Attorney General Reno Addresses Intelligence and Law Enforcement

Attorney General Janet Reno addressed the Standing Committee’s November 19 breakfast. Seating for the event sold out almost immediately, and we devote most of this issue to reprinting the national security law portions of her remarks for the benefit of those who were unable to attend.

The challenge is to identify and manage our role in matters relating to intelligence and national security. No area is more intricate . . . and fraught with peril than the interaction between intelligence and law enforcement.

We have not been as well prepared as we should be to deal with these issues of national security and intelligence when they arise in the context of our investigations or prosecutions.

Those of you who followed the brutal chronicling of the shortcomings of BNL and BCCI and the Noriega cases understand to what I refer.

Let me begin by setting forth two realities: First, while the Soviet Union may be dead, espionage directed at our vital interests continues to thrive. I know it full-well from what I do every day.

Espionage in the traditional sense is not the only threat. International narcotics trafficking, economic espionage, terrorism, and transnational money laundering have reached such size and sophistication as to pose a critical threat to our national interest.

The need for strong intelligence-gathering capability to inform policy makers fully in these areas has never been more imperative than it is today. And I

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Wilson Center Bulletin
Reports from Moscow Archives

Stalin Approved Korean Attack, Urged Chinese Intervention

The prestigious Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars established the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) in late 1991 with the help of a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The objective was to encourage governments on both sides to make public information about the history of the Cold War, and, more specifically, to promote the widespread dissemination of new information made available from “the other side” (that is, the former Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact, and other Leninist States).

Since the Spring of 1992, CWIHP has published three issues of a quite fascinating Bulletin, under the editorship of James G. Hershberg, summarizing some

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think, as I look out at it in terms of nations fragmented, with modern technology giving us greater opportunities for espionage, that it becomes all the more critical as languages surface—I am just amazed at the links and language across the world, the multiplicity of languages, the complications that are involved in trying to understand different dialects. The problem is as acute today as ever before.

As for law enforcement, I pledge that we will vigorously pursue and prosecute those who engage in espionage and related conduct, to the full extent of the law. We have been doing that. And we are trying to do that right now.

And this brings me to our second reality. Law enforcement is now operating on an international level. I began to see it in my role as state attorney in Miami. There were inevitable international issues, as I mentioned.

Crime does not stop or start at our borders anymore. Criminal enterprises assume international proportions. The proceeds of the smuggling of aliens or narcotics from one country into another are laundered through a business in a third country.

We realized years ago that if we were going to combat these problems effectively, we would often need to work with law enforcement and other officials in foreign countries. In recognition of this changing role, Congress has wisely given us expanded extraterritorial jurisdiction. And so the law enforcement and intelligence communities find themselves occupying the same field and targeting the same players and transactions, in order to accomplish our separate missions.

I do not wish to suggest that law enforcement should merge its efforts with those of the intelligence community. There are important, critical public policy reasons why our two communities must remain separate. Law enforcement and intelligence exist for different reasons, and operate in accordance with different laws and rules.

But we need to, we are, and we are going to continue in every way proper and possible to communicate with each other, consistent with these rules, to ensure that we do not work at cross purposes and that we protect our rights guaranteed under our Constitution.

If we revert to working in isolation and ignoring each other’s game plan, we risk collision. And yet, if we cavalierly embark on a “team effort,” we can run afoul of the rules. It is a great balancing act, but one I feel fully confident that we can maintain in the spirit of what is best and in the best interests of our national security, what is in the best interests of justice, and what is in the best interests of the Constitution.

I can only speak for law enforcement when I say that we need to redefine our relationships and responsibilities in this area, consistent with our changing role.

I would like, in particular, to talk about three such relationships: Justice’s relationship with the White House when issues of national security arise; our relationships with the intelligence community wherein law enforcement requires itself, requiring a coordinated effort; and mostly and most important, Justice’s relationship with the public we serve. I include, in this last category, a subject which I think may interest you, too, which is our relationship to civil litigants.

Let me first turn to our relationship with policy makers in the Executive Office of the President. We recognize that there are certain types of information required in the course of our investigations that are of great importance to our national security. Such information can and should be shared with the NSC so it can advise the President on matters relating to national security.

