



# National Security Law Report

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## September 22 Breakfast

### Adm. Owens Emphasizes Jointness and Technology for Post-Cold War Military

Admiral William A. Owens, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, spoke to the Standing Committee's September 22nd breakfast at the Army-Navy Club in Washington, DC.

He observed that the military is confronting "three revolutions" at the present time. First of all, the world has changed dramatically in recent years, and this requires the Pentagon to restructure in response to the new, post-Cold War, realities. Not only has the primary military threat largely dissipated, but there are new missions involving places like Rwanda, Bosnia, North Korea, Haiti, and Cuba. The focus today is more on peacekeeping, peace-making, and humanitarian missions; but the military must keep in mind that its primary mission remains war fighting—protecting the security of the United States.

Related to these changes is the second "revolution"—the revolution of the budget. From the end of the 1980s to the end of the 1990s the real Defense Budget will decrease about 45 percent. While Admiral Owens did not quarrel with the planned cuts, he expressed concern that additional cuts would not be prudent. Force structure will soon be down by about 35 percent, but the infrastructure is more resistant to cutbacks—in part for political reasons.

The third "revolution" is that of technology. This is especially good news, as enormous things are happening that "genuinely excite" military leaders. If we are wise enough to take advantage of the

benefits promised in this area, we will be able to do "some very important things for our country."

The old Pentagon processes are inadequate to meet the new challenges. Among the approaches being taken to improve efficiency is an emphasis on jointness—integrating and benefiting from the strengths of each of the military services. "From head to toe, we must be a joint force," Admiral Owens said. He illustrated the problems of past years by a reference to his own experience in managing the Navy's budget at a time when he knew very little about Army or Air Force programs.

The Pentagon now has a Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC), made up of the Vice Chiefs of each of the services and chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (currently Admiral Owens). The committee spends about 30 hours each month focusing upon jointness issues and

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## December 1-2, at the International Club

### Non-Governmental Security Threats to be Addressed at Conference

The Standing Committee's next conference will take place on Thursday and Friday, December 1-2, 1994, at the International Club in Washington, DC. It will address "Non-Governmental Security Threats: The 'Gray Area' Challenge."

Few potential threats to our nation's security are more alarming than the possibility that major criminal organizations around the world will join forces in a high-tech global "Mafia" determined to obtain weapons of mass destruction and sell them to the highest bidder. It is no secret that there is a market for such a product among radical States, and criminal elements have already managed to smuggle small amounts of nuclear materials out of the former Soviet Union.

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## Admiral Owens...

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ways in which new technology can be used to meet new missions. Again, however, he emphasized that peacekeeping and humanitarian missions must not be allowed to obscure the more essential traditional missions like air superiority and strategic deterrence.

The JROC has been focusing upon nine generic assessment areas in putting together a Chairman's Program Assessment for submission to the Secretary of Defense as a recommendation for program and budget. Once the program is put together, the JROC members fly out to visit all of the major command Commanders-in-Chief ("CinCs") to explain the package and obtain feedback which is incorporated before the final document is presented. Admiral Owens reported that the first assessment has already been done, and constitutes "a consensus of the four-star military leadership."

During the question period, Admiral Owens reported that the Nuclear Posture Review has been completed. He observed that the long-range missile systems still in Russia and other former Soviet States still have the capability to do serious damage to the United States, but the United States no longer targets its own nuclear warheads on those missiles. Should democracy fail and the situation in Russia deteriorate, that policy could be revisited.

Although the United States has made "dramatic cuts" in our ballistic missiles and bombers—approaching START I levels—the Russians have not made comparable reductions in their own systems. Whether this is a result of the Soviet economy and the costs associated with downsizing, or a reflection of policy differences within the Russian government, he did not speculate—but the end result is that the Russians have a substantial numerical lead over the United States in these strategic systems.

An even greater problem, in the Admiral's view, is the imbalance in non-strategic nuclear inventories. Although this issue does not get much attention in the press, the Russian inventory of such systems is "several times" that of the United States. "Enormous imbalances" exist in the present situation, and the Admiral suggested that it may be a mistake for the United States to go lower in strategic or non-strategic nuclear inventories at this point. In this regard, he noted that it has been recommended that we eliminate non-strategic nuclear weapons from surface Navy combatants and from carrier-based aviation.

Asked about Haiti—just three days into the US military operation—he noted that there were "thus

far" no casualties among US forces or caused by US forces; and he said that, again "thus far," things were going better than he had thought probable. On the issue of US military involvement in police functions in Haiti, he noted that most American troops are not trained for that function and opposed such a role. Instead, he noted, the United States was training Haitians to take over police duties.

