A Tale of Two Countries: Does Canada’s Legalization of Cannabis Give It the First Mover Advantage in Franchising?

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I. Introduction

Since Canada’s legalization of recreational marijuana in 2018, the cannabis industry has witnessed a significant number of U.S. cannabis brands moving north to Canada to capitalize on the freedom and growth potential afforded in a legalized marijuana market. Given the regulatory challenges facing the recreational marijuana market in the United States, this is no wonder. While a number of U.S. brands have experienced considerable financial returns within the U.S. state markets that have legalized recreational marijuana, the restrictions inherent in a country where marijuana is still illegal under federal law, but legal to varying degrees (if at all) within certain states, has placed constraints on the ability of brands to utilize tools to increase their market presence and profitability. One such restriction is the inability of U.S. cannabis brands to effectively utilize franchising to expand across state lines.

The cannabis industry nevertheless appears ripe for the utilization of franchising as an expansion model, and at least one U.S. cannabis company

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1. This Article does not discuss or address industrial hemp or cannabidiol (CBD) derived from industrial hemp. It uses the terms “cannabis” and “marijuana” interchangeably, but, when using either, is referencing cannabis with a tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) content of greater than 0.3% on a dry weight basis. Additionally, this Article focuses on the retail distribution of recreational marijuana and does not discuss or address issues pertaining to medical marijuana.

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has deployed a limited cannabis brand franchise, seemingly successfully. But without a doubt, the federally illegal nature of marijuana in the United States has created significant barriers and risks to those wishing to franchise their cannabis brands. These barriers have understandably led many to question whether brand growth prospects are more promising in Canada, a country without similar tensions and constraints.

All the while, many are currently speculating that U.S. federal legalization of marijuana is not far off. For this reason, industry players question whether the United States’ future marijuana market will be eclipsed by Canada’s marijuana market, which currently appears to possess a significant first mover advantage. Such concerns are well-founded given the current trend of Canadian investment in U.S. cannabis companies; however, Canada itself is facing significant challenges in implementing its recreational marijuana regime that may complicate or frustrate brand expansion in Canada. Thus, while Canada’s marijuana market may appear to have an overwhelming leg up on the United States, this article questions whether Canada’s perceived first mover advantage is secure enough to withstand the test of time and the anticipated turn toward federal legalization in the United States.

Parts II and III of this article detail the legal landscape underlying recreational marijuana in both the United States and Canada, as well as the current state of the recreational marijuana industry in both countries. Part IV discusses the benefits of brand franchising, while Part V explores the legal and economic challenges currently facing U.S. cannabis brands that wish to franchise in the United States. Part VI then discusses how federal legalization in Canada has unlocked opportunities for U.S. and Canadian brands in Canada. Finally, Part VII explores whether Canada’s head start in the legalized recreational marijuana market will be enough for it to maintain a market advantage over the United States if the U.S. federal government eventually legalizes recreational marijuana.


5. When speaking of a “market advantage,” this Article is referring to a competitive advantage gained through access to superior products, lower prices, and large-scale distribution.
II. Overview of Cannabis Laws in the United States

A. Federal Law

The United States federal government prohibits the manufacturing, distribution, and possession of a variety of illicit substances intended for recreational use. It exercises control over such substances through a practice known as “supply reduction,” which seeks to make drugs “more difficult, expensive, and risky to obtain” through domestic drug enforcement actions. State and federal law enforcement agencies cooperate in drug enforcement to “dismantle and disrupt criminal organizations involved in domestic drug production and distribution.” The Attorney General of the United States is primarily responsible for controlling the use of illicit substances at the federal level.

The federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) is the cornerstone piece of legislation passed by Congress to define, regulate, and classify illegal substances and their manufacture, distribution, and possession. The CSA also provides the statutory framework through which the federal government regulates the “lawful production, possession, and distribution of controlled substances.” Under the CSA, substances are classified into one of five schedules. Schedules are determined according to “(1) how dangerous [the substances] are considered to be, (2) their potential for abuse and addiction, and (3) whether they have legitimate medical use.” Schedule I substances are considered the most dangerous and addictive, and thus are the most regulated and restricted. For example, marijuana and heroin are categorized as Schedule I substances, whereas cocaine and methamphetamine are categorized as Schedule II substances.

While federal agencies, namely the Drug Enforcement Administration under the supervision of the U.S. Attorney General, enforce the provisions of the CSA, all states have their own statutory framework through which they also enforce their own drug laws. In fact, the majority of drug crimes are dealt with at the state level. But, while states primarily enforce drug law

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7. Id. at 1; David Boyum & Peter Reuter, An Analytic Assessment of U.S. Drug Policy 77, 94–95 (2005).
8. Sacco, supra note 6, at 1.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 6.
11. Id. Substances are evaluated on (1) actual or relative potential for abuse; (2) scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known; (3) current scientific knowledge of the substance; (4) history and current pattern of abuse; (5) scope, duration, and significance of abuse; (6) risk to public health; (7) psychic or physiological dependence liability; and (8) whether the substance is an immediate precursor of an already-scheduled substance. See 21 U.S.C. § 811.
12. Sacco, supra note 6, at 6.
14. Sacco, supra note 6, at 16.
violations, “the CSA places drug control under federal jurisdiction regardless of state laws.” In other words, federal agencies may enforce the CSA in all states and territories irrespective of state laws criminalizing or legalizing drug possession, use, and distribution. What’s more, federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies often coordinate their drug-related law enforcement efforts.

Because the CSA classifies marijuana as a Schedule I substance, federal law prohibits manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, or possessing marijuana.

B. State Laws

Despite the federal prohibition of marijuana, starting as early as the 1970s, municipalities and states began enacting a range of laws and policies deviating from strict federal prohibition. In 1973, Oregon became the first state to pass cannabis decriminalization legislation, and in 1996, California became the first state to legalize the use and possession of marijuana for medical purposes.

