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IN THE
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INTRODUCTION

THE activities of the American Bar Association in the field of legal education during the past decade may be briefly summarized as follows:

In 1921, two features of a bar admission system were emphasized as of prime importance:

First, that the applicant should be a graduate of an acceptable law school; and Second, that he should be subjected to independent examination by public authority.

A law school, to be acceptable, must possess certain specified characteristics, all of which were either already requisite for membership in the Association of American Law Schools, or were soon to become so. The sets of "standards" promulgated by the two associations were progressively assimilated to each other, even in detail, until the chief remaining difference came to be that the American Bar Association has not followed the Association of American Law Schools in stipulating that schools must have complied with the stated requirements for at least two years. Under this formula substantial progress has been made, especially in the direction of increasing the amount of general education required by the states and by the full-time schools. No steps were taken, however, to improve the quality of the bar examinations held in any state, or even to abolish the "diploma privilege," under which in thirteen states graduates of favored law schools are exempted from further examination.

Several recent developments indicate a change of attitude, or at least of emphasis, on the part of the American Bar Association and of its subordinate Section of Legal Education and Council on Legal Education.

The Section has directed the Council to report, at the annual meeting of 1931, on "the problem of bringing law students into personal contact with members of the profession of high standing." The chairman of the Section and of the Council has appointed a representative committee of bar examiners to arrange for holding, at the same date, a general Conference of Bar Examiners. The Association of American Law Schools, in amending the requirements for membership set forth in its Articles of Association, not only has increased the stringency of its specifications regarding libraries and full-time teachers, but also has added the following new section:

"It shall be a school which possesses reasonably adequate facilities and which is conducted in accordance with those standards and practices generally recognized by member schools as essential to the maintenance of a sound educational policy."

This blanket provision will presumably form the basis for an accumulation of "case law" as to the particular standards and practices recognized by this Association. Sooner or later, the authorities of the American Bar Association will be forced to determine whether they will be content permanently to follow—possibly at a certain
interval—wherever the Association of American Law Schools leads, or whether they will proceed independently with respect to phases of the problem that do not primarily concern the leading full-time law schools.

A similar issue is presented by a resolution adopted in 1929 by the American Bar Association, without reference to its Section or Council, concerning a compulsory law-school course in professional ethics. Although this resolution puts the Association formally on record as favoring such a course, no instructions have as yet been issued to the Council to try to enforce this recommendation through pressure upon the schools. The wisdom of issuing any such instructions may well be doubted. In last year's Annual Review, the real, though limited, value of instruction in professional ethics, or professional etiquette, was explicitly recognized. It is one thing, however, to feel that such instruction would be profitable, if conducted by those who sincerely believe in its value; it is quite another thing to encourage perfunctory instruction, given and taken under compulsion. Higher education contains already too many instances of policies entered into by institutions, not because of conviction as to their merit, but solely for the sake of standing well with standardizing bodies. Furthermore, insistence upon this particular reform places emphasis upon the wrong point. The great service that legal practitioners can render to legal education, through their control of bar admissions, is not the detailed supervision of law schools in that portion of the field of legal education which is rightly theirs; it is the development of those portions of the field which lie outside the province of law schools, and yet are equally important for the training and testing of competent and high-minded lawyers.

The leading topic discussed in this issue of the Review has especial interest for those who are actively engaged in reforming bar admission systems; namely, the extent to which these systems are based upon legislative statutes rather than the more easily amended rules of court. For reasons of space, systematic treatment has been accorded only to provisions affecting applicants not already admitted to practice in another jurisdiction. The material for a similar discussion of the rules affecting "immigrant attorneys" has been collected, and will be published in next year's issue, unless another topic appears to be more timely or of wider appeal. To ensure accuracy, copies of this Review are regularly submitted in confidential proof to bar admission authorities of every state or Canadian province, to administrative officers of all American and Canadian law schools, and to officials of other organizations specially mentioned. Suggestions are also welcomed as to the topic of the next year's leading article; as to the reclassification of statistical material proposed on pages 29 to 30; and, in general, as to means for making this annual publication more useful, both to those who administer and to those who seek to improve our present system of legal education.

1 Annual Review of Legal Education for 1929, pp. 21-22.
LEGISLATION AFFECTING ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE
OF THE LAW

A QUESTION that is often asked is the extent to which admission to legal practice, in the several states, is controlled by the courts or by the legislatures. The question has some general interest for the student of our political institutions. It is of particular concern to bar association committees and other agencies that are endeavoring to secure improvement in the rules for admission to the bar. In any particular state may their efforts be addressed to a court or board that has full responsibility for the rules? Or is it necessary to await the next session of the legislature?

I. OCCASIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION

In the absence of legislation each separate court has, of course, the right to determine who shall appear before it in behalf of litigants, just as under similar conditions any court has the right “at common law” to determine its own rules of procedure. Legislation modifying this system of unrestricted judicial control has been enacted for various reasons.

1. Technical Simplification of the Rules

In the case of admission to legal practice, as in the case of court procedure, legislative action has sometimes been sought merely to simplify and perfect rules which, as developed by the courts, have become cumbersome and ineffective. From the point of view of the courts, this is sometimes unsympathetically described as “legislative interference”; and there can be no doubt that the results have often been unfortunate, because of a tendency, on the part of legislatures, to go into too much detail. Especially in the field of court procedure proper, the well-meant activities of reformers have sometimes produced rules which—especially after hostile judges have finished interpreting them—seem to be as complex and as logically indefensible as the old common-law system that they were designed to improve. This is a criticism, however, of the way in which legislatures have discharged their functions, rather than of the propriety of trying to cure acknowledged evils by remedial legislation. It is no reflection upon our judges to point out that the whole purpose of their office, and the whole effect of their training, develops a type of mental activity radically different from that required for the establishment and current amendment of codified rules. Furthermore, the multiplicity of courts tends in itself to produce a confusing diversity of requirements affecting lawyers who practise in more than a single court. The smoothing out of these technical imperfections in the rules for admission to legal practice, as in the rules of procedure proper, is a task which, if undertaken in the spirit of doing for the courts what the courts, for one reason or another, cannot conveniently do for themselves, is most clearly appropriate to a legislative body.

1 This section, in condensed form, appears also in the Twenty-fifth Annual Report of the President of the Carnegie Foundation (1930). For references to the statutes summarized, see below, pages 59–60, "Appendix A."
Long before the separation of the American colonies from England, considera-
tions such as the above had called forth repeated Acts of Parliament affecting attor-
neys and solicitors. It is from this branch of the legal profession, rather than from
the inner and specially privileged "bar," that our own legal practitioners are de-
scended. At the time of the American Revolution, the English courts still exercised
the power of admitting common-law attorneys and chancery solicitors into practice,
but statutes having as their object the simplification and standardization of require-
ments were already a commonplace. We inherited, in other words, not only the prin-
ciple that, in the absence of legislative action, the respective courts were in full con-
trol, but the further tradition that the courts would respect, and even welcome, legis-
lation conceived in a helpful spirit.

2. Determination of Public Policy

To some extent, the development of adequate bar admission rules is merely a tech-
nical process of adjusting means to generally accepted ends. Of the many points of
detail that arise, most can safely be left to experts to decide. If the problem is taken
seriously, however, sooner or later a broad question of public policy is certain to
come up for discussion. This is, How rigorous ought the standards to be?

This question never can be answered to the complete satisfaction of all concerned,
for the reason that two diametrically opposed considerations come into play. For
the purpose of ensuring complete competency among newly admitted members of
the legal profession, any required period of preparation or probationary training is
clearly too short. Yet insistence upon an inordinately long period makes the pre-
paratory training so expensive as to be beyond the means of any but a small element
of the population. Furthermore, not only must the standard that is actually adopted
avoid the two extremes, of one that is unduly high and one that is unduly low, but
there is no permanently satisfactory method of discovering at just what point, in
between, the line should be drawn. Its precise location in any given jurisdiction is
finally determined, not by logical reasoning, but as a compromise between two con-
tending parties which place a differing emphasis upon opposing considerations. As
in the case of all essentially political issues, the position taken by individuals is likely
to be affected by self-interest. Those who are already members of the legal profession
are perhaps a little more inclined to appreciate the evil that ignorant competitors
inflict upon the public at large; those who have a young relative who is eager to be
admitted are somewhat more predisposed to regard the practice of law as a public
profession that ought to be reasonably open to all. In the main, however, the differ-
ences in attitude are not self-seeking but temperamental, and thus lead to a contro-
versy that is often marked by inability even to understand the opponent's position.

In every country the standards for admission to legal practice that are in force at
any given time are at bottom arbitrary. In England, in France, and in Germany, ad-
mission might be somewhat more difficult than it is at present, or it might be some-
what easier, without doing violence to logical thought. The process, however, by which
traditional standards are modified involves much more open and more bitter contro-
versy in this country than elsewhere, because, among our citizens, special causes con-
tribute to the maintenance of two widely divergent and tenaciously defended points
of view. On the one hand, our law is so unusually complicated, and our lawyers' re-
luctance to ease the burden of legal education by formally dividing their ranks is so
deep-seated, that the need for a long and laborious course of professional preparation
is even greater than in other lands. On the other hand, here, more than in most coun-
tries, public opinion is alive to the importance of ensuring that the legal profession
shall not spring predominantly from a socially privileged group, but shall be fairly
representative of all social and economic levels.

In this perennial controversy, the policy pursued by the courts, originally respon-
sible for admission to legal practice, has varied greatly from state to state. In some
cases they have merely bowed to the weight of prevailing professional or public
opinion, making admission either more difficult or less difficult, as the spirit of the
times seemed to demand. Thus in several states there has survived, virtually unim-
paired, the tradition that the courts alone have authority over admissions. In other
cases, one of the contending parties has gone over the head of the courts into the
legislature, and the courts have acquiesced in the more or less detailed statutory reg-
ulations that have resulted. Sometimes, it may be conjectured, the judges have been
glad to be relieved from the responsibility of making a decision in an essentially po-
litical issue. In other cases, they have openly expressed their dissent from the policy
expressed in the statute, but have accepted it with greater or less grace. In still other
cases, they have defeated what they have regarded as an invasion of the judicial pre-
rogative, by declaring the statute unconstitutional.

This last result has sometimes been reached by close construction of language used
in the constitution of the particular state. A more generally applicable method was
first suggested, so far as my own researches extend, by Senator Reverdy Johnson of
Maryland, in a brief submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States, in 1866.
In a case involving the power of Congress to exclude from the United States courts
participants in the late Rebellion, he contended that

"The admission of counsel, and dismissal when admitted, is . . . a power inher-
ent in the courts, and to be exercised by them alone. . . . [T]he propriety of its
exercise cannot be questioned by any other department of the government."

This contention found no favor with the court to which it was addressed, both the
majority and the dissenting members agreeing that the legislature may prescribe
qualifications for the privilege of practising law.\(^1\) Several state tribunals, however,
have delivered opinions subscribing to the doctrine that under our system of govern-
ment the principle of the separation of powers protects the courts from legislative
interference with the process of admission to legal practice.

\(^1\) *Ex parte Garland*, 71 U. S. 333: 370-71; 378-79; 384-85.
Space does not permit an analysis of the conflicting body of decisions handed down by the courts of different states, and sometimes by the courts of the same state, with regard to the extent to which they are constitutionally free from legislative control in this respect. Suffice to say in general, that the opinions often go further than is necessary to decide the point at issue in the case, and in particular, that there is some tendency to confuse the question of judicial control over admission to practice during good behavior, with the very different question of the inherent power of the courts to discipline and disbar. In the pages that follow, an attempt is made merely to summarize the considerable body of legislation that actually stands on the statute books to-day, all of which, with trifling exceptions, seems to be recognized by the courts, whether as a matter of constitutional obligation, or as a voluntary mark of respect paid to a coordinate department of government.

3. Definition of the Field of Practice

Before concluding this introductory account of the occasions which call forth legislation affecting admission to legal practice, reference should be made to the influence exerted by an independent but allied movement to define the admitted lawyer's privileged field of professional activities.

The traditional privilege that the courts, of their own motion, are in a position to confer is that of appearance before them, in a professional capacity, to represent parties engaged in litigation. In addition to representing litigants, however, lawyers customarily engage in many activities that do not bring them into immediate contact with courts. These “office activities” have come to play a more important part in the practice of most attorneys and counsellors than the trial work that in the early days of the Republic constituted their most important function. Many of these activities are, furthermore, of a sort that requires adequate legal education for their efficient discharge. The general practitioner—or, in the larger cities, the specialist member of a firm engaged in general practice of the law—finds himself increasingly exposed to competition for this business at the hands of corporations, who may operate through untrained assistants, or through assistants who have received special training in the law of insurance, real estate, banking, etc., but have not been admitted to general practice of the law. Even when the staff includes fully admitted members of the bar, their dependence upon a single employer differentiates their position somewhat sharply from that enjoyed by members of a traditionally independent profession.

While, broadly speaking, the phenomenon in question is at bottom a symptom of the progressive differentiation or breaking up of the legal profession, which for many reasons is inevitable and is already clearly under way, it is not surprising that the inheritors of ancient traditions should usually regard it, in simpler terms, merely as an unwelcome curtailment of their customary privileges. Hence a growing agitation in the legal profession both of this country and of Canada against “unauthorized practice of the law” by other than regular independent practitioners or legal firms.
LOCATION OF THE ADMITTING POWER

The precise form which this self-protective movement has assumed in different states, and, still more, the precise form which it ought to assume, are topics that will not be discussed in the following pages. We are concerned here with the extent to which admission to the legal profession is controlled by legislation—not with the extent of the privileges that the duly admitted lawyer secures. Yet we should do something less than justice to our own topic if we ignored the stimulus to all legislative activity that this other movement provides. For while the courts may or may not be able to build up, without legislative assistance, a satisfactory system of admission to their own bars, certainly they can do little or nothing to protect duly admitted lawyers against competition in fields of activity that lie outside the court-room. To secure, or to confirm, these supplementary privileges, recourse must necessarily be had to legislation that shall define the field of legal practice with some precision and provide penalties for its invasion. A considerable mass of such legislation already exists. Legislators would be less human than they notoriously are if they did not feel that those who are asked to protect lawyers in their special privileges should have some voice in determining how these privileges may be secured.

Approaching our subject realistically, therefore, we find that three principal causes have been at work to do away with the original system of unrestricted control possessed by the courts separately over their respective bars, and to replace it by a state-wide system which rests in large measure upon legislative statutes. In the first place, even before the Revolution, both in England and in this country, legislation had been found to be a convenient means of simplifying the rules governing admission to legal practice, of remedying the aimless diversity of standards that was fostered by the older plan, and of substituting either uniform, or systematically graded, requirements for admission to all the courts of the state. The courts at least acquiesced in this legislation, and, in all probability, welcomed it. In the second place, legislation has been invoked to impose a social policy upon the courts. Sometimes this may have taken the form of encouraging an advance in standards which a particular court was too easy-going to put into effect for itself; more often, it was a part of the extreme democratic movement of the early part of the nineteenth century, when legislators took pleasure in toppling over the very elaborately organized professional structures that Federalist judges had raised, or it has represented a more recent conflict of social ideals, somewhat similar, though far less pronounced. In the earlier manifestations of legislative policy, the courts always acquiesced; more recently, they have sometimes registered objections. Finally, the lawyers, by inviting legislation to confirm them in the privileges which they believe to be rightly theirs, have provided the legislatures with still a third inducement to assume responsibility for the process of admission.