For example, we should share credible information of illicit activities on the part of foreign officials of a plot which might result in the destabilization of a foreign power, or of any number of things in which we would agree the President and his advisors must be aware of.

I do not need to point out that sharing investigative information should not come naturally to the Department of Justice. We strive to maintain the integrity of our law enforcement effort by remaining apart from politics and possible political pressure.

Even the appearance of political pressure or political influence on an investigative or prosecutorial
decision can hurt the public’s trust in our commitment to execute the laws faithfully and impartially. I want to do everything I can, as I have said, to make sure that the Department of Justice is not politicized in any fashion.

It is difficult in a democracy, because politics is what democracy is all about; politics in the good and fine sense. But Justice should be political-party blind. It should be color-blind. It should be ethnic-blind. It should be impartial decision making, according to the evidence, the law, and the Constitution of this country.

For this reason, we enacted the policy requiring that all contact and all cases from individuals at the White House originate with the Office of Counsel to the President, and be directed at the outset to the Attorney General, the Deputy, or the Associate. In this way, we insulate our agents and attorneys from any improper attempt to influence them, or even from a misguided attempt at a communication which may be perceived by the agent or the attorney as an improper attempt to influence.

At the same time, I am instructing all of the agency employees that address the issue to do their job, do it the right way, based on what is right, and tell anybody who attempts to exert political pressure to pound salt.

Having gone to great lengths to protect our law enforcement processes from influence that is not related to law enforcement ends, we are not accustomed to sharing information with executive officials outside of the law enforcement community. We, therefore, need a regularized and publicly-defined mechanism for the dissemination of those types of information that are of significant import to the national security.

Currently, the Department of Justice and the NSC are working on a proposal that will enumerate what information should be passed, to whom it should be given, and how it should be transmitted. This will ensure that the President has the information he needs to make informed national security decisions.

Now, let me turn to the second relationship I mentioned, the relationship of the Department of Justice to the intelligence community. No subject is more difficult than the question of how law enforcement can and should work with the intelligence community. We have information that the community wants, but may not be legally entitled to receive. We have a need for information which the community can gather, but it may not be permissible for us to ask intelligence agencies to do so.

When and to what extent can we share our stores of information or our capacity to gather it? How much can we ask the intelligence community to do for us? These are some of the critical issues that we face.

A joint task force composed of members of both communities is currently looking at these questions and will make certain recommendations to Director Woolsey and me. I look forward to receiving their report. But as part of that process, I look forward to whatever appropriate input and discussion can be identified with it to make sure that all points of view are considered.

We have identified, and I would like to share, however, as part of this process, some points with you. First, I believe the Department of Justice can and should make greater use of some intelligence information for its strategic planning. We are not now adequately using the information the intelligence community gathers to set our sights on the problems ahead.

With intelligence about emerging trends in international narcotics trafficking and growing terrorist tides in certain countries, we can shape our investigative priorities, redirect our prosecutorial resources and be prepared to combat new criminal threats.

We can pull so much information together to shed light on crime problems happening in the United States. In this way, we can take the limited resources of law enforcement and use them in the wisest manner possible. But I want to stress that it is important that this information be shared only when proper. And it is imperative that we develop and understanding of what is proper and what is not proper.

Secondly, we must confront the question of how we request assistance from the intelligence community in a manner that is consistent with the community’s mission and with sound public policy. If we agree that the sharing of strategic information is permissible, assuming this is appropriate, how far can we legally go and properly go in asking the intelligence community to help us on a particular case?

If we agree that we can ask the community to search their files for existing information, when can we ask intelligence agencies to gather new information for us? Is it enough that the target is legitimately of intelligence interest?

All of these questions are formulations of the old, old question of, “where do we draw the line?” We need appropriate definition. I do not have all of the answers yet, but we are trying to evolve sound policies that will benefit the intelligence community, the Department, and the public.

The third point on which we agree is that our technical systems for receiving and maintaining intelligence from the intelligence community are embarrassingly inadequate. I am amazed, as I find in the Department of Justice a manila folder data storage, an electronic data storage, and an index card data

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storage. I wonder how we will ever meet all of our
discovery demands sometimes.

