“Carbon Copy” Prosecutions: A Growing Anticorruption Phenomenon in a Shrinking World

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Carbon Copy Prosecution: When foreign or domestic Jurisdiction A files charges based on a guilty plea or charging document from Jurisdiction B.

In February 2009, oilfield services giant Halliburton Company settled with US authorities for a record-breaking $579 million to put an end to charges that one of its former units bribed Nigerian officials to obtain multibillion dollar contracts to build liquefied natural gas facilities on Bonny Island, Nigeria.¹ The resolution no doubt brought a sigh of relief to those Halliburton executives who had been under investigation but who, at the conclusion of the US probe, had not been criminally or civilly charged. For many of them, however, that relative calm ended on

December 7, 2010, when Nigerian anticorruption authorities released a sixteen-count criminal complaint against Halliburton, several related companies, and many of their C-suite executives for conduct that mirrored—and that the companies to a great extent had already publicly admitted to being part of—the resolved US criminal and administrative cases.2

Even more, the announcement garnered worldwide headlines due to its inclusion of former US Vice President Richard Cheney, the one-time Halliburton CEO.3 Nigerian authorities also sought extradition of the defendants (including Vice President Cheney), invoking its longstanding extradition treaty with the US.4 Within two weeks, Halliburton settled the Nigeria case.5 But the message sent by the actions of the Nigerian authorities was loud and clear. First, if a corporation reaches a negotiated resolution with US authorities on international bribery-related charges—whether through a non-prosecution agreement, a deferred prosecution agreement, or a guilty plea—there is a bona fide risk that other countries will initiate prosecutions based on the same facts as, and admissions arising out of, the US investigation and resolution. Second, if an individual corporate officer is even tangentially involved or implicated in a US-negotiated resolution, that corporate officer—even if not named at all in the resolution—faces potential criminal charges overseas. The officer, therefore, has a strong incentive to ensure that the resolution either does not name him or her or describes the officer’s conduct in the most positive light (or at least neutrally).

This Article examines this growing—but still largely underrecognized—international phenomenon of “carbon copy” prosecutions.6 Part I provides a brief overview of the Foreign Corrupt

3 See, for example, Nigeria Plans to Charge Cheney in Case of Bribery, NY Times A12 (Dec 3, 2010).
6 Mr. Boutros coined the term “carbon copy” prosecutions during a presentation he and Mr. Funk delivered in Toronto, Canada in the summer of 2011. See Juliet S. Sorensen, The Globalization of Anti-Corruption Law, FCPA Professor Blog (Aug 16,
Practices Act (FCPA) and its constituent parts. It also examines recent FCPA enforcement trends and statistics, and places that data in the context of the historical progression of the statute’s enforcement. Part II introduces the reader to the concept of carbon copy prosecutions. It identifies several key cases in which foreign governments have brought follow-on enforcement actions predicated on the very admissions and factual findings that emerged from US government-led investigations and negotiated resolutions, although also identified are instances where the enforcement order is reversed. Part II also examines several matters in which corporations have agreed to cooperate with foreign authorities as a condition to resolving charges with US authorities. Part III then details the myriad cost-benefit considerations that companies might weigh when deciding whether to make voluntary front-end disclosures to foreign authorities concurrently with their disclosures of potential FCPA violations to US officials. Among these considerations is the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy implication of serial, multiplicitous international prosecutions arising out of a common core of operative facts. Part IV discusses the collateral estoppel effect of US resolutions on international enforcement actions, and vice versa. Finally, Part V concludes with some observations on the current state of international enforcement, including the future of carbon copy prosecutions.

I. THE FCPA

A. FCPA Overview: How Liability Attaches

The FCPA, at its core, makes it a crime for a person, company, or other entity to corruptly offer or provide anything of value to a foreign government official for the purpose of improperly obtaining or retaining business.\(^7\) The classic paradigm is an illegal quid pro quo: a company representative pays a bribe overseas to a foreign official in exchange for that official awarding the company a lucrative contract or granting a critical license. Often, the bribe is negotiated by a non-US third party agent working abroad, with the improper payment occurring on foreign soil. Despite the non-domestic nature of the crime, the FCPA’s extrater-

\(^7\) See 15 USC § 78dd-l et seq.
ritorial reach captures and prohibits precisely this type of conduct, so long as it is committed by persons, issuers, companies, or other entities that have a statutorily-defined nexus to the United States.\(^8\)

Of course, the kind of bribery the FCPA proscribes typically is also illegal under the local laws of the foreign country where the bribe is offered, paid, or received. In this regard, a person or company that violates the FCPA—and, particularly, that admits to such violations in the public record—risks successive prosecution \textit{both} by the US and another sovereign for that conduct.

In addition to the antibribery provisions, the FCPA contains two accounting provisions: (1) the books-and-records provision and (2) the internal controls provision. The books-and-records provision requires issuers to “make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.”\(^9\) The internal controls provision, in turn, requires that issuers “devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that,” among other requirements, (1) “transactions are executed in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization”; (2) “access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization”; and (3) “transactions are recorded as necessary to permit a preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles . . . and to maintain accountability for assets.”\(^10\)

B. FCPA Enforcement Progression: Past, Present, & Future

The last several years have witnessed a significant uptick in FCPA enforcement actions. On November 8, 2011, Assistant Attorney General (AAG) Lanny Breuer, addressing the 26th National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, noted that 2011—though not to the extent of 2010—witnessed historic

\(^8\) See 15 USC § 78dd-1 (making the FCPA applicable to “issuers”); 15 USC § 78dd-2 (making the FCPA applicable to “domestic concerns”); 15 USC § 78dd-3 (making the FCPA applicable to “persons” other than “issuers” or “domestic concerns” who undertake an act “while in the territory of the United States”).