In response to another question about the wisdom of the Haiti deployment, Admiral Owens reaffirmed that the first role of the US military is "war fighting" and protecting the nation, but he said there were occasions where the United States could make contributions to humanitarian missions. In particular, he pointed to the airlift support the United States had provided in Rwanda—a capability unmatched by other countries. Other areas where the United States has a special advantage include sophisticated communications and our ability to open airfields through which Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) can bring in aid. Only the United States has this kind of capability. While we must be selective in choosing where to become involved, we do have the ability to help humanity in this way. He assured the audience that there is "enormous dialogue" on this issue before such decisions are made.

Discussing the problems in the Somalia deployment, he observed that these are "new missions" and that we are learning "important lessons" from each of them. Somalia taught us that when the job is done we need to get out and return to our basic mission, but he said it would be a mistake to conclude that the US military should limit itself to "fighting wars." We must be "very selective," and

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## BOOK REVIEW

by Richard E. Friedman

### OPERATION ANADYR

by Anatoli I. Gribkov & General William Y. Smith  
Chicago: Edition Q, Inc. (1994)  
Pages: 252. Price: \$24.95.

This book compares the views of two senior military officers who were adversaries in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Soviet General Anatoli Gribkov, who subsequently served as Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces, at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the supervisor of Operation ANADYR, the secret shipment of Soviet missile forces to Cuba. US General William Smith was Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), and served on the staff of General Maxwell Taylor at the White House and in the Pentagon between 1961 and 1963. This fascinating research work is enriched by access to recently opened official archives in Moscow and Washington.

Throughout the missile crisis, Communist Party Chairman Nikita Khrushchev deceived President John Kennedy. The crisis originated in the extension of Moscow's policy of sustained provocation towards the United States and was designed, in part, to offset United States superiority in strategic nuclear weapons. This was coupled with the Soviet regime's ideological commitment to defend their Cuban socialist comrades from US aggression.

The authors conclude that Khrushchev made a series of miscalculations:

1. He did not understand Washington's perceptions of "national interests" and, in the aftermath of the Khrushchev-Kennedy summit in Vienna, he doubted that Kennedy had the courage to defend those interests, whatever they may have been.

2. Khrushchev believed that the use of low-yield, short-range nuclear weapons in combat limited to defensive operations in Cuba would not provoke massive nuclear retaliation by the United States against the Soviet Union. He believed that Kennedy would regard the missiles as defensive rather than offensive weapons and would therefore not become unduly alarmed.

3. Khrushchev believed that a US invasion of Cuba was imminent, and that only Soviet nuclear missiles could deter or repulse an invasion of Cuba.

4. Khrushchev believed that Soviet missiles in Cuba would be undetectable until they were operational and their existence could be presented as a *fait accompli* to the United States.

5. Finally, when the United States made known to the Soviets in late October, 1962, that missiles had been detected, Khrushchev believed that the US naval blockade of Soviet ships was a first-step feint before a full-scale invasion, thus complicating the last-minute negotiations.

President Kennedy also made important strategic errors. He was obsessed with the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco, and this obsession clouded his assessment of US national interests. Failing to articulate a clear and realistic set of objectives for dealing with Castro, he left his advisers and the Joint Chiefs of Staff guessing as to US policy. They assumed that Castro must be removed from power. This confusion led to the formulation of a number of covert, psychological warfare operations targeted at Castro and his regime, including the execution of a two-week amphibious military training exercise in the Caribbean in the spring of 1962 that was interpreted in Moscow as hard evidence that a US invasion of Cuba was imminent. This was believed by Khrushchev to be Kennedy's response to the declaration that the Soviets would assist the Cuban people in beating back an armed attack on Cuba.

President Kennedy's policy objective at that time was to isolate Castro but not to overthrow him. This was not understood by top echelon civilian officials or by the United States military. Kennedy had no intention of invading Cuba. However, the Joint Chiefs were unaware that Kennedy had determined that the United States could live with Castro. The wrong signals were communicated by the White House to the Pentagon and by the United States to the Soviets.

Political considerations on both sides of the crisis influenced the respective negotiating posture. When Khrushchev announced Operation ANADYR to the Soviet Politburo in May, 1962, there was no political opposition. Khrushchev's arguments were persuasive: the Cuban project would enhance the Soviet position as a superpower; Soviet missiles would be in parity with US missiles in Turkey; and, it would be a valuable bargaining chip in negotiations with the

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## Book Review—Operation Anadyr . . .