The intelligence community can hardly be criti-
cized for its reluctance to share certain information
when we in law enforcement cannot be certain that
we know what we have and how to retrieve it. We are
far behind the times in automatic data storage and
retrieval. And we need, very much, to catch up. And
in the process of catching up, we will face a whole host
of security issues concerning how we can effectively
protect the information and yet still have ready ac-
cess. I think it is a lot more difficult to infiltrate an
index card data storage system than one computer-
ized system.

Ladies and gentlemen, I do not think that most
Americans realize the dimension of the security prob-
lem once information is stored in a computer. When
you look at what one hacker can do, and you think of
a sophisticated mind that wants to break this open,
our challenges in this area are mind-boggling. And I
think it is imperative that both this government and
the private sector, both in terms of private enterprise
and national security, do far more than we have done
to date. But we can face these challenges if the
intelligence community and the Department of Just-
ice work together, as proper, to address the problem.

Finally, even where we have assured ourselves that
interaction with the intelligence community is appro-
priate and we have the technical capability to inter-
act, we do not always know how to do it.

This brings me to a fourth point of consensus.
Where we have agreed that interaction is appropriate
on a given matter, we need to provide a means by
which individual prosecutors can interact effectively
with the intelligence community when the need for
cooperation arises on a particular case, and not six
months or a year or three years into it, but right up
front, as soon as the need for cooperation is known.

A common problem that I have already noted is
that we do not speak the same language. Now, that is
not the intelligence community's fault. I thought I had
trouble speaking legalese. Coming to Washington
and speaking Department of Justice in Washington
legalese is even more difficult. Nobody can speak the
same language as lawyers.

A file or records search basically means the same
thing in law enforcement parlance. However, in the
intelligence world, there are many levels of searches.
Elizabeth [Rindskopf] uses words that I still do not
understand. I decided I was going to publish her
vocabulary, after I left office, of non-classified defini-
tions that could be important for others coming into
office. However, in the intelligence world, there are
many levels of searches. A prosecutor who legiti-
mately needs to request a search of intelligence com-
mon files may, out of unfamiliarity with the opera-
tion of the intelligence community, do so in a way that
is overly burdensome or improperly broad. We, there-
fore, need to train selected individuals in both com-
monities to act as focal points for receiving, process-
ing, and making such requests. These individuals
should be familiar with the resources of the intelli-
genence community and the proper scope of requests
for assistance from the law enforcement community.

However, requests for information do not only origi-
nate with those of us in law enforcement or intelli-
gence. Private litigants and other members of the
public often ask us to provide them with information.
How we respond reflects how we view our relation-
ship with the public. I would like to talk with you
briefly about that and my background. I come from a
state that has, probably, one of the most open public
records laws possible, that says everything, except
intelligence information relating to either an ongoing
or prospective investigation and certain other mat-
ters, are public records. In Florida, for example, the
disciplining of prosecutors is of public record, after
the fact. We have a government-in-the-sunshine law.

I, frankly, thought that when my name first was
mentioned in January for Attorney General that I
would never, ever be considered, because nobody
would ever want to yet fifteen years as a prosecutor in
Dade County, Florida. There would be too many
problems and too many mine fields in that fifteen
years for anybody to want to examine. In a three-
or four-day vetting process, I was scrutinized. I do not
think there is a thing that the vetters missed. And my
cases were scrutinized. And I was amazed to look
back and I think back to that time, and watch how my
office responded. As questions arose, there was a
memorandum. As another question arose there was a
case file. And with another question, there was a
close-out document, explaining why we had done
something, why we had not charged, what our sen-
tence recommendations were, and how we had han-
dled a particular matter. We were able to do this
because we had participated in open government.
And we had explained ourselves to the people in an
appropriate way.

Many reporters will tell you that my favorite com-
ment was, "No comment," concerning pending inves-
tigations and pending prosecutions. But after those
investigations and prosecutions were concluded, if
there was not intelligence information concerning
ongoing investigations contained therein, we com-
mented and we described why we did things. I am a
deep and devout believer in open government, where
it does not threaten the judicial process, the investigative process, or our national security.

With this belief, I came to Washington. My first official undertaking was to understand the whole security and classification process. Then I studied FOIA and, lastly, the Privacy Act. And I would get more confused.

I, all along, believed that if only the American people could see what the lawyers and the Department of Justice have done, and if only the Department of Justice lawyers could explain why they have done something or why they have not done something, and if only we could explain what we have done to follow up on a complaint, and if only we used small, old words that the public could understand, then the public would have such great, great confidence and admiration for the lawyers in the Department of Justice who serve the people of this country day in and day out, in such a dedicated way.