II. Location of the Admitting Power

Legislation affecting admission to legal practice, whatever its occasion or justification, has taken one of three general forms.
First, statutes determining what court, or courts, or other agency, shall exercise the power of admission, have been enacted by Congress for the courts of the United States, including those of the District of Columbia, and by the legislatures of every state but one. In New Jersey, by ancient custom, the Governor issues licenses, under the great seal of the State, to two grades of practitioners—attorneys and counsel-lors—but acts in a purely formal capacity, on the advice of the Supreme Court. Essentially, this Court is the general admitting authority for the state, and the Governor’s recognition of its powers in this respect is an exercise of legislative functions, inherited from Colonial days, when an undifferentiated Governor and Council acted sometimes in an executive or administrative, sometimes in a legislative, and sometimes in a judicial capacity.

Second, in forty-two of the forty-eight states, legislation, of greater or less importance, affects the machinery or procedure of admission, as distinguished from the qualifications that applicants must possess. This does not include instances where merely the form of the lawyer’s oath is set forth. Supplementary revenue licenses, which must be secured in several states, have likewise been disregarded in the above computation.

Third, thirty-nine states have enacted legislation—likewise of greatly varying importance—with respect to the qualifications, educational or otherwise, that applicants must possess.

The most convenient way of presenting the data will be to show, first, where the power of admission is located, in the several states; and, following this, to divide the states into groups arranged according to the practical importance of the two other forms of legislation.

1. Power of Admission Located in the Respective Courts

In the case of the United States courts, including those of the District of Columbia, and in the State of Delaware, the several courts have retained the power of admission to their respective bars. Legislation to this effect seems to add nothing to the privileges that, in the absence of such legislation, these courts would have possessed at common law. The Code of Law for the District of Columbia contains no provisions that directly affect admissions, except a broad grant of authority to the Supreme Court of the District over membership in its own bar, and a definition of the lawyer’s oath. Delaware, in addition to defining the oath and prescribing minimum qualifications, of no practical significance, for those admitted by the judges of the respective courts, has a revenue act, the following extract from which may elicit a fleeting smile from the unregenerate:

“The following fee shall be paid to the Clerk of the Peace, for the use of the State, for any license to be issued by him . . . for each license to perform or practice jugglery, the sum of twenty-five dollars; for each license as a lawyer, the sum of ten dollars . . .”
The reason why this primitive organization of the admitting authority is praticable in the District of Columbia and in Delaware is the small size of these jurisdictions. It is obviously convenient for the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia to adopt a rule admitting to its bar those already admitted by the Supreme Court of the District, instead of instituting separate regulations of its own. The federal courts of the United States likewise make their systems of admission lean upon those of the state courts. In Delaware the judges of the Superior Court and of the Court of Chancery sit also upon the Supreme Court, thus making it a simple matter to harmonize the rules for admission to their respective bars. In larger states it is less easy to overcome the practical inconvenience of a divided admitting authority; hence, very general recourse to the legislature for the purpose of centralizing authority.

2. Each Court admits to its Own Bar, but the Supreme Court admits to General Practice

That recourse to the legislature for this purpose is not, however, absolutely indispensable, even in a large state, is shown by the example of Pennsylvania. While this state was still operating on the traditional “each court to each” plan, an enlightened Supreme Court, establishing its own energetic State Board of Law Examiners, built up a very effective system of bar admissions. Court and Board negotiated with the courts of sixty-seven counties to bring about a division of the field on the following basis: In return for the local court’s acceptance of the State Board’s responsibility for educational qualifications, the Board would look to the local court for assistance in determining the applicant’s moral character.

In the absence of legislation, any particular local court might or might not consent to admit Supreme Court attorneys to its bar without independent action of its own. After many years of effort, legislation to compel such admission, subject to the approval of the local examining board, was finally secured, and its constitutionality affirmed. Each local court still retains, however, the power to institute, at its own discretion, an independent local bar. Except to devotees of standardized uniformity, this will seem to be, not a defect, but a positive merit of the Pennsylvania plan. Conditions differ greatly in urban and rural counties. Is not the desirability or undesirability of retaining a supplementary local bar, engaged only in local practice, a question of local policy, that a local authority can best decide?

3. Each of Several Courts admits to General Practice, with Power reserved to Any Court to enquire into Moral Character

Another intermediate instance reflects a less happy situation. Indiana adopted, in 1850, a state constitution which contained the following provision:

“Every person of good moral character, being a voter, shall be entitled to admission to practice law in all courts of justice.”
This provision, which is still in force, resembles one adopted by New York in 1846, but Indiana omitted a phrase which appeared in the New York instrument:

“and who possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability.”

The omission makes it impossible for Indiana’s admission examination to cover other matters than moral character and possession of the right of suffrage. Under these circumstances, it has not hitherto seemed worth while to establish a centralized admission system. Under existing legislation, admission by a court of record of any county qualifies for practice in all the courts of the state, except that when any person “offers to practice law” in any court, independent enquiry may be made into moral character. A jury may be summoned to determine this question; and applicants who do not wish to be thus advertised as standing upon their constitutional rights may be examined touching their learning in the law, for the purpose of being placed upon a special roll of attorneys “qualified to practice law by reason of their learning therein.”

4. Each of Several Courts admits to General Practice

Four states—Georgia, Michigan, New York, and Massachusetts—retain the once common system whereby each of several courts admits to general practice, but avoid the evils of varying standards by instituting a central examining board, appointed by the highest court. These states differ among themselves in detail as follows:

In Georgia, the Superior Court of any county admits to practice in all courts except the Supreme Court and the intermediate Court of Appeals. Each of these courts admits, under its own rules, upon proof of good moral character, attorneys who have been licensed by a Superior Court. In order to secure this license, an applicant who is not a graduate of a local law school, and has not already been admitted to practice in another jurisdiction, must secure a certificate from the State Board of Examiners as to the applicant’s educational qualifications. This certificate is both essential and conclusive, so that except in a purely technical sense this board, rather than the Superior Court, is the real admitting authority for those whom it examines.

In Michigan, technical admission to any court is granted by any Circuit Court or by the Supreme Court, except in the case of attorneys already admitted to practice elsewhere, who apply to the Supreme Court only. In the case of applicants who do not claim admission on this ground, the statute does not make it absolutely clear that a certificate from the State Board of Law Examiners is either essential or conclusive, but such is the apparent intention.

In New York, the power of admission is vested in the Appellate Divisions of the Supreme Court for the four judicial departments into which the state is divided. The certificate of the State Board of Law Examiners is essential, but not conclusive, the respective Appellate Divisions being required to make independent enquiry into character and fitness. The Court of Appeals, which appoints the Board, is directed to prescribe rules providing for a uniform system of examination. The statute authorizes the Court, however, to dispense with the

1 Legislation establishing such a system was enacted in March, 1931.
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bar examination in the case of graduates of certain law schools, and to make such provisions as it shall deem proper for the admission of persons already admitted to practice in other states or countries.

In Massachusetts, the power of admission is vested in the Superior Court and in the Supreme Judicial Court. The dignity of the bench is scrupulously regarded in directions that the applicant's petition be referred to the Board of Bar Examiners "unless the court otherwise orders," and that upon their recommendation he shall be admitted "unless the court otherwise determines."

5. A Single Court admits to General Practice

In thirty-six states, or three-fourths of the total number, power of admission to general practice has been vested by the legislature in a single court—usually the highest appellate tribunal, but in Connecticut the Superior Court, which, as in several states, operates for rule-making purposes as a single court, even though holding separate terms in the several counties. To these states may be added New Jersey, whose peculiar system has already been described; in this case, also, it may be noted that the "Supreme Court" which by custom acts to all intents and purposes as the admitting authority, resembles the similarly misnamed Supreme Courts of New York and of the District of Columbia in not being really the court of last resort.

In thirty-five of these thirty-seven states, the court in question is the single admitting authority both for applicants who have not already been admitted to practice in another jurisdiction, and for those who have. Maine is peculiar in that the Supreme Court technically exercises this power only in the case of attorneys already admitted elsewhere; in the case of other applicants, the certificate of qualification issued by the Supreme Court's Board of Bar Examiners is apparently only a recommendation addressed to each court in which the applicant aspires to practice. In Arkansas, and perhaps also in Nevada, although the Supreme Court is in general the admitting authority, a vestige of earlier rules survives in the requirement that the clerk of each court must keep a roll of those licensed to practise therein; and in Arkansas non-resident attorneys are admitted by each court separately.

6. A Single Board admits to General Practice

In the preceding and greatly predominant group of states, whatever be the restrictions placed upon the admitting court, whether by the establishment of Boards of Examiners or in other ways, the court retains at least some measure of control—how great or how little will be discussed in the next section. In four Southern states, however, the effect of the legislation is actually to displace a court as the admitting authority.

In Virginia, the Supreme Court of Appeals appoints the Board of Law Examiners, but thereafter its only control over admissions is that it is given discretion to grant a certificate without examination to practitioners of other states or professors in local law schools, of three years standing. The Board licenses its own examinees, and
certifies to the Court the list of those whom it has licensed, "which list shall be spread upon the records of said court."

In Florida, a State Board of Law Examiners, appointed by the Governor, admits to practice. The Supreme Court controls the subjects of examination only.

In Mississippi, a State Board of Law Examiners, appointed by the Governor, technically only issues a certificate that the applicant possesses sufficient legal learning, and it is the Chancery Court or Chancellor of the county in which the applicant intends to practise that issues an order licensing him to practise in all courts. The local court, however, is obliged to issue the license. The Supreme Court does not figure in the process in any way.

In Alabama, the newly established Board of Commissioners of the State Bar appoints the Board of Examiners and certifies to the Supreme Court the names of qualified applicants. "Such certifications shall entitle such persons to be enrolled in the Bar of the State and to practice law, provided the fees hereafter required are paid." The Supreme Court seems to have no power to make rules relative to admission to the bar, or to change rules once made; rules adopted by the Board of Commissioners, however, do not become effective until approved by this court, which also exercises direct control over the admission of attorneys removing from other states.

7. Historical Vestiges of Older Systems

Before proceeding to summarize the important restrictions under which, in many states, the admitting authority is permitted, or is expected, to discharge its functions, a word may be inserted as to certain incidental features which appear in several bar-admission systems. While of little practical importance, they are of considerable interest to the student of our institutions, as survivals from an earlier era.

Far back in Colonial times, when Virginia attorneys were admitted by the bars of its several courts, the legislature attempted to improve the character of lower-court attorneys in the following way: An applicant, having first obtained a certificate of good moral character from his County Court, was required to secure a license from a central examining board, appointed by the highest court. Armed with this purely intermediate "license," he then returned to the County Court to complete, by taking the oath and signing the roll, the process of admission proper. The system somewhat resembled that already described as in force to-day in Georgia, Michigan, New York, and Massachusetts, but differed in several respects. No historical connection can be traced here. In several other Southern states, however, and in Illinois, which, prior to its admission as a state, was under the territorial administration of W. H. Harrison of Virginia, vestigial remains of the earlier procedure survive.

One of these vestiges has already been mentioned in describing the Arkansas and Nevada systems. Each court must keep a separate roll of the attorneys licensed to practise therein. The Louisiana statute (somewhat doubtfully) requires the oath to be taken in each court. Mississippi explicitly requires both oath and roll for each
court where the attorney or counsellor, who has been "licensed" under the peculiar system already described, “intends to practice.”

In these four instances, it is the end of the original process that survives—action in a local court, after a central court or board has issued or authorized the license. The West Virginia statute, on the other hand, emphasizes the beginning of the process: The applicant makes his original application to the County Court1 of his residence, and secures a certificate of good moral character and full age, before he goes up to the Supreme Court of Appeals, which issues a license to practise law in all the courts of the state. Nothing is said as to subsequent oath and roll, though, as a matter of customary procedure, at least the oath must be taken in the particular court where the applicant practises. The Illinois statute provides that the applicant must obtain a certificate of good moral character “from a court of some county” before he is entitled to receive a license—but not necessarily before he applies to the Supreme Court for one. In Virginia itself, the statute explicitly requires not only that the applicant, before he takes the examination, file a certificate from the local court of his residence as to honest demeanor, good moral character, and full age, but also that he take an oath before each court in which he intends to practise. Similar, though less explicit, provisions are found in Tennessee.

A provision in the Ohio statute requiring an applicant, before being admitted to the examination, to produce a certificate from an attorney at law testifying to various matters, including good moral character and the attorney’s belief that he has sufficient legal knowledge and ability to discharge his duties, may possibly be a faint survival of an early New England tradition that the local bar (rather than, as in Virginia, the local court) should assume responsibility for newly admitted members of the profession. The prominent part played by New Englanders in the settlement of Ohio would make this theory plausible. It is not so easy to account for the requirement of a somewhat similar certificate, to be signed by two practising members of the bar, in the statutes of Georgia.

### III. Responsibility for Results

It is a great mistake to hold bar examiners individually accountable for the poor quality of newly admitted members of the bar. To begin with, examining boards are rarely organized in a manner conducive to effective action. Furthermore, in most states they are greatly hampered by their inability, under existing statutes or under existing rules of court, to enforce adequate preliminary requirements of general and professional education. In an ideal system of admission to legal practice, applicants would be so weeded out by these requirements that the bar examination itself would be in the nature of a supplementary test, serving two purposes: Graduates of one or more types of good law schools would be examined as to their possession of certain

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1 The new West Virginia Code, effective January 1, 1931, substitutes “the circuit court of the county” or “a committee of three attorneys practicing before such court, appointed by the court.” The Revisers note that “the issuance of such certificates by the county courts has been merely perfunctory.”
qualities and accomplishments that lie outside the proper province of even the best law school; and a general review of the work of the law school itself would be of advantage to both student and school. In the absence of such preliminary requirements, bar examiners can do relatively little to determine whether applicants are properly qualified to practise law. When there is a miscellaneous collection of applicants who come from law schools of greatly varying types and standards, or who come from no law school at all, a uniform test that shall adequately measure educational achievement is a practical impossibility.

Responsibility both for the proper organization of the examining machinery, and for the preliminary requirements that applicants must meet before they come up for examination, rests in some states primarily with the courts, in other states primarily with the legislatures. Usually, responsibility is divided, in a great number of ways. No two states are precisely alike in this respect, and few even closely resemble one another. It would be tedious to attempt a systematic catalogue of details. The following pages show the general groups into which existing bar admission systems fall when classified from this point of view, and some, though by no means all, of the subordinate variations.

1. Virtually Complete Control is exercised by a Court

In six jurisdictions, of which all but one are situated on or near the North Atlantic seaboard, a court is in virtually complete control of the situation. The system in force in the District of Columbia has already been described. Rhode Island has granted singularly broad powers to its Supreme Court:

“The Supreme Court shall by general or special rules regulate the admission of attorneys to practice in all the courts of the state.”

Under this provision, it would not even be necessary for the Supreme Court itself to function as the admitting authority, should it think best to delegate this power. The Connecticut statute is less broad only in that the Superior Court must continue, at least technically, to admit to practice.

In New Jersey, the common-law control possessed by the Supreme Court has been supplemented by legislation prescribing the fees that must be paid by applicants, and providing for a confirmatory license in cases where the original has been lost.