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United States over Berlin and Laos. The undertaking was thought to be a win-win political opportunity for the Soviets. Khrushchev was placed in a weak position, internally, when his assumptions proved wrong.

The reciprocal US political considerations confronting Kennedy were vastly different. Congressional elections were scheduled for November and Kennedy wanted flexibility to respond to the crisis. However, the Republican leadership signaled that Castro would be the dominant political theme in the congressional campaign, and many demanded an invasion of Cuba. Republican Senator Kenneth Keating, in early October, announced that intermediate missiles capable of striking the US mainland were in Cuba and would be operational within six months.

In part because of partisan political pressure, Kennedy's policy options were limited: invasion; air strikes against the missile sites; or, a naval blockade (which was not favored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff). Kennedy was confronted with a sensitive leadership problem—overcoming the image of weakness and indecisiveness arising from the Bay of Pigs. The Kennedy administration was confronted by Soviet assertiveness from Berlin to Laos. However, the Joint Chiefs were insensitive to the political dimensions of the crisis. Further, Kennedy did not trust the strategic judgment of the Joint Chiefs after the Bay of Pigs. The Joint Chiefs wanted to remove the missiles, oust Castro, and by so doing, regain Kennedy's respect. Kennedy did not want to remove Castro. The crisis actually widened the gap between the president and the military.

The negotiations between Kennedy and Khrushchev leading to the conclusion of the crisis were undermined by Khrushchev's lies to Kennedy about the Soviet buildup in Cuba in early September, 1962. Khrushchev had told Kennedy that no offensive weapons would be emplaced in Cuba. Khrushchev may have been making an artful distinction between defensive and offensive missiles. Also, he told Kennedy that the Soviets would do nothing to embarrass Kennedy or disrupt the 1962 US congressional elections.

The authors conclude that, although both sides made many critical errors of judgment based upon erroneous assumptions, Kennedy correctly defined his objective to have the missiles removed from Cuba. He centered his actions and decisions on this objective, and successfully concluded the crisis.

The Soviets have said that their objective was to enhance their relative strategic nuclear power position and ensure Castro's survival. Berlin was not an objective in the Cuba political equation. Among the most important lessons learned is that governments should closely examine the way their opponents perceive their actions. Neither Kennedy nor Khrushchev clearly articulated their objectives in the time period immediately preceding the crisis. In contrast, during the late phase of the crisis, both Kennedy and Khrushchev clearly identified their objectives to each other, and this became the basis for a negotiated settlement.

## December Conference . . .

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A public opinion poll taken not long ago in Russia asked: "Who's in control in Russia today?" Reportedly, the three most frequent answers were: (1) organized crime, (2) nobody, and (3) Boris Yeltsin. In terms of profits, the drug cartels already rank alongside major multinational corporations; and the thought that they might decide to bankroll terrorists and other criminal elements around the globe is frightening.

While the lineup of speakers is still being finalized, several distinguished experts have already agreed to take part. Thursday morning will begin with an overview of the problem including Professor Richard K. Betts, Director of Columbia University's Institute on War and Peace Studies, and Brian Sullivan of the National Defense University's Institute for Strategic Studies.

Subsequent panels will look at organized crime in the former Soviet Union and the problem of controlling international drug cartels—which will feature former US Ambassador to Peru David Jordan and senior experts from the Departments of State and Justice.

Friday's session will begin with a look at international terrorism and will then include a panel on the transfer of dual-use technology. Former Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency

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### Calendar of Events

**December 1-2—Conference on  
"Non-Governmental Security Threats"**  
International Club  
1800 K St., NW, Washington DC

## BOOK REVIEW

by Robert F. Turner

### ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS

Edited by Prof. Lori Fisler Damrosch

New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press (1993)

Pages: 403. Price: \$17.95

In early 1992 the Council on Foreign Relations brought together a distinguished group of experts, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Max M. Kampelman, to study "Collective Involvement in Internal Conflicts." This valuable book is a product of that initiative.

The contributors include a distinguished group of academicians and practitioners, including Professor Tom J. Farer of American University and Domingo E. Acevedo, the Principal Legal Adviser to the Organization of American States (OAS). Following a substantive introduction by Professor Damrosch (who participated in this month's Standing Committee conference), the book consists of nine chapters, two thirds of which focus upon case studies of intervention in countries like Cambodia, Somalia, and Haiti.

The focus is upon collective action, but it includes operations formally approved by the United Nations as well as those carried out on more of an *ad hoc* basis by groups of States. Excluded from the study are interventions resulting from transborder aggression; however situations like Iraq's repression of its Kurds and Shi'ites obviously involve some overlap with acts of international aggression.