So the big question is: How do we protect national security? How do we protect proper intelligence information? How should we maintain the integrity of the judicial process so we do not try our cases in the paper and do not leak information concerning investigations, while at the same time giving the people of the United States the opportunity to understand and watch and appreciate their government in action?

Law enforcement is all about bringing criminals to public trial. Public accountability and openness should be one of the highest priorities of government. No government is legitimate if it is not accountable. No government is accountable where it does not share with the people the information they need to make informed judgments.

The Freedom of Information Act provides the public with a powerful tool whereby it can enforce the disclosure of information held by the government. I say it is a powerful tool because each and every denial of a request for information must be made for a specific reason, a detailed and, unfortunately, slow process.

In very many cases, the reason for the denial of a FOIA request is that the information is classified. Last year alone, the Department of Justice, and, for the most part, the FBI, created over—I am boggled at this every time—818,000 classified documents.

I just could not believe that. Vast categories of this information remain classified after decades and decades; some of it for good reason, but much of it, I fear, for no good reason at all.

Mary Lawton, who many of you knew and who gave me such wonderful guidance and such wonderful strength, and a person I will miss a great deal, confronted the protective instinct of government information managers when she worked closely with the FBI in the early days of FOIA. Frustrated with the propensity of the Bureau to deny access in those days, she filed her own FOIA request for a copy of the FBI directory. It was denied. The Bureau has come a long way since then and would no longer issue a blanket denial. But we can still do better.

I share the President's concern that too much information is kept from the public. This is especially true with respect to classified information in the post-Cold War period. We must respond to the legitimate desires for a more open system. Yet, at the same time, we must also continually, vigilantly protect sources and methods. Without such protection, our effectiveness and intelligence capabilities will quickly be undermined. I believe we can do both.

On October the fourth, I announced that all agencies must apply the principles of openness in government to each and every request for information filed under the Act. In its capacity as the litigator of all FOIA issues, the Department has promulgated a new

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and more open policy.

In a memo to agency heads, I described the policy this way:

It shall be the policy of the Department to defend the assertion of a FOIA exemption only in those cases where the agency reasonably believes that disclosure would be harmful to an interest protected by that exemption. Where an item of information might technically or arguably fall within an exemption, it ought not to be withheld from a FOIA requestor unless it need be.

Today, the Department is part of an interagency process that is reviewing ways in which classified information could be more readily declassified after a certain length of time. The reason for withholding release despite the passage of time must be both narrow and specific. We must protect truly sensitive national security information. But we must dispose of the large amount of classified information, much of it old and with little or no real remaining sensitivity, that is of great interest to the public. We expect that any system which includes public accountability and access will require greater use of personnel and resources to review requests for access by the public. I believe the just end of increased openness is worth this commitment of resources.

In addition, we must ensure that when our citizens go to court, either as defendants, private parties, or respondents to an administrative hearing, they have, as far as we can provide consistent with national interest, access to the information they need to litigate their case. This has been an ongoing issue. On occasion, a case cannot be litigated because the government cannot, consistent with national security, provide litigants with classified information they need to argue their point.

The Classified Information Procedures Act has worked well in the criminal context. We should now consider whether a similar mechanism is appropriate in civil and administrative proceedings.

Even short of enacting such procedures, we should, at a minimum, ensure that the government’s treatment of private litigants and matters of access to classified information is always even-handed, always forthright, always fair.

All of these steps that I have outlined require a great deal of effort. They are going to require thoughtful discussion, careful analysis, principled application of the law.

I look forward to working with you in the days ahead.

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of the more exciting materials that are being unearthed by scholars working at the Russian archives or coming from other sources (such as interviews with retired Soviet generals and even a conference in Havana at which Fidel Castro spoke at length about his own recollections of the Cuban Missile Crisis more than three decades ago).

Korean War Findings

For example, issue number three (Fall 1993) includes an article by Florida State University Professor Kathryn Weathersby entitled, "New Findings on the Korean War," that is based primarily upon a single "top secret" document dated 9 August 1966 and prepared for distribution to "Brezhnev, Kosygin, Gromyko," and half-a-dozen other senior Soviet leaders and organizations. Professor Weathersby hand-copied large parts of the document while visiting the Moscow archives, and those sections are reprinted at the end of her analysis in the Bulletin.

