RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association, without taking a position supporting or opposing the death penalty, urges each jurisdiction that imposes capital punishment to prohibit the imposition of a death sentence on or execution of any individual who was 21 years old or younger at the time of the offense.
REPORT

Introduction

The American Bar Association (ABA) has long examined the important issue of the death penalty and has sought to ensure that capital punishment is applied fairly, accurately, with meaningful due process, and only on the most deserving individuals. To that end, the ABA has taken positions on a variety of aspects of the administration of capital punishment, including how the law treats particularly vulnerable defendants or those with disabilities. In 1983, the ABA became one of the first organizations to call for an end of using the death penalty for individuals under the age of 18.¹ In 1997, the ABA called for a suspension of executions until states and the federal government improved several aspects of their administration of capital punishment, including removing juveniles from eligibility.²

Now, more than 35 years since the ABA first opposed the execution of juvenile offenders, there is a growing medical consensus that key areas of the brain relevant to decision-making and judgment continue to develop into the early twenties. With this has come a corresponding public understanding that our criminal justice system should also evolve in how it treats late adolescents (individuals age 18 to 21 years old), ranging from their access to juvenile court alternatives to eligibility for the death penalty. In light of this evolution of both the scientific and legal understanding surrounding young criminal defendants and broader changes to the death penalty landscape, it is now time for the ABA to revise its dated position and support the exclusion of individuals who were 21 years old or younger at the time of their crime.

The ABA has been – and should continue to be – a leader in supporting developmentally appropriate and evidence-based solutions for the treatment of young people in our criminal justice system, including with respect to the imposition of the death penalty. In 2004, the ABA filed an amicus brief in Roper v. Simmons, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the imposition of the death penalty on individuals below the age of 18 at the time of their crime.³ It also filed an amicus brief in 2012 in Miller v. Alabama, concerning the constitutionality of mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles convicted of homicides.⁴ The ABA’s brief in Roper

³ Brief for the ABA as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
emphasized our long-standing position that juvenile offenders do not possess the heightened moral culpability that justifies the death penalty.\(^5\) It also demonstrated that under the “evolving standards of decency” test that governs the Eighth Amendment, over 50 percent of death penalty states had already rejected death as an appropriate punishment for individuals who committed their crimes under the age of 18.\(^6\) In *Miller*, the ABA stressed that mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles, even in homicide cases, were categorically unconstitutional because “[m]aturity can lead to that considered reflection which is the foundation for remorse, renewal and rehabilitation.”\(^7\)

Not only has the U.S. Supreme Court held that there is a difference in levels of criminal culpability between juveniles and adults generally,\(^8\) but the landscape of the American death penalty has changed since 1983. Fifty-two out of 53 U.S. jurisdictions now have a life without parole (LWOP) option, either by statute or practice;\(^9\) and the overall national decline in new death sentences corresponds with an increase in LWOP sentences in the last two decades.\(^10\) In 2016, 31 individuals received death sentences,\(^11\) and only two of those individuals were under the age of 21 at the time of their crimes.\(^12\) As of the date of this writing, 23 individuals had been executed in 2017, further reflecting a national decline in the imposition of capital punishment.\(^13\) The U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized that the Eighth Amendment’s evolving standards of decency has made other groups categorically ineligible for the death penalty – most notably individuals with intellectual disability.\(^14\)

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13 See Searchable Execution Database, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/views-executions?exec_name_1=&exec_year%5B%5D=2017&sex=All&sex_1=All&federal=All&foreigner=All&juvenile=All&volunteer=All&=Apply (last visited Nov. 13, 2017).
14 See *Atkins v. Virginia*, 536 U.S. 306 (2002). The ABA was at the forefront of this movement as well, passing a resolution against executing persons with intellectual disability in 1989. See ABA House of Delegates Recommendation 110 (adopted Feb. 1989),
Furthermore, the scientific advances that have shaped our society’s improved understanding of the human brain would have been unfathomable to those considering these issues in 1983. In 1990, President George H.W. Bush launched the “Decade of the Brain” initiative to “enhance public awareness of benefits to be derived from brain research.”\textsuperscript{15} Advances in neuroimaging techniques now allow researchers to evaluate a living human brain.\textsuperscript{16} Indeed, neuroscience “had not played any part in [U.S. Supreme Court] decisions about developmental differences between adolescents and adults,” likely due to “how little published research there was on adolescent brain development before 2000.”\textsuperscript{17} These and other large-scale advances in the understanding of the human brain, have led to the current medical recognition that brain systems and structures are still developing into an individual’s mid-twenties.