A major theme of this timely study is the shift in international peacekeeping operations, from being based either upon a response to external aggression or the consent of the target State, to "noncon-

sensual peace enforcement . . ." Some of the cases were generally successful, while others clearly failed. In at least one case, the intervention not only has thus far not been a success—it may actually have exacerbated the problem. Thus, Professor Damrosch writes:

The Yugoslav crisis compels us to ask whether well intentioned—but weak and ineffectual—efforts from outside parties only made the situation worse. . . . Did the half-hearted international involvement only disable the victims from defending themselves, without in any way hampering the attackers?

Mr. Acevedo's chapter on the OAS response to Haiti is particularly interesting in view of the current US military mission in that country. He not only includes valuable background about the current crisis, but also traces the growth of an Inter-American commitment to democracy and the rule of law that leads him to conclude that the "illegal replacement of a democratically elected govern-

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### Admiral Owens . . .

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protecting our troops must be at the forefront of our policy, but we can make important contributions in other areas. It is critically important to explain our actions so that the American people will understand and support us.

Admiral Owens concluded his talk with a recruiting pitch. Despite the downsizing, the military is still looking for good young people to join up. Today's military personnel are "the best we've ever had." He urged members of the audience to encourage their sons, daughters, and younger friends to consider signing up—noting that his own son had just graduated from the Naval Academy.

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## ***The National Security Agenda . . . .***

**Clinton Administration May Seek Revision of War Powers Resolution**—In remarks at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs on 21 October, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake asserted that congressional debates over the 1973 War Powers Resolution have placed American troops at risk and indicated the Clinton Administration would seek revisions to the Act next year.

**Congress Set to Reassess US Intelligence Community**—*The Wall Street Journal* (26 Sept. 94, p. 6) reported that Congress is preparing the first full-scale reappraisal of the US Intelligence Community since World War II. Quoting Senate Intelligence Committee General Counsel (and Standing Committee member) L. Britt Snider, the *Journal* reported that Congress will establish a 17-member bipartisan commission, likely to be headed by Les Aspin, to study and make recommendations for reforms.

**Ex-KGB General Alleges Philip Agee Sold US Secrets to Moscow**—According to *US News & World Report* (17 Oct. 94, p. 26), during a recent public television taping in Canada a "shouting match" erupted between former KGB General Oleg Kalugin and Philip Agee, the former CIA employee who devoted years to exposing alleged CIA employees in foreign countries and whose actions are thought responsible for the murder of Richard Welsh and several other Americans. (After Agee contacted Iranian officials during the 1979 hostage crisis and offered to fly to Tehran and help identify "CIA agents" among the hostages, Secretary of State Muskie canceled his passport—leading to the landmark Supreme Court case *Haig v. Agee* [453 U.S. 280 (1981)] upholding the Secretary's action.) Angry that Kalugin's book reported Agee offered to sell secrets to Moscow, Agee called the General a "liar." But when Kalugin challenged Agee to deny receiving \$10,000 from the General through another KGB officer and "threatened to reveal more if Agee didn't stop calling him names," Agee reportedly followed him into another room "and shook his hand."

**Talks to Put Teeth in Biological Weapons Convention to Start in January**—Members of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) agreed earlier this month in Geneva to begin negotiations in January in an effort to draft verification language for inclusion in the treaty. Unlike the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention, the BWC contains no procedures to promote compliance. Some Third World States are expected to oppose intrusive verification measures which might reduce technological transfers and impair fledgling biotechnology industries.

### **December Conference . . .**

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General Counsel Daniel Silver—a leader in the Standing Committee's efforts in the 1980s in the intelligence oversight field—will lead a panel on coordinating the government's national security and law enforcement communities in the struggle against "gray area" threats; and the final panel will address "controlling the assault against the justice systems and the rule of law" around the globe.

Individuals wishing further information about this important conference are invited to contact Ms. Holly Stewart McMahon, the Standing Committee's staff director (see box on page 5).

### **Book Review—Enforcing Restraint . . .**

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ment" is no longer "immune from international scrutiny . . ." He illustrates this point with references to various OAS resolutions dealing with Suriname (1990), Venezuela (1992), Peru (1992), and Guatemala (1993).

The fact that the OAS would abandon its traditional anti-interventionism—a legacy of decades of US implementation of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine—is remarkable, and suggests the intellectual strength of the growing doctrine known as "Democracy Enlargement," "Democracy Entitlement," or "Rule of Law Engagement."