May 5, 2009

The Honorable Henry C. Johnson
Chairman, Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Policy
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

The Honorable Howard Coble
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Policy
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Re: Hearing on “Bye Bye Bargains? Retail Price Fixing, the Leegin Decision, and Its Impact on Consumer Prices,” held on April 28, 2009

Dear Chairman Johnson and Ranking Member Coble:

On behalf of the American Bar Association (“ABA”), which has over 400,000 members, I write to express our views concerning the subject of the Subcommittee’s April 28 hearing titled “Bye Bye Bargains? Retail Price Fixing, the Leegin Decision, and Its Impact on Consumer Prices.” As Chair of the ABA Section of Antitrust Law, I have been authorized to express the ABA’s views on this important topic. In particular, I would like to express the association’s support for the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007). After considering a record that included voluminous factual evidence and economic analysis, the Supreme Court held squarely that minimum resale price maintenance agreements will be evaluated under the antitrust rule of reason, not the per se rule, under the Sherman Act 15 U.S.C. §1. In addition, the ABA opposes federal legislation, such as S. 148, which would effectively reverse the Supreme Court’s decision in Leegin. We ask that this letter be included in the official record of the Subcommittee’s April 28, 2009 hearing.

In February 2007 the ABA House of Delegates adopted a resolution proposed by the Section of Antitrust Law, recommending that:

the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1 . . . should not be interpreted to apply a rule of per se illegality to agreements between a buyer and seller setting the price at which the buyer may resell goods or services purchased from the seller.¹

The ABA derived this position from the basic principle of antitrust jurisprudence that the “rule of reason” identified in Standard Oil of Ohio v. United States, 220 U.S. 1, 60-68 (1911), is the

¹ ABA Resolution 101, adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in February 2007, and the related background Report are both attached to this letter.
fundamental standard that governs the evaluation of all restraints of trade. *Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.*, 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). Any departure from the rule of reason standard must be based upon “demonstrable economic effect rather than . . . formalistic line drawing”. *Id. at 58-59.* Only when a specific type of restraint produces a “predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect” and has limited potential for procompetitive benefit will the Supreme Court deem it unlawful per se. *State Oil Co. v. Khan*, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).

The Supreme Court’s decisions over nearly a century since adopting the rule of reason standard have carefully examined the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of specific practices to determine whether they warrant treatment as anticompetitive under all circumstances, and thus classification as per se illegal. Through consideration of their identifiable economic effects, the Court has recognized that non-price resale restrictions and maximum resale price agreements often produce substantial procompetitive effects by encouraging resellers to undertake promotional efforts and provide additional services to customers. *See id.; Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.*, 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977). Like these restraints, minimum resale price agreements may stimulate competition among resellers in ways that produce material benefits to consumers, which would not be available if sellers were unable to introduce some degree of price restriction through their agreements with their resellers.

As outlined in the Report accompanying ABA Resolution 101 that explained the basis for the ABA’s policy position, a rule of reason analysis for resale price maintenance agreements is appropriate for the following reasons:

- Most of the significant economic literature regards minimum resale price maintenance as more likely to be used by manufacturers to achieve efficiencies in distribution of their products than to enable dealers to maintain significant margins. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS OF PRODUCT DISTRIBUTION 37-76 (2006). When dealers are forced to compete without cutting prices, they “vie with one another to provide presale services,” which benefits both the manufacturer and the consumers. Richard A. Posner, *Legal Narratology*, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 737, 738 (1997).

- Empirical studies of minimum resale price maintenance have not established that the practice is invariably anticompetitive. The available evidence has not shown that agreements between an individual manufacturer or distributor and its resellers increased the market power of any individual brand or distorted market-wide competition. Recent empirical study of the effects of minimum resale price maintenance by Federal Trade Commission personnel found no basis for concluding that minimum resale price maintenance is invariably anticompetitive. Pauline M. Ippolito, *Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence from Litigation* (FTC 1988); Pauline M. Ippolito, *Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence from Litigation*, 34 J. L & ECON. 263 (1991).

- Manufacturers and suppliers have developed practices of achieving effective minimum resale price maintenance without actually entering into any agreements on resale pricing. A
manufacturer’s unilateral announcement that it will not sell to discounters and will terminate dealers that resell at less than its suggested resale prices can suppress discounting of its products. *E.g.*, *Euromadas, Inc. v. Zanella, Ltd.*, 368 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2004); *Audio Visual Associates, Inc. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.*, 210 F.3d 254, 262 (4th Cir. 2000). No evidence has been developed to show that this common practice has increased any manufacturer’s market power or has curtailed interbrand competition.

- The per se prohibition on minimum resale price maintenance in force for several decades has had the effect of enhancing the market power of very large scale retailers that carry a wide variety of products. These large retailers may sell certain products at loss leader prices that smaller retailers specializing in those products cannot match. This unrestrained advantage eventually will result in the disappearance of such outlets for those products. The use of minimum resale price maintenance agreements would provide opportunities for the manufacturer to retain a larger array of outlets and for those businesses to continue serving consumers.

For these reasons, the ABA supports the position that under the federal antitrust laws—and analogous state and territorial antitrust law—agreements between a buyer and seller setting the price at which the buyer may resell a product or service purchased from the seller should not be illegal per se. Instead, these agreements should be evaluated under a rule of reason analysis. The ABA further believes that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in *Leegin* is consistent with that position. Accordingly, the ABA opposes proposed legislation, such as S. 148, which would effectively reverse the *Leegin* decision.

Thank you for considering the views of the ABA on this very significant issue. If the ABA or its Section of Antitrust Law can be of further assistance, please contact me at (614) 464-5606 or the ABA’s senior legislative counsel for antitrust law issues, Larson Frisby, at (202) 662-1098.

Sincerely,

James A. Wilson, Chair
ABA Section of Antitrust Law

Attachment

cc:    All Members of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Policy
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association recommends that the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and comparable state and territorial laws should not be interpreted to apply a rule of per se illegality to agreements between a buyer and seller setting the price at which the buyer may resell goods or services purchased from the seller.

I. INTRODUCTION

This report presents the view of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law concerning the standard for determining the legality of minimum resale price maintenance under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and comparable state and territorial antitrust laws. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc., No. 06-480, on December 7, 2006, after earlier recalling and staying the mandate of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit had applied a rule of per se illegality to the setting of a minimum resale price, and the Supreme Court will address whether minimum resale price maintenance should be subject to that rule.

II. RECOMMENDATION

The Section of Antitrust Law recommends that the American Bar Association support the position that, under the Sherman Act and analogous State and territorial antitrust law, agreements between a buyer and seller setting the price at which the buyer may resell a product or service purchased from the seller should not be illegal per se.

The Sherman Act and the many State and territorial antitrust laws that are modeled on the Sherman Act contain language prohibiting every agreement in restraint of trade, but the Supreme Court has interpreted this language to prohibit only unreasonable restraints and has formulated two modes of analysis to determine whether a particular restraint should be considered unreasonable. “[M]ost antitrust claims are analyzed under a ‘rule of reason,’ according to which the finder of fact . . . tak[es] into account a variety of factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its condition before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.” State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). “Some types of restraints, however, have such predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect, and such limited potential for procompetitive benefit, that they are deemed unlawful per se.” Id. Today, there “is often no bright line” separating rule of reason from per se analysis; the rule of reason encompasses a range of analysis, extending from an abbreviated “quick look” to a “plenary market examination,” and even where the rule of reason is not applied, “a ‘considerable inquiry into market conditions’ may be required before the application of any so-called ‘per se’ condemnation is justified.” California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999), quoting National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. 85, 104, n. 26 (1984).

The rule of per se illegality against vertical price fixing (i.e., agreements between buyers and sellers setting the resale price) was established by the Supreme Court in 1911 in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). That decision was based, inter alia, on the Court’s application of the common law rule against restraints on alienation and its concern that minimum resale price maintenance could achieve the same purpose as an agreement among the buyers themselves to fix the prices at which they would resell.
Subsequently, in *United States v. Colgate & Co.*, 250 U.S. 300 (1919), the Court clarified that the Sherman Act does not apply to sellers’ unilateral refusals to deal with buyers that fail to charge the resale prices suggested by the sellers, thereby permitting sellers to exercise substantial influence over resale prices so long as they avoid entering into bilateral agreements to this effect. The Colgate doctrine was unsuccessfully challenged, on the ground that it was tantamount to minimum resale price maintenance, in *Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. FTC*, 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1983), and then was squarely reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in *Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Co.*, 465 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1984).

At one time, the rule of per se illegality applied not only to minimum resale price maintenance, but to most vertical resale restraints between buyers and sellers, including both price restraints and non-price restraints. *See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.*, 388 U.S. 365, 380 (1967). Incrementally, however, the Supreme Court has abandoned this standard, except for the per se rule against minimum resale price maintenance, in favor of the rule of reason, under which the procompetitive effects of a restraint are weighed against the anticompetitive effects. The Court has “ma[d]e clear that departure from the rule of reason standard must be based upon demonstrable economic effect rather than—as in Schwinn—upon formalistic line drawing.” *Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.*, 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977).

The chief reason for this about-face was the recognition that vertical resale restraints simultaneously have the potential to reduce competition between resellers of the same brand (“intrabrand competition”) while stimulating competition between different brands (“interbrand competition”) by stimulating resellers of each brand to compete harder. *Continental T. V., supra*, 433 U.S. at 51-52. Manufacturers and other sellers impose vertical restraints “to induce retailers to engage in promotional activities or to provide service and repair facilities necessary to the efficient marketing of their products” which otherwise, “[b]ecause of market imperfections such as the so-called ‘free rider’ effect, . . . might not be provided . . . .” *Id.* at 55.

Thus, the Court overruled application of the per se rule to such non-price resale restraints as location clauses, territorial restraints and customer restraints, holding that these restraints should be judged under the rule of reason. *See Continental T. V., supra*, 433 U.S. 36.

Addressing price-related vertical restraints, the Court has held that the rule of per se illegality does not apply to bona fide consignment sales, maximum resale price maintenance, or agreements between a buyer and a seller for the seller to stop doing business with buyers that resell below a particular price. *Simpson v. Union Oil Co.*, 377 U.S. 13 (1964); *State Oil Co. v. Khan*, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); *Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.*, 485 U.S. 717 (1988). At the same time, lower courts have declined to apply the per se rule to agreements against advertising at prices that are less than an agreed level. *E.g., Illinois Corporate Travel, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc.*, 806 F.2d 722, 728-29 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 919 (1990); see also *In re Advertising Checking Bureau*, 109 F.T.C. 146 (1987).

The Section of Antitrust law believes that the time has come to extend the rule of reason approach of these earlier decisions to minimum resale price maintenance because the same motives that manufacturers possess for entering into non-price vertical restraint agreements can
also explain their motivation for wanting to enter into minimum resale price maintenance agreements. Manufacturers view dealer margins as their cost of distribution and have no economic incentive to overcompensate dealers—if they want to raise prices they need only raise their own wholesale prices to the dealers without limiting the prices at which the dealers may resell. See Continental T.V., supra, 433 U.S. at 56 n. 24. As explained further below, minimum resale price maintenance, like other vertical resale restraints, can stimulate interbrand competition and is not so inevitably pernicious as to warrant per se illegality.

III. REASONS WHY THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SHOULD SUPPORT APPLYING THE RULE OF REASON TO MINIMUM RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE

There are several reasons to support application of the rule of reason to minimum resale price maintenance, including the following:

A. The Weight of Economic Analysis Favors Application of the Rule of Reason

The economic literature weighs heavily against condemning all minimum resale price agreements to per se illegality. Notable examples include Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 32 (1978), and Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 189 (2d ed. 2001). See generally ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS OF PRODUCT DISTRIBUTION 37-76 (2006) (“the bulk of the economic literature on [minimum resale price maintenance] . . . suggests that [minimum resale price maintenance] is more likely to be used to enhance efficiency than for anticompetitive purposes”). The seminal treatment appears in Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade, 3 J. L. & ECON. 86 (1960), which explained why manufacturers would adopt minimum resale price maintenance to assure the efficient distribution and marketing of their products—by encouraging dealers to promote the product without fear of “free riding” by rival dealers of the same brand that cut prices and spend little or nothing on services. As this principle is described by Judge Posner, when dealers are forced to compete without cutting prices, they “vie with one another to provide presale services” and the manufacturer benefits. Richard A. Posner, Legal Narratology, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 737, 738 (1997). The prevailing view among economists is that minimum resale price maintenance is more often adopted to serve the interests of manufacturers in achieving efficiencies in distribution than to serve the interests of dealers in assuring their margins. See Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., supra, at 727 n. 2 (“[r]etail market power is rare” citing Baxter, The Viability of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 933, 948-49 (1987)).

B. The “Ancient Rule Against Restraints on Alienation” Does Not Support A Per Se Rule Against Minimum Resale Price Maintenance

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Dr. Miles was predicated largely on “the ancient rule against restraints on alienation,” a rule that the Court cited again in its since-overturned decision in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 380 (1967). However, there never actually was an unqualified rule against restraints on alienation. “The plain fact is that the
common law never proscribed all restraints on alienation, even of land, and that the ‘ancient rule’ which the Court invokes actually permitted such restraints under a variety of circumstances.” Milton Handler, The Twentieth Annual Antitrust Review—1967, 53 VA. L. REV. 1667, 1684 (1967). “Coke on Littleton cannot provide the answers for the problems that vex[ed] us in the twentieth century,” id. at 1685, much less the twenty-first century.

C. Empirical Evidence Under the Fair Trade Laws and Application of the Colgate Doctrine Do Not Support Application of a Per Se Rule

There have been several empirical tests of minimum resale price maintenance, none of which proves that the practice is always destructive. Between 1937, when the Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 75-314, 50 Stat. 693, was passed, and 1975, when the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801, was adopted, states were empowered to adopt Fair Trade Laws permitting manufacturers and retailers to enter into minimum resale price maintenance agreements. Many states enacted such laws and many manufacturers took advantage of them, fixing the retail prices at which their products could be resold. Empirical studies conducted at the time showed that identical products tended to cost more in Fair Trade states than in other states, but the premise underlying these studies was that minimum resale price maintenance agreements were usually imposed by buyers upon reluctant sellers—a premise that, as noted above, has not won universal acceptance among economists. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH NO. 2, VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS LIMITING INTRABRAND COMPETITION 79-80 (1977). There is no indisputable evidence that such agreements created additional market power for any individual brand or were destructive of market-wide competition. Nevertheless, Congress chose to end the program during the decade when Schwinn was still controlling law.

More recently, since the 1984 Monsanto decision reaffirmed the Colgate doctrine and the right of sellers to stop doing business with discounters, numerous sellers have relied upon this doctrine to announce that they will not sell to discounters and to cut off dealers that resell at less than suggested resale prices. See, e.g., Euromadas, Inc. v. Zanella, Ltd., 368 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2004); Audio Visual Associates, Inc. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 210 F.3d 254, 262 (4th Cir. 2000). The result has been to curtail discounting for the products affected, and as the FTC predicted in Russell Stover, the outcome has been very close to the effect of minimum resale price maintenance, but again there is no evidence that the impact has been the augmentation of market power or a diminution in interbrand competition. This has led to criticism that the per se rule against minimum vertical price fixing has become a trap for the unwary, with sophisticated companies accomplishing almost the same result without illegality, but only by jumping through the hoops of the Colgate defense, a result that critics consider both inefficient and unfair.

Finally, more recent empirical study conducted into the effects of minimum resale price maintenance by Federal Trade Commission personnel has found no basis for concluding that minimum resale price maintenance is always anticompetitive or for preserving the rule of per se illegality. See Pauline M. Ippolito, Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence from Litigation (FTC 1988); Pauline M. Ippolito, Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence from Litigation, 34 J. L & ECON. 263 (1991). See also Thomas R. Overstreet, Jr., Resale Price Maintenance: Economic Theories and Empirical Evidence (FTC 1983); Ronald N. Lafferty,

D. Outlawing Minimum Resale Price Maintenance Has Raised Barriers to Entry and Produced Anticompetitive Effects

The rule of per se illegality against minimum resale price maintenance has had an impact on retail competition today that was not addressed or necessarily foreseen when the Supreme Court decided *Dr. Miles*. Currently, it is possible for large retailers that carry a wide variety of products to sell selected products at very low prices—even at or below cost—in order to attract customers into their stores. The retailer does not need to earn a profit on the sale of such products because it can make up for this by selling other products to the consumers that frequent its stores. This strategy works most effectively by discounting products that are exactly the same at every outlet, so that consumers can easily compare prices. The problem for manufacturers of these products, however, is that retailers specializing in such products cannot match the unremunerative prices because they do not carry the wide variety of other products in their stores. The natural result is the eventual disappearance of more specialized outlets, or their refusal to support the targeted products, leaving manufacturers and consumers with fewer options and eventually leaving the large retailers with less competition and greater market power.

All of these reasons militate against preservation of the rule of per se illegality and in favor of application of the rule of reason, under which minimum resale price maintenance would only be unlawful if, on balance, its anticompetitive effects can be proven to outweigh its procompetitive effects in a relevant market.

IV. REASONS ADVANCED IN SUPPORT OF THE RULE OF PER SE ILLEGALITY AGAINST MINIMUM RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE

To assure that this Report reaches a sound conclusion, consideration also has been afforded to the reasons that have been advanced for preserving the rule of per se illegality against minimum resale price maintenance, including the following:

A. Elevating Prices to Consumers

A common reason advanced for the rule of per se illegality is that minimum resale price maintenance eliminates the ability of retailers and other resellers to engage in price competition on a local level—for example by providing fewer services or a less costly location in exchange for lower prices—thereby resulting in elevated prices to all consumers, including those who would prefer a less expensive distribution option. See William B. Comanor, *Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy*, 98 HARV. L. REV. 983, 987 (1985); Robert Pitofsky, *In Defense of Discounters: The No Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing*, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1493 (1983). While non-price vertical resale restraints may limit the number of resellers that are allowed to compete for any particular sale, they do not limit the freedom of each competing reseller in a marketplace to adjust its own resale
price to local conditions, thereby distinguishing non-price vertical resale restraints from vertical
price fixing. Also, while some services may benefit consumers as well as manufacturers, other
services provide little or no benefit to consumers even though resale price maintenance can be
expected to elevate the price that some consumers pay.

Of course, if minimum resale price maintenance were permitted, and a manufacturer set
too high a resale price, sales of its products would suffer. Again, manufacturers have no
incentive to increase the margins that their dealers earn on each sale unless the result will be
greater sales and greater profits for the manufacturer as well. See Continental T. V., supra, at 56
n. 24. Furthermore, if minimum resale price maintenance harms competition in a relevant
market more than it strengthens competition, it would be subject to condemnation under the rule
(1988) (agreements to terminate “price cutters” subject to rule of reason).

B. Facilitating Coordination or Collusion Among Sellers

Another longtime rationale advanced for the per se rule is that minimum resale price
maintenance can facilitate coordination or outright collusion among manufacturers and other
sellers to fix the wholesale prices at which they sell their products to dealers. Although
wholesale prices frequently are not public, making it difficult for one manufacturer to determine
the price that another manufacturer is charging to its dealers, retail prices typically are out in the
open. As a consequence, the fixing of retail prices would make it easier for a manufacturer to
determine whether another manufacturer is “cheating” on an understanding to maintain prices
above a particular level.

For example, if gasoline refiners were permitted to enter into agreements with service
stations fixing the price at which each service station owner may resell gasoline to consumers,
the refiner could assure that the prices at the pump would be the same at all stations reselling
its brand (either with variation among states to account for differences in taxes in different states or
even without such variation by equalizing the effect of differences in state taxes). This would
enable each refiner to know the retail prices that competing refiners are setting and to coordinate
its own wholesale and retail pricing accordingly. If there were an actual agreement among the
refiners to maintain a particular resale price, it would be easy to detect deviations from that price.
Previously, it has been held that refiners may not intentionally disclose their wholesale prices to
one another, In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 906 F.2d 432, 445-48 (9th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 500 U.S. 959 (1991), but permitting minimum resale price maintenance could be
equally effective in facilitating price uniformity.

In Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n. 18 (1977), the
Supreme Court observed: “The per se illegality of price restrictions has been established firmly
for many years and involves significantly different questions of analysis and policy [than
nonprice restrictions]. . . . [S]ome commentators have argued that the manufacturer’s motivation
for imposing vertical price restrictions may be the same as for nonprice restrictions. There are,
however, significant differences that could easily justify different treatment. In his concurring
opinion in White Motor Co., [372 U.S. 253 (1963),] Mr. Justice Brennan noted that, unlike
nonprice restrictions, ‘[r]esale price maintenance is not designed to, but almost invariably does in
fact, reduce price competition not only among sellers of the affected product, but quite as much between that product and competing brands.’ 372 U.S. at 268. Professor [now Judge] Posner also recognized that ‘industrywide resale price maintenance might facilitate cartelizing.’ Posner, [Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. J. 282 (1975)] at 294 (footnote omitted).”

But is this sufficient reason to deny every seller the ability to enter into minimum resale price maintenance agreements with buyers, regardless of the nature of the product and the circumstances of its distribution? Plainly, this has not been a rhetorical question, but manufacturers engaging in horizontal collusion risk fines under the Sherman Act of $100 million or more and individuals participating in such collusion risk fines of $1 million and ten years in prison, which provides appreciable deterrence without applying a rule of per se illegality to every instance of minimum resale price maintenance.

C. Facilitating Collusion Among Buyers

A further criticism of minimum resale price maintenance is that it can facilitate collusion among buyers to maintain supracompetitive prices. As noted earlier, this was a consideration in the original Dr. Miles decision. However, this not only would run counter to the interests of the seller, but would require the complicity of resellers of other brands, if there are any. See R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Cigarettes Cheaper!, 2006-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 75,393 (7th Cir. 2006) (why a seller would be drawn into a buyers’ cartel “is a mystery” because it would be hurt thereby at least as much as would consumers). In any event, this phenomenon appears to be sufficiently rare as not to justify perpetuation of a rule of per se illegality. Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., supra, at 727 n. 2 (“[r]etail market power is rare”). Moreover, if a seller is drawn into a price fixing conspiracy among buyers, this still would be subject to the rule of per se illegality, not as a vertical conspiracy but as a horizontal one. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).

D. Congress Has Not Supported Efforts to Overrule the Per Se Rule

In 1983, the Department of Justice filed an amicus brief in the Monsanto case in favor of overturning the per se rule of Dr. Miles and wanted to present oral argument to the same effect, but Congress enacted legislation prohibiting the use of funds “for any activity, the purpose of which is to overturn or alter the per se prohibition on resale price maintenance in effect under the Federal antitrust laws.” Pub. L. 98-166, 97 Stat. 1071. Congress never has endorsed abandonment of the per se rule and, when confronted with an effort to achieve this end, chose to block it, indicating its support for the existing rule. Nevertheless, the per se rule was the creation of the Supreme Court and it is within the Court’s discretion to allow the rule to evolve. As the Court has recognized, the “changing content” of the term “restraint of trade” in the Sherman Act already was “well recognized” when the Act was adopted in 1890, and [i]t would make no sense to create out of the single term ‘restraint of trade’ a chronologically schizoid statute, in which a ‘rule of reason’ evolves with new circumstances and new wisdom, but a line of per se illegality remains forever fixed where it was.” Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., supra, at 731-32.
V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons described above, the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law respectfully requests approval of the proposed resolution.

Respectfully submitted,

Joseph Angland
Chair
Section of Antitrust Law
February 2007