In response to an increase in states enacting laws legalizing medical marijuana, then acting U.S. Deputy Attorney General David Ogden issued a memorandum to federal prosecutors (the Ogden Memo) instructing them to avoid prosecuting users of medical marijuana, such as those with cancer or other serious illnesses, whose actions “are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing for the medical use of marijuana,” and to instead focus prosecution efforts on “commercial enterprises that unlawfully market and sell marijuana.” Despite this guidance, uncertainty remained high among federal prosecutors in jurisdictions where medical marijuana had been legalized, and many sought further clarification from the federal government. In 2011, in response, then acting U.S. Deputy Attorney General James Cole issued a memorandum for federal prosecutors reiterating many of the points made in the Ogden Memo and emphasizing that the Ogden Memo did not foreclose prosecution of those engaged in large-scale commercial marijuana cultivation, even when operated in compliance with state law.
Thereafter, pro-legalization sentiments continued to grow and were brought to national attention when, on November 6, 2012, citizens of Colorado and Washington passed ballot initiatives legalizing the recreational use, possession, and distribution of marijuana.\(^{23}\) Retail sales of marijuana began on January 1, 2014 in Colorado and on July 8, 2014 in Washington.\(^{24}\)

Following this move toward legalization, on August 29, 2013, Deputy Attorney General James Cole released his second memorandum, colloquially referred to as the “Cole Memo.” The Cole Memo provided “guidance to federal prosecutors concerning marijuana enforcement under the [CSA]” in states that had legalized marijuana for recreational purposes.\(^{25}\) The Cole Memo stated that the DOJ would not intervene with or challenge state laws legalizing marijuana so long as states implemented and maintained strict systems of regulation addressing threats to public safety, public health, and other law enforcement interests potentially posed by legalization.\(^{26}\) It also provided guidance to federal prosecutors in the form of eight “enforcement priorities”\(^{27}\) as to when prosecutorial discretion should be exercised and when prosecution may be warranted.\(^{28}\)

Following the federal government’s release of the Cole Memo, on November 4, 2014, Alaska, Oregon, and the District of Columbia legalized recreational marijuana.\(^{29}\) Since 2014, seven additional states—Maine,
Nevada, Vermont, California, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Illinois—have legalized marijuana for recreational purposes. But following President Trump’s election to office, Attorney General Jeff Sessions rescinded the Cole Memo in what is known as the “Sessions Memo,” declaring marijuana activity to be a “serious crime.” In doing so, the Sessions Memo did not go so far as to order federal prosecutors to take any specific action relating to prosecuting marijuana possession or use. Instead, it simply instructed federal prosecutors to “weigh all relevant considerations” when deciding which cases to prosecute, leaving industry players to closely watch any and all public statements and sentiments coming from federal prosecutors’ offices throughout the country to understand their varying enforcement philosophies and priorities.

Regardless of the uncertainty surrounding federal marijuana policy, recreational marijuana markets in states that have legalized marijuana continue to grow, with recreational market sales achieving considerable success. In 2018, recreational sales of cannabis products in the United States were projected to reach between $8 and $10 billion, and this number is projected to increase to around $20 billion by 2022. While U.S. market sales are sizeable, certain U.S. brands have opted to target the Canadian marketplace in hopes of capitalizing on Canada’s fully legalized system, spurring a flurry of recent Canadian investment in, and acquisition of, U.S. cannabis brands. But is Canada’s legalized marijuana regime able to sustain the flow of U.S. cannabis brands moving north, and will brands ultimately experience the success in Canada that they now anticipate? To answer these questions, one must first understand how the cannabis industry is regulated in Canada.

### III. Overview of Cannabis Laws in Canada

To understand how recreational cannabis is regulated in Canada, it is first necessary to be aware of the constitutional model of governance in the country. Under Canada’s Constitution Act, 1867 (the Constitution), the legislative powers and responsibilities are divided among three types of government: federal, provincial/territorial, and Indigenous self-governments. The Constitution outlines the specific powers assigned to the federal and provincial governments in particular. Section 91 of the Constitution outlines the sub-

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32. Id.
35. Constitution Act, 1867 (Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982), c 11 (U.K.).
ject matters for which the federal government can enact laws, namely, those matters not assigned exclusively to the provinces, which are outlined in Section 92.36 Matters regulated exclusively by the federal parliament include trade and commerce, criminal law, currency, and banking. Matters regulated exclusively by provincial legislatures include the municipal institutions, lands belonging to the province, property and civil rights in the province, administration of justice, and “all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the Province.”37 These broad provincial areas of jurisdiction give provinces “the power to enact laws regulating and controlling the development and use of land; regulating business activities through licensing; and promoting and protecting public health, safety and welfare.”38

Despite this division of powers, the broad nature of the areas of jurisdiction can lead to situations wherein the laws required to regulate a particular activity do not fall squarely into one category of government. Regulating the production, distribution, use, and sale of recreational cannabis is such an activity. The regulation of recreational cannabis does not fit neatly under federal or provincial jurisdiction, as cannabis touches on numerous enumerated categories of governance. While the federal government is responsible for enacting criminal laws with respect to cannabis, provincial and territorial governments have the power to regulate the production, retail sale, and consumption of cannabis based on the comprehensive head of power of “property and civil rights” granted to provincial governments by Section 92.39 Therefore, the criminal laws related to cannabis, as enacted by the federal government, apply to all Canadians, while the ways Canadians can purchase and use cannabis will vary, depending on the province in which they live.

A. Federal

On October 17, 2018, Canada became the second country in the world to legalize recreational cannabis.40 In anticipation of the legalization date, the federal government of Canada passed the Cannabis Act (the Act) on June 21, 2018.41 The Act is an expansive statute with more than 200 sections and many regulations.42 Its mandate includes the broad goal of protecting public health and safety, as well as more specific purposes, such as protecting young

36. Id. at §§ 91, 92.
37. Id. at § 92.
39. Id.
41. Cannabis Act, S.C. 2018, c 16 (Can.).
42. Health Canada released the federal Cannabis Regulations, SOR/2018-144 (Can.), on July 11, 2018. These Regulations govern matters such as licensing; packaging, labelling and promotion, and taxes.
persons, preventing illicit activities, reducing the burden on the criminal justice system, and ensuring a quality-controlled supply.\textsuperscript{43}

The Act also reflects the constitutional division of powers of Canada by setting a broad federal regime for the licensing of cannabis and the creation of criminal offences, while “carving out areas where provinces and territories can legislate for the distribution and retail sale of cannabis.”\textsuperscript{44} Accordingly, the Act is, in some ways, limited in scope, as it is “simply one part of a larger picture that includes provincial and territorial legislation, municipal bylaws, and measures taken by Indigenous authorities.”\textsuperscript{45} The Act does, however, provide guidance on where to find more specific regulations, such as the Criminal Code for impaired driving provisions and provincial legislation for workplace cannabis issues.\textsuperscript{46}