While the full story of the origins of the Korean War will undoubtedly benefit from information contained in other documents that have not yet been made public (including, presumably, North Korean archives if such records exist), Professor Weathersby’s document would appear to be of enormous value in assessing a scholarly debate that has lasted more than four decades. While always a minority viewpoint among American scholars, the idea that the 25 June 1950 invasion of South Korea was launched by Kim Il Sung without Stalin’s knowledge or approval and as a defensive response to South Korean provocations was embraced in a major 1990 study by Professor Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, published by the Princeton University Press.

Based upon her study of the document, which she found in the Soviet Foreign Ministry archive, Professor Weathersby concludes:

Calendar of Events

January 27, 1994—Breakfast, International Club Speaker: Representative Dan Glickman Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
this action was planned and/or supported by the Sovi-
et Union. It is clear from the information presented
below that the assertion maintained to this day by the
DPRK, and by the Soviet government until its demise,
that the military action by North Korea on June 25 was
a defensive response to provocation by the South, is
simply false. The DPRK planned a full-scale attack on
South Korea to begin June 25, with the goal of unifying
the country through military force. Stalin approved
the North Korean plan, provided sufficient arms and
equipment to give the DPRK a significant military
superiority by the time of the attack, and sent Soviet
military advisers to North Korea to assist in planning
the campaign.

On the other hand, the document supports the
“revisionist” contention that “the impetus for the war
came from Pyongyang, not Moscow.” Stalin was per-
suaded to go along with the invasion because of a
fundamental failure of deterrence—he “calculated
that it would not involve military conflict with the
United States.” While Professor Weathersby does not
focus upon the signals from Washington that contrib-
uted to this deterrence failure—such as the with-
drawal of U.S. ground troops from South Korea in 1949
and public statements by General MacArthur and
Secretary of State Acheson that the U.S. would not
respond to an invasion of South Korea (a country that
Acheson told the National Press Club, on 12 January
1950, was outside the U.S. “defensive perimeter”)—
she does note a wealth of recent evidence from former
Soviet sources that “Stalin was surprised and alarmed
by the U.S. intervention” in response to the invasion of
South Korea.

According to Professor Weathersby, the Foreign
Ministry document is the first such evidence to be
found confirming that Stalin pressured the Chinese
government to send “volunteers” to halt the advance
of United Nations forces into North Korea in October
1950. The document states that a total of one million
Chinese troops entered the fighting, and “[their] losses
for the first year of the Korean War alone were more
than 300,000 men.”

Another long-standing debate that is influenced by
this important document is the question of why North
Korea finally agreed to a cease-fire. In May of 1953 the
Eisenhower Administration sent strong signals that
the United States was considering using nuclear weapons
against China if the war continued. Indeed, some
scholars have reported that the United States leaked
word to Mao through India that such weapons were
being shipped to Okinawa for that purpose.

While President Eisenhower and Secretary of State
Dulles attributed the end of the conflict to this act of
“brinkmanship,” the document from the Soviet For-
eign Ministry archive suggests that a more important
development was Stalin’s death in March 1953. Thus,
the formerly “top secret” document recounted:

Measures undertaken by the Soviet government after
the death of Stalin in many ways facilitated the conclu-
sion of the agreement. While in Moscow for Stalin’s
funeral, Zhou Enlai had conversations with Soviet
leaders regarding the situation in Korea. During
these conversations, Zhou Enlai, in the name of the
government of the PRC, urgently proposed that the
Soviet side assist the speeding up of the negotiations
and the conclusion of an armistice. Such a position by
the Chinese coincided with our position. For the
implementation of practical measures ensuing from
the complicated situation, a special representative
was sent to Pyongyang from Moscow in March 1953
with a proposal for speeding up the peace negoti-
ations. By that time the Koreans also showed a clear
aspiration for the most rapid cessation of military
activity.
On July 27 an armistice agreement was signed in
Pannmunjom.

Professor Weathersby concludes: “If further evi-
dence proves this conclusion to be true, it will have
significant implications for our understanding of the
relationship among Stalin, Mao, and Kim, as well as
for the study of ‘atomic diplomacy.”’