It is now both appropriate and necessary to address the issue of late adolescence and the death penalty because of the overwhelming legal, scientific, and societal changes of the last three decades. The newly-understood similarities between juvenile and late adolescent brains, as well as the evolution of death penalty law and relevant standards under the Eighth Amendment lead to the clear conclusion that individuals in late adolescence should be exempted from capital punishment.\textsuperscript{18} Capital defense attorneys are increasingly making this constitutional claim in death penalty litigation and this topic has become part of ongoing juvenile and criminal justice policy reform conversations around the country. As the ABA is a leader in protecting the rights of the vulnerable and ensuring that our justice system is fair, it is therefore incumbent upon this organization to recognize the need for heightened protections for an additional group of individuals: offenders whose crimes occurred while they were 21 years old or younger.

\textsuperscript{15} Project on the Decade of the Brain, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, \url{http://www.loc.gov/loc/brain/} (last visited Oct. 6, 2017).
\textsuperscript{17} Laurence Steinberg, \textit{The Influence of Neuroscience on US Supreme Court Decisions about Adolescents’ criminal Culpability}, \textit{14 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE} 513, 513-14 (2013).
\textsuperscript{18} Earlier this year, a Kentucky Circuit Court held pre-trial evidentiary hearings in three cases and found that it is unconstitutional to sentence to death individuals “under twenty-one (21) years of age at the time of their offense.”\textit{See Commonwealth v. Bredhold}, Order Declaring Kentucky’s Death Penalty Statute as Unconstitutional, 14-CR-161, *1, 12 (Fayette Circuit Court, Aug. 1, 2017); \textit{Commonwealth v. Smith}, Order Declaring Kentucky’s Death Penalty Statute as Unconstitutional, 15-CR-584-002, *1, 12 (Fayette Circuit Court, Sept. 6, 2017); \textit{Commonwealth v. Diaz}, Order Declaring Kentucky’s Death Penalty Statute as Unconstitutional, 15-CR-584-001, *1, 11 (Fayette Circuit Court, Sept. 6, 2017).
Major Constitutional Developments in the Punishment of Juveniles for Serious Crimes

The rule that constitutional standards must calibrate for youth status is well established. The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that legal standards developed for adults cannot be uncritically applied to children and youth. Although “neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone,” the Court has held that “the Constitution does not mandate elimination of all differences in the treatment of juveniles.”

As noted above, between 2005 and 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court issued several landmark decisions that profoundly alter the status and treatment of youth in the justice system. Construing the Eighth Amendment, the Court held in Roper v. Simmons that juveniles are sufficiently less blameworthy than adults, such that the application of different sentencing principles is required under the Eighth Amendment, even in cases of capital murder. In Graham v. Florida, the Court, seeing no meaningful distinction between a sentence of death or LWOP, found that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibited LWOP sentences for non-homicide crimes for juveniles.