This integrated regulatory regime borne of the constitutional model of governance in Canada has been met with varying opinions. On the one hand, Marc Gold, a member of the Canadian Senate from the Province of Québec, stated in the Proceedings of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs that this cannabis regime “respects the balance of power between the federal and provincial jurisdictions and that it properly addresses federal concerns about criminality and health. It also recognizes that the provinces, municipalities and communities, with their own particular values, have the right to have their say there, too.”\textsuperscript{47} On the other hand, it has been noted by Bruce A. MacFarlane, Robert J. Frater, and Croft Michaelson, authors of a treatise on cannabis law in Canada, that such a structure, so dependent on the cooperation of “intricate local, provincial and federal cannabis laws,” will inevitably lead to complications related to the constitutionality of federal and provincial laws.\textsuperscript{48}

B. \textit{Provincial and Territorial}

The federal Cannabis Act grants considerable discretion and powers to the provincial and territorial governments with respect to the regulation of cannabis production, distribution, and consumption. Specifically, Section 69 of the Act outlines the following minimum legislative measures that must be enacted by provinces and territories for the distribution and retail sales of cannabis:

- Only cannabis produced by a person authorized under the Act to produce cannabis for commercial purposes may be sold;
- Cannabis may not be sold to young persons;\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{43} Cannabis Act, § 7; MacFarlane, supra note 38, at 1-8.
\textsuperscript{44} MacFarlane, supra note 38, at 6-2.
\textsuperscript{45} Id. at 1-9.
\textsuperscript{46} Id.
\textsuperscript{47} Proceedings of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (42nd Parl., 1st Sess. March 21, 2018). See also MacFarlane, supra note 38, at 6-7.
\textsuperscript{48} MacFarlane, supra note 38, at 6-7 to 6-8.
\textsuperscript{49} “Young person” is defined in Section 2(1) of the Cannabis Act as an individual who is under eighteen years of age for the purposes of Section 69.
• Appropriate records must be kept on activities with cannabis possessed for commercial purposes; and

• Adequate measures must be taken to reduce the risk that cannabis for commercial purposes would be used in an illicit market or activity.50

Each province and territory in Canada has implemented legislation to fulfill these legislative measures in different ways. Some provinces have made amendments to existing gaming and liquor legislation to include the distribution and sale of cannabis.51 Others have created new legislation with considerable influence from liquor control laws.52 Further, provincial and territorial approaches to governing who is permitted to distribute/sell cannabis have ranged from government monopoly to private business owners.53 At present, Québec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and the Northwest Territories distribute cannabis through publicly owned crown corporations (state-owned enterprises),54 while Ontario, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Newfoundland, Yukon, and Nunavut permit retail sales by privately owned and operated brick-and-mortar retailers.55 British Columbia operates on a hybrid model permitting the sale of cannabis through both privately and publicly owned stores.56 In addition, the provincial distributor in every province and territory, except in Saskatchewan and Manitoba, is responsible for online sales of cannabis. In those two provinces, private retailers are permitted to sell cannabis online within the province.57 As such, approaches to retail sales of cannabis vary widely across provinces.

But even given the inconsistent regulations with which they must contend, Canadian cannabis brands are prospering. The three biggest cannabis companies globally—Canopy Growth Corporation, Tilray Inc., and Aurora

50. Cannabis Act § 69.
51. MacFarlane, supra note 38, at 6-2 to 6-3.
52. Id. at 6-4.
53. MacFarlane, supra note 38, at 6-4.
Cannabis Inc. are Canadian. And unlike U.S. brands, which are facing considerable legal obstacles hindering brand growth, Canadian brands have degrees of access to growth vehicles, such as franchising within provinces, that allow for private distribution.

IV. Impact of Brand Franchising

In the United States, franchising has grown in popularity and economic significance since the early 1950s. Today, franchised businesses can be found in many sectors of the economy, ranging from restaurants, gas stations, and auto dealerships, to financial service organizations and even nonprofit organizations. Indeed, with an estimated 801,153 franchised businesses in the United States providing nearly 9 million jobs (or 5.6% of all private sector jobs in the United States), producing close to $900 billion in annual output, and paying more than $350 billion in annual payrolls, franchised businesses directly impact the U.S. economy in ways that are difficult to fully appreciate or comprehend.

Likewise, franchises contribute significantly to the Canadian economy across numerous industries, representing almost 5% of the Canadian economy or $86 billion per year to the Canadian gross domestic product. Robust franchise legislation is in place in six provinces (Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Manitoba), meaning Canada offers unique franchising growth opportunities and is widely viewed as a “stable, predictable and profitable expansion landscape.”

62. The Economic Impact of Franchised Businesses, supra note 61, at 1-6.
64. Franchises Act, R.S.A. 2000, c F-23; Alta. Reg. 240/95 (Can.).
65. Franchises Act, S.B.C. c 35; B.C. Reg. 238/201 (Can.).
66. Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000, S.O. 2000, c 3; O. Reg. 581/00 (Can.).
68. Franchises Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c F-14.1; P.E.I. Reg. EC232/06 (Can.).
69. Franchises Act, C.C.S.M. c F156; Man. Reg. 29/2012 (Can.).
70. Larry Weinberg, A Canadian Perspective on the Independent Contractor-Employer Issue, 34 Franchise L.J. 311, 312 (2015); see also George J. Eydt & Edward (Ned) Levitt, The Devil Is
Because franchising can accelerate the expansion of businesses in numerous industries and markets, it theoretically should be an apt vehicle for widespread growth in the cannabis industry as well. But in the United States, a number of obstacles, rooted in both the differences and complexities of state legalized marijuana regimes, as well as the prohibitions contained in the CSA, stand between cannabis brands’ ability to fully exploit the franchise model.

V. Current Obstacles Impeding Cannabis Brand Franchising in the United States

Federal prohibition of marijuana has led to a patchwork of inconsistent state laws and regulations in states that have legalized recreational marijuana. These state laws have created considerable barriers for those seeking to franchise cannabis brands, particularly across state lines. One of the primary benefits of franchising for franchisors is the franchisor’s ability to enter new markets and reach new customers with less capital and time as compared to company-store growth. But in the current cannabis regulatory climate in the United States, in which each franchised unit must be customized to comply with state, municipal, and county law, many of the advantages of franchising are undermined.

A. Patchwork Nature of State Legalized Marijuana Regimes

States in which recreational marijuana has been legalized continue to implement and develop laws and regulations guiding marijuana growth, processing, and sale. Complying with these laws, which differ considerably across states, presents particular problems for those interested in franchising cannabis businesses in the United States.