In the two states off the actual seaboard—Vermont and Minnesota—the statute goes a little farther in providing that there must be a separate examining board. This board is, however, entirely subordinated to the Supreme Court, which not only appoints it, but is not obliged to follow its recommendations.

2. Relatively Unimportant Statutory Restrictions

In eight states—Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Hampshire, Ohio, Illinois, and, in the Far West, Colorado, Wyoming, and Oregon—while the court is in as complete control of the admitting machinery as in the preceding group, the statute prescribes
certain qualifications that must be possessed by applicants. These statutory prescriptions are, however, of relatively little importance. Pennsylvania and Delaware merely authorize the admission of

"a competent number of persons, of an honest disposition, and learned in the law,"

leaving the courts entirely free both to interpret, and to supplement, this vague formula. Illinois and Colorado, in addition to requiring good moral character, prohibit discrimination on account of sex, or on account of race or sex. New Hampshire and Oregon demand also citizenship (or in Oregon declaration of intention to become a citizen), age of twenty-one years, and (by implication in New Hampshire, explicitly in Oregon) residence in the state. Although a residential requirement is desirable as preventing outsiders from misusing the admission machinery in order to evade the higher standards of their own jurisdictions, courts can usually be trusted to introduce this safeguard without legislative action. The Ohio and Wyoming statutes add to similar non-educational qualifications a requirement of a three-year period of law study. It is fairly clear, however, that this is a minimum requirement, which the courts are free to strengthen at their own discretion. The language is at least more open to this construction than that used in many states.

On the whole, this group of eight states may be added to the preceding six, to constitute a total of fourteen jurisdictions where a single court is most clearly responsible for the proper development of the rules for admission to practice. It will be noted that all these states are on the North Atlantic seaboard, or in the Middle or Far West, and include none in the South or Southwest.

3. Admitting Machinery, but Not Educational Qualifications, Prescribed in Some Detail

In nine states, situated for the most part in the West or Southwest, but including New York, statutory qualifications are either lacking or unimportant, but the court's control over the admitting machinery is not so complete as in the jurisdictions previously listed.

In four of these states—New York, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Washington—a court continues to appoint the examining board, but either the court is authorized to admit only those recommended by this board, or details of procedure are prescribed, or its freedom of action is restricted in both of these ways.

In New York, as we have seen, the tribunal which appoints the board, and controls it, subject to these statutory restrictions, is distinct from the four courts or “Divisions” which actually admit into practice. Educational qualifications are mentioned in only one of these four states, Washington. Here, in the case of students in other than approved law schools, it is fairly clear that the statutory requirement as to general education—education sufficient to qualify for admission into the State University or State College—operates in the first instance as a maximum; neither the court nor its board can directly prescribe a
higher standard. On the other hand, it is even clearer that the requirement as to period of law study—three years—sets up only a minimum standard. Not only may the board, accordingly, lengthen this statutory period for all students, but it can use its powers in this respect to secure better general education as well; applicants whose general education does not exceed the amount defined by the statute may be held to an exceptionally long period of law study.

The other five states of this group—North Dakota, New Mexico, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Idaho—have all been affected by a recent movement to establish a "self-governing bar." The original intention of this movement seems to have been to replace judicial by professional control, on the model of the systems developed in England and Canada, after the separation of the American colonies. The judges, however, or their adherents in the legislature, have made difficulties, so that the actual outcome has been to divide responsibility between the Supreme Court and the organized practitioners. In all five cases the court continues to be the technical admitting authority, but has no longer complete power of appointment over the examining board. There is much variation as regards further details.

In North Dakota, the only departure from the usual system is that the Court must make its appointments to the State Bar Board from a list of three times the number of vacancies, submitted by the State Bar Association. The Court retains the power to prescribe rules, however, governing this examining body, and is not obliged to follow its recommendations.

In New Mexico, Nevada, and Oklahoma the examining board is appointed, with the approval of the Supreme Court, by the Board of Commissioners or Board of Governors of the State Bar. In New Mexico, although the Board of Commissioners determines qualifications for admission, its rules may be annulled or modified by the Court; recommendation of the applicant by the examiners is made essential, but not conclusive. In Nevada and in Oklahoma, the Board of Governors has power to fix and determine qualifications for practice, "with the approval of the Supreme Court." This apparently means that the Court, having once given its approval, may not independently change the rules. That such a provision amounts to something at the inauguration of a system, however, is indicated by the fact that, although the Oklahoma statute is even more explicit than that of New Mexico in forbidding the admission of applicants who have not been recommended by the examining committee, the Oklahoma court refused to approve rules which did not give it full power of review. Under the rules finally adopted, the Court, although it may not move in the first instance, is explicitly authorized to substitute its own findings for those of the Committee with respect to the literary and legal qualifications possessed by any applicant. In Nevada the court probably possesses a similarly broad authority under the terms of a less explicit statute; here the rules are published as those of the Supreme Court itself, instead of Board rules approved by the Court.

In the fifth state, Idaho, the Board of Commissioners of the State Bar functions itself as the examining body, whose recommendation for admission is essential but not conclusive. The Board has the same power to determine qualifications, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court, as in Nevada and Oklahoma.
RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESULTS

In New Mexico and in Oklahoma the power to determine qualifications for admission to practice includes power to fix the fees paid by applicants for admission (as distinguished from the annual license fees required in all the self-governing states); in North Dakota, Nevada, and Idaho these fees are fixed by independent statutory provisions. North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Idaho prescribe certain non-educational qualifications for applicants. The North Dakota statute includes also a provision affecting the period of law study, but so phrased as to make it at least doubtful whether it is intended to limit the power of the court to set a higher standard.

4. Highest Court Controls Machinery and Procedure but Not Educational Qualifications

In the preceding group of nine states, a fairly elaborate admitting machinery has been built up by legislative action, and can be improved only by the same means. On the other hand, somewhere within the prescribed organization lies responsibility for the actual qualifications that applicants must possess. The legislature itself has not attempted to determine standards.

Another group of eight states, which includes South Carolina and West Virginia, but otherwise no state east of the Mississippi, pursues a sharply contrasted policy. Few restrictions are placed upon the power of the Supreme Court to determine what the machinery and procedure of admission shall be; in only three cases—South Carolina, Texas, and Iowa—does the statute even require the establishment of an examining board or commission, and even in these cases the court is under no obligation to follow its examiners' recommendations. On the other hand, definite limitations are placed upon the court's power to determine educational standards.

In six of these eight states, the limitation takes the form of relieving the graduates of one or more local law schools from any independent examination as to their educational qualifications, subject in one case (Montana) to the right of the Chief Justice to order an examination as in ordinary cases. In Arkansas and West Virginia the court is otherwise in complete control, except as regards the question of whether special treatment should be accorded to attorneys already admitted to practice elsewhere—a question that is answered by different states in many different ways. In Texas, the statute provides that applicants in general must have studied law “for a period of at least two years,” and in Utah, “for a period of at least three years”; it is a problem of statutory interpretation whether or not this language is intended to limit the power of the court to demand a longer period. In Montana, however, it is clearly the intention of the legislators to forbid the requirement of a longer period of law study than two years; and South Carolina not only fixes this period at the same figure, but also specifies the amount of preliminary general education that may be demanded (equivalent to that of a graduate of a South Carolina high school).

Neither Iowa nor Kansas grants the “diploma privilege” to local law schools, but in other ways both seem to limit the power of the court to set its own standards either of professional or of general education. The Iowa statute, after specifying
a course of law study of "at least three full years" and a high school course of study "of at least four years in extent," makes a grant of rule-making power to the court that is much narrower than in many states. Under the brief Kansas statute, it is apparently impossible to require more than three years of law study from applicants preparing in a law office, or to refuse recognition to law schools whose "requirements and reputation" equal those of the law department of the University of Kansas.

5. Both Machinery and Qualifications are largely Determined by Statute

There remain eighteen states—Massachusetts and Maine; Michigan, Wisconsin, and Indiana; Missouri, Nebraska, and South Dakota; California and Arizona; and the eight Southern states of Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana—where legislation affects, in important particulars, both the machinery or procedure of admission and the educational qualifications that can be required. This group includes eight of the twelve states shown in the first section not to have vested the power of admission in a single court: Indiana, where one of several courts admits to general practice, with power reserved to any court to enquire into moral character; Georgia, Michigan, and Massachusetts, where a similar system, without this reservation, prevails; and Virginia, Florida, Mississippi, and Alabama, where an examining board, rather than a court, functions, either technically or in practical effect, as the admitting authority. The state last named and likewise California are "self-governing bar" states. In the other sixteen states, legislation either gives the examining board independent powers, as against the court, or affects the procedural detail, or both, for the most part in much the same way as in the third group. North Carolina labors under the peculiar handicap that the judges of its Supreme Court are required themselves to conduct the examination.

Seven of these states extend the "diploma privilege" to graduates of one or more local law schools. The Wisconsin statute is the only one that clearly imposes no other educational restrictions. In Nebraska and South Dakota, the force of the language used is doubtful. In Mississippi, there is no authority to demand any period of law study. In Alabama, a period of eighteen months is fixed. In Florida, general education, and in Georgia, both general education and period of law study, are matters into which neither court nor board is given authority to enquire. In the remaining eleven states, special privileges are not accorded to graduates of particular schools, but in none of them is court or board free to fix the preliminary qualifications of applicants, at least in the field of general education.

In a word, as contrasted with the fourteen jurisdictions of the first two groups, in which a single court is in pretty complete control of the entire situation, and the seventeen states in which the admitting authorities control either the machinery and procedure or the qualifications that may be set, but not both, in this last group of eighteen states legislation is required to effect improvements either in the machinery or in the standards.
IV. Conclusion

In the preceding pages, various methods of attacking the problem of bar admission have been distinguished. The question may now be asked, “Which of these methods has yielded the best results?” Does experience indicate that it is better to leave a wide range of discretion to a single admitting authority, or to prescribe details by legislative act? Is there any marked difference in this respect between statutes that define, with some precision, the machinery or procedure of admission, and statutes that fix the educational standards of applicants?

Two years ago, in an attempt to make intelligible the widely differing systems of admission to legal practice that prevail in the forty-eight states and the District of Columbia, the Annual Review of Legal Education enumerated certain elementary essentials of a sound bar admission system. Now for the third successive year, existing systems are shown to fall within three broad groups, according as they possess or lack these essentials. The leading group is characterized by the fact that the applicant is required to show that he possesses some specific amount of general education, however small, before he begins to study law during some definitely prescribed period, long or short. An intermediate group likewise demands both a specific amount of general education and a definite period of law study, but does not insist in all cases that the one be secured before the other begins. The lowest group fails to prescribe one or the other—usually both—of these qualifications.

This particular method of appraising the systems according to their technical merit possesses no permanent value. It is lenient to the last degree. Since for the time being, however, it divides the states into almost equal groups, it provides a practically useful working classification. In the autumn of the current academic year, 1930–31, the first or so-called “Advanced” group included fifteen jurisdictions; the “Intermediate” group, nineteen; and the lowest or “Primitive” group, fifteen.

This classification takes no account of whether the features which determine the ranking of any particular jurisdiction were developed by a court, or by a legislature, or by joint action of these or other agencies. Accordingly, it would seem useful to bring these independent distinctions of technical merit into relation with the rough grouping on the basis of judicial or legislative control that has been attempted in the preceding pages. A table on the following page not only does this, but may serve as a convenient summary of the information already given.

A glance at this table shows that where a large measure of control has been retained by, or vested in, the courts, half, or more than half, of the systems are, whatever their defects, at least in the most advanced of these three groups. Where the legislature has prescribed most of the details, a majority of the systems are in the most primitive group. States where the legislature determines the organization but not the qualifications, or the qualifications but not the organization, tend to occupy an intermediate position, and there is no great difference in the indicated effect of these two types of legislative supervision.
This relatively poor showing made by legislators is doubtless due, in part, to the fact that they lend a more sympathetic ear than do the judges to arguments against raising standards. In part it is due to the cumbersomeness and dilatoriness of all legislative process. Even in the presence of a general tendency to strengthen requirements for admission to legal practice, it is inevitable that states in which progress depends upon legislative action should lag somewhat behind those in which a court may act at will. The contrast, moreover, should serve as a warning only against legislation of the wrong sort, that saps freedom of initiative, and substitutes

**EXISTING SYSTEMS OF ADMISSION TO LEGAL PRACTICE, CLASSIFIED VERTICALLY ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENCE OF CERTAIN TECHNICALLY ESSENTIAL FEATURES, AND HORIZONTALLY ACCORDING TO THE RELATIVE EXTENT OF JUDICIAL AND OF LEGISLATIVE CONTROL**

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<th>Jurisdictions in which:</th>
<th>States in which the systems are technically:</th>
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<td><strong>Advanced</strong></td>
<td><strong>Intermediate</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>A court is in most complete control of the admitting machinery and of qualifications for applicants.</td>
<td>District of Columbia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>Connecticut</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>Illinois</td>
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<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Tennessee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>South Carolina</td>
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<tr>
<td>Statutes both describe in some detail machinery or procedure, and determine in important respects educational qualifications.</td>
<td>Michigan</td>
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<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>Maine</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>West Virginia</td>
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<td>Texas</td>
<td>Montana</td>
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**States marked (s) have enacted legislation providing for a self-governing bar.**

mechanical procedure and formulas for informed responsibility and capacity to march with events. Even courts that have built up reasonably satisfactory admission systems for themselves may be helped by judicious legislation that does not descend too much into detail. As for states which are embarrassed by statutes providing antiquated machinery and restrictive rules, their prime need is remedial legislation.
CURRENT BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS

I. RECENT CHANGES

During 1930, changes in the rules for admission to legal practice were reported in twenty American states\(^1\) and two Canadian provinces.\(^2\) Although these changes were usually improvements, they were for the most part of a technical or administrative nature, involving no radical departure from the policy previously pursued by the admitting authorities.

1. General Education

Connecticut strengthened its requirements of general education for office students by requiring applicants not actually graduated from a non-technical high school to pass examinations conducted by the College Entrance Board. Minnesota and West Virginia made their respective state universities responsible for the examinations accepted as a substitute for two years of college. Ohio and Ontario made changes affecting the type of college that will be recognized. Missouri greatly strengthened the administration of its still exceedingly low requirements.

2. Period of Law Study

Connecticut has greatly strengthened its rules affecting office students. New York and New Jersey have made slight changes in the definition of an office clerkship, or in the procedure for determining compliance with the rules. Iowa has instituted a registration provision affecting office students only. Prince Edward Island has secured legislation doing away with its former anomalous extension of the total period of preparation in the case of applicants taking a complete course in a law school.

3. Final Examination

Application forms have been improved by Nebraska and Virginia, and have been abandoned by Mississippi. West Virginia has increased its fees. The dates or frequency of examinations have been changed in New Jersey and Oregon. The interval between application and examination has been increased to forty or sixty days in New Jersey and Missouri, and reduced to ten days in West Virginia. Pennsylvania and Oregon have made slight changes in the rules affecting the conduct of examinations. Iowa, Maryland, and West Virginia have amplified their published information as to the subjects covered by the examination, or the preparation expected. Mississippi has discontinued its detailed rules affecting the grading of papers. Five

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\(^1\) Classified as in the following section these states were "Advanced": Connecticut, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania (7). "Intermediate": Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, West Virginia (9).