Then, in Miller v. Alabama, the U.S. Supreme Court held “that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” Justice Kagan, writing for the majority, was explicit in articulating the Court’s rationale: the mandatory imposition of LWOP sentences “prevents those meting out punishment from considering a juvenile’s ‘lessened culpability ‘and greater ‘capacity for change,’ and runs afoul of our cases ‘requirement of individualized sentencing for defendants facing the most serious penalties.” The Court grounded its holding “not only on common sense…but on science and social science as

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19 See, e.g., May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (“Children have a very special place in life which law should reflect. Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination of a State ‘s duty towards children.”); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (plurality opinion) (“[A child] cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity.”).
20 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
22 Apart from the sentencing decisions discussed herein, the Court, interpreting the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, held in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, that a juvenile’s age is relevant to the Miranda custody analysis. 564 U.S. 261, 264 (2011). In all of these cases, the Court adopted settled research regarding adolescent development and required the consideration of the attributes of youth when applying constitutional protections to juvenile offenders.
27 Miller, 567 U.S. at 480.
well,” all of which demonstrate fundamental differences between juveniles and adults.

The Court in Miller noted the scientific “findings – of transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences – both lessened a child’s ‘moral culpability’ and enhanced the prospect that, as the years go by and neurological development occurs, his ‘deficiencies will be reformed.’” Importantly, the Court specifically found that none of what Graham “said about children – about their distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and environmental vulnerabilities – is crime-specific.” Relying on Graham, Roper, and other previous decisions on individualized sentencing, the Court held “that in imposing a State’s harshest penalties, a sentencer misses too much if he treats every child as an adult.” The Court also emphasized that a young offender’s moral failings could not be comparable to an adult’s because there is a stronger possibility of rehabilitation.

In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court in Montgomery v. Louisiana expanded its analysis of the predicate factors that the sentencing court must find before imposing a life without parole sentence on a juvenile. Montgomery explained that the Court’s decision in Miller “did bar life without parole . . . for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.” The Court held “that Miller drew a line between children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity and those rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption,” noting that a life without parole sentence “could [only] be a proportionate sentence for the latter kind of juvenile offender.”

Collectively, these decisions demonstrate a distinct Eighth Amendment analysis for youth, premised on the simple fact that young people are different for the purposes of criminal law and sentencing practices. Relying on prevailing developmental research and common human experience concerning the transitions that define adolescence, the Court has recognized that the age and special characteristics of young offenders play a critical role in assessing whether sentences imposed on them are disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment. More specifically, the cases recognize three key characteristics that distinguish adolescents from adults: “[a]s compared to adults, juveniles have a ‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility’; they ‘are more

28 Id. at 471.
29 Id. at 472 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).
30 Id. at 473.
31 Id. at 477.
32 Miller 567 U.S. at 471 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).
34 Id. at 734 (emphasis added).
35 Id. (emphasis added).
36 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; see also Miller, 567 U.S. at 471-72.
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure'; and their characters are 'not as well formed.'

As both the majority and the dissent agreed in *Roper* and *Graham*, the U.S. Supreme Court has supplanted its “death is different” analysis in adult Eighth Amendment cases for an offender-focused “kids are different” frame in serious criminal cases involving young defendants. Indeed, in *Graham v. Florida*, the Court wrote “criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants’ youthfulness into account at all would be flawed.”

**Increased Understanding of Adolescent Brain Development**

American courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have increasingly relied on and cited to a comprehensive body of research on adolescent development in its opinions examining youth sentencing, capability, and custody. The empirical research shows that most delinquent conduct during adolescence involves risk-taking behavior that is part of normative developmental processes. The U.S. Supreme Court in *Roper v. Simmons* recognized that these normative developmental behaviors generally lessen as youth mature and become less likely to reoffend as a direct result of the maturational process. In *Miller and Graham*, the Court also recognized that this maturational process is a direct function of brain growth, citing research showing that the frontal lobe, home to key components of circuitry underlying “executive functions” such as planning, working memory, and impulse control, is among the last areas of the brain to mature.