For example, state laws differ in terms of what marijuana-related practices a licensed marijuana business may engage in. Colorado and Oregon allow for vertical integration—a producer of marijuana may simultaneously sell its marijuana in its own retail location, so long as the licensee holds a license for both marijuana production and retail.71 The same is true in California.72 But, by contrast, in Washington, a licensed marijuana producer and processor is prohibited from having any financial interest in a licensed marijuana retailer.73 This means that franchised cannabis brands wishing to produce, process, and sell marijuana at retail are unable to expand into Washington’s cannabis market, thus limiting their growth.

Similarly, states differ in terms of who may invest in licensed marijuana businesses. For example, California does not impose a California residency
requirement on investors, Colorado now permit out-of-state investment in licensees, but, in Washington, a prospective licensee must have lived in Washington for at least six months to be eligible for a license—out-of-state ownership of a licensed business of any kind is strictly prohibited. This law means that in Washington, a franchisor's pool of potential franchisees is limited to those who have lived in Washington for the requisite amount of time. Further, franchisors must be careful not to provide, or to be perceived as providing, any monetary investment in Washington franchisees, or else the franchisor could be subject to regulation.

States likewise differ in terms of how much power municipalities are afforded in determining whether to license marijuana businesses within their borders. For example, California, Alaska, Colorado, and Washington all permit local jurisdictions to prohibit licensed marijuana businesses from operating within their territory, but via state-specific mechanisms that do not universally prohibit licensing divisions from issuing licenses to those wishing to operate in jurisdictions that prohibit recreational marijuana. By contrast, Oregon permits cities and counties to adopt ordinances that impose reasonable regulations on the operation of licensed marijuana businesses, but only permits local jurisdictions to prohibit marijuana retail sales if voters vote to ban such sales during a statewide general election. To that end,

74. Omar Sacirbey, It’s Not Easy, but Nonresident Cannabis Entrepreneurs Can Set Up Shop in California, Marijuana Business Daily (Dec. 27, 2017), https://mjbizdaily.com/not-easy-non-resident-cannabis-entrepreneurs-can-set-shop-california/. That being said, while California’s marijuana regime does not mandate state residency, it does require business license applicants to first have a local marijuana business permit before they can apply for a state permit, and many municipalities require marijuana business operators to be residents of California or the municipality where they apply. Id.
80. For example, while local jurisdictions in Washington can ban marijuana businesses by enacting zoning laws that place restrictions on what land may be used for, the State Liquor and Cannabis Board has the final authority over whether to grant or deny a marijuana license in Washington. See Matter of Kittitas Cty. for a Declaratory Order, 438 P.3d 1199, 1203 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019). A recent Washington Court of Appeals decision upheld the Liquor and Cannabis Board’s authority to issue licenses over restrictions contained in local zoning laws, holding that while the Liquor and Cannabis Board may consider zoning restrictions in making licensing decisions, doing so is not required under current law. Id. That being said, a Washington Court of Appeals decision also recently upheld the authority of local jurisdictions to ban marijuana licensees within their territories. Emerald Enters., LLC v. Clark Cty., 413 P.3d 92, 105 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018), review denied, 421 P.3d 445 (2018). Enforcement of such bans has recently escalated. Uprooting Cannabis: Officials Stepping Up Enforcement of Ban on Recreational Marijuana Businesses, Seattle Times (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/retail/uprooting-cannabis-officials-stepping-up-enforcement-of-ban-on-recreational-marijuana-businesses. But in California, for example, licenses will not be issued to those wishing to operate in a local jurisdiction where recreational marijuana is prohibited. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 26200.
Oregon’s legislation goes even farther by repealing any municipal charter amendments or local ordinances that conflict with its recreational marijuana legislation.\textsuperscript{82} Thus, even though a state may have legalized marijuana, a cannabis franchisor’s ability to access the entirety of a state’s market may be limited by what laws and regulations a given county or municipality within that state chooses to enact.

Finally, the newness of marijuana regulations, coupled with the rapid rate at which laws in even the most “established” recreational marijuana jurisdictions are changing, poses additional challenges for those wishing to establish cannabis franchises.\textsuperscript{83} Cannabis franchisors must be willing and able to adapt their business model to comply with changes to laws and regulations in the jurisdictions in which they operate, and often across jurisdictions. While this risk is inherent in any franchised business, it is particularly acute in the recreational marijuana space, where laws are changing regularly.

Thus, the discrepancies in state laws with which cannabis franchisors must comply when seeking to expand their brand into new states present a significant obstacle to market expansion. Due diligence must be given at every turn to ensure that the franchised unit is legally compliant with laws that often differ considerably and change often. Of course, the differences in which states have chosen to legalize marijuana within their borders are not the only source of challenges for cannabis franchisors. Many challenges are rooted in obstacles imposed on cannabis franchisors by other federal laws.

B. Other Federal Roadblocks to Franchising in the Cannabis Industry\textsuperscript{84}

1. Inability to Register a Federal Trademark

One of the primary obstacles currently limiting cannabis franchisors in the United States is their inability to register a federal trademark. A trademark, sometimes referred to as a brand or brand name, is a “word, phrase, symbol, and/or design that identifies and distinguishes the source of goods

\textsuperscript{82} Id. § 475B.454.


\textsuperscript{84} The roadblocks identified in this section are by no means exhaustive. For example, an additional and significant federal roadblock to cannabis franchising is Internal Revenue Code § 280E, prohibits marijuana businesses, as businesses engaged in “trafficking in controlled substances,” from claiming business deductions or tax credits on their federal income tax returns. See 26 U.S.C. § 280E. The inability to claim such deductions reduces the net profit of cannabis businesses, meaning aspiring cannabis franchisors may be required to reduce their fees below what it could otherwise charge. See Shannon L. McCarthy & Dawn Newton, \textit{Franchising a Marijuana Business: It's Not Quite Mission Impossible}, 35 \textit{Franchise L.J.} 357, 376–77 (2016).
of one party from those of others.\textsuperscript{85} Because a trademark is associated with a business and the goods or services it provides, companies have an interest in preventing their trademarks from being infringed, used, or appropriated by other entities. Trademark law—federal, state, and common—provides protections.

