involved automobile accidents caused by excess speed for the road conditions, or passing on a curve. Because of the narrow roads in Bosnia and the over-abundance of large SFOR vehicles, driving in Bosnia requires constant vigilance. Unfortunately, several cases I heard involved fatal accidents which claimed the lives of local Serbs and SFOR soldiers.

Another aspect of my judicial duties with the Claims Tribunal included hearing a case involving property damage to a home as the result of SFOR conducting ordnance destruction. The claimant alleged that all of the damage to his home was caused by SFOR explosions. SFOR maintained that the claimant’s home was beyond the ring of impact for the explosions to have been the cause of property damage. However, SFOR sent the claimant a form letter stating that the home had been inspected and found not to be within the ring of impact from the explosions. The home had not been inspected though the claimant requested inspection on several occasions. Thus, the claimant was awarded a small amount as compensation and SFOR was advised to conduct damage inspections properly. The experience as a judge for the Claims Tribunal was to be one of many challenging assignments in Bosnia.

Document Exploitation

Document exploitation is an extremely valuable intelligence collection tool. When properly used, it can be a rich source of timely strategic, operational and tactical intelligence. Document exploitation involves the acquisition, screening and translation, digitization and dissemination of documents and materials. Annexes 1A and 10 of the Dayton Peace Accords gives the military broad authority to ensure a stable environment in Bosnia. Thus, if the military has a reasonable belief that activity is afoot that will interfere with the mandate to ensure a stable environment, then the military is authorized to take any appropriate action to
maintain the peace and preserve the stability. The document exploitation team is a theater asset which provides service to a multinational client base throughout Bosnia. The document exploitation team included representatives from NATO and all branches of the United States military. Document exploitation required coordination with all of the national intelligence support team agencies and provided mission support to many commands within SFOR headquarters.

As the Officer in Charge of a new document exploitation mission, I was required to develop the concept of operations and design our facility from ground zero, and regularly brief the SFOR Commander, U.S. Army General Montgomery Meigs. My team included between nine and fifteen Serbo-Croatian contract linguists, six intelligence analysts, four computer exploitation team members, and three additional administrative support personnel.

I established GoTeams and Mobile Training Teams to help acquire material, and I had the opportunity to lead several of my teams on missions in hostile territory. During my tour, we were able to identify key documents which have strategic, operational, tactical, and evidentiary value for exploitation by mission planners, intelligence analysts, and investigators of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

Conclusion

This nine-month recall to active duty was one of the most challenging assignments I have had in my twelve years as a U.S. Navy reservist. I admire the work of our armed forces and allies, though there remains much to improve about how we do business in a multinational environment. Today, the United States is challenged to provide strong and certain leadership around the globe. It is incumbent upon those of us in the national security community to assist in the effort to develop a vision for the future and a framework for conducting foreign policy that will encourage all nations interested in promoting democracy and freedom and discourage rogue states bent on oppression and violence.

Robert Davis is a Professor of Law at the University of Mississippi School of Law, founder of the Journal of National Security Law, and a member of the Standing Committee.

Merits of the ABM Treaty are Debated at June Breakfast

by William E. Conner

At its June 21, 1999 breakfast meeting, the Standing Committee was treated to a thoughtful discussion of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty by a distinguished panel of arms control experts. The panel ably substituted for former Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey, who was forced to cancel his remarks at the last minute. Stewart Baker, former general counsel at the National Security Agency, introduced the panel, which consisted of John Rhinelander, Sven Kraemer, and Lee Minichielo.

The ABM Treaty (formally the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems Between the United States and the Soviet Union) was signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972, ratified by the U.S. Senate on August 3, 1972, and entered into force on October 3, 1972. The Treaty originally provided that each country may have only two ABM deployment areas, but restricted and located in such a way that they cannot provide a nationwide ABM defense or form the basis for developing one. In 1976, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a protocol to the Treaty that reduced the number of ABM deployment areas from two to one, deployed either around each parties' national capital area or, alternatively, at a single ICBM deployment area. The Soviet Union deployed an ABM system around Moscow, but the U.S. elected not to deploy an ABM system and deactivated its site at Grand Forks, North Dakota in 1976. The Treaty has subsequently been extensively modified by amendment, as well as by various protocols and memoranda of understanding.

Mr. Rhinelander, a former drafter of the ABM Treaty, is a partner with the law firm of Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge in Washington, DC. He began his remarks by reminding his audience of the conclusions of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (commonly referred to as the Rumsfeld Commission after its chairman, former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld). In its final report of July 15, 1998 the Commission concluded that the threat to the U.S. posed by the emerging capabilities of rogue states is broader, more mature, and evolving more rapidly than has been reported by the Intelligence Community. Further, the Intelligence Community's ability to provide timely and accurate estimates of ballistic missile threats to the United States is eroding, and the Intelligence Community's capabilities in this area need to be strengthened in terms of both resources and methodology.
Mr. Rhinelander believes that the three most important threats facing the United States emanate from Russian strategic forces, Russian tactical weapons, and the alarming amount of enriched plutonium available in the former Soviet Union. Mr. Rhinelander sees the threats from the People’s Republic of China and from rogue states as serious but secondary to the Russian challenges.