\(^9\) 15 USC § 78m(b)(2)(A).

\(^10\) 15 USC § 78m(b)(2). For a decision tree illustrating the flow, logic, and big picture considerations at play in a “typical” FCPA antibribery case, see T. Markus Funk and M. Bridget Minder, \textit{The FCPA in 2011 and Beyond: Is Targeted FCPA Reform Really the “Wrong Thing at the Wrong Time”?}, 6 Bloomberg L Rep—Corporate and M&A Law 1, 12 (Dec 29, 2011).
FCPA enforcement actions. More specifically, there were more FCPA trials in 2011 than in any prior year, and 2011 also saw the longest prison sentence—fifteen years—ever imposed under the FCPA. Indeed, 2011 (the last full year for which enforcement statistics are available as of the publication of this article) was another strong year for FCPA enforcement. Stated plainly, in just a few short years the FCPA morphed from an obscure, largely unenforced criminal statute into the hottest corporate compliance and criminal legal issue facing the global business community. And this transformation was anything but accidental.

On November 17, 2009, recapping the government’s 2009 FCPA enforcement efforts, AAG Breuer noted that “[o]ne can say without exaggeration that this past year was probably the most dynamic single year in the more than thirty years since the FCPA was enacted.” A year later, AAG Breuer announced a prosecutorial sea change: “[W]e are in a new era of FCPA enforcement.” The 2010 and 2011 enforcement statistics, which are represented below in graphical form, not only proved AAG Breuer’s point, but also demonstrate that the FCPA without a doubt ranked as one of the government’s top enforcement priorities.

In 2011, AAG Breuer confirmed the government’s intention to continue its heightened FCPA enforcement efforts:

[I]n the Criminal Division, we have dramatically increased our enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices

12 Id.
Act in recent years. That statute, which was once seen as slumbering, is now very much alive and well. We recently promoted a new head of the Section’s FCPA Unit and two assistant chiefs, and we have also increased the number of line prosecutors in the Unit, attracting high caliber attorneys with extensive experience—including Assistant U.S. Attorneys with significant trial and prosecutorial experience and attorneys from private practice with defense-side knowledge and experience. These changes have significantly increased our FCPA enforcement capabilities.17

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Director of Enforcement Robert Khuzami reinforced AAG Breuer’s comments: “Word is getting out that bribery is bad business, and we will continue to work closely with the business community and our colleagues in law enforcement in the fight against global corruption.”18

These enforcement figures are particularly impressive given the accelerated pace at which they arrived.19 Consider that in 2004 and 2005, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the SEC only brought FCPA charges against a combined twelve individuals.20 In 2009 and 2010, on the other hand, the DOJ and SEC brought a combined sixty enforcement actions against individuals.21

19 See Funk, Another Landmark Year, 3 Bloomberg L Rep—White Collar Crime at 1–2 (cited in note 14) (noting that the total number of FCPA actions increased from 2009 to 2010 and projecting a further increase in 2011).
21 Id. On March 26, 2012, the cases against twenty-two defendants charged by the DOJ in its undercover “Shot Show” sting operation were dismissed with prejudice. See Alexandra A. Wrage and Sarah Geiger, All Charges Dismissed in the Department of Justice’s FCPA Africa Sting Case, TRACEblog (TRACE Mar 28, 2012), online at http://traceblog.org/2012/03/28/all-charges-dismissed-in-the-department-of-justices-fcpa-africa-sting-case/ (visited Sept 10, 2012).
Moving from the prosecution of individuals to the prosecution of companies, the ten largest FCPA enforcement actions—measured in terms of the size of combined SEC and DOJ recoveries—consist mostly of cases against foreign companies. As of August 2012, the top ten cases were as follows:

1. Siemens (Germany): $800 million in 2008;
2. KBR/Halliburton (US): $579 million in 2009;
3. BAE (UK): $400 million in 2010;
5. Technip SA (France): $338 million in 2010;
6. JGC Corporation (Japan): $218.8 million in 2011;
7. Daimler AG (Germany): $185 million in 2010;

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22 See Recent Trends and Patterns in FCPA Enforcement, FCPA Digest at 3 (cited in note 20). Note, Figure 1 includes the “Shot Show” actions, which although ultimately dismissed were nonetheless originally filed. See note 21.

8. Alcatel-Lucent (France): $137 million in 2010;

9. Magyar Telekom/Deutsche Telekom (Hungary/Germany): $95 million in 2011; and

10. Panalpina (Switzerland): $81.8 million in 2010. 

The trend of active enforcement continued in 2011. In that year, a federal judge handed down the longest prison sentence ever under the FCPA—fifteen years. In another case, 2011 also saw the largest FCPA forfeiture judgment against an individual—$149 million. Both the DOJ and the SEC, moreover, unveiled plans to further augment their dedicated FCPA resources.