A business acquires a trademark simply by using a mark when selling or rendering goods or services.\textsuperscript{86} When a business does so, it acquires what is known as a “common law” trademark,\textsuperscript{87} which protects a company's trademark within the geographic area in which the goods or services associated with that mark are used.\textsuperscript{88} While better than nothing, common law trademark protections require those wishing to protect their trademark to first start doing business in whatever jurisdiction in which they wish to assert protections.\textsuperscript{89} For this reason, most businesses opt to register their trademarks, which can be done at the state or federal level.\textsuperscript{90}

Both state and federal trademark registration offer owners a degree of protection. That being said, federal trademark registration provides the trademark owner with the most benefits. Unlike state registered trademarks, which can only be enforced in the state in which they are registered,\textsuperscript{91} federal trademark registration grants the mark's owner nationwide rights to


\textsuperscript{86.} Herdrich, supra note 85, at 151; Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., Inc., 391 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that “[u]nder the principle of first in time equals first in right, priority ordinarily comes with earlier use of a mark in commerce” and that “[i]t is ‘not enough to have invented the mark first or even to have registered it first’”); Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508 F.2d 1260, 1264–65 (5th Cir. 1975).

\textsuperscript{87.} Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (“Federal law does not create trademarks . . . . Trademarks and their precursors have ancient origins, and trademarks were protected at common law and in equity at the time of the founding of our country.”).

\textsuperscript{88.} McCarthy & Newton, supra note 84, at 368; Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 453 (E.D. Va. 2015) (“Regardless of whether a mark is registered, the right to a particular mark grows out of its use, not its mere adoption.”).


\textsuperscript{91. Id.}
the exclusion of all others. This means that “[b]rands are generally valued higher when federal registration is secured.”

But a trademark is only eligible for registration if its owner has used it in commerce, defined under federal law as “all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.” While Congress regulates marijuana pursuant to the CSA because it is classified as a Schedule I controlled substance, it has no acceptable use under federal law. Accordingly, businesses selling cannabis goods or services that touch the marijuana plant are unable to register their trademark at the federal level.

Indeed, companies that have tried to obtain federal trademark registration have been unsuccessful. And while certain cannabis companies have deployed a franchising business model, it does not appear that they have done so with federally protected marks. Certain brands have sought state trademark registration in states where marijuana has been legalized, but

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99. For example, The Green Solution, a Colorado-based cannabis company, is rumored to have successfully registered its franchise program in Washington; however, Washington’s franchise agency licensee database does not indicate that the program is currently registered. See Rochelle Spandorf, Franchising in the Cannabis Industry Begins to Light Up, Law 360 (May 2, 2019, 2:27 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1154096/franchising-in-the-cannabis-industry-begins-to-light-up; https://fortress.wa.gov/dfi/webapp/dfi/EFilings-LicenseLookUp/LicenseLU/Filing (last visited May 21, 2109).
these protections will not serve to protect them beyond that state’s jurisdiction. Thus, state trademark registration provides limited protections to brands hoping to expand their market reach.100

2. Limited Ability to Access Financial Services and Products

Cannabis businesses wishing to franchise are also hindered by the fact that many cannabis companies still have limited access to financial services. In 2014, after issuing the Cole Memo, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a companion memo pertaining to the Bank Secrecy Act, as well as other laws and regulations regarding financial crimes (the BSA Cole Memo).101 The BSA Cole Memo provided that financial transactions involving proceeds generated by marijuana-related conduct could form the basis for prosecution under federal money laundering statutes and the BSA.102 That being said, the BSA Cole Memo indicated that investigations and prosecutions instigated against banks accepting funds from marijuana-related businesses should be conducted pursuant to the same enforcement priorities as those outlined in the Cole Memo.103

At the same time, the Financial Enforcement Crimes Network (FinCEN) of the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) issued guidance as a companion to the BSA Cole Memo (the FinCEN Guidance) to clarify BSA expectations for financial institutions seeking to provide services to marijuana related businesses (MRBs).104 The stated goal of the FinCEN Guidance was to “enhance the availability of financial services for . . . marijuana-related businesses.”105 While the FinCEN Guidance did not change federal law, it did provide some comfort that federal law enforcement and federal banking regulators did not intend to pursue financial institutions providing at least certain banking functions to MRBs operating in compliance with state law and where federal priorities were not otherwise implicated.106 But while doing so, the

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100. See Spandorf, supra note 99.
102. Id. at 2–3.
103. Id. (“For example, if a financial institution or individual provides banking services to a marijuana-related business knowing that the business is diverting marijuana from a state where marijuana sales are regulated to ones where such sales are illegal under state law, or is being used by a criminal organization to conduct financial transactions for its criminal goals, such as the concealment of funds derived from other illegal activity or the use of marijuana proceeds to support other illegal activity, prosecution for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957, 1960 or the BSA might be appropriate. Similarly, if the financial institution or individual is willfully blind to such activity by, for example, failing to conduct appropriate due diligence of the customers’ activities, such prosecution might be appropriate. Conversely, if a financial institution or individual offers services to a marijuana-related business whose activities do not implicate any of the eight priority factors, prosecution for these offenses may not be appropriate.”).
104. FinCEN Guidance, supra note 28. The FinCEN guidance does not define what constitutes a “marijuana related business,” but the “general consensus seems to be that [the term] applies to those businesses that deal directly with the plant in some way, such as growing or retailing.” Robert Rowe, Compliance and the Cannabis Conundrum, ABA: Risk and Compliance (Sept. 11, 2018), https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2018/09/compliance-and-the-cannabis-conundrum.
106. Id.
FinCEN Guidance reminded financial institutions that the sale of cannabis remains illegal under federal law and that accepting proceeds from marijuana-related activity continues to violate the BSA.107

Among other things, the FinCEN Guidance requires financial institutions to perform enhanced due diligence on MRBs.108 Additionally, because federal law prohibits the distribution and sale of marijuana, the FinCEN Guidance also requires participating financial institutions to file suspicious activity reports (SARs) on certain activities involving MRBs (including those MRBs duly licensed under state law).109 Put simply, the FinCEN Guidance requires financial institutions to do more than passively receive information provided by their customers; instead, they must seek out and monitor their customers’ behavior outside of their standard banking practices.

Following the issuance of the FinCEN Guidance, some financial institutions began to provide services to MRBs in accordance with the FinCEN Guidance’s terms.110 But when the Sessions Memo’s rescinded the Cole Memo and the BSA Cole Memo in January of 2018,111 it signaled a potential increase in risk of federal enforcement of the CSA against MRBs, even those that complied fully with state laws.112 While the Sessions Memo did not rescind the FinCEN Guidance, because the FinCEN Guidance was largely built on the foundation established by the Cole Memo, the Sessions Memo created increased concerns among financial institutions providing services to MRBs and had a chilling effect on additional financial institutions expanding their services to MRBs.113 To date, FinCEN has not offered

107. Id. at 2; see also BSA Cole Memo, supra note 28, at 2 (emphasizing that marijuana-derived financial transactions “can form the basis for prosecution under the money laundering statutes”).