"Primitive": California, Mississippi, Missouri, Virginia (4).

Changes in Delaware and New Hampshire, and additional changes in Louisiana, Minnesota, and New Jersey, not effective until 1931, will be noted in the 1931 issue of this Annual Review.

\(^2\) Ontario, Prince Edward Island.
states—Connecticut, Kentucky, Louisiana, Virginia, and West Virginia—have restricted the former privilege of reexamination without payment of additional fee.

There has been no change in the number of states—thirteen—in which graduates of one or more law schools take no examination other than that conducted by the school itself. In Texas, this “diploma privilege” is enjoyed even by law schools situated outside the state, including all schools approved by the Council on Legal Education. Partly through the growth of such schools, and partly through additions made by the local bar admission authorities, the total number of law schools that are, or on application may be, thus specially privileged in Texas, has increased during the year from 75 to 80.

4. Other Features

Attempts to improve the machinery or administration of character requirements have been made by Connecticut, Massachusetts, Missouri, Virginia, West Virginia, and Ontario. The required period of residence in Oklahoma has been reduced from six months to sixty days. California and Connecticut have strengthened the rules affecting admission of those already admitted to practice in another jurisdiction.

II. COMPARATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSION TO LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND NEWFOUNDLAND

The salient features of the sixty state or provincial bar admission systems of the United States and Canada, at the beginning of the academic year 1930–31, are exhibited on the inserted sheet. The table is confined to educational requirements affecting those first admitted to practice. It does not include provisions designed to test moral character, nor special rules affecting war veterans or attorneys already admitted to practice in another jurisdiction.

For convenience of reference, the corresponding recommendations of the American Bar Association are shown in summary form. The table makes clear that no state has followed these recommendations as a whole. If a much less rigorous test be applied, it will be found that fifteen states are more advanced than the rest, in that at least they require all applicants to have secured a specified amount of general education, however small, and, following this, to study law during some definitely prescribed period, long or short. These fifteen states are the following:

BAR ADMISSION SYSTEMS OF A TECHNICALLY ADVANCED TYPE

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Nineteen jurisdictions resemble the above group in demanding both a specific amount of general education and a definite period of law study, before the bar examination. They do not insist, however, in all cases, that the general education be
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<th>STATE</th>
<th>NOTARIES LEGISLATION</th>
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<td>Montana</td>
<td>Pass</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
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<td>Pass</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
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<tr>
<td>New York</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
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<td>Pass</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
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<td>Pennsylvania</td>
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<td>Rhode Island</td>
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<td>Pass</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>Pass</td>
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<td>Pass</td>
<td>Pass</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>Pass</td>
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<td>Pass</td>
<td>Pass</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>Pass</td>
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<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Pass</td>
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<td>Pass</td>
<td>Pass</td>
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<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>Pass</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
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<td>Pass</td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>Pass</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>Pass</td>
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<td>Pass</td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>Pass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>Pass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>Pass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>Pass</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- Minimum requirements vary by state.
- States with "Pass" indicate that the state recognizes notaries with the same requirements as in the issuing state.
- States with "Not permitted" indicate that notaries in the state are not recognized.
- States with "Not prohibited" indicate that notaries in the state are not required to meet certain requirements.
- States with "None" indicate that the state does not have specific requirements for notaries.
- States with "Equivalent of high school" or "Graduate of high school" indicate that a high school diploma is required.
- States with "Equivalent of 4 years of college" indicate that a bachelor's degree is required.
- States with "Equivalent of 6 years of college" indicate that a master's degree is required.
- States with "Equivalent of 8 years of college" indicate that a doctoral degree is required.
- States with "3 years college or equivalent" indicate that 3 years of college or equivalent are required.
- States with "5 years college or equivalent" indicate that 5 years of college or equivalent are required.
- States with "8 years college or equivalent" indicate that 8 years of college or equivalent are required.
- States with "Equivalent of 2 years of college" indicate that 2 years of college or equivalent are required.
- States with "Equivalent of 4 years of college" indicate that 4 years of college or equivalent are required.
THREE BROADLY DISTINGUISHED GROUPS

secured before the period of law study begins. This technical defect in the rules encourages the diversion of time that is really needed for legal study to concurrent “cram work” that is a most inadequate substitute for a sound preliminary education. The states included in this intermediate group are the following:

BAR ADMISSION SYSTEMS OF A TECHNICALLY INTERMEDIATE TYPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delaware</th>
<th>Kentucky</th>
<th>Montana</th>
<th>Oregon</th>
<th>West Virginia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District of Columbia</td>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Wyoming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, the remaining fifteen states have systems of a still more primitive type, in that reliance is placed solely upon the bar examination to test either general education, or legal attainments, or both. This failure to winnow out the applicants before they come up for examination not only adds needlessly to the bar examiners’ labors, but exaggerates the possible efficacy of any unsupported examination. The states that are in this most backward group of all are the following:

BAR ADMISSION SYSTEMS OF A TECHNICALLY PRIMITIVE TYPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alabama</th>
<th>California</th>
<th>Indiana</th>
<th>Nevada</th>
<th>North Dakota</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>Utah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LAW SCHOOLS

I. Recent Changes

In last year's issue of this Annual Review, reference was made to the growing importance attached by full-time law schools to research activities leading to law reform, and to the increasing amount of educational machinery that is specifically devoted to these ends. In addition to continuing work of this sort that is being done under the auspices, or with the cooperation, of law schools at Harvard, Columbia, and Yale, and—outside of professional law schools—by the American Law Institute and the Johns Hopkins Institute of Law, the following organizations have been noted as started during the year: a Foundation for Research in Legal History at the Columbia University School of Law; a Committee for Research in the Social Sciences at Yale University; and an Air Law Institute and a Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory, affiliated with Northwestern University. Doubtless in other law schools and universities there have been similar developments that have not been brought to the attention of the Foundation. Still other schools prefer to pursue such activities as part of either their undergraduate or their postgraduate curriculum, without the creation of special machinery. The University of Michigan Law School has recently been left a large bequest available for these purposes.

During the past year, no new full-time school has been opened. The University of Santa Clara (California), however, and Howard University, of Washington, D.C., have shifted from the part-time or “mixed” groups, with the result that the total number of institutions that offer exclusively full-time work during at least three academic years has risen from 79 to 81. Santa Clara requires for admission three years of college. The University of Iowa, since January 1, 1930, has admitted only college graduates or students who have completed three years of college in an approved “combined course.” Michigan has abolished the six-year combined course except for students in its own college. California and Yale now require in all cases a college degree. The number of law schools that have the very highest requirements in point of time (a total of seven academic years after the high school) has thus been raised to seven. Indiana Law School, of Indianapolis, the Dickinson School of Law, of Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and Cumberland University, of Lebanon, Tennessee (one-year law course), continue to be the only full-time law schools that do not even pretend to require college work for admission.

No part-time or mixed law schools have been reported as newly opened during the academic year 1930–31.1 Shifts back and forth between part-time and mixed schools, and the two transfers already noted into the exclusively full-time type, account for a net reduction of two in the number of part-time institutions operating in the autumn

1 The current list includes two schools newly reported as opened before the beginning of the current academic year: autumn of 1929, Southern Law School, of Athens, Georgia (two-year course); January, 1930, Metropolitan University Law School of Los Angeles, California (three-year day and four-year evening divisions).
of 1930. One school has been closed since then,¹ and one has ceased to admit firstyear students.² Local bar admission requirements explain increases in entrance requirements or in length of law course in eight schools.³ The Springfield Y. M. C. A. Division of Northeastern University School of Law has lengthened its course to five years, without such inducement.

II. Changes over a Period of Forty Years

1. Increased Importance of Part-time Law Courses

The term “part-time” has come into current usage to designate law courses that are given either in the evening, or in the late afternoon or early morning, for the special convenience of students who are obliged to support themselves while securing their education. The following table shows the great change that has occurred since 1890 in the relative number of full-time law schools, of part-time law schools, and of law schools of an intermediate or “mixed” type that maintain separate full-time and part-time divisions. The figures are given for ten-year intervals, beginning with those for the academic year 1889–90. Figures for 1920–21 and 1930–31 are also included, both in order to bring the information up to date, and because 1921 saw the publication of Foundation Bulletin Number 15, *Training for the Public Profession of the Law*, and was the year in which the American Bar Association adopted its epoch-making recommendations with regard to bar admission requirements and law schools.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exclusively full-time</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed full-time and part-time</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusively part-time</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It will be observed that while the number of schools offering exclusively full-time work has doubled during this period of forty years, the number offering part-time work, either exclusively or in connection with full-time divisions, has approximately quadrupled. On the average, one new full-time law school has been added every year, as against two schools of the part-time or mixed type. The proportion of schools that offer only full-time work has shown a steady decrease, from over two-thirds of the total, in 1889–90, to well under one-half at present.

Simultaneously, the relative attendance at full-time law schools, which in 1889–90 constituted almost three-quarters (74.1 per cent) of a total of 4,486 law-school students, has fallen at an even more rapid rate. In the autumn of 1929, it constituted approximately one-third of a total of 44,000 students.

¹ Long Beach (California) Branch of Southwestern University School of Law.
² Providence Y. M. C. A. Division of Northeastern University School of Law.
³ One in Michigan, three in Minnesota, three in New York, and one in Pennsylvania.
The table also shows, however, that the decrease in the relative number of full-time schools has been much less marked during the last ten years than during any preceding decade. The figure reached its minimum in 1927–28, when out of every sixteen law schools, only seven (43.75 per cent) offered exclusively full-time work. There was a slight increase the following year, and again, as shown by the table, between 1929–30 and 1930–31. The current total of 98 part-time or “mixed” degree-conferring schools includes one whose suspension has already been announced; one that is accepting no new entries; and one that has a purely metaphysical existence, having for two successive years failed to enroll a single student.

Attendance at part-time law schools or divisions is adversely affected both by the increased requirements of general education that have been made by the bar admission authorities of several states, and by a nation-wide business depression that bears with especial force upon self-supporting students. It is probable that the combination of these two influences will substantially reduce the number of part-time and “mixed” schools during the next few years. It is most improbable, however, that this reduction will be so drastic as to undo the work of the preceding generation. Institutions specially designed to serve self-supporting students will continue to be a highly important, and at their best a highly useful, factor in recruiting and training American lawyers.

2. Lengthened Period of Preparation

There has also been a marked increase in the period of time required to secure a law degree, whether because of a lengthened law course, or because of higher entrance requirements.

Two tables follow, of which the first covers those schools that offer exclusively full-time work.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FULL-TIME LAW SCHOOLS, 1890 TO 1930, CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF ACADEMIC YEARS AFTER THE HIGH SCHOOL NEEDED TO SECURE THE DEGREE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1889-1890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six years, if from the local college</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six years¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five years¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below two years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table shows that forty years ago an overwhelming majority of full-time law schools required two years or less, after the high school, to secure their degree. Twenty

¹ Additional time in law office or law school, required by the University of Wisconsin Law School since 1916, is ignored in these figures.
years ago, an overwhelming majority required no more than three years. Ten years ago, a majority still required no more than four years. To-day, only three schools out of eighty-two require less than five years, and a substantial number—nearly one-fourth of the total—require six or seven years.

These figures are accurate, and are significant, so far as they go. Their principal limitation is that they are expressed in terms of the traditional academic year of American education, covering nine months or less. The remaining long summer vacation was originally left free for make-up work, or for necessary recreation, or, especially in agricultural districts, for economic employment. To-day, in an effort to offset the effect of higher standards in prolonging the student’s period of preparation, an increasing number of law schools hold summer sessions, work in which may be credited toward the residential requirement of three academic years. By this means students who enter the summer session immediately after completion of their preliminary college work may often complete a so-called “three-year” course in two-and-one-quarter calendar years. If they go to a college where the same system prevails, they may complete six academic years of college and law work combined in four-and-one-half calendar years. In the above table, law schools that permit this shortening of the gross period of preparation are not distinguished from those that refuse to regard summer work, if given at all, as the equivalent of study pursued under more favorable conditions.

The second table aims to cover the same ground as the first, for part-time law courses offered either exclusively or in connection with full-time divisions.

| PART-TIME LAW SCHOOLS OR DIVISIONS, 1890 TO 1930, CLASSIFIED AS IN THE PRECEDING TABLE |
|---------------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|                                            | 1890| 1899| 1909| 1919| 1920| 1929| 1930| 1931|
| Seven years                                | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 1   | 1   |     |
| Six years                                  | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 2   | 27  | 27  |     |
| Five years                                 | 0   | 0   | 0   | 4   | 1   | 17  | 22  |     |
| Four years                                 | 0   | 2   | 7   | 21  | 30  | 36  | 30  |     |
| Three years                                | 1   | 20  | 34  | 40  | 38  | 13  | 12  |     |
| Two years                                  | 15  | 16  | 18  | 11  | 9   | 6   | 6   |     |
| One year                                   | 4   | 1   | 1   | 0   | 0   | 0   |     |     |
| Total                                      | 20  | 39  | 60  | 76  | 80  | 100 | 98  |     |

The figures in this table are in several ways less satisfactory than the preceding. Part-time law schools sometimes push their attempts to make use of the summer months to the point of announcing a regular course of three, or of four, calendar years, with intervening breaks of less than a month, or with no breaks at all; consistently with the treatment of full-time institutions, it is necessary to classify such schools, a bit artificially, as maintaining courses covering respectively four, and five, academic years. In states, moreover, that have low bar admission requirements, it is some-
what misleading to classify a school on the basis of its degree requirements, when a large proportion of its students attend only long enough to qualify for the bar examinations. Even greater complications attend attempts to measure preliminary requirements of general education.

With all allowances made, however, this table shows that among these schools, also, there has been a general movement to lengthen the total period of preparation. Indeed, the number of part-time law schools or divisions that purport to require a total period of six or seven years to-day exceeds, both absolutely and relatively, the corresponding number of full-time schools. There is a special reason for this. It is comparatively easy for part-time law schools under the stimulus of the new American Bar Association standards to announce that candidates for the degree must have two years of college work followed by four years of law. It takes much more courage—and much greater readiness to subordinate professional training to cultural education—for a full-time law school to preface three years of law by a rigorously enforced entrance requirement of three or more college years. With this exception, the movement has produced much less striking results among part-time than among full-time law schools. Forty years ago, the proportion of institutions that had not advanced beyond the two-year level was even greater among the part-time than among the full-time group. Similarly as to the three-year level in 1910. Ten years ago, the number of part-time schools or divisions that required as many as four years was still less than one-half of the total. To-day, barely more than one-half, as compared with almost all of the full-time schools, require a total period as long as five years.

It appears, therefore, that despite the general movement for lengthening the course in part-time law schools, such schools are far from catching up with their full-time rivals, as regards the amount of time that is measured by their law degree. On the contrary, they are being more and more outdistanced in this respect.

The two phenomena described in this and in the preceding section—the relative increase of part-time law courses, and the lengthening of the total period of preparation for all types of schools—are, of course, related. The lengthening of the period for full-time law schools, by making legal education more expensive, has stimulated the demand for part-time law schools; and these, in turn, have moved up as close as they could to the rising full-time standards. For those who like to measure social events with the pseudo-precision of statistics, the developments of the past forty years may be summarized as follows:

In 1890, 66 per cent of the total number of law schools offered exclusively full-time work requiring three years or less, after the high school, in order to secure the degree.

To-day, 88 per cent of all law schools require four years or more. Half of these are of the exclusively full-time type, and require at least five years after the high school. The other half offer part-time work either exclusively or in connection with full-time divisions.
3. Suggested Change in Grouping of Law Schools

The information presented in the preceding two tables covers more details than most readers will readily grasp. They would be even more confused if account were taken of still other aspects of the "time element" that are indicated, in the pages immediately following, by symbols attached to particular schools; the distinction, namely, between part-time sessions that are scheduled in the evening, and those that are held in the late afternoon; the distinction between schools of the exclusively part-time and of the "mixed" type; the length of the period of preparation in the full-time divisions of "mixed" schools; and, finally, how the total period is divided between college and law school. An occasional elaborate survey of this sort is useful to measure progress over an extended term of years. Statistical information, however, that is published annually for purposes of reference and systematic comparison, must be greatly simplified. This may be best accomplished by dividing the schools into a few large groups, broadly distinguished one from the other.

Such a grouping first appeared in the Foundation's Annual Report and reprinted pamphlet of 1920. The present division into six groups, as regularly printed following the List of Law Schools in this Annual Review of Legal Education, was inaugurated in 1923. At that date, the number of law schools, either full-time or part-time, that had a course of less than three academic years, had already dwindled to such small proportions (thirteen per cent of the total as early as 1919–20) that these were all placed together to constitute a "limbo," or lowest group, of obvious anachronisms. The remaining full-time schools were then subdivided into three groups, of which the highest demanded a total period of preparation longer than the five years (two years college plus three years law) recommended by the American Bar Association. The second group did no more than meet this requirement, while the third (which as late as 1921–22 included a majority of the three-year full-time schools) required less. The remaining part-time schools and the remaining schools of the "mixed" type constituted, in their entirety, respectively the fourth and the fifth divisions.

To-day, the lower group, as originally constituted, contains only eight schools—one full-time and seven part-time. Only three full-time law schools fall below the five-year level. If to these there be added eighteen part-time or mixed schools now requiring less than four years after the high school, the new "limbo" that would be thus formed would still contain less than twelve per cent of the entire number of degree-conferring institutions. The remaining full-time schools might then be divided into three groups, requiring a minimum, respectively, of seven years', of six years', and of five years' preparation; while all the other schools, whether part-time or "mixed," could be convenientel distinguished one from the other according as they do or do not conform, at least nominally, to American Bar Association standards of preliminary education and duration of law study. A table, thus reconstituted, would read as follows:
LAW SCHOOLS

PROPOSED REGROUPING OF DEGREE-CONFERRING LAW SCHOOLS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1889-</th>
<th>1890-</th>
<th>1890-</th>
<th>1890-</th>
<th>1891-</th>
<th>1891-</th>
<th>1892-</th>
<th>1892-</th>
<th>1892-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full-time schools requiring:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven academic years</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six academic years, at least for students</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in the local college</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five academic years</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-time or mixed schools requiring for the part-time course:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six academic years or more</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four or five academic years</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other schools</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>180</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

An expression of opinion is solicited as to whether the statistical material, showing number of schools and student attendance, that appears this year in its usual form on pages 54 and 55, should be redistributed on the above basis in future issues of this publication.

III. CURRENT LIST OF RESIDENTIAL LAW SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

The following list of law schools is not a selective list of “recognized” institutions. It aims to cover every degree-conferring law school in the United States and Canada (other than correspondence schools), and for each such school to give information as to important features of its work. The form in which the material is presented differs only slightly from that previously used in this Annual Review, beginning with the issue for 1920. Canadian schools were first included in 1925; tuition fees, in 1927; and autumn attendance figures, in 1928. In that year, the law schools were also for the first time divided so as to occupy parallel positions on opposite pages.

In the explanatory matter that appears at the head of the list, attention is particularly directed to the limited significance of the roman numerals denoting the number of college years that are required, prima facie, for admission. This information may be most misleading if it is not clearly understood to represent merely the major differences between law schools in this respect, and to be subject to many qualifications in detail, as regards any particular institution.

The left-hand pages list, for each state or Canadian province, schools that offer exclusively “full-time” work—the purely “M” schools, in the language of the technical symbols. At the beginning of the current academic year there were 82 such law schools in the United States, of which all but one require, for their first law degree, residence during at least three academic years, or their assumed equivalent, and all but three have in addition at least a nominal entrance requirement of two college years or more. The appended symbols show that 68 of these law schools, or 83 per cent of the whole group, have been designated by the Council on Legal Education as complying with the standards of the American Bar Association in this and in other re-
speets; and that 63 (77 per cent) are, in addition to this, members of the Association of American Law Schools.

The right-hand pages list, in a similar way, law schools that schedule classroom work at hours, usually in the evening or in the late afternoon, that are specially convenient for most self-supporting students. The total number of such schools that confer a law degree is 98, including 7 that have law courses covering less than three academic years, and 23 that maintain separate divisions for full-time students. Of these schools, only 7 (invariably of the "mixed" type) have been approved by the Council on Legal Education, and only 6 are members of the Association of American Law Schools.

A few of the longer-established part-time law schools that do not possess power to confer degrees are also shown on these right-hand pages, but are not included in the subsequent comparative tables. Owing to the difficulty of drawing an objective line between a "law school" and a fleeting "law class" conducted by one or more attorneys, no attempt has been made to construct a comprehensive list of such institutions.
**LIST OF LAW SCHOOLS**

**Explanation of Symbols**

The symbols attached to each school measure roughly the extent of its *prima facie* compliance with three standards, affecting the amount of time devoted by students to their work, that have been formulated by the American Bar Association.

The roman numerals show the minimum number of college years, or their alleged equivalent, that are required for admission to regular standing as candidate for a degree, without close enquiry as to what is accepted as "college work," and without regard to the important complications produced by the admission of special students, etc., or of regular students with entrance conditions. An asterisk means that a college degree is required for admission; in the case of the two French-speaking Canadian schools, this symbol is included in parentheses to indicate that an examination may be substituted.

The letter M (morning, including early afternoon) denotes that classroom sessions preëmpt the best working hours of the day, and that therefore students are, or may be, required to devote to their studies all of their time not needed for necessary recreation; while the letters A (late afternoon, early morning, or a very few weekly mid-morning hours), E (evening), and AE (sessions beginning in the late afternoon and continuing into the evening) denote that instruction is conducted at other hours, more generally convenient for self-supporting students, or (in Canada) for those who serve a concurrent office clerkship.

The arabic numerals show the minimum number of academic years, or their alleged equivalent in summer work, that are required to complete the law course.

When separate divisions are conducted at different hours of the day, the require-
ments for each are stated in full, separated by commas. In all cases the symbols denote the requirements in force for those who entered the regular first-year class at the beginning of the autumn term of 1930. Courses recently abandoned as a matter of policy, but continued temporarily for the benefit of students already enrolled, are not noted. Announcements of subsequent changes are occasionally mentioned in footnotes. When no degree is conferred at the completion of the course, the set of symbols is enclosed in [brackets].

In parentheses, schools members of the Association of American Law Schools at the conclusion of its annual meeting held in December, 1930, are marked (s); schools designated by the Council on Legal Education as complying with the standards of the American Bar Association at, or shortly after, the same date, are marked (c).

\[\text{FEES}\]

The information as to fees combines, under a single head, all charges that must be paid annually by students taking the full course; when each subject or credit-hour is charged separately, the total payments needed to secure the required number of credits have been averaged. Matriculation and Degree fees are additional payments made only once, at entrance and at graduation.

\[\text{Attendance Figures}\]

Except as otherwise stated, the figures refer to the autumn of the current year. Owing to the considerable number of failures to supply information promptly, the subsequent comparative tables for the United States lag in this respect a year behind the other data.

\[\text{PART-TIME AND “MIXED” LAW SCHOOLS, 1930–31} \]

\[\text{UNITED STATES}\]

\[\text{Alabama}\]

Birmingham

Y. M. C. A., Birmingham School of Law

\r Fees: Annual, $102; Degree, $7.50
Autumn attendance: 76

\[\text{Arkansas}\]

Little Rock

Arkansas Law School

\r Fees: Annual, $155; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 71

\[\text{California}\]

Bakersfield

Lincoln College of Law

\r Fees: Annual, $230; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance not reported since 1929 (16)

Fresno

Olympic University, San Joaquin College of Law

\r Fees: Annual, $86; Degree, $15
Autumn attendance: 20
Los Angeles

University of Southern California, The School of Law

Fees: Annual, $300; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: Morning, 323; Evening, 47; Total, 370

Palo Alto

Stanford University, School of Law

Fees: Annual, $354; Application, $5; Degree, $5
Autumn attendance: 202

San Francisco

University of California, Hastings College of Law

Fees: Annual, $100
Autumn attendance: 179

Santa Clara

University of Santa Clara, College of Law

Fees: Annual, $275; Matriculation, $10; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 64

COLORADO

Boulder

University of Colorado, School of Law

Fees: Annual, $112.50 for residents, $160.50 for non-residents; Matriculation, $10; Degree, $5
Autumn attendance: 91

Denver

University of Denver, School of Law

Fees: Annual, $177; Matriculation, $0; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 83

1 Old students completing the course.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Fees</th>
<th>Autumn Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long Beach</td>
<td>Southwestern University, School of Law, Long Beach Branch</td>
<td>Annual: $154; Degree: $15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>Lincoln University, College of Law, Los Angeles Division</td>
<td>Annual: $200 for Day students, $150 for Evening students; Matriculation, $25</td>
<td>20 / 170 / Total 195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loyola University, College of Law</td>
<td>Annual: $265 for Day students, $150 for Evening students; Matriculation, $5; Degree, $10</td>
<td>Morning: 25; Evening: 170 / Total 195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metropolitan University, Law School</td>
<td>Annual: $106</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Olympic University, College of Law</td>
<td>Annual: $204 for Day students, $148 for Evening students</td>
<td>Day: 20; Evening: 100 / Total 120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pacific Coast University, College of Law</td>
<td>Annual: $160</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Southwestern University, School of Law</td>
<td>Annual: $204 for Day students, $150 for Evening students; Degree, $15</td>
<td>2 / 177 / Total 199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University of the West, Los Angeles College of Law</td>
<td>Annual: $192 for Day students, $146 for Evening students; Degree, $10</td>
<td>Day: 76; Evening: 259 / Total 335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Oakland College of Law</td>
<td>Annual: $135; Matriculation, $10; Degree, $10</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>McGeorge College of Law, Sacramento College of Law</td>
<td>Annual: $125; Degree, $10</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lincoln University, College of Law</td>
<td>Annual: $100; Matriculation, $2</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>St. Ignatius College, The Law School</td>
<td>Annual: $160; Matriculation, $2</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>San Francisco Law School</td>
<td>Annual: $178.50; Matriculation, $10; Degree, $10</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y. M. C. A., Golden Gate College, School of Law</td>
<td>Annual: $127.50</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Westminster Law School</td>
<td>Annual: $145; Matriculation, $8; Degree, $15</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**COLORADO**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Fees</th>
<th>Autumn Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denver</td>
<td>Westminster Law School</td>
<td>Annual: $145; Matriculation, $8; Degree, $15</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Discontinued, February, 1931.
2 After July 1, 1931, one year of college will be required.
FULL-TIME LAW SCHOOLS, 1930–31

CONNECITUT

New Haven
Yale University, The School of Law
Fees: Annual, $450; Degree, $20
Autumn attendance: 339

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Washington
The Catholic University of America, The School of Law
Fees: Annual, $325; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 28
Howard University, School of Law (colored)
Fees: Annual, $154.50; Matriculation, $5; Degree, $7
Autumn attendance: Morning, 63; Evening, 4; Total 67

FLORIDA

DeLand
John B. Stetson University, College of Law
Fees: Annual, $150; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 45

Gainesville
University of Florida, College of Law
Fees: Annual, $47.50 for residents, $147.50 for non-residents; Degree, $5
Autumn attendance: 194

Miami
University of Miami, School of Law
Fees: Annual, $225; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 56

GEORGIA

Athens
University of Georgia, Law Department (The Lumpkin Law School)
Fees: Annual, $150 for residents, $250 for non-residents
Autumn attendance: 64

Atlanta
Emory University, The Lamar School of Law
Fees: Annual, $215; Matriculation, $5; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 77

Macon
Mercer University, The Law School
Fees: Annual, $197.68; Matriculation, $5
Autumn attendance: 64

1 Old students completing the course.
PART-TIME AND "MIXED" LAW SCHOOLS, 1930–31

CONNECTICUT

Hartford

The Hartford College of Law

Fees: Annual, $150

Autumn attendance: 105

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Washington

Georgetown University, School of Law

Fees: Annual, $305 for Morning students, $205 for Afternoon students; Matriculation, $5; Degree, $15

Autumn attendance: Morning, 232; Afternoon, 261; Total, 493

The George Washington University, The Law School

Fees: Annual, $225 for Morning students, $172 for Afternoon students; Degree, $15

Autumn attendance: Morning, 165; Afternoon, 49; Total, 814

K. of C., Columbus University, School of Law

Fees: Annual, $103; Matriculation, $5; Degree, $10

Autumn attendance: 201

National University Law School

Fees: Annual, $166.50 for LL.B. or B.C.L., $198 for J.D.; Matriculation, $5; Degree, $15

Autumn attendance: 97

Washington College of Law

Fees: Annual, $122; Matriculation, $5; Degree, $15

Autumn attendance: Morning, 284; Afternoon, 294; Total, 578

Y. M. C. A., Southeastern University, School of Law

Fees: Annual, $103 for first year, $123 for each upper year; Degree, $15

Autumn attendance: 265

GEORGIA

Athens

Southern Law School

Fees: Annual, $150

Autumn attendance not reported

Atlanta

The Atlanta Law School

Fees: Annual, $127.50; Degree, $15

Autumn attendance not reported since 1926 (134)

1 Beginning 1931-32, two years of college will be required.
IDAHO

Moscow
The University of Idaho, The College of Law
Fees: Annual, $51 for residents, $111 for non-residents
Autumn attendance: 36

ILLINOIS

Chicago
Northwestern University, School of Law
(Union College of Law) *IIIM3 or IIIM4 (sc)
Fees: Annual, $300 (but $250 for the last year of the four-year course);
Matriculation, $10; Degree, $20
Autumn attendance: 403

The University of Chicago, The Law School
Fees: Annual, $575; Matriculation, $10; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 70

Urbana
University of Illinois, College of Law
Fees: Annual, $100 for residents, $150 for non-residents; Matriculation, $10
Autumn attendance: 272

INDIANA

Bloomington
Indiana University, School of Law
Fees: Annual, $96 for residents, $131 for non-residents; Degree, $5
Autumn attendance: 148

Indianapolis
Butler University, University of Indianapolis, Indiana Law School M3
Fees: Annual, $150; Degree, $15
Autumn attendance: 136

Notre Dame
The University of Notre Dame, The College of Law
Fees: Annual, $223; Matriculation, $10; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 143

Valparaiso
Valparaiso University, The School of Law
Fees: Annual, $202; Matriculation, $5; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 20

IOWA

Des Moines
Drake University, The Law School
Fees: Annual, $266; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 63

Iowa City
The State University of Iowa, College of Law
Fees: Annual, $128 for residents, $168 for non-residents; Matriculation, $10; Degree, $15
Autumn attendance: 226