Mr. Rhinelander explained that when the ABM Treaty was drafted 27 years ago basic missile technology consisted primarily of large, land-based systems. According to Mr. Rhinelander, during the treaty negotiations the United States’ primary concern was to prevent the Soviets from converting their extensive existing surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites into ABM sites and thus possess a nationwide ABM system. As a consequence, Mr. Rhinelander said the two most important goals of the Treaty were to emphasize maximum warning time and to prohibit mobile missile systems. He stated that the Treaty was intended to be a flexible, dynamic document, however, the complexity of the issues involved and bilateral disagreements between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia have prevented further progress on the Treaty. Although the Treaty allows for the United States to unilaterally withdraw with six months notice, Mr. Rhinelander believes such withdrawal would be counterproductive and significantly harm U.S.-Russian relations. Finally, Mr. Rhinelander noted that during recent congressional testimony he detected a surprising level of apathy regarding the ABM Treaty and, therefore, he does not foresee serious discussions being held or progress being made concerning the Treaty until the next Administration takes office in January, 2001.

Sven Kraemer, former director of arms control for the National Security Council, is president of Global Challenge 2000 in Washington, DC. Mr. Kraemer considers the missile threat against the U.S. to be real and accelerating. Further, he is concerned that the threat from sea-based platforms has not received the serious attention it deserves.

Mr. Kraemer commented that although the ABM Treaty is generally thought of as being the “cornerstone” of United States strategic stability, he believes the Treaty may prove to be the “tombstone” for many Americans if the Treaty remains in force. Substantive provisions of the Treaty are barriers to the current U.S. missile program, he explained. According to Mr. Kraemer, the Treaty restricts deployment of a national missile defense system, limits interceptors to 100 ground-based (non-mobile) sites, and prohibits research and development of certain missile components.

Mr. Kraemer asserted that the Treaty has been breached by the Soviets, but despite this, the U.S. has “artificially extended” the Treaty via the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures (CBMA) signed in New York on September 26, 1997. These accords were enhanced and implemented by a second set of agreements signed by representatives of the United States, the Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine on October 13, 1998 in Geneva, which provide for an exchange of technical data and notifications on certain theater ballistic missile defense systems. The CBMA, which has never ratified by the Senate, is part of a set of ABM Treaty related agreements which are intended to preserve the Treaty’s viability in the post-Cold War era. According to Mr. Kraemer, these agreements accomplished little more than transferring weapons from some of the former Soviet Republics into the Russian arsenal.

Although the United States has not deployed any mobile missile systems, other nations are developing and deploying such systems, Mr. Kraemer stated. Mr. Kraemer credits the “Star Wars” program rather than the ABM Treaty with reducing the strategic threat. When the Treaty was signed in 1972, he explained, the United States possessed

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four strategic missile systems while the Soviet Union had 28 missile systems. It was not until President Ronald Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative, commonly known as “Star Wars,” in March of 1983 that the Russians accepted substantial cuts in strategic arms and which led to the arms reduction treaties of the 1980s, he said. Mr. Kraemer concluded by stating that he believes the U.S. should develop and deploy an ABM defense system in cooperation with the Russians and do so now.

The final panelist was Lee Minicelli, a consultant with SAIC in Virginia and a former director of the Secretary of Defense’s Office of Arms Control and Implementation. Mr. Minicelli observed that U.S.-Russian arms controls diplomacy is complicated by parties’ differing perceptions. On the one hand, Mr. Minicelli explained, the Russians would like the United States to renegotiate the strategic offensive force agreements in place to implement the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II of 1993 and make further reductions in our strategic systems. The United States, on the other hand, favors reopening negotiations on the ABM Treaty to address the threat from rouge nations — a threat the Russians do not fear. In fact, the Russians fear the ABM Treaty’s affect on their ability to threaten us, he said.

Yet, to deploy an effective missile defense even against rogue states will require amendment to the Treaty. Mr. Minicelli suggests that the U.S. work with Russians to modify the Treaty to alleviate Russia’s potential contribution to proliferation and to develop and deploy systems to defend against emerging threats. The Russians still possess large numbers of sophisticated missile systems and so they ought not to be fearful of any ABM system developed and deployed by the United States, he said.

Bill Conner is a former Navy intelligence officer who is now an attorney in private practice in Virginia.

Special thanks to...

Dr. Robert F. Turner
Editor-in-Chief, National Security Law Report
ABA Standing Committee on Law and National Security
September 1992 -- December 1999

Dr. Robert F. Turner has been an extraordinary friend and mainstay of the Standing Committee for over a decade. After many years of selfless contributions to the Standing Committee, he became its eighth Chair in August 1989. When he stepped down after three consecutive terms as Chair, Dr. Turner volunteered to serve as the Editor of the Committee’s National Security Law Report. Over the last seven years, he has published more than sixty issues of the Report that have been widely distributed to government officials, private practitioners, educators, journalists, students, and others with an interest in national security law.

Dr. Turner has dedicated his life’s work to the national security of the United States. He served extensively in Indochina between 1968 and the final evacuation in 1975, first as a journalist, then as an Army officer on detail to the American Embassy in Saigon, and later as a national security adviser to a member of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Dr. Turner co-founded the Center for National Security Law with Professor John Norton Moore in April 1981, was the first President of the U.S. Institute of Peace, and has served in the Pentagon as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, as Counsel to the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board, and as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs. A prolific writer, Dr. Turner holds both professional and academic doctorates from the University of Virginia.

Wherever the Standing Committee has been over the last ten years, Dr. Turner has always been there behind the scenes -- as photographer, friend, and mentor. During its October 1999 business meeting, the Standing Committee honored Dr. Turner and presented him with a leather bound photo journal as a small thank you for his outstanding dedication and selfless contributions to the Standing Committee and its work. Thank you, Bob, on behalf of all of us.

Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker

Dr. Robert F. Turner has served the Standing Committee for over a decade as either its Chair, Editor of its National Security Law Report, colleague, friend, or mentor.