108. For example, the FinCEN Guidance recommends that banks (1) review each customer’s state license application for operating a MRB, (2) request additional information about the customer and related parties from state licensing and enforcement authorities, (3) conduct ongoing monitoring for adverse information about the customer and related parties, (4) conduct ongoing monitoring for suspicious activity by the customer, and (5) periodically refresh the bank’s information about the customer. FinCEN Guidance, supra note 28, at 2–3.

109. SARs are required for MRB transactions in amounts over $5,000, individually or in the aggregate. 31 C.F.R. § 1020.320. SARs are also required for customers that provide goods and services to MRBs, such as landlords that lease space to MRBs. FinCEN Guidance, supra note 28, at 6.


112. Id.

further guidance to financial institutions on what, if any, operational and/or compliance changes might be necessary as a result of the Sessions Memo.\footnote{114. The Department of the Treasury, however, has issued a letter clarifying that, for the time being, the SAR reporting structure set forth in the FinCEN Guidance remains in effect. Letter from Drew Maloney, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, Dep’t of the Treasury, to Denny Heck, Representative, U.S. Congress (Jan. 21, 2018), available at https://dennyheck.house.gov/sites/dennyheck.house.gov/files/documents/Treasury%20Response%201.31.18_Heck.pdf.}

That being said, in 2019, two bills were introduced in the U.S. Congress that, if passed, would substantially change the landscape of banking in the marijuana sector. On the one hand, the Safe Banking Act of 2019 would, among other benefits, protect financial institutions from federal prosecution for providing financial services to cannabis-related businesses that are acting in compliance with state law.\footnote{115. Melissa Schiller, \textit{SAFE Banking Act Reintroduced in U.S. Senate}, Cannabis Business Times (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.cannabisbusinesstimes.com/article/safe-banking-act-reintroduced-us-senate.} The Strengthening the Tenth Amendment Through Entrusting States (STATES) Act of 2019, on the other hand, would go even further by amending the CSA so that its provisions no longer apply to any person acting in compliance with state or tribal laws relating to the manufacture, production, possession, or distribution of marijuana, so long as states and tribes comply with basic protections.\footnote{116. Senator Elizabeth Warren & Senator Cory Gardner, \textit{The STATES Act}, available at https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/STATES%20Act%20One%20Pager.pdf.} In the banking sector, it would provide that all compliant banking transactions do not constitute trafficking and do not result in proceeds of an unlawful transaction, thus insulating banks from fear of federal prosecution or retribution for banking with marijuana industry customers.\footnote{117. \textit{Id}.} Thus, if either bill is ultimately signed into law, those involved in the cannabis industry may be able to utilize banking resources in a manner not previously available to them.

3. Inability to Move Product over State Lines

Cannabis franchisors are also hindered by the fact that they cannot move marijuana over state lines. Under the CSA, transporting a Schedule I drug via interstate commerce is prohibited, meaning marijuana plants, oils, extracts, and more grown or produced in one state cannot legally be transported across state lines to another state.\footnote{118. \textit{See} 21 U.S.C. § 801 \textit{et seq.} \textit{See generally} Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).} This presents problems to those wishing to establish marijuana franchises because they are prohibited from moving the core product of their business—marijuana—across state lines when establishing new franchised units. Thus, for existing brands to sell outside of the state in which their marijuana products are produced, they must rely on out-of-state licensees to source marijuana plants and attempt to match their brand’s formulation or strain in hopes that the product ultimately produced is the same as the original.\footnote{119. McCarthy & Newton, \textit{supra} note 84, at 376.} But not all cannabis plants are the same—indeed, there are numerous strains that, although related,
are far from identical and contain varying amounts of the cannabinoids that customers specifically seek to purchase. Because consumers have come to expect brand and product consistency across franchised units and, as a result, many franchises uphold consistency as a core principle of their brand, this serves as an obstacle for such franchises wishing to franchise in the marijuana industry.

Given the numerous challenges facing U.S. cannabis brands seeking to expand their market reach, it is no wonder many have opted to move north in search of the capital and the freedom that coast-to-coast legalization should bring—freedom that theoretically should enable companies tomeaningfully and productively capitalize on brand expansion mechanisms, such as franchising.

VI. Cannabis Brand Franchising in Canada Post-Legalization

With Canada’s turn to the legalization of recreational marijuana, the U.S. cannabis industry has set sights on Canada to capitalize on the opportunities that a legalized market provides. One such opportunity is the ability to franchise with groups like Colorado’s ONE Cannabis, which has begun promoting franchise opportunities in Canada. While the path into Canada for U.S. cannabis brands is not nearly as established as it would be for a food brand or service based system, the relative freedom in Canada to commence cannabis franchise development makes it a compelling first step along the growth path for emerging cannabis brands.

The ability of any franchised brand to franchise successfully in a particular geographical area and industry hinges on various factors rooted in long-term stability. These factors include “the concept of a proven business formula over many years of trial and error. The all-important consistency of product, service and brand recognition that successful franchisors and their franchisees have mastered over time.” In this relatively new post-
legalization cannabis world, those ever-present risk factors that are unique to franchising are only exacerbated due to the uncertainty of laws and lack of proven track records.

The burgeoning retail industry of post-legalization cannabis in Canada is working out the growing pains necessary to establishing stability. This process undoubtedly has come with obstacles—obstacles that may result in Canada being unable to sustain U.S. cannabis companies moving north to capitalize on Canada’s legalization of marijuana.

**VII. Looking Behind the Curtain: Is the Grass Greener on the Other Side of the Border?**

Having legalized marijuana first, Canada should be at a significant advantage over the United States in the recreational marijuana market, even once the United States ultimately legalizes; the number of U.S. cannabis brands moving north since Canada’s legalization serves as an indication of Canada’s growing hold on the marijuana market. But the implementation of Canadian legalization has been far from smooth, and the brand and recreational marijuana user experience in Canada’s legalized market have not been perfect.