1 College degree required except for students taking the combined course in this University.
2 College degree required except for students taking an approved combined course in this or another University.
### Illinois

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Fees</th>
<th>Autumn Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>Chicago-Kent College of Law</td>
<td><strong>Annual, $156; Matriculation, $5; Degree, $15</strong></td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chicago Law School</td>
<td><strong>Annual, $125; Degree, $10</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>De Paul University, College of Law</td>
<td><strong>Annual, $245 for Day students, $175 for Evening students; Matriculation, $10; Degree, $10</strong></td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The John Marshall Law School</td>
<td><strong>Annual, $120; Degree, $10</strong></td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loyola University, School of Law</td>
<td><strong>Annual, $240 for Full-time students, $180 for Evening students; Matriculation, $10; Degree, $10</strong></td>
<td>812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Lincoln College of Law</td>
<td><strong>Annual, $120; Matriculation, $0; Degree, $10</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Indiana

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Fees</th>
<th>Autumn Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Danville</td>
<td>Central Normal College, Law Course</td>
<td><strong>Annual, $126</strong></td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indianapolis</td>
<td>Benjamin Harrison Law School</td>
<td><strong>Annual, $90; Degree, $10</strong></td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Iowa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Fees</th>
<th>Autumn Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Des Moines</td>
<td>The Des Moines Night School of Law</td>
<td><strong>Annual, $130; Matriculation, $2</strong></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 College work may be taken concurrently with law work.
FULL-TIME LAW SCHOOLS, 1930–31

KANSAS

Lawrence
University of Kansas, The School of Law
Fees: Annual, $66 for residents, $86 for non-residents; Matriculation, $10 for residents, $15 for non-residents; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 132

Topeka
Washburn College, School of Law
Fees: Annual, $198.50; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 166

LEXINGTON
University of Kentucky, College of Law
Fees: Annual, $10 for residents, $30 for non-residents
Autumn attendance: 111

LOUISIANA

Baton Rouge
Louisiana State University, Law School
Fees: Annual, $69 for citizens of the United States, $219 for others; Degree, $5
Autumn attendance: 88

New Orleans
The Tulane University of Louisiana, College of Law
Fees: Annual, $225 for residents, $230 for non-residents; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 138

MASSACHUSETTS

Boston
Boston University, School of Law
Fees: Annual, $265 for men, $260 for women; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 519

Cambridge
Harvard University, The Law School
Fees: Annual, $410
Autumn attendance: 1,506
KENTUCKY

Louisville

Jefferson School of Law
Fees: Annual, $125; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 132

Simmons University, Department of Law
(The Central Law School) (colored)
Fees: Annual, $110; Matriculation, $10; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 11

University of Louisville, School of Law
Fees: Annual, $150; Matriculation, $5
Autumn attendance: 69

LOUISIANA

New Orleans

Loyola University, School of Law
Fees: Annual, $170; Matriculation, $5; Degree, $25
Autumn attendance: Day, 49; Evening, 37; Total, 86

MARYLAND

Baltimore

University of Baltimore, School of Law
Fees: Annual, $175; Matriculation, $10; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 874

The University of Maryland, The School of Law
Fees: Annual, $202 for resident Day or $162 for resident Evening students, $252 for non-resident Day or $202 for non-resident Evening students; Matriculation, $10; Degree, $15
Autumn attendance: Morning, 65; Evening, 95; Total, 150

MASSACHUSETTS

Boston

Boston College, The Law School
Fees: Annual, $210 for Day students, $150 for Evening students; Matriculation, $5; Degree, $15
Autumn attendance: Morning, 66; Evening, 54; Total, 120

Northeastern University, School of Law, Boston Y. M. C. A.
Fees: Annual, $150; Matriculation, $5; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 925

Portia Law School (for women)
Fees: Annual, $150; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 90

Suffolk Law School
Fees: Annual, $145; Senior bar examination review, $20; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 1,115

Springfield

Northeastern University, School of Law, Springfield Y. M. C. A. Division
Fees: Annual, $150; Matriculation, $5; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 115

Worcester

Northeastern University, School of Law, Worcester Y. M. C. A. Division
Fees: Annual, $150; Matriculation, $5; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 97

1 Beginning September, 1931, two years of college will be required.
FULL-TIME LAW SCHOOLS, 1930–31

MICHIGAN

Ann Arbor  University of Michigan, Law School IIM3\(^1\) (sc)

Fees: Annual, $123 for residents, $143 for non-residents; Matriculation, $10 for residents, $20 for non-residents; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 534

MINNESOTA

Minneapolis  University of Minnesota, The Law School IIM3\(^2\) (sc)

Fees: Annual, $138 for residents, $168 for non-residents; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 252

St. Paul  The College of St. Thomas, The School of Law IIM3

Fees: Annual, $205; Matriculation, $10; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 31

MISSISSIPPI

Oxford  University of Mississippi, School of Law IIM3 (c)

Fees: Annual, $122.75 for residents, $172.75 for non-residents; Matriculation, $25; Degree, $5
Autumn attendance: 101

MISSOURI

Columbia  The University of Missouri, School of Law IIM3 (sc)

Fees: Annual, $60 for residents, $60 for non-residents; Degree, $5
Autumn attendance: 194

St. Louis  St. Louis University, School of Law IIM3 (sc)

Fees: Annual, $250 for Day students, $215 for Evening\(^3\) students; Matriculation, $5; Degree, $3
Autumn attendance: Day, 103; Evening, 9; Total, 112

Washington University, The School of Law IIM3 (sc)

Fees: Annual, $262; Matriculation, $5; Degree, $3
Autumn attendance: 130

MONTANA

Missoula  University of Montana, The School of Law IIM3 (sc)

Fees: Annual, $70.50 for residents, $145.50 for non-residents; Matriculation, $5; Degree, $5
Autumn attendance: Professional, 64; Other, 23; Total, 87

\(^1\) College degree required except for students taking the combined course in this University.
\(^2\) After November 1, 1930, IIM3 or IIM4.
\(^3\) Old students completing the course.
PART-TIME AND “MIXED” LAW SCHOOLS, 1930-31

**MICHIGAN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Fees</th>
<th>Autumn attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>Detroit City Law School</td>
<td>Annual, $110 for residents, $150 for non-residents; Degree, $10</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University of Detroit, College of Law</td>
<td>Annual, $220; Matriculation, $5; Degree, $12.50</td>
<td>Morning, 139; Afternoon, 60; Total, 199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y. M. C. A., Detroit College of Law</td>
<td>Annual, $115; Matriculation, $5; Degree, $17.50</td>
<td>754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis</td>
<td>Minneapolis College of Law</td>
<td>Annual, $100; Matriculation, $5; Degree, $10</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minnesota College of Law</td>
<td>Annual, $100; Degree, $5</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minneapolis Y M C A Schools, College of Law</td>
<td>Annual, $90; Degree, $3</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Paul</td>
<td>St. Paul College of Law</td>
<td>Annual, $125; Matriculation, $10; Degree, $10</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MINNESOTA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Fees</th>
<th>Autumn attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kansas City</td>
<td>The Kansas City School of Law</td>
<td>Annual, $120; Degree, $10</td>
<td>688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Joseph</td>
<td>Y. M. C. A., St. Joseph Law School</td>
<td>Annual, $55; Degree, $10</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>Benton College of Law</td>
<td>Annual, $165; Matriculation, $5; Degree, $12</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>City College of Law and Finance, School of Professional Law</td>
<td>Annual, $125 for first three years, $150 for fourth year</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Missouri Institute of Accountancy and Law, Law Department</td>
<td>Annual, $150; Degree, $15</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"After March 1, 1931, two years of college will be required."
NEW YORK

Albany  Union University, Department of Law (Albany Law School)  IIM3 (c)
Fees: Annual, $310; Matriculation, $10; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 181

Buffalo  The University of Buffalo, The School of Law  IIM3
Fees: Annual, $272; Matriculation, $5; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 231

Ithaca  Cornell University, The Cornell Law School  IIM31 (sc)
Fees: Annual, $400, and $24 additional for men, $20 additional for
women, taking the first year of law in the combined course; Matricu-
lation, $10; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 181

New York City  Columbia University, School of Law  IIM3 (sc)
Fees: Annual, $320; Degree, $20
Autumn attendance: 566

Syracuse  Syracuse University, College of Law  IIM3 (sc)
Fees: Annual, $300; Matriculation, $5; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 115

1 College degree required except for students taking the combined course in this University.
**NEBRASKA**

**Omaha**
The University of Omaha, The Night Law School  
*Fees: Annual, $100; Degree, $10*  
*Autumn attendance: 90*

**NEW JERSEY**

**Camden**
South Jersey Law School  
*Fees: Annual, $160; Matriculation, $10; Degree, $15*  
*Autumn attendance: 123*

**Jersey City**
John Marshall College of Law  
*Fees: Annual, $110; Matriculation, $10*  
*Autumn attendance not reported*

**Newark**
The Mercer Beasley School of Law  
*Fees: Annual, $203; Matriculation, $10; Degree, $15*  
*Autumn attendance: Afternoon, 114; Evening, 88; Total, 202*

**New Jersey Law School**  
*Fees: Annual, $208; Matriculation, $10; Degree, $15*  
*Autumn attendance: Morning, 239; Afternoon, 189; Evening, 260; Total, 688*

**NEW YORK**

**New York City**
St. Lawrence University, The Brooklyn Law School  
*Fees: Annual, $200; Matriculation, $10; Degree, $15*  
*Autumn attendance: Morning, 427; Afternoon, 230; Evening, 1,299; Total, 1,956*

**Fordham University, School of Law**  
*Fees: Annual, $210; Matriculation, $10; Degree, $20*  
*Autumn attendance: Morning, 318; Afternoon, 211; Evening, 673; Total, 1,202*

**New York Law School**  
*Fees: Annual, $180; Examinations for Degree, $30*  
*Autumn attendance: Afternoon, 166; Evening, 279; Total, 445*

**New York University, School of Law**  
*Fees: Annual, $246.50 for Full-time students, $206.50 for Part-time students; Degree, $20*  
*Autumn attendance: Morning, 554; Afternoon, 170*;  
*Evening, 713; Total, 1,437*

**St. John's College, School of Law**  
*Fees: Annual, $180; Matriculation, $10; Degree, $15*  
*Autumn attendance: Morning, 459; Afternoon, 164; Evening, 1,104; Undistributed, 107; Total, 1,865*

---

1 In addition to an evening division, separate divisions meet respectively in the morning and in the early afternoon.  
2 Except as to part-time students who commenced their law school study prior to September 1, 1930.  
3 Postgraduate students and old students completing the undergraduate course.
NORTH CAROLINA

Chapel Hill  University of North Carolina, The School of Law
Fees: Annual, $146 for residents, $171 for non-residents
Autumn attendance: 104

Durham  Duke University, The School of Law
Fees: Annual, $225; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 75

Wake Forest  Wake Forest College, School of Law
Fees: Annual, $185
Autumn attendance: 84

NORTH DAKOTA

Grand Forks  University of North Dakota, The School of Law
Fees: Annual, $80 for residents, $100 for non-residents
Autumn attendance: 72

OHIO

Ada  Ohio Northern University, Warren G. Harding College of Law
Fees: Annual, $180; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 60

Cincinnati  University of Cincinnati, College of Law
(Cincinnati Law School)
Fees: Annual, $200 for college graduates, $215 for others; Degree, $5
Autumn attendance: 181

Cleveland  Western Reserve University, The Franklin Thomas Backus Law School
Fees: Annual, $305; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 228

Columbus  Ohio State University, College of Law
Fees: Annual, $111 for residents, $216 for non-residents; Matriculation, $10; Degree, $6
Autumn attendance: 292

1 Beginning September, 1931, three years of college will be required.
2 College degree required except for students taking the combined course in this University.
### PART-TIME AND “MIXED” LAW SCHOOLS, 1930-31

#### NORTH CAROLINA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Fees: Annual</th>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Autumn attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wilmington</td>
<td>Wilmington Law School</td>
<td>$108</td>
<td>$5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### OHIO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Fees: Annual</th>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Autumn attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akron</td>
<td>The Akron Law School</td>
<td>$143.50</td>
<td>$10</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Matriculation: $10</td>
<td>Degree: $10</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton</td>
<td>The William McKinley School of Law</td>
<td>$150</td>
<td>$5</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Matriculation: $6</td>
<td>Degree: $10</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cincinnati</td>
<td>St. Xavier College, College of Law</td>
<td>$150</td>
<td>$10</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Autumn attendance: 46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Y M C A Night Law School</td>
<td>$151</td>
<td>Degree: $10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Autumn attendance: 116</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>The Cleveland Law School</td>
<td>$120</td>
<td>Degree: $10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Autumn attendance: 234</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The John Marshall School of Law</td>
<td>$122.50</td>
<td>$10</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Registration: $1</td>
<td>Degree: $10</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lake Erie School of Law</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>Degree: $10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Autumn attendance not reported since 1928 (196)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus</td>
<td>Columbus Y M C A Schools, The Columbus College of Law</td>
<td>$152</td>
<td>Degree: $5</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Autumn attendance: 136</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dayton</td>
<td>University of Dayton, College of Law</td>
<td>$125</td>
<td>Degree: $10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>for three-year students: $125 for four-year students</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>Autumn attendance not reported since 1927 (112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Dayton Y M C A Law School</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>Degree: $10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Autumn attendance: 186</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toledo</td>
<td>The University of the City of Toledo, Law Department</td>
<td>$5, plus $5 for each year-hour for residents, or $10 for non-residents</td>
<td>Matriculation: $8</td>
<td>Autumn attendance: 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngstown</td>
<td>Y. M. C. A., Youngstown College of Law</td>
<td>$120</td>
<td>Degree: $5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Autumn attendance: 60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Since 1928, no communication of any sort has been received from this school.
FULL-TIME LAW SCHOOLS, 1930–31

OKLAHOMA

Norman

University of Oklahoma, School of Law
Fees: Annual, $13 for residents, $63 for non-residents; Degree, $5
Autumn attendance: 270

OREGON

Eugene

The University of Oregon, School of Law
Fees: $108.75 for residents, $329.75 for non-residents; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 93

Pennsylvania

Carlisle

Dickinson College, Dickinson School of Law
Fees: Annual, $200; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 160

Philadelphia

University of Pennsylvania, The Law School
Fees: Annual, $400; Matriculation, $5
Autumn attendance: 495

Pittsburgh

University of Pittsburgh, The School of Law
Fees: Annual, $300; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 319

South Carolina

Columbia

University of South Carolina, School of Law
Fees: Annual, $97 for residents, $162 for non-residents; Degree, $5
Autumn attendance: 77

Greenville

Furman University, The Law School
Fees: Annual average, $173; Matriculation, $10; Degree, $10
Autumn attendance: 24

South Dakota

Vermillion

University of South Dakota, School of Law
Fees: Annual, $126 for residents, $176 for non-residents; Degree, $5
Autumn attendance: 74

Tennessee

Knoxville

The University of Tennessee, The College of Law
Fees: Annual, $123.75; Matriculation, $5; Degree, $5
Autumn attendance: 60

Lebanon

Cumberland University, Law School
Fees: Annual, $205; Degree, $5
Autumn attendance: 224

Nashville

Vanderbilt University, The School of Law
Fees: Annual, $113; Matriculation, $10; Degree, $5
Autumn attendance: 83

1 Except for a limited number of students with special qualifications, three college years are required for admission. After 1930–31, three college years will be required of all candidates for the degree.

2 Separate divisions meet respectively in the morning and in the early afternoon.
PART-TIME AND "MIXED" LAW SCHOOLS, 1930-31

**Oklahoma**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Fees: Annual,</th>
<th>Matriculation,</th>
<th>Degree,</th>
<th>Autumn attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tulsa</td>
<td>Tulsa Law School</td>
<td>$160</td>
<td>$5</td>
<td>$10</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Oregon**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Fees: Annual,</th>
<th>Degree,</th>
<th>Autumn attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portland</td>
<td>Northwestern College of Law</td>
<td>$102.50</td>
<td>$10</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salem</td>
<td>Willamette University, College of Law</td>
<td>$150</td>
<td>$5</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Pennsylvania**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Fees: Annual,</th>
<th>Matriculation,</th>
<th>Degree,</th>
<th>Autumn attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>Philadelphia College of Law</td>
<td>$180</td>
<td>$3</td>
<td>$15</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temple</td>
<td>Temple University, School of Law</td>
<td>$215</td>
<td>$5</td>
<td>$10</td>
<td>Afternoon, 139; Evening, 415; Total, 554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pittsburgh</td>
<td>Duquesne University, The School of Law</td>
<td>$225</td>
<td>$13</td>
<td></td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Rhode Island**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Fees: Annual,</th>
<th>Matriculation,</th>
<th>Degree,</th>
<th>Autumn attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Providence</td>
<td>Northeastern University, School of Law, Providence Y. M. C. A. Division</td>
<td>$150</td>
<td>$5</td>
<td>$10</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Tennessee**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Fees: Annual,</th>
<th>Degree,</th>
<th>Autumn attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chattanooga</td>
<td>Chattanooga College of Law</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$5</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knoxville</td>
<td>John Randolph Neal College of Law</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td></td>
<td>Autumn attendance not reported since 1925 (32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memphis</td>
<td>University of Memphis, Law School</td>
<td>$150</td>
<td>$6</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nashville</td>
<td>Y. M. C. A. Law School of Nashville</td>
<td>$50</td>
<td>$5</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 In the case of applicants intending to practise in New Jersey, the equivalent of two college years is required for admission.
2 Beginning 1930, no first-year students admitted.
3 Since February, 1926, no communication of any sort has been received from this school.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>University/Institution</th>
<th>Fee Details</th>
<th>Autumn Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salt Lake City</td>
<td>University of Utah, School of Law</td>
<td><strong>Fees</strong>: Annual, $141.50 for residents, $157.50 for non-residents; Degree, $10</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Autumn attendance</strong>: 74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charlottesville</td>
<td>The University of Virginia, Department of Law</td>
<td><strong>Fees</strong>: Annual, $235 for residents, $290 for non-residents</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Autumn attendance</strong>: 291</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lexington</td>
<td>Washington and Lee University, School of Law</td>
<td><strong>Fees</strong>: Annual, $250</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Autumn attendance</strong>: 98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williamsburg</td>
<td>The College of William and Mary in Virginia, The School of Jurisprudence</td>
<td><strong>Fees</strong>: Annual, $142.50 for residents, $245.50 for non-residents; Degree, $7.50</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Autumn attendance</strong>: 62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seattle</td>
<td>University of Washington, School of Law</td>
<td><strong>Fees</strong>: Annual, $75 for residents, $180 for non-residents; Degree, $5</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Autumn attendance</strong>: 279</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morgantown</td>
<td>West Virginia University, The College of Law</td>
<td><strong>Fees</strong>: Annual, $115 for residents, $300 for non-residents; Degree, $10</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Autumn attendance</strong>: 152</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madison</td>
<td>University of Wisconsin, Law School</td>
<td><strong>Fees</strong>: Annual, $45 for residents, $245 for non-residents</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Autumn attendance</strong>: 508</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
<td>Marquette University, Law School</td>
<td><strong>Fees</strong>: Annual, $225; Matriculation, $10; Degree, $12.50</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laramie</td>
<td>University of Wyoming, The Law School</td>
<td><strong>Fees</strong>: Annual, $52.50 for residents, $67.50 for non-residents; Matriculation, $2; Degree, $5</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 College work beyond the second year may be taken concurrently with law work.
2 Beginning September, 1931, three years of college will be required.
3 Ten additional weeks of law school or six months of office study are also required.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Fees</th>
<th>Autumn Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dallas</td>
<td>The Jefferson School of Law</td>
<td>Annual, $125; Degree, $10</td>
<td>not reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Autumn attendance not reported since 1929</em> (122)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>The Houston Law School</td>
<td>Monthly, $7.50; Degree, $5</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas College of Law</td>
<td></td>
<td>Monthly, $7.50</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Texas School of Law (Y. M. C. A.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Annual, $85; Matriculation, $5</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Antonio</td>
<td>The San Antonio School of Law</td>
<td>Monthly, $10</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norfolk</td>
<td>Norfolk College, Law School</td>
<td>Annual, $100</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richmond</td>
<td>University of Richmond, The T. C. Williams School of Law</td>
<td>Annual, $200; Degree, $5</td>
<td>Morning, 41; Evening, 35; Total, 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>University of Richmond, The T. C. Williams School of Law</td>
<td>Annual, $200; Degree, $5</td>
<td>Morning, 41; Evening, 35; Total, 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spokane</td>
<td>Gonzaga University, School of Law</td>
<td>Annual, $161; Matriculation, $5; Degree, $10</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Texas**

**Virginia**

**Washington**
## FULL-TIME LAW SCHOOLS, 1930–31

### CANADA

#### ALBERTA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Fees: Annual</th>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Autumn attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edmonton</td>
<td>University of Alberta, Faculty of Law</td>
<td>$135</td>
<td>$10</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### MANITOBA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Fees: Annual</th>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Autumn attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Winnipeg</td>
<td>University of Manitoba and Law Society of Manitoba, The Manitoba Law School</td>
<td>$108, or for students proceeding to the LL.B., $118, or for extra-mural students, $20; Matriculation for the LL.B., $2; Degree, $10</td>
<td>77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### NOVA SCOTIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Fees: Annual</th>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Autumn attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Halifax</td>
<td>Dalhousie University, Faculty of Law</td>
<td>$215</td>
<td>$10</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### QUEBEC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Fees: Annual</th>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Autumn attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>McGill University, Faculty of Law</td>
<td>$222 for men, $215 for women</td>
<td>97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### SASKATCHEWAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Fees: Annual</th>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Autumn attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saskatoon</td>
<td>University of Saskatchewan, College of Law</td>
<td>$76</td>
<td>$5</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1 During the first two years of a four-year course leading to the degree of LL.B., students devote their entire time to the work of the law school; during the last two years, they serve a concurrent clerkship in a law office.
PART-TIME AND "MIXED" LAW SCHOOLS, 1930-31

CANADA

BRITISH COLUMBIA

Vancouver

Law Society of British Columbia, Vancouver Law School

Fees: Annual, $15
Autumn attendance: 35

NEW BRUNSWICK

St. John

University of New Brunswick, Faculty of Law

Fees: Annual, $122; Degree, $14.50
Autumn attendance: 12

ONTARIO

Toronto

Law Society of Upper Canada, The Osgoode Hall Law School

Fees: Annual, $120
Autumn attendance: 249

QUEBEC

Montreal

Université de Montréal, Faculté de Droit

Fees: Annual, $160; Degree, $15
Autumn attendance: 213

Quebec

Université Laval, Faculté de Droit

Fees: Annual, $130 for college graduates, $155 for others; Degree, $15
Autumn attendance: 77
TABLE 1. UNITED STATES DEGREE-CONGRERING LAW SCHOOLS SINCE 1890, GROUPED ACCORDING TO THE AMOUNT OF TIME REQUIRED AFTER THE HIGH SCHOOL TO COMPLETE THE COURSE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full-time schools requiring</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than five academic years</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five academic years</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three or four academic years</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Part-time schools requiring a law course of three or more academic years</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed full-time and part-time schools</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools requiring a law course of less than three academic years</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage of Total Number of Law Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of School</th>
<th>1889-1890</th>
<th>1900-1905</th>
<th>1910-1915</th>
<th>1920-1925</th>
<th>1925-1930</th>
<th>1925-1930</th>
<th>1930-1931</th>
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<tr>
<td>Full-time schools requiring</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than five academic years</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 0 4.0 6.8 7.3 7.3 7.2 7.1 6.8 7.1 8.0 8.0 8.7 10.0 11.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five academic years</td>
<td>0 0 2.4 12.3 13.3 14.0 17.6 21.3 21.6 31.5 31.6 31.8 34.7 32.8 32.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three or four academic years</td>
<td>9.8 23.5 28.2 28.2 22.0 23.3 19.6 16.8 16.7 6.0 4.0 3.4 1.2 1.1 1.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-time schools requiring a law course of three or more academic years</td>
<td>1.6 18.6 25.8 39.0 42.0 41.3 39.2 39.5 39.9 39.1 39.8 39.3 38.8 37.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed full-time and part-time schools</td>
<td>0 2.0 7.3 12.3 13.3 14.0 17.6 21.3 21.6 31.5 31.6 31.8 34.7 32.8 32.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools requiring a law course of less than three academic years</td>
<td>88.5 53.9 32.3 13.0 10.0 6.0 5.9 5.2 6.2 5.4 5.7 5.7 4.0 4.4 4.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2. UNITED STATES LAW SCHOOL ATTENDANCE SINCE 1890, CLASSIFIED BY TYPE OF SCHOOL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full-time schools requiring</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than five academic years</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>1,741</td>
<td>3,407</td>
<td>4,811</td>
<td>5,068</td>
<td>6,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five academic years</td>
<td>0 0 751 2,326 5,617 8,158 8,034 8,188 9,129 7,686</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three or four academic years</td>
<td>1,192 3,992 5,946 4,799 4,600 1,675 1,385 1,065 349 283</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-time schools requiring a law course of three or more academic years</td>
<td>108 2,275 4,787 9,338 15,208 16,160 15,743 16,767 16,669 15,475</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed full-time and part-time schools</td>
<td>0 704 1,963 3,087 11,058 12,365 14,927 15,284 15,229 12,917</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools requiring a law course of less than three academic years</td>
<td>3,186 4,676 4,310 1,546 849 914 980 758 770 641</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,486 12,408 19,498 24,503 42,743 44,340 47,357 48,593 48,942 43,989</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Percentage of Total Law School Attendance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of School</th>
<th>1889-1890</th>
<th>1900-1905</th>
<th>1910-1915</th>
<th>1920-1925</th>
<th>1925-1930</th>
<th>1925-1930</th>
<th>1930-1931</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full-time schools requiring</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than five academic years</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.1 8.9 13.9 11.3 11.4 13.3 13.4 13.9 13.9 15.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five academic years</td>
<td>0 0 3.9 9.4 13.1 18.4 17.0 16.9 18.7 17.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three or four academic years</td>
<td>26.6 32.2 30.4 19.6 10.8 3.8 2.9 2.2 0.7 0.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-time schools requiring a law course of three or more academic years</td>
<td>2.4 18.3 24.6 38.1 35.6 96.4 33.2 34.5 34.1 35.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed full-time and part-time schools</td>
<td>0 5.7 10.1 12.6 27.3 27.9 31.5 31.4 31.1 29.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools requiring a law course of less than three academic years</td>
<td>71.0 37.7 22.1 6.3 2.0 2.1 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Omitting 1 school. 2 Omitting 2 schools. 3 Omitting 3 schools. 4 Omitting 5 schools. 5 Omitting 6 schools. 6 Omitting 8 schools.
### TABLE 3. CANADIAN LAW SCHOOLS SINCE 1890, GROUPED ACCORDING TO THE AMOUNT OF TIME REQUIRED AFTER THE HIGH SCHOOL TO COMPLETE THE COURSE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than five academic years (I)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five academic years (II)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three or four academic years (III)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-time schools having a law course of three or more academic years (IV)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed full-time and part-time schools (V)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools having a law course of less than three academic years (VI)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3. Canadian Law Schools Since 1890, Grouped According to the Amount of Time Required After the High School to Complete the Course**

### Percentage of Total Number of Law Schools

| Full-time schools requiring | More than five academic years (I) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 |
| Five academic years (II) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9.1 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 40.0 | 40.0 | 40.0 |
| Three or four academic years (III) | 0 | 0 | 7.7 | 15.4 | 25.0 | 36.4 | 30.0 | 20.0 | 20.0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Part-time schools having a law course of three or more academic years (IV) | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 92.3 | 84.6 | 75.0 | 54.5 | 50.0 | 50.0 | 50.0 | 50.0 | 50.0 | 50.0 | 50.0 |
| Mixed full-time and part-time schools (V) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Schools having a law course of less than three academic years (VI) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

### TABLE 4. CANADIAN LAW SCHOOL ATTENDANCE SINCE 1890, CLASSIFIED BY TYPE OF SCHOOL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full-time schools requiring</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than five academic years (I)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five academic years (II)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three or four academic years (III)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-time schools having a law course of three or more academic years (IV)</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>1,255</td>
<td>1,081</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed full-time and part-time schools (V)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools having a law course of less than three academic years (VI)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>1,255</td>
<td>1,081</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>586</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4. Canadian Law School Attendance Since 1890, Classified by Type of School**

### Percentage of Total Law School Attendance

| Full-time schools requiring | More than five academic years (I) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 54 | 64 |
| Five academic years (II) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 77 | 60 | 106 | 169 | 156 | 177 | 196 | 209 | 218 |
| Three or four academic years (III) | 0 | 0 | 50 | 153 | 159 | 258 | 242 | 171 | 98 | 82 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Part-time schools having a law course of three or more academic years (IV) | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 96.2 | 87.6 | 84.3 | 64.9 | 69.1 | 69.6 | 70.5 | 72.3 | 74.6 | 72.9 | 70.4 | 66.5 |
| Mixed full-time and part-time schools (V) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Schools having a law course of less than three academic years (VI) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | % | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

### Figures for the largest school are for 1891-92.
APPENDIX
APPENDIX

A. REFERENCES TO BAR ADMISSION STATUTES

The bar admission legislation summarized on pages 8 to 20 is in most states not voluminous, and can readily be traced by consulting the index to the latest Compiled Statutes or Code, and subsequent Session Laws (caption “Attorney”). The following notes refer to the few jurisdictions where special difficulties arise.

ALABAMA: Sections 3318 and 6220 to 6239 of Michie’s Alabama Code of 1928 appear in State Bar Acts, Annotated, published by the Conference of Bar Association Delegates of the American Bar Association, February 2, 1931. See also Code sections 6240 to 6249, 6259.


IDAHO: In addition to the State Bar Act (Laws of 1923, ch. 211; amended by Laws of 1925, ch. 90, Laws of 1929, ch. 98), quoted in State Bar Acts, Annotated, see Laws of 1925, ch. 90, amending section 9 of State Bar Act and adding new section 9A; and see Compiled Statutes, 1919, section 6565, amended by Laws of 1929, ch. 63; sections 6568, 6570; section 6571, amended by Laws of 1929, ch. 63.

INDIANA: See Burns’ Annotated Statutes, 1926, section 188 (Constitution, Article 7, section 21), sections 1029 to 1036.