The “Morris Affair”

Issue three of the Bulletin also provides interesting
background on the so-called “Morris Affair”—the in-
ternational incident surrounding the revelation by
Harvard scholar Stephen J. Morris that a document in
Moscow’s Center for the Storage of Contemporar-
Y Documentation (TSKhSD)—which houses all Soviet
Communist Party Central Committee documents
from late 1952 until the collapse of the Soviet Union—
indicated that Hanoi was holding 1,205 American
Prisoners of War in early 1972.

Release of the document at least temporarily
seemed to sidetrack normalization efforts between
the United States and Vietnam, and both the docu-
ment and Dr. Morris came under strong attack from
various parts of the world. Vietnam claimed the
document was a forgery, a senior Russian official at
the archive was fired and accused of having “sold” the
document to Morris illegally, and both government
officials and scholars in the United States found fault
with Morris for one reason or another.

While the Bulletin article—written by Dr. Mark
Kramer, of Brown University’s Center for Foreign
Policy Development, who worked with Morris in Mos-
cow—does not resolve the underlying issue of the
veracity of the 25-page document, he does provide
information of relevance to that question and to the
attacks on Morris himself. Dr. Kramer writes:
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Morris had ordered the document in the same way he would have requested any other item, and the archival staff delivered it to him in a perfectly routine manner. Contrary to what was later alleged in the Russian media, nothing that Morris did in ordering and receiving the document was at all unusual. His discovery and subsequent use of the report were in full conformity with TskhSD’s rules. Contrary to charges made by the Vietnamese government, it is inconceivable that the document could have been planted or forged, or that Morris could have been steered to it in any way. Any doubts about the authenticity of the Russian document can thus be safely laid to rest. (Questions about the authenticity and accuracy of the Vietnamese original are of course a different matter.)

Kramer reports that Morris received the report in question along with a number of other documents he had requested, and did not even read it for some time. When he did discover that it contained remarkable information about possible American Prisoners of War, he recognized its importance and considered making it available to the press. Instead, at Kramer’s urging, he decided to bring it to the attention of senior officials in the Clinton Administration—concerned that making it public might place at risk any surviving American prisoners.

According to Kramer’s account, Morris received a very cool reception in Washington; but, as soon as he left, the officials he had met with arranged to have former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Malcolm Toon obtain a copy of the document directly from the TskhSD archive staff. The document was mentioned shortly thereafter in an Izvestiya article, and only then did Morris take his story to the New York Times, which featured a front-page story on 12 April.

Kramer notes that a second document was discovered in September of this year which appears to confirm some of the POW numbers found in the Morris document, and also notes that a three-page cover memorandum found with the Morris document—prepared by Army-General Pyotr Ivashutin, head of Soviet military intelligence (GRU) at the time—“clearly shows that Ivashutin regarded the figures in the Morris document translation to be accurate . . .”

The full story of the Cold War is still coming out on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Indeed, the CIA is engaged in a remarkable effort to make public documents from its own files during this important period of our history. As will be discussed in a forthcoming issue of the Report, once “top secret” documents about the Korean conflict that were released by the U.S. Government nearly two decades ago have still not been fully digested even within the academic community.

While these preliminary reports provided in the Cold War International History Project Bulletin may, in the end, prove to be only small pieces of a much bigger and more complex puzzle; everyone interested in learning the facts should be grateful to the Woodrow Wilson Center for this highly impressive and valuable contribution to current knowledge.

Individuals desiring further information about the Bulletin are invited to contact the Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Woodrow Wilson Center, 1000 Jefferson Drive, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20580 (202) 357-2967; fax (202) 357-4439.

Conference Audio Tapes and Transcripts Available

The Standing Committee has sponsored a number of important conferences over the years. To assist interested individuals, libraries, and organizations wishing more timely access to conference proceedings, the Standing Committee has begun audio taping all conference programs. Audio tape cassettes of panels and speakers are available from the Standing Committee at a nominal fee.

In addition, we can provide photocopies of the unedited verbatim transcript made of each conference, or of specific speakers or panels, for the cost of duplication and a small postage and handling fee.

Individuals or organizations interested in further information about either of these options are urged to contact Ms. Holly Stewart McMahon at the Standing Committee office (address at bottom of page 5).