While many of these difficulties are likely attributable to the challenges associated with establishing any new industry, they may also indicate that cannabis brands moving north may experience complications with their immediate growth plans. While brands may have the ability to utilize certain tools for expansion to which they lack comparable access in the United States, such as franchising, it is possible that obstacles in place in the Canadian market—resulting from the manner in which Canada’s recreational marijuana laws are written and have been implemented—may likewise limit cannabis brands’ ability to fully reap the rewards of the franchising business model in an unfettered fashion.

**A. Obstacles to Franchising from Uncertainty in Canadian Cannabis Legislation**

Issues stemming from the differing laws and uncertainty about enforcement and interpretation across the provinces have made it difficult for the post-legalization cannabis industry to burgeon to its fullest potential. As legalization neared, the Canadian media braced itself for these complications because Canada’s cannabis regime was, in the words of one journalist, “worse than a splotchy patchwork of where one can shop for marijuana, where one can’t, where one can’t yet and where it kind-of-depends-on-a-few-things.”

Unfortunately, this patchwork and accompanying confusion remain, with some noting a lack of surprise:

Such confusion may have been inevitable, given that politicians and bureaucrats face the seemingly incompatible tasks of encouraging legal enjoyment of cannabis while simultaneously shielding everyone from its harms. They’ve been pulled in conflicting directions by entrepreneurs, law enforcement, health experts and grumpy seniors who vote, producing contradictions in rules from jurisdiction to jurisdiction that can border on the absurd.\textsuperscript{127}

These convoluted rules across provinces include the retail sale of cannabis. The most obvious obstacle to cannabis brands’ ability to franchise in Canada post-legalization, then, is that several provinces have chosen public or government-operated sales regimes for cannabis, making franchising impossible. Québec, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and Nova Scotia have all opted for government monopolies on the sale of cannabis.\textsuperscript{128} The other six provinces (Ontario, British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland) have adopted a private or hybrid (both private and public) distribution model, making franchising a viable option for cannabis brands entering the retail sales market in those provinces.\textsuperscript{129}

Therefore, viability of a cannabis brand franchise in Canada depends on compliance with provincial cannabis legislation. A cannabis brand would need to look within the relevant provincial legislation to ensure franchising is permitted in the areas targeted for expansion. Given the recent timing of legalization, specific difficulties highlighting cannabis brands’ ability to franchise in Canada post-legalization have begun to surface in the Canadian news media as the country works through new and evolving laws and circumstances. And these difficulties may limit the growth potential of U.S. cannabis brands that are moving north to take advantage of the Canadian marketplace.

B. Licensed Producers’ Obstacles to Brand Expansion in Ontario

Another obstacle to cannabis brands building and expanding their retail strategy has surfaced in Ontario as a direct result of the province’s cannabis legislation. Ontario’s cannabis framework consists mainly of the following statutes: Cannabis Control Act, 2017,\textsuperscript{130} Ontario Cannabis Retail Corporation Act, 2017,\textsuperscript{131} and the Cannabis Licence Act, 2018.\textsuperscript{132} Section 4(4) of the Cannabis Licence Act, in particular, has created confusion for cannabis brands looking to expand and franchise in Ontario. The provision outlines the restrictions applicable to cannabis producers licensed under the Cannabis Act, including the restriction that the “person and its affiliates, as defined by the regulations, may not between them hold more than one retail store authorization.”\textsuperscript{133} The initial interpretation of “affiliate” seemingly created...
impediments to market monopolization by licensed producers and vertical integration by prohibiting producers and their affiliates from operating more than one retail location. Further, the regulations to the Cannabis Licence Act, O. Reg. 468/18, defines in Section 2 what an “affiliate” of a person is, the most relevant branches for licensed producers being:

- A corporation of which the person beneficially owns or controls, directly or indirectly, shares or securities currently convertible into shares carrying more than 9.9 per cent of the voting rights under all circumstances or by reason of the occurrence of an event that has occurred and is continuing, or a currently exercisable option or right to purchase such shares or such convertible securities.\(^{134}\)

- A person is deemed to be an affiliate of another person if the other person, or a group of persons or entities acting jointly or in concert with the other person, has any direct or indirect influence that, if exercised, would result in control in fact of that person.\(^{135}\)

Interestingly, franchising has emerged as a potential workaround by licensed producers from this impediment created by the Ontario legislation. As large licensed producers may be barred from participating as owners of cannabis stores in Ontario pursuant to the Cannabis Licence Act and its regulations, “the only way they will be able to get their logos and brands on storefronts is to license or franchise all of these small business people to which the province wants to allow access, [. . .] [which] will create fertile ground for franchising by licensed producers.”\(^{136}\) At least one Canadian franchise lawyer has noted that franchising is a viable option for getting around this limitation in the cannabis retail framework as franchising is, by its nature, a model that allows for franchisors to set up independent operators with the resources necessary to be in business for themselves.\(^{137}\) So long as the licensed producer, as franchisor, exercises the appropriate level of control over the franchisee and its retail business, the level of control that comes with this independence may possibly satisfy the “control in fact” standard as articulated in Section 2(3) of the Regulations.\(^{138}\)

Pursuant to the Ontario Regulations, the Ontario government gave the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario (AGCO) the mandate to hold a random lottery to determine who may apply for Retail Operator Licences, the selection of which was completed on January 11, 2019.\(^{139}\) At the outset,

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135. Id. § 2(3).
138. See Cannabis Licence Act, O. Reg. 468/18, § 2(3).
139. Id. at § 8.2; Expression of Interest Lottery Rules, ALCOHOL & GAMING COMMISSION OF ONTARIO, https://www.agco.ca/cannabis/expression-of-interest-lottery-rules.
interested parties were informed to be prepared to open a cannabis store on April 1, 2019.\textsuperscript{140} As a result of supply shortages, on December 13, 2018, the government temporarily capped the issuing of licenses at twenty-five Retail Store Authorizations to allow for the supply of cannabis to stabilize.\textsuperscript{141} The twenty-five lottery winners, divided by geographic region, were announced at the close of the lottery and had until January 18, 2019, to submit a Retail Operator Licence Application to start the process of operating a brick-and-mortar cannabis store.\textsuperscript{142} A majority of the twenty-five lottery winners were sole proprietors,\textsuperscript{143} many with limited to no retail experience.\textsuperscript{144} Due to the numerous steps these individual lottery winners were required to complete on their own with limited resources and experience, the April 1, 2019, deadline became too aggressive. As a result, by March 29, 2019, only ten stores in Ontario had received the necessary licenses to meet the April 1st deadline.\textsuperscript{145} The aggressive deadline for opening stores created an angle for cannabis brand owners and lottery winners to negotiate to enter into licensing agreements to get stores up and running.\textsuperscript{146} Spiritleaf, an Alberta-based cannabis company, entered into an agreement with one of the sole proprietor lottery winners, allowing them to open a store in Kingston, Ontario.\textsuperscript{147} Canopy Growth Corporation entered into agreements with two sole proprietor lottery winners to each operate a Tweed store in London and Tokyo Smoke store in Toronto, both brands owned by Canopy Growth.\textsuperscript{148} Upon becoming

\textsuperscript{140} Id.