KENTUCKY: See Constitution, section 228, and Carroll’s Kentucky Statutes, Annotated, 1930, sections 98-6, 98-8, 98a1 to 98a11, 101.

LOUISIANA: See Marr’s Annotated Revision of the Statutes of Louisiana, 1915, sections 179, 180 Third, 180 Fourth, 183, 186; Annotated Supplement, 1924, page 55, Act 163 of 1920: page 58, Act 113 of 1924: page 58, Act 114 of 1920. The following sections of Marr’s Revision of 1915 seem to be repealed or superseded: sections 180 Second, by section 189 of the same volume and by Act 113 of 1924; sections 180 First, 181, 182, and 200, by Act 113 of 1924; sections 184 and 185, by Act 163 of 1920, section 3.

NEVADA: In addition to the State Bar Act (Hillyer’s Nevada Compiled Laws, 1929, sections 540 to 590), summarized in State Bar Acts, Annotated, see Compiled Laws,

¹ This section of the Appendix was not submitted in confidential proof to bar admission and law school officials.
sections 591 to 600, 617, 619 to 623. The State Bar Act probably supersedes sections 592, 593, and 597.

New Mexico: In addition to the State Bar Act (Courtright's New Mexico Statutes, Annotated, 1929, sections 9–201 to 9–212) quoted in State Bar Acts, Annotated, see Statutes, sections 9–101 to 9–126. The State Bar Act probably supersedes sections 9–101 to 9–120.

New York: See Cahill’s Consolidated Laws, 1930, Chapter 18, Executive Law, section 30; Chapter 31, Judiciary Law, sections 53–1, 53–2, 53–3, 53–4, 53–5, 56, 82, 88–1, 264–6, 460 to 470; Chapter 41, Penal Law, sections 270, 271, 271a, 272, 277, 280, 1876; Chapter 51, Real Property Law, section 442–f; Chapter 60, Stock Corporation Law, section 7; Chapter 66, Workmen’s Compensation Law, section 24–a. See also Laws of 1918, ch. 263; Laws of 1920, ch. 159; Laws of 1921, ch. 458; Laws of 1930, ch. 169.


North Dakota: In addition to the State Bar Board Act (Compiled Laws, 1913, Supplement, 1925, sections 782 to 784, 787, 808 to 812) and the Bar Association Act (Supplement, 1925, Sections 813a1 to 813a5), both of which are quoted in State Bar Acts, Annotated, see Compiled Laws, 1913, sections 785, 786, 788 to 793.

Oklahoma: In addition to the State Bar Act (Laws of 1929, ch. 264), summarized in State Bar Acts, Annotated, see Bunn’s Compiled Statutes, 1922, sections 1076, 4093, 4095.

South Carolina: See Constitution, Article III, section 26; Code of Civil Procedure, 1922, sections 268 to 278, 282; Laws of 1925, No. 41.

Tennessee: See Shannon's Compilation of the Tennessee Statutes, 1917, 1918, sections 5772, 5772a1, 5776, 5777a1 to 5777a6; Laws of 1919, ch. 154. Part of the legislation of 1919, amending sections 5777a3 and 5777a4, is of doubtful constitutionality; the text of these sections, quoted in the official pamphlet published by the State Board of Law Examiners, differs from the version which appears in the Session Laws and in Shannon’s Supplement of 1926; whichever of the two versions is correct, the Supreme Court, in 1919, actually adopted a rule prescribing preliminary general education and a period of law study.
B. STANDARDS OF ASSOCIATIONS IN FORCE JANUARY 1, 1981

RESOLUTIONS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION WITH RULINGS THEREON
BY THE COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR

The American Bar Association is of the opinion that every candidate for admission to the bar should give evidence of graduation from a law school complying with the following standards:

(a) It shall require as a condition of admission at least two years of study in a college.

An approved school shall require of all candidates for any degree at the time of the commencement of their law study the completion of one-half of the work acceptable for a Bachelor's degree granted on the basis of a four-year period of study either by the state university or a principal college or university in the state where the law school is located.

Each school shall have in its records, within twenty days after the registration of a student, credentials showing that such student has completed the required pre-legal work.

Students who do not have the required preliminary education shall be classed as special students, and shall be admitted to approved schools only in exceptional cases.

The number of special students admitted in any year shall not exceed ten per cent of the average number of beginning law students admitted during each of the two preceding years.

No student shall be admitted as a special student except where special circumstances, such as the maturity and the apparent ability of the student seem to justify a deviation from the rule requiring at least two years of college work. Each school shall report to the Council the number of special students admitted each year, with a statement showing that the faculty of the school has given special consideration to each case and has determined that the special circumstances were sufficient to justify a departure from the regular entrance requirements.

The following classes of students are to be considered as special students unless the law school in which they are registered has on file credentials showing that they have completed the required pre-legal work:

(a) Those transferring from another law school either with or without advanced standing in law;
(b) Those doing graduate work in law after graduation from an unapproved school;
(c) Those taking a limited number of subjects either when registered in another department of the University or when on a purely limited time basis.

(b) It shall require its students to pursue a course of three years duration if they devote substantially all of their working time to their studies, and a longer course, equivalent in the number of working hours, if they devote only part of their working time to their studies.

A law school which maintains a course for full-time students and a course for part-time students must comply with all the requirements as to both courses.

The curriculum and schedule of work of a full-time course shall be so arranged that substantially the full working time of students is required for a period of three years of at least thirty weeks each.

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1 Resolutions of the American Bar Association are in italics, rulings by the Council in roman.
2 "Resolution (1)," adopted in Cincinnati, September 1, 1921.
A part-time course shall cover a period of at least four years of at least thirty-six weeks each and shall be the equivalent of a full-time course.

Adequate records shall be kept of all matters dealing with the relation of each student to the school.

The conferring of its degree shall be conditioned upon the attainment of a grade of scholarship ascertained by written examinations in all courses reasonably conformable thereto.

A school shall not, as a part of its regular course, conduct instruction in law designed to coach students for bar examinations.

(c) It shall provide an adequate library available for the use of the students.

An adequate library shall consist of not less than seventy-five hundred well selected, usable volumes, not counting obsolete material or broken sets of reports, kept up to date and owned or controlled by the law school or the university with which it is connected.

A school shall be adequately supported and housed so as to make possible efficient work on the part of both students and faculty.

(d) It shall have among its teachers a sufficient number giving their entire time to the school to ensure actual personal acquaintance and influence with the whole student body.

The number of full-time instructors shall not be less than one for each one hundred students or major fraction thereof, and in no case shall the number of such full-time instructors be less than three.

The American Bar Association is of the opinion that graduation from a law school should not confer the right of admission to the bar, and that every candidate should be subjected to an examination by public authority to determine his fitness.¹

The Council on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar is directed to publish from time to time the names of those law schools which comply with the above standards and of those which do not and to make such publications available so far as possible to intending law students.²

Schools shall be designated "Approved" or "Unapproved."

A list of approved schools shall be issued from time to time showing the schools that have fully complied with the American Bar Association standards.

No school shall be placed upon the approved list without an inspection prior to such approval made under the direction of the Council.

All schools, in order to be upon the approved list, are required to permit full inspection as to all matters when so requested by any representative acting for the Council, and also to make such reports or answers to questionnaires as may be required.

The president of the Association and the Council on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar are directed to cooperate with the state and local bar associations to urge upon the duly constituted authorities of the several states the adoption of the above requirements for admission to the bar.³

In compliance with the policy announced by The American Bar Association in 1921, we recommend the establishment in each state, where none now exist, of opportunities for a collegiate training, free or at moderate cost, so that all deserving young men and

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¹ "Resolution (2)," adopted in Cincinnati, September 1, 1921.
² "Resolution (3)," adopted in Cincinnati, September 1, 1921.
³ "Resolution (4)," adopted in Cincinnati, September 1, 1921.
women seeking admission to the Bar, may obtain an adequate preliminary education; and, that the several states be urged through the Council of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, to provide at stated times and places, for pre-legal examinations to be held by the university of the state or by the Board of Law Examiners thereof, for those applicants for admission to the Bar, obliged to make up their preliminary qualifications outside of accredited institutions of learning.¹

Law schools shall not be operated as commercial enterprises, and the compensation of any officer or member of its teaching staff shall not depend on the number of students or on the fees received.²

It is the sense of this Association, and it so places itself on record, that a compulsory course in and the teaching of professional ethics be a part of the curriculum of all law schools.³

SIXTH AND SEVENTH ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS

Sixth. Law schools may be elected to membership at any meeting by a vote of the Association, but no law school shall be so elected unless for at least two years immediately preceding its application it has complied with the following requirements:

1. It shall be a school not operated as a commercial enterprise, and the compensation of any officer or member of its teaching staff shall not depend on the number of students, nor on the fees received.

2. It shall require of all candidates for any degree at the time of the commencement of their law study the completion of one-half of the work acceptable for a Bachelor's degree granted on the basis of a four-year period of study by the state university or the principal colleges or universities in the state where the law school is located.

3. A school whose curriculum and schedule of work are so arranged that, in the opinion of the Executive Committee, substantially the full working time of its students is required for the work of the school, shall be considered a full-time school. A full-time school shall require of its candidates for the first degree in law resident study of law during a period of at least ninety weeks and the successful completion of at least ten hundred and eighty hours of classroom instruction in law.

A school whose curriculum and schedule of work are so arranged that, in the opinion of the Executive Committee, substantially the full working time of its students is not required for the work of the school, shall be considered a part-time school. A part-time school must maintain a curriculum which, in the opinion of the Executive Committee, is the equivalent of that of a full-time school. The action of the Executive Committee under this paragraph shall in each instance be reported to the Association at its next annual meeting and shall stand as the action of the Association until set aside by a vote of a majority of all the members of the Association.

Any school now or hereafter a member of the Association, that conducts both

¹ Resolutions adopted in Buffalo, September 2, 1927. This weakening of Standard (a), above, was foreshadowed by "Resolutions 5-8," adopted by a Special Conference on Legal Education, held in Washington, D. C., February 23 and 24, 1923.

² Resolution adopted in Memphis, October 24, 1929. The language follows "Resolution 8," adopted by the Washington Conference on Legal Education, February 24, 1922. This recommendation has been inserted by the Council on Legal Education, as "Standard (e)," in its official publications.

³ Resolution adopted in Memphis, October 25, 1929. The Council has not been directed to take any steps in furtherance of this recommendation.
full- and part-time curricula, must comply as regards each with the requirements therefor as set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

No school shall be or remain eligible to membership if the institution of which it is a part shall through any other agency conduct instruction in law designed to prepare students for admission to the Bar or for Bar examinations, save in conformity with the provisions of the preceding paragraphs.

4. The conferring of its degree shall be conditioned upon the attainment of a grade of scholarship ascertained by examination.

5. Students with less than the academic credit required of candidates for the law degree by Section 2 of this article, may be admitted as “specials” provided
   a. They are at least twenty-three years of age, and
   b. There is some good reason for thinking that their experience and training have specially equipped them to engage successfully in the study of law, despite the lack of the required college credits, and
   c. The number of such “specials” admitted each year shall not exceed ten per cent of the average number of students admitted by the school as beginning regular law students during the two preceding years.

6. Commencing September 1, 1932, it shall own a law library of not less than ten thousand volumes, which shall be so housed and administered as to be readily available for use by students and faculty.

   Commencing September 1, 1932, for additions to the library in the way of continuations and otherwise there shall be spent over any period of five years at least ten thousand dollars, of which at least fifteen hundred dollars shall be expended each year.

7. Commencing September 1, 1932, its faculty shall consist of at least four instructors who devote substantially all of their time to the work of the school; and in no case shall the number of such full-time instructors be fewer than one for each one hundred students or major fraction thereof.

8. Each member shall maintain a complete individual record of each student, which shall make readily accessible the following data: Credentials for admission; the action of the administrative officer passing thereon; date of admission; date of graduation or final dismissal from school; date of beginning and ending of each period of attendance, if the student has not been in continuous residence throughout the whole period of study; courses which he has taken, the grades therein, if any, and the credit value thereof, and courses for which he is registered; and a record of all special action of the faculty or administrative officers.

9. It shall be a school which possesses reasonably adequate facilities and which is conducted in accordance with those standards and practices generally recognized by member schools as essential to the maintenance of a sound educational policy.

Seventh. Any school which shall fail to maintain the requirements provided for in Article Sixth, or such standard as may hereafter be adopted by resolution of the Association, shall be excluded from the Association by a vote at the general meeting, but may be reinstated at a subsequent meeting on proof that it is then bona fide fulfilling such requirement.

Any member school which shall fail to be represented by some member of its faculty at the annual meeting at least once in any three year period shall be deemed to have discontinued its membership.
C. PUBLICATIONS OF THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION DEALING WITH LEGAL EDUCATION AND COGNATE MATTERS

BULLETINS


ANNUAL REVIEWS AND REPORTS


The Study of Legal Education, 5 pages, 1913. (Out of print.)

Eighth Annual Report, 1913, pp. 27–31. (Same as preceding.)


The Study of Legal Education, 10 pages, 1915. (Out of print.)

Tenth Annual Report, 1915, pp. 21–30. (Revision of preceding.)


Eleventh Annual Report, 1916, pp. 123–127. (Same as preceding.)

The Study of Legal Education, 4 pages, 1917.

Twelfth Annual Report, 1917, pp. 119–123. (Same as preceding.)

Legal Education during the War, 13 pages, 1918. (Out of print.)


The Study of Legal Education, 3 pages, 1919. (Out of print.)


The Study of Legal Education, 8 pages, 1920. (Out of print.)


The Study of Legal Education, Recommendations of the American Bar Association, List of Law Schools, 28 pages, 1921. (Out of print.)

Sixteenth Annual Report, 1921, pp. 86–111. (Revision of preceding.)


Seventeenth Annual Report, 1922, pp. 59–90. (Same as preceding.)

Legal Education, Comparative Professional Statistics, Current Bar Admission Requirements, List of Law Schools, Restatement of American Law, 23 pages, 1923. (Out of print.)

Eighteenth Annual Report, 1923, pp. 49–63. (Same as preceding.)

Nineteenth Annual Report, 1924, pp. 57–79. (Same as preceding.)

Some Contrasts between American and Canadian Legal Education, Bar Admission Requirements, Standardizing Agencies, Statistics and List of Law Schools, The American Law Institute, 33 pages, 1925. (Out of print.)

Twentieth Annual Report, 1925, pp. 37–67. (Revision of preceding.)


Review of Legal Education in the United States and Canada for the years 1926 and 1927, 48 pages, 1928. (Includes, in addition to the two preceding, “Standards recommended by Associations,” “Bar Admissions,” and “Law Schools.”)


Twenty-third Annual Report, 1928, pp. 58–64, “Legal Education.” (Same as first part of preceding.)

Review of Legal Education in the United States and Canada for the year 1929, 72 pages, 1930. (The Missing Element in Legal Education, Practical Training and Ethical Standards.) (Out of print.)

The Missing Element in Legal Education, Practical Training and Ethical Standards, 32 pages. (Reprinted from the preceding.)


Review of Legal Education in the United States and Canada for the year 1930, 67 pages, 1931. (Bar Admission Statutes, Progressive Differentiation of Law Schools.)

Copies of all publications of the Foundation, not out of print, may be had without charge upon application to its office, 522 Fifth Avenue, New York City, by mail or in person.
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