In the years since *Roper*, research has consistently shown that such development actually continues beyond the age of 18. Indeed, the line drawn by the U.S. Supreme Court no longer fully reflects the state of the science on adolescent development. While there were findings that pointed to this conclusion prior to 2005, a wide body of research has since provided us with an

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37 Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70).
39 560 U.S. at 76.
44 See, e.g., Graham Bradley & Karen Wildman, Psychosocial Predictors of Emerging Adults’ Risk and Reckless Behaviors, 31 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 253, 253–54, 263 (2002) (explaining that, among emerging adults in the 18-to-25-year-old age group, reckless behaviors—defined as those actions that are not socially approved—were found to be reliably predicted by antisocial peer pressure and stating that “antisocial peer pressure appears to be a continuing, and perhaps critical, influence upon [reckless] behaviors well into the emerging adult years”); see also Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence, 58 AM.
expanded understanding of behavioral and psychological tendencies of 18 to 21 year olds.\textsuperscript{45}

Findings demonstrate that 18 to 21 year olds have a diminished capacity to understand the consequences of their actions and control their behavior in ways similar to youth under 18.\textsuperscript{46} Additionally, research suggests that late adolescents, like juveniles, are more prone to risk-taking and that they act more impulsively than older adults in ways that likely influence their criminal conduct.\textsuperscript{47} According to one of the studies conducted by Dr. Laurence Steinberg, a leading adolescent development expert, 18 to 21 year olds are not fully mature enough to anticipate future consequences.\textsuperscript{48}

More recent research shows that profound neurodevelopmental growth continues even into a person’s mid to late twenties.\textsuperscript{49} A widely-cited longitudinal
study sponsored by the National Institute of Mental Health tracked the brain
development of 5,000 children, discovering that their brains were not fully mature
until at least 25 years of age. This period of development significantly impacts
an adolescent’s ability to delay gratification and understand the long-term
consequences of their actions.

Additionally, research has shown that youth are more likely than adult
offenders to be wrongfully convicted of a crime. Specifically, an analysis of
known wrongful conviction cases found that individuals under the age of 25 are
responsible for 63 percent of false confessions. Late adolescents’ propensity
for false confessions, combined with the existing brain development research,
supports the conclusion that late adolescents are a vulnerable group in need of
additional protection in the criminal justice system.

Legislative Developments in the Legal Treatment of Individuals in Late
Adolescence

The trend of treating individuals in late adolescence differently from adults
goes well beyond the appropriate punishment in homicide cases. As noted,
scientists, researchers, practitioners and corrections professionals are all now
recognizing that individuals in late adolescence are developmentally closer to
their peers under 18 than to those adults who are fully neurologically developed.
In response to that understanding, both state and federal legislators have created
greater restrictions and protections for late adolescents in a range of areas of
law.

For example, in 1984, the U.S. Congress passed the National Minimum
Drinking Age Act, which incentivized states to set their legal age for alcohol
purchases at age 21. Since then, five states (California, Hawaii, New Jersey,
Maine, and Oregon) have also raised the legal age to purchase cigarettes to age 21.
In addition to restrictions on purchases, many car rental companies have

(Ages 0 to 85 Years) Measures with Atlas-Based Parcellation of MRI, 65 NEUROIMAGE 176. 176-
193 (2013).
50 Nico U. F. Dosenbach et al., Prediction of Individual Brain Maturity Using fMRI, 329 SCI. 1358,
1358–59 (2010).
51 See Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting,
80 CHILD DEV. 28, 28 (2009).
52 Understand the Problem, BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS OF YOUTH,
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/wrongfulconvictionsyouth/understandproblem/ (last
53 Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World,
82 N.C. L. Rev. 891, 945 (2004).
the imposition of the death penalty, despite factors calling for less severe penalty).
56 Jenni Bergal, Oregon Raises Cigarette-buying age to 21, WASH. POST, (Aug. 18, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/oregon-raises-cigarette-buying-age-to-
21/2017/08/18/83366b7a-811e-11e7-902a-2a9f2d808496_story.html?utm_term=.132d118c0d10.
set minimum rental ages at 20 or 21, with higher rental fees for individuals under age 25. Under the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FASFA), the Federal Government considers individuals under age 23 legal dependents of their parents. Similarly, the Internal Revenue Service allows students under the age of 24 to be dependents for tax purposes. The Affordable Care Act also allows individuals under the age of 26 to remain on their parents’ health insurance.

In the context of child-serving agencies, both the child welfare and education systems in states across the country now extend their services to individuals through age 21, recognizing that youth do not reach levels of adult independence and responsibility at age 18. In fact, 25 states have extended foster care or state-funded transitional services to late adolescents through the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008. Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), youth and late adolescents (all of whom IDEA refers to as “children”) with disabilities who have not earned their traditional diplomas are eligible for services through age 21. Going even further, 31 states allow access to free secondary education for students 21-years-old or older.

Similar policies protect late adolescents in both the juvenile and adult criminal justice systems. Forty-five states allow youth up to age 21 to remain under the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system. Nine of those states also allow individuals 21 years old and older to remain under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, including four states that have set the maximum jurisdictional age at 24. A number of states have created special statuses, often called “Youthful

65 Id.
“Serious Offender” status allows individuals in late adolescence to benefit from similar protections to the juvenile justice system, specifically related to the confidentiality of their proceedings and record sealing.\(^{66}\)

For example, in 2017, the Vermont legislature changed the definition of a child for purposes of juvenile delinquency proceedings in the state to an individual who “has committed an act of delinquency after becoming 10 years of age and prior to becoming 22 years of age.”\(^{67}\) This change affords late adolescents access to the treatment and other service options generally associated with juvenile proceedings.\(^{68}\) In 2017, Connecticut, Illinois, and Massachusetts legislators were considering similar efforts to provide greater protections to young adults beyond the age of 18.\(^{69}\) Notably, even when late adolescents enter the adult criminal justice system, some states have created separate correctional housing and programming for individuals under 25.\(^{70}\)

Furthermore, several European countries maintain similarly broad approaches to treatment of late adolescents who commit crimes. In countries like England, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland, late adolescence is a mitigating factor either in statute or in practice that allows many 18 to 21 year olds to receive similar sentences and correctional housing to their peers under 18.\(^{71}\)

There has thus been a consistent trend toward extending the services of traditional child-serving agencies, including the child welfare, education, and juvenile justice systems, to individuals over the age of 18. These various laws and policies, designed to both restrict and protect individuals in this late adolescent age group, reflect our society’s evolving view of the maturity and culpability of 18 to 21 year olds, and beyond. Virtually all of these important reforms have come after 1983, when the ABA first passed its policy concerning the age at which individuals should be exempt from the death penalty.

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\(^{67}\) The legislature made this change in 2017 in order to make Vermont law consistent, as it had also expanded its Youthful Offender Status in 2016 so that 18-to-21-year-olds would be able to have their cases heard in the juvenile court versus the adult court. See H. 95, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2016); S. 23, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2017).

\(^{68}\) Id.


\(^{71}\) Ineke Pruin & Frieder Dunkel, TRANSITION TO ADULTHOOD & UNIV. OF GREIFSWALD, BETTER IN EUROPE? EUROPEAN RESPONSES TO YOUNG ADULT OFFENDING: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 8-10 (2015).
Purposes Served by Executing Individuals in Late Adolescence

Regardless of whether one considers the death penalty an appropriate punishment for the worst murders committed by the worst offenders, it has become clear that the death penalty is indefensible as a response to crimes committed by those in late adolescence. As discussed in this report, a growing body of scientific understanding and a corresponding evolution in our standards of decency undermine the traditional penological purposes of executing defendants who committed a capital murder between the ages of 18 and 21. Just as the ABA has done when adopting earlier policies, we must consider the propriety of the most common penological justifications for the death penalty: “retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.”

Capital punishment does not effectively or fairly advance the goal of retribution within the context of offenders in late adolescence. Indeed, the Eighth Amendment demands that punishments be proportional and personalized to both the offense and the offender. Thus, to be in furtherance of the goal of retribution, those sentenced to death – the most severe and irrevocable sanction available to the state – should be the most blameworthy defendants who have also committed the worst crimes in our society. As has been extensively discussed above, contemporary neuroscientific research demonstrates that several relevant characteristics typify late adolescents’ developmental stage, including: 1) a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, 2) increased susceptibility to negative influences, emotional states, and social pressures, and 3) underdeveloped and highly fluid character.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s holdings in Roper and Atkins were based on the findings that society had redrawn the lines for who is the most culpable or “worst of the worst.” Similarly, the scientific advancements and legal reforms discussed above support the ABA’s determination that there is an evolving moral consensus that late adolescents share a lesser moral culpability with their teenage counterparts. If “the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the state”, then the lesser culpability of those in late adolescence surely cannot justify such a form of retribution.

72 Roper, 543 U.S. at 553.
74 See Commonwealth v. Bredhold, Order Declaring Kentucky’s Death Penalty Statute as Unconstitutional, 14-CR-161, *1, 7-8 (Fayette Circuit Court, Aug. 1, 2017) (After expert testimony and briefing based on contemporary science, the court made specific factual findings that individuals in late adolescence are more likely to underestimate risks; more likely to engage in “sensation seeking;” less able to control their impulses; less emotionally developed than intellectually developed; and more influenced by their peers than adults. It then held that, based on those traits and other reasons, those individuals should be exempt from capital punishment.)
Second, there is insufficient evidence to support the proposition that the death penalty is an effective deterrent to capital murder for individuals in late adolescence. In fact, there is no consensus in either the social science or legal communities about whether there is any general deterrent effect of the death penalty. Even with the most generous assumption that the death penalty may have some deterrent effect for adults without any cognitive or mental health disability, it does not necessarily follow that it would similarly deter a juvenile or late adolescent. Scientific findings suggest that late adolescents are, in this respect, more similar to juveniles. As noted earlier, late adolescence is a developmental period marked by risk-taking and sensation-seeking behavior, as well as a diminished capacity to perform rational, long-term cost-benefit analyses. The same cognitive and behavioral capacities that make those in late adolescence less morally culpable for their acts also “make it less likely that they can process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result, control their conduct based upon that information.”

Finally, both the death penalty and LWOP effectively serve the additional penological goal of incapacitation, as either sentence will prevent that individual from release into general society to commit any future crimes. However, only the death penalty completely rejects the goal of providing some opportunity for redemption or rehabilitation for a young offender. Ninety percent of violent juvenile and late adolescent offenders do not go on to reoffend later in life. Thus, many of these individuals can and will serve their sentences without additional violence, even inside prison, and will surely mature and change as they reach full adulthood. Imposing a death sentence and otherwise giving up on adolescents, precluding their possible rehabilitation or any future positive contributions (even if only made during their years of incarceration), is antithetical to the fundamental principles of our justice system.

Conclusion

In the decades since the ABA adopted its policy opposing capital punishment for individuals under the age of 18, legal, scientific and societal developments strip the continued application of the death penalty against

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78 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320.
individuals in late adolescence of its moral or constitutional justification. The rationale supporting the bans on executing either juveniles, as advanced in Roper v. Simmons, or individuals with intellectual disabilities, as set forth in Atkins v. Virginia, also apply to offenders who are 21 years old or younger when they commit their crimes. Thus, this policy proposes a practical limitation based on age that is supported by science, tracks many other areas of our civil and criminal law, and will succeed in making the administration of the death penalty fairer and more proportional to both the crimes and the offenders.

In adopting this revised position, the ABA still acknowledges the need to impose serious and severe punishment on these individuals when they take the life of another person. Yet at the same time, this policy makes clear our recognition that individuals in late adolescence, in light of their ongoing neurological development, are not among the worst of the worst offenders, for whom the death penalty must be reserved.