**Figure 2. Summary of DOJ and SEC Enforcement Actions Brought, 2004–2011**

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The United States is by far the global anticorruption leader.\textsuperscript{29} By way of example, the United States in 2010 outpaced the rest of the world’s collective enforcement efforts by an astounding 3:1 ratio in outbound bribery enforcement activity. The United States continues to file more than 70 percent of the world’s foreign antibribery charges, with the United Kingdom coming in second place with about 5 percent of prosecutions.\textsuperscript{30} Stated plainly, from 2000 to 2010, US enforcers brought over 3.5 times as many antibribery enforcement actions as all other countries in the world combined.\textsuperscript{31} Consider the recent TRACE International, Inc. findings:

Foreign bribery enforcement by countries other than the United States actually fell in 2010, while the United States surged ahead with a more than a doubling of its formal enforcement figures between 2009 and 2010.\ldots The United States has accumulated over 14 times as many anti-bribery enforcement actions as the country with the next highest total, the United Kingdom. Many countries worldwide have not pursued a single enforcement action in the 34-year period.\textsuperscript{32}

But the gross 2010 and 2011 enforcement figures are not the only cause of sleepless nights among many of the world’s corporate executives. A number of emerging enforcement trends presage that, in the coming years, the business community can expect these enforcement efforts to continue to ramp up (and, depending on one’s perspective, get more—or overly—aggressive). For example:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Whistleblower bounty provisions are being fine-tuned to lure in additional tipsters.\textsuperscript{33}
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{29} See Funk, \textit{Another Landmark Year}, 3 Bloomberg L Rep—White Collar Crime at 2 (cited in note 14) (noting that the US outpaced the world’s collective enforcement efforts by a 3:1 ratio in 2010, as measured by total number of FCPA actions filed).


\textsuperscript{32} Id at 2–3 (emphasis in original).

\textsuperscript{33} On May 25, 2011, the SEC issued its final rules to establish a new whistleblower program, as required by Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act, paying awards to whistle-
• Increased compliance and promises of leniency are being used to encourage self-disclosure.34

• Multijurisdictional cooperation and parallel investigations and prosecutions are becoming more common.35

• With reportedly over 150 open/pending investigations, investigative approaches and techniques are growing increasingly proactive and aggressive, with FCPA violations being investigated like sophisticated “street” crimes, namely, through the use of techniques that include undercover agents and informants, court-authorized wiretaps, and searches and seizures.36

• The prosecution of individual defendants continues to be a top enforcement priority.37

• Law enforcement agent specialization has promoted more effective industry-specific enforcement.38

• The “demand side” of the enforcement net is being widened to also catch bribe recipients and those middlemen who assist them.39

• Congress is considering mandatory debarment of governmental contractors found to be FCPA violators.40

Rounding out this list, of course, is the emerging trend that is the subject of this Article, namely transnational carbon copy prosecutions. Although there is a superfluidity of views on whether this trend is a “race to the top” or a “race to the bot-

34 See Funk, Another Landmark Year, 3 Bloomberg L Rep—White Collar Crime at 1 (cited in note 14).
35 See id.
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 See Funk, Another Landmark Year, 3 Bloomberg L Rep—White Collar Crime at 1 (cited in note 14).
39 See id.
40 See Overseas Contractor Reform Act, HR 3588, 112th Cong, 1st Sess (Dec 7, 2011).
One thing is clear: the US is, and will for the foreseeable future continue to be, the global anticorruption leader.

II. CARBON COPY PROSECUTIONS

A. Carbon Copy Prosecutions: A New Fixture in the International Enforcement Arena

1. A definition and an explanation of carbon copy prosecutions.

We use the term carbon copy prosecutions to refer to successive, duplicative prosecutions by multiple sovereigns for conduct transgressing the laws of several nations, but arising out of the same common nucleus of operative facts. We view carbon copy prosecutions as an emerging—and likely, lasting—development almost certain to permanently change the equation used to conduct and resolve international anticorruption investigations.

For years, corporate targets concerned themselves primarily with whether they would face liability from both the DOJ and SEC for overseas conduct violating the FCPA. However, exposure to liability from a single sovereign is no longer the standard concern. Now, companies and their executives and agents cannot afford to focus exclusively on the enforcement arms of the DOJ and SEC, both acting on behalf of the unitary, monolithic sovereignty of the United States. Today’s international enforcement picture is much more complex.


42 See Sorensen, The Globalization of Anti-Corruption Law (cited in note 6) (“Boutros also pointed out an increased trend in what he termed ‘carbon copy’ prosecutions, a phenomenon where foreign authorities rely on the factual findings emerging out of US enforcement actions to vindicate the local laws of their own jurisdiction—often the site of the bribe payment or bribe receipt.”).

First, an increasing number of nations are enacting—or at least contemplating—enhanced anticorruption laws. For example, China, Russia, and the United Kingdom have passed new and enhanced anticorruption legislation, while India is in the process of doing so. Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, Taiwan, and the Ukraine, furthermore, are among those countries also to have recently proposed or adopted anticorruption measures. More importantly for purposes of this Article, and as recent foreign enforcement actions demonstrate, more and more nations are actively enforcing their own local anticorruption laws. As such, serious consideration must be given to the increasing possibility of successive prosecutions by multiple sovereigns for the same core conduct that gives rise to US liability.

Of course, an important distinction must be made between the theoretical risk of prosecution and a foreign nation’s actual, demonstrated willingness to prosecute. To be sure, for years companies and others have known and understood—at least on a theoretical level—that from an international jurisdictional standpoint, an illegal act committed in one nation could give rise to liability in another nation that prohibits the same or a similar act (or conduct facilitating the commission of the illegal act).

44 See PRC Anti-Unfair Competition Law Art 8 (People’s Republic of China 2003); PRC Criminal Law Art 164 and Amend 8 (People’s Republic of China 2011) (criminalizing the payment of bribes to non-PRC government officials and international public organizations); Federal Law On Amendments to the Criminal Code and the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation to Improve State Anti-Corruption Management, online at http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/2164 (visited Sept 10, 2012) (raising fines to up to 100 times the amount of the bribe given or received with a cap of 500 million rubles, or approximately $18.3 million); Bribery Act 2010, c 23 (UK).