\textsuperscript{141} Id.


\textsuperscript{143} Express of Interest Lottery Selection Results, Alcohol & Gaming Commission of Ontario, https://www.agco.ca/cannabis/express-interest-lottery-selection-results.


aware of this development, the AGCO required additional information about these agreements with large retailers and producers, and Ray Kahnert, a spokesperson of the AGCO, made a statement about the lottery rules being “very clear about application requirements and that those selected in the lottery must maintain control of the business.”

As a result, franchising and licensing are continually being explored as ways for cannabis brands to enter into the Canadian cannabis market post-legalization. However, the success of this endeavor, and the true growth potential for U.S. cannabis brands that have moved north to Canada, will depend on the resolution of numerous supply issues.

C. Effects of Cannabis Supply Issues

Major cannabis supply issues have arisen across Canada since its legalization of marijuana. Around the time of legalization, it was widely reported that the supply of legal cannabis would “only meet 30 percent to 60 percent of demand.” This has proven true as these supply shortages have been present since legalization and could last “as long as three years.”

About fifty percent of products in five provinces were out of stock by mid-December. The effects of these supply issues are far-reaching, slowing the granting of licenses and store development, and resulting in general consumer disappointment, all of which hinders cannabis brands’ ability to franchise in Canada post-legalization. The Alberta Gaming, Liquor and Cannabis, the governing body in the province, decided to temporarily suspend accepting applications and issuing any additional cannabis retail licenses until further notice as a result of the “national cannabis supply shortage.” On December 13, 2018, the Ontario government similarly announced a temporary cap on twenty-five Retail Store Authorizations while the supply shortage stabilizes. Together, these adjustments to the required foundations of retail cannabis (product and licenses) have necessarily slowed store development, with Québec stores having to close three days a week, Alberta halting the

149. George-Cosh, supra note 144.
153. Id.
opening of new stores, and Ontario limiting its initial retail store roll-out to twenty-five stores.\textsuperscript{156}

Despite these nation-wide shortages and subsequent complications, the province of Manitoba maintains an aggressive and ambitious plan for cannabis store development in line with an “open market.”\textsuperscript{157} The government has committed to the goal that, “within two years, 90 percent of Manitobans should be able to access legal cannabis within a 30-minute drive or less.”\textsuperscript{158} This highlights the divergent approaches to the retail cannabis industry post-legalization across the provinces.

A further obstacle to the ability of cannabis brands to franchise in Canada is the lack of product consistency, a necessity for franchise success, and the fact that shortages have led to certain instances of consumer disappointment in Canada. Many consumers have continued to purchase cannabis through illegal channels given the supply shortages, delays in delivery, high prices, and logistical confusion surrounding accessing legal cannabis. Statistics recently released by the Canadian government showed that the price of dried cannabis has increased by 17.3 percent post-legalization.\textsuperscript{159} Meanwhile, the prices from illegal sources have decreased. Hundreds of Canadians responded that they were still purchasing their marijuana from illegal sources due to the price of legal marijuana.\textsuperscript{160} In a national poll conducted by Ipsos, a global market research and consulting firm, about a month after legalization, it was reported that a third of users continued to purchase their cannabis from their regular dealers after legalization.\textsuperscript{161} More recently, Scotiabank analysts noted in a research note that “the black market will control 71 percent of cannabis sales in Canada in 2019.”\textsuperscript{162} This continued usage of the black market,

\textsuperscript{156} Owram, \textit{supra} note 152.
\textsuperscript{158} Retail Cannabis in Manitoba, Gov’t of Manitoba, https://www.gov.mb.ca/cannabis/knowthefacts/retailcannabis.html.
\textsuperscript{159} StatsCannabis Data Availability: Crowdsourced Cannabis Prices, First Quarter 2019, Statistics Canada (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/daily-quotidien/190410/dq190410c-eng.pdf [hereinafter StatsCannabis]. Prior to legalization, the unweighted average price per gram of dried cannabis was $6.85 in 2018. Post-legalization, the average price per gram was $8.04.
largely stemming from supply issues, will be a further obstacle to cannabis brands’ ability to franchise and successfully grow in Canada.

VIII. Conclusion

Although many cannabis companies in the United States have entered Canadian markets with hopes of realizing large gains in the absence of extraordinary legal constraints, the reality is that the regulatory landscape varies significantly from province to province, and, in some cases, other local laws impose additional layers of complication. Ultimately, opportunities for cannabis franchising in Canada may not be as unlimited as some have foreseen. That being said, Canada still possesses great potential as a jurisdiction in which to incubate, develop, and expand a franchised network of cannabis retail locations. Cannabis brands can bank in the mainstream and obtain federal registrations for their trademarks. Although federal and provincial legislation prohibits cannabis companies from influencing or “coming into contact with” minors, cannabis marketing experts continue to find ways to push the limits to insert their brands into the public mind.

For cannabis franchisors in Canada, the local franchise laws are applied the same as they are to non-cannabis companies. Thus, there is no preliminary governmental oversight of cannabis franchising activities like there would be in a registration state in the United States. For these reasons, and despite some limitations and restrictions on private enterprise distribution in some of the Canadian provinces, franchising is a viable and attractive distribution model for cannabis companies wishing to enter and expand in Canadian markets.

Closer to home, it continues to be interesting to watch the evolution of cannabis regulation. From the roots of deregulation in Oregon and later in California, to the Ogden Memo, Cole Memo, and Sessions Memo, cannabis distribution in the United States has become increasingly a part of political agendas and, more recently, the country’s market economy. Canada is undoubtedly pioneering the way for widespread legalization of cannabis production and distribution in North America. But whether Canada, as a market for U.S. distributors and franchisors, will maintain its appeal if the U.S. federal government legalizes cannabis distribution in interstate commerce remains to be seen. What does appear to be clear, however, is that changes to Canada’s legalized marijuana regime may be needed if Canada hopes to maintain its first mover advantage over time.