Respectfully submitted,

Seth Miller
Chair, Death Penalty Due Process Review Project

Robert Weiner
Chair, Section of Civil Rights and Social Justice

February, 2018
1. **Summary of Resolution.**

This resolution urges each death penalty jurisdiction to not execute or sentence to death anyone who was 21 years old or younger at the time of the offense. Without taking a position supporting or opposing the death penalty, this recommendation fully comports with the ABA’s longstanding position that states should administer the death penalty only when performed in accordance with constitutional principles of fairness and proportionality. Because the Eighth Amendment demands that states impose death only as a response to the most serious crimes committed by the most heinous offenders, this resolution calls on jurisdictions to extend existing constitutional protections for capital defendants under the age of 18 to offenders up to and including the age of 21.

2. **Approval by Submitting Entity.**

Yes. The Steering Committee of the Death Penalty Due Process Review Project approved the Resolution on October 26, 2017 via written vote. The Council of the Section of Civil Rights and Social Justice approved the Recommendation at the Section’s Fall Meeting in Washington, D.C on October 27, 2017, and agreed to be a co-sponsor.

4. **What existing Association policies are relevant to this Resolution and how would they be affected by its adoption?**

The ABA has existing policy that pertains to the imposition of capital punishment on young offenders under the age of 18; this new policy, if adopted, would effectively supercede that policy and extend our position to individuals age 21 and under. Specifically, at the 1983 Annual Meeting, the House of Delegates adopted the position “that the American Bar Association opposes, in principle, the imposition of capital punishment upon any person for any offense committed while under the age of 18.”

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5. If this is a late report, what urgency exists which requires action at this meeting of the House?

N/A.


N/A. There is no known relevant legislation pending in Congress or in state legislatures. However, several states have passed laws in recent years extending juvenile protections to persons older than 18 years of age, including, for example, allowing youth under 21 to remain under the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system. Additionally, this is an issue being raised more frequently in capital case litigation.

7. Brief explanation regarding plans for implementation of the policy, if adopted by the House of Delegates.

If this recommendation and resolution are approved by the House of Delegates, the sponsors will use this policy to enable the leadership, members and staff of the ABA to engage in active and ongoing policy discussions on this issue, to respond to possible state legislation introduced in 2018 and beyond, and to participate as amicus curiae, if a case reaches the U.S. Supreme Court with relevant claims. The sponsors will also use the policy to consult on issues related to the imposition of the death penalty on vulnerable defendants generally, and youthful offenders specifically, when called upon to do so by judges, lawyers, government entities, and bar associations.

8. Cost to the Association. (Both direct and indirect costs)

None.

9. Disclosure of Interest. (If applicable)

N/A.

10. Referrals.

This Resolution has been referred to the following ABA entities that may have an interest in the subject matter:

Center for Human Rights
Center on Children and the Law
Coalition on Racial and Ethnic Justice
Commission on Youth at Risk
Criminal Justice Section
Death Penalty Representation Project
Judicial Division
Law Student Division
11. **Contact Name and Address Information** (prior to the meeting)

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12. **Contact Name and Address Information.** (Who will present the report to the House?)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Summary of the Resolution

This resolution urges each death penalty jurisdiction to not execute or sentence to death anyone who was 21 years old or younger at the time of the offense.

2. Summary of the Issue that the Resolution Addresses

This resolution addresses the practice of sentencing to death and executing young persons ages 21 and under. The resolution clarifies that the ABA’s long-standing position on capital punishment further necessitates that jurisdictions categorically exempt offenders ages 21 and under from capital punishment due to the lessened moral culpability, immaturity, and capacity for rehabilitation exemplified in late adolescence.

3. Please Explain How the Proposed Policy Position Will Address the Issue

The resolution aims to accomplish this goal by consulting on issues related to young offenders and the death penalty when called upon to do so by judges, lawyers, government entities, and bar associations, by supporting the filing of amicus briefs in cases that present issues of youthfulness and capital punishment, and by conducting and publicizing reports of jurisdictional practices vis-à-vis the imposition of death on late adolescent offenders for public information and use in the media and advocacy communities.

4. Summary of Minority Views or Opposition Internal and/or External to the ABA Which Have Been Identified

None.