46 See F. Joseph Warin, et al, 2008 Year-End FCPA Update (Gibson Dunn 2009), online at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2008Year-EndFCPAUpdate.aspx (visited Sept 10, 2012) (quoting the DOJ’s then Acting Assistant Attorney General as stating that the “United States is not the only player at the table” when it comes to “fighting global corruption”).

47 Indeed, the statistics show that foreign enforcements continue to considerably lag behind US enforcement activities. See Funk and Minder, The FCPA in 2011 and Beyond, 6 Bloomberg L Rep—Corporate and M&A Law at 10 (cited in note 10) (“[A]lthough the world may, indeed, be … passing more local anti-corruption legislation … its collective zeal to actually enforce anti-corruption laws continues to significantly lag.”).

48 See, for example, David C. Weiss, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC Disgorgement of Profits, and the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weighing Proportionality, Retribution, and Deterrence, 30 Mich J Intl L 471, 493–94 & n 118 (2009) (identifying and collecting the jurisdictional provisions of at least seventeen countries that are said to “employ broad jurisdiction that could result in an individual or firm facing foreign bribery charges and being subject to prosecution in multiple jurisdictions for the same underlying conduct”).

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For example, a bribe paid overseas by a US agent to a foreign official not only offends the FCPA and the US Travel Act,\(^\text{49}\) but it almost certainly violates the local laws where the bribe was paid and accepted. Even more, with the proliferation of extraterritorial provisions in the criminal laws of nations that prohibit international bribery, a single improper payment can trigger liability not only in the US under the FCPA and in the country where the bribe took place, but in every jurisdiction that claims a codified interest in putting an end to foreign bribery by those that carry on a business, or part of a business, within its territories.\(^\text{50}\)

But the phrase carbon copy prosecutions does not refer to questions of overlapping jurisdiction among nations, nor does it implicate hypothetical enforcement opportunities arising out of the quilt-like pattern of overlapping foreign laws that prohibit international bribery. Instead, it describes the real-world, burgeoning phenomenon of consecutive prosecutions (or at least investigations) in multiple jurisdictions for the same (or similar) underlying conduct.\(^\text{51}\) Indeed, two key features of these prosecutions are (1) the timing in which often foreign governments bring their follow-on actions and (2) the subject matter of these enforcement actions.

Turning from the general to the specific, recent enforcement trends tell a story of foreign countries initiating largely similar (if not nearly identical) foreign proceedings with increased frequency after a company has already resolved its FCPA liability with US authorities, whether by way of a non-prosecution agreement, a deferred prosecution agreement, or a guilty plea. In this regard, one organization, the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP), has petitioned the Nigerian gov-

\(^{49}\) 18 USC § 1952.

\(^{50}\) See Weiss, Note, 30 Mich J Intl L at 493–94 (cited in note 48). One such example is the UK Bribery Act, which includes a jurisdictional provision that captures within its reach all entities and partnerships that “carry[y] on a business, or part of a business, in any part of the United Kingdom,” even if the improper payment itself has no territorial connection to the United Kingdom. Bribery Act 2010, c 23 s 7(5) (UK). See generally T. Markus Funk, Understanding the UK Bribery Act as it Relates to Organizations (Section 7) (Perkins Coie 2011), online at http://www.perkinsoie.com/files/upload/LIT_11_12Flow Chart_UKBriberyAct.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012).

\(^{51}\) Carbon copy prosecutions are also to be distinguished from global resolutions across countries, such as the global settlements (or proposed global settlements) involving (1) Siemens (resolution with United States and Germany), (2) BAE Systems PLC (resolution with the United States and United Kingdom), and (3) Ineospec Inc (resolution with the United States and United Kingdom). See, for example, Claudius O. Sokenu, 2010 FCPA Enforcement Year-End Review, 43 BNA Sec Reg & L Rep 12 (Mar 21, 2011) (describing BAE’s and Ineospec’s efforts and tribulations in entering into a global settlement with US and UK authorities).
government to “urgently take steps to seek adequate damages and compensation against multinational corporations who have been found guilty in the US of committing foreign bribery in Nigeria.”52 In fact, in an effort to provide specific, actionable information to the Nigerian government in support of its petition, SERAP identified by name those companies that had already admitted to having committed FCPA violations in Nigeria, yet had received no, or in SERAP’s views, too little punishment, under Nigerian law.53 According to SERAP:

While settlement by Halliburton Co and Kellogg Brown & Root LLC (KBR) in Nigeria has amounted only to US $35 million, the corporation has paid over $727 million in settlement and damages in the US. Similarly, Technip SA has paid $338 million in settlement in the US, but has not paid any damages in Nigeria. Snamprogetti Netherlands BV and ENI SpA paid only $32.5 million in Nigeria, but has [sic] paid $365 million in the US.

JGC Corp paid $28.5 million in Nigeria but paid $218.8 million in the US; MW Kellogg paid no damages in Nigeria, but has paid £7 million in the UK. Also, Julius Berger Nigeria Plc has paid only $29.5 million in Nigeria, while Willbros International has paid over $41 million in the US but has made no payment in Nigeria. Panalpina paid $82 million in US, but no payment has been made in Nigeria. The Royal Dutch Shell Plc has paid only $10 million in Nigeria whereas it has paid $48.2 million in the US.

... Pride International paid $56.1 million in the US but made no payment in Nigeria; Noble Corp has paid $8.1


53 Amalu, Bribery: SERAP Asks EFFC to Seek Damages (cited in note 52).
million in the US but no payment made in Nigeria; Tidewater Inc has paid $15.7 million in the US but no payment in Nigeria; Transocean Inc made payment of $20.6 million in the US but no payment made in Nigeria; Shell Nigerian Exploration and Production Co. Ltd paid $18 million in the US but no payment in Nigeria; and Siemens AG paid only $46 million in Nigeria, whereas it paid $800 million in the US.  

Similarly—although with the carbon copy request being directed to US authorities—the highly influential international corruption watchdog organization Transparency International asked the DOJ to “examine” Oklahoma-based Walters Power International’s $20 million fraud conviction in Pakistan and to “take action against” it and other US firms under the FCPA based on the Pakistani Supreme Court’s findings of guilt.  

When faced with such serial, linear enforcement proceedings, companies can be expected to resolve their successive enforcement actions in a manner similar to their original resolution.

2. Carbon copy prosecutions: their practical implications.

When a company enters into a negotiated resolution with the DOJ, it must allocate; that is, it must admit, accept, and acknowledge responsibility for the underlying conduct that gave rise to liability. In the case of a guilty plea, a court is not permitted to accept a guilty plea unless it “determine[s] that there is a factual basis for the plea.” Moreover, a district court’s acceptance of a guilty plea is a “factual finding” that a defendant is guilty of the charge.

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55 See Usman Manzoor, US Urged to Take Action Against RPP Firm for $20m Fraud, The News International (April 10, 2012) (“Transparency International Pakistan requests Chief, Fraud Section U.S. Department of Justice Criminal Division to kindly examine this case and take action against the US firms under the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA Act 1977.”).

56 FRCrP 11(b)(3).

57 See, for example, United States v Hildenbrand, 527 F3d 466, 475 (5th Cir 2008) (“[T]he Fifth Circuit regards the district court’s acceptance of a guilty plea as a factual finding to be reviewed for clear error.”). See also Gray v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 708 F2d 243, 246 (6th Cir 1983) (stating that a “guilty plea is as much a conviction as a conviction following jury trial” and explaining further in the tax context that
In contrast, and until January 2012, the SEC had a long-standing policy of settling cases by allowing a party neither to admit nor to deny the agency’s allegations in the civil injunctive complaint or administrative order.58 But on January 7, 2012, the SEC announced a modification to the “settlement language [appropriate] for cases involving criminal convictions where a defendant [ ] admit[s] violations of the criminal law.”59 “[T]he new policy does not require admissions or adjudications of fact beyond those already made in criminal cases, but eliminates language that may be construed as inconsistent with admissions or findings that have already been made in the criminal cases.”60 The policy applies regardless of whether the criminal resolution comes in the form of a conviction, deferred prosecution agreement, or non-prosecution agreement.61 Naturally, then, the

58 See SEC Release No 33-5337 (Nov 28, 1972), 37 Fed Reg 25224-01 (Nov 29, 1972) (formally permitting respondent to avoid admitting or denying the allegations). See also 17 CFR §202.5; SEC v Citigroup Global Markets, Inc, 2011 WL 5903733, *4 (SDNY 2011) (describing as “long-standing” the SEC’s policy “of allowing defendants to enter into Consent Judgments without admitting or denying the underlying allegations”); SEC v Vitesse Semiconductor Corp, 771 F Supp 2d 304, 308–10 (SDNY 2010) (examining the history of the SEC policy). In recent years, this policy has led to increasing criticism and scrutiny by the federal courts. Compare Citigroup Global Markets, Inc, 2011 WL 5903733 at *2 (“[T]he Court concludes that it cannot approve [the Consent Judgment], because the Court has not been provided with any proven or admitted facts upon which to exercise even a modest degree of independent judgment.”), with SEC v Citigroup Global Markets, Inc, 673 F3d 158, 169 (2d Cir 2012) (granting a stay of the district court’s proceedings on the ground that the SEC and Citigroup had made a “strong showing of likelihood of success in setting aside the district court’s rejection of their settlement”). See also Letter to Counsel, SEC v Koss Corp, No 11-C-991, *1–2 (ED Wisc Dec 20, 2011) (relying on the district court’s decision in SEC v Citigroup Global Markets, Inc, to reject an SEC settlement with Koss Corporation and requesting “a written factual predicate” for the settlement); Adam S. Hakki, Christopher R. Fenton, and Brian G. Burke, The Impact of the Financial Crisis on the Regulatory Landscape and the Resulting Implications for Securities Class Action Litigation, 1950 PLI/Corp 81, 94 (Apr 26, 2012); SEC v Bank of America Corp, 653 F Supp 2d 507, 508 (SDNY 2009) (denying an SEC-proposed $33 million settlement with Bank of America because, in part, Bank of America neither admitted nor denied the allegations in the Consent Judgment and took the position in its court submission that “the proxy statement in issue was totally in accordance with the law”).


60 Khuzami, Public Statement (cited in note 59). As the SEC noted, the new policy change “does not affect [the SEC’s] traditional ‘neither admit nor deny’ approach in settlements that do not involve criminal convictions or admissions of criminal law violations.” Id.

61 Id. The SEC has recently expanded its settlement vehicles to include deferred
Statement of Facts in a criminal plea agreement—especially in those cases with parallel SEC enforcement exposure—can prove to be the most negotiated (and contested) portion of such a resolution.

Similarly, when a company admits to the factual basis in a DOJ-based deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreement, the terms of the agreement typically bar the company from making any public statement contradicting the factual basis.\(^{62}\) Moreover, these agreements ordinarily empower the DOJ alone to determine whether a company has breached its agreement and taken a position contradicting the factual basis.\(^{63}\)

The net effect of these DOJ and SEC policies is that when a company enters into a negotiated resolution with the DOJ—particularly in those cases with parallel SEC enforcement actions—it is essentially powerless to defend against, much less deny, the factual basis on which the resolution is based.\(^{64}\) This all but ensures that a company that settles with the DOJ—or both the DOJ and SEC in parallel proceedings—will have little or no choice but to settle with foreign authorities, should such authorities choose to exercise jurisdiction and enforce their corollary anticorruption laws.


\(^{62}\) See F. Joseph Warin, et al, 2009 Year-End Update on Corporate Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements (Gibson Dunn 2010), online at http://www.gibson dunn.com/publications/pages/2009YearEndUpdateCorpDeferredProsecutionAgreements.a spx (visited Sept 10, 2012) (observing that “the terms and conditions of DPAs and NPAs have become more homogenous over the past few years” and that “the vast majority of DPAs and NPAs contained provisions … prohibiting the company for making any statement that contradicts the facts as laid out in the agreement”). See also Khuzami, *Public Statement* (cited in note 59) (“Under the new approach … we will … [r]etain the current prohibition on denying the allegations of the Complaint/[Order Instituting Proceedings] or making statements suggesting the Commission’s allegations are without factual basis.”).

\(^{63}\) See Warin, et al, 2009 Year-End Update (cited in note 62) (observing that pretrial diversion agreements routinely “giv[e] DOJ sole discretion to determine whether the agreement has been breached by the company”).

potential follow-on derivative and employment lawsuits, tort and contract law claims, securities fraud actions, and private actions under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. By keeping the factual statement as simple as possible, companies position themselves to be able to defend themselves more vigorously against these piggyback civil actions, while at the same time avoiding claims that they are contradicting the negotiated factual statements. In today’s international anticorruption climate, however, such concerns transcend civil liability and reach the very real possibility of sequential liability to foreign sovereigns.

B. Noteworthy Examples of Carbon Copy Prosecutions

The concept of carbon copy prosecution may be something that here, for the first time, is receiving analytical scrutiny and is being proposed as a foundational construct, but its real-world manifestation is certainly not new.

1. Alcatel-Lucent.

Take, for example, Alcatel-Lucent SA ("Alcatel-Lucent")—a case involving a double dose of carbon copy prosecutions. In January 2010, the French-based telecommunications equipment and services provider agreed to pay $10 million to the Costa Rican

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65 See id at 129. The authors explain:

As should be obvious, the whole point of a DPA is that companies may not be able to weather the storm of an indictment without it; upon indictment, companies are likely to face fundamental instability, downgrading of creditworthiness, loss of market share, diminution of stock value, market and reputational damage, debarment from certain industries, regulatory proceedings, and class actions.

Id.

66 For a discussion of the interplay and potential implications of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) on successive multi-sovereign enforcement actions, see Mary Shaddock-Jones and Thomas Fox, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: A New Focus!, FCPA Compliance and Ethics Blog (Sept 8, 2011), online at http://tfoxlaw.wordpress.com/category/united-nations-convention-against-corruption-uncac/ (visited Sept 10, 2012). Shaddock-Jones and Fox explain:

An enforcement action based upon Article 53 could allow a country such as Nigeria to come into a U.S. court and seek compensation from a U.S. company which has committed bribery in Nigeria or require the DOJ/SEC to recognize a foreign country which has ratified the UNCAC as the “legitimate owner” of profits disgorged or fines and penalties paid to the U.S. government as a result of a FCPA violation.

Id.
government to settle charges that it had paid some $7 million in kickbacks to Costa Rican government officials (including $800,000 that went directly to former Costa Rican President Miguel Angel Rodriguez) to win a 2001 cellular telephone equipment contract valued at $149 million. The settlement “marked the first time in Costa Rica’s history that a foreign corporation agreed to pay the government damages for corruption.”

Less than a year later, in December 2010, US authorities announced that Alcatel-Lucent and three of its subsidiaries had resolved a pending six-year FCPA investigation. As part of this resolution, Alcatel-Lucent agreed to pay a combined $137.4 million to the DOJ and SEC to resolve a variety of FCPA violations arising from millions of dollars of improper payments to foreign officials in Costa Rica, Honduras, Malaysia, and Taiwan. Specifically, to settle the SEC’s civil complaint, Alcatel-Lucent agreed to pay $45.4 million in disgorgement to the SEC and also consented to an injunction from future violations of the FCPA’s antibribery, books-and-records, and internal controls provisions.

To resolve its criminal case with the DOJ, Alcatel-Lucent agreed to proceed by way of criminal information (as opposed to indictment) and entered into a three-year deferred prosecution agreement that included a nearly forty-five page statement of facts chronicling years of improper payments and lax controls.

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Significantly, as part of its deferred prosecution agreement, Alcatel-Lucent also agreed to cooperate with foreign authorities in their investigations. 73 Specifically, Alcatel-Lucent’s deferred prosecution agreement stated:

At the request of the Department, and consistent with applicable law and regulations … Alcatel-Lucent shall also cooperate fully with such other domestic or foreign law enforcement authorities and agencies, as well as the Multilateral Development Banks (“MDBs”), in any investigation of Alcatel-Lucent, or any of its present and former officers, directors, employees, agents, consultants, contractors, subcontractors, and subsidiaries, or any other party, in any and all matters relating to corrupt payments, related false books and records, and inadequate internal controls, and in such manner as the parties may agree. 74

Alcatel-Lucent also agreed that:

With respect to any information, testimony, documents, records or other tangible evidence provided to the Department pursuant to this Agreement, Alcatel-Lucent consents to any and all disclosures, subject to applicable law and regulations … to other governmental authorities, including United States authorities and those of a foreign government, and the MDBs, of such materials as the Department, in its sole discretion, shall deem appropriate. 75

Three of Alcatel-Lucent’s subsidiaries resolved their criminal cases by pleading guilty to charges of conspiring to violate the FCPA, and each agreed to a forty-three page consolidated statement of facts. 76 As part of their plea agreements, the Alcatel-Lucent subsidiaries agreed that, “at the request of the Department,” the subsidiaries would “cooperate fully with foreign law enforcement authorities and agencies.” 77

Two days later, Honduran authorities responded to the news of Alcatel-Lucent’s US resolution by announcing that they would reopen their investigation against Alcatel-Lucent and, more spe-

73 Alcatel-Lucent DPA at *4 (cited in note 72).
74 Id.
75 Id at *5.
76 See Plea Agreement, United States v Alcatel Centroamerica, SA, No 10-CR-20906-Martinez (SD Fla filed Dec 27, 2010).
77 Id at *3.
cifically, into the now-admitted conduct that occurred in Honduras and gave rise to Alcatel-Lucent’s US liability. According to news reports, “Honduran anti-corruption prosecutor Henry Salgado said Honduras will ask the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to supply the information on which the settlement was based, [in order] to identify those [in Honduras who were] involved.”

According to Mr. Salgado, “[i]n this case, international assistance should be asked for, in order to access the file and see who made the payments to [the Honduran government officials]. . . . If we accept the guilt, there must be people’s names. We expect international collaboration.” Such collaboration, according to the news reports, meant that the “plan” would be to “petition” the SEC and DOJ for information. This news came despite the fact that the “Alcatel relationship had already been investigated [] by the Honduran High Court of Auditors, who found no improprieties.”


   a) The Bonny Island prosecutions: Halliburton. Although carbon copy prosecutions appear to be a globally emerging trend, the movement has been especially pronounced in Nigeria. Take,

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78 Associated Press, Honduras Reopens Alcatel Bribe Case on SEC ruling, Bloomberg Businessweek (Bloomberg Dec 29, 2010), online at http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9KDN1F00.htm (visited Sept 10, 2012). Malaysian authorities are also said to be investigating Alcatel-Lucent for bribes it paid to its government officials. See Sokenu, 43 BNA Sec Reg & L Rep 12 (cited in note 51) (“Following the company’s $137 million settlement with the Justice Department and the Commission, officials in Malaysia and Honduras, two countries mentioned in the U.S. settlement, announced that they were investigating Alcatel-Lucent’s conduct in their respective countries.”). Even without a carbon copy prosecution out of Malaysia, Alcatel-Lucent is believed to have served a one-year ban on participating in Malaysian government-related vendor bids, including tender offers, contracts, and joint ventures. See Melissa Chua, Alcatel-Lucent Barred in Malaysian Bid Due to Bribery Allegations (Telecom Asia Mar 25, 2011), online at http://www.telecomasia.net/content/alca-lu-barred-axiata-tm-bids (visited Sept 10, 2012).

79 Associated Press, Honduras Reopens Alcatel Bribe Case (cited in note 78).


81 Id.

82 Id. Indeed, the manager of the Honduran State telephone company, Hondutel, was quoted as saying that “[t]he information we have from the Hondutel legal counsel is that they did research Alcatel, but it ended with nothing, they found no liability at the time.” Id (stating also that “[t]he Honduras TSC [the Tribunal Superior de Cuentas or Secretary General of The Court of Accounts] revealed that they had investigated the administration of former Hondutel manager, Luis Alonso ‘Chitin’ Valenzuela, and found no civil or criminal liability between the years 2004 and 2005”).

83 Despite this fact, “the total amount of fines levied by the [Nigerian] Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) . . . equates to less that 4% of the total penalties
for example, the case of the earlier mentioned Bonny Island joint venture, in which the TSKJ consortium\textsuperscript{84} paid some $182 million in third party consulting fees, with the expectation that some of those fees would be used to pay bribes to Nigerian officials.\textsuperscript{85} Three of the joint venture participants are of particular relevance here: Halliburton/KBR, Inc/KBR;\textsuperscript{86} Snamprogetti and its parent company ENI SpA; and JGC.\textsuperscript{87}

When, in February 2009, Halliburton’s former subsidiary KBR pleaded guilty to five counts of violating the FCPA, it admitted to being part of the TSKJ consortium that had paid at least $182 million in consulting fees.\textsuperscript{88} As discussed above, these fees were used in part to pay bribes to Nigerian government officials between 1995 and 2004, with the goal of securing engineering, procurement, and construction contracts to build liquefied natural gas facilities. The contracts were valued at approximately $6 billion and led to KBR profits of approximately $235.5 million. As part of its plea agreement, KBR agreed to pay a $402 million criminal fine.\textsuperscript{89} Simultaneously, KBR’s current and former parent companies—KBR, Inc and Halliburton, respectively—entered into civil settlements with the SEC based on alleged internal control failures and falsified corporate books and records.\textsuperscript{90} The two entities agreed to disgorge jointly $177 million in fines [sic] imposed by the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom.” See Cohen, Elesinmogun, and Egwuatu, \textit{Will Nigeria Take Another Bite?} (cited in note 52). See also Amalu, \textit{Bribery: SERAP Asks EFCC to Seek Damages} (cited in note 52) (providing a detailed breakdown of the payouts made by multinational companies to resolve their Nigerian-related FCPA liability without a corresponding payout to the Nigerian government).

\textsuperscript{84} The TSKJ consortium consisted of four companies from four different countries: (1) Technip, SA, a French company; (2) Snamprogetti Netherland BV, a Dutch company; (3) Halliburton Company, a US company; and (4) JGC Corporation, a Japanese company.

\textsuperscript{85} Id.

\textsuperscript{86} See note 1.


\textsuperscript{89} See id.

profits derived from the FCPA violations. In total, Halliburton, KBR, Inc, and KBR agreed to a total payment package of $579 million to resolve their FCPA matters.

Less than two years later, in early December 2010—after Halliburton, KBR, Inc., and KBR had resolved their Bonny Island criminal and civil liability in the US—Nigeria’s anticorruption agency, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, filed a sixteen count criminal complaint, based on the same Bonny Island activities, against KBR, Halliburton, and current and former executives of each. The charges against KBR’s then-current CEO were lodged notwithstanding KBR’s claim that the CEO joined KBR after the conclusion of the conduct associated with the Bonny Island projects.

Similarly, the Nigerian government charged Vice President Cheney even though, according to Vice President Cheney’s lawyer, “[t]he Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission investigated that joint venture extensively and found no suggestion of any impropriety by Dick Cheney in his role of CEO of Halliburton.” Despite this, news outlets reported that, according to Nigerian authorities, an arrest warrant for Vice President Cheney (and presumably others) would be “issued and transmitted through Interpol,” typically the first step in an extradition process.

91 Id.
92 Id.
95 See Gambrell, Nigeria Charges Dick Cheney in Halliburton Bribery Case (cited in note 93) (further stating that “[a]ny suggestion of misconduct on [Mr. Cheney’s] part, made now, years later, is entirely baseless”).
96 Bala-Gbogbo, Nigeria to Charge Dick Cheney in Pipeline Bribery Case (cited in note
According to some, “[i]t is believed the Nigerian authorities want to probe the case further from their perspective,” notwithstanding the US investigation.97 Others speculated that the Nigerian probe was politically motivated: “There could [have] be[en] political calculations at play in the new charges. Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan face[d] a[n] [up]coming primary election in the nation’s ruling party against former Vice President Atiku Abubakar,” and “the charges c[a]me as the election loom[ed].”98 Either way, at the time, KBR insisted that it would “continue to vigorously defend itself and its executives if necessary, in th[e] matter” and it described the actions of the Nigerian government as “wildly and wrongly asserting blame.”99

Less than two weeks later, however, KBR’s fight ended when Halliburton agreed to pay $35 million to the Nigerian authorities to settle bribery allegations of “distribution of gratification to public officials.”100 According to Halliburton’s statement on the issue:

Pursuant to [the settlement] agreement, all lawsuits and charges against KBR and Halliburton corporate entities and associated persons have been withdrawn, the [Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN)] agreed not to bring any further criminal charges or civil claims against those entities or persons, and Halliburton agreed to pay US$32.5

93. See also Gambrell, Nigeria Charges Dick Cheney in Halliburton Bribery Case (cited in note 93). Gambrell quoted a Nigerian spokesperson as stating that “[w]e are following the laws of the land. We want to follow the laws and see where it will go … [w]e're very convinced by the time the trial commences, we'd make application for appropriate court orders to be issued.” Id. See generally note 4.

97 Nigeria Files Bribery Charges against Dick Cheney (cited in note 93) (emphasis added).


million to the FGN and to pay an additional US$2.5 million for FGN’s attorneys’ fees and other expenses.101

Halliburton also “agreed to provide reasonable assistance in the FGN’s effort to recover amounts frozen in a Swiss bank account of a former … agent [associated with the Bonny Island projects] and affirmed a continuing commitment with regard to corporate governance.”102

b) Snamprogetti & JGC Corporation. A similar pattern ensued with Snamprogetti and JGC Corporation, two additional members of the TSKJ consortium. In July 2010, the Italian energy company ENI SpA and its Dutch subsidiary Snamprogetti resolved FCPA charges arising out of their shares of bribes paid in connection with the Bonny Island projects.103 ENI and Snamprogetti jointly settled their civil cases with the SEC and agreed to disgorge $125 million in profits.104 Snamprogetti also entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the DOJ to resolve two criminal counts of FCPA-related violations and agreed to pay a $240 million criminal fine.105 Less than five months later, Snamprogetti agreed to pay $32.5 million to settle a carbon copy prosecution brought by Nigerian authorities for the same conduct that gave rise to its FCPA liability.106 In return, the “Federal Government of Nigeria agreed to dismiss all charges against

102 Id.
105 Id. Snamprogetti was charged by criminal information with (1) conspiracy to violate the FCPA and (2) aiding and abetting an FCPA violation. See Criminal Information, United States v Snamprogetti Netherlands BV, Case No 4:10-CV-2414 (SD Tex filed July 7, 2010).
Snamprogetti … and to renounce to [sic] any civil claims and criminal charges in any jurisdiction” against the company.\textsuperscript{107}

Similarly, in January 2011, JGC Corporation agreed to pay $28.5 million to Nigerian authorities to resolve its portion of the bribes paid by the TSKJ consortium.\textsuperscript{108} But in a reversal of the typical order of enforcement proceedings, four months later, JGC Corporation entered into a deferred prosecution with the DOJ to resolve criminal FCPA charges.\textsuperscript{109} As part of its US-based resolution, JGC Corporation agreed to pay a $218.8 million criminal fine.\textsuperscript{110}

c) Shell and Siemens. In 2010, the Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission brought additional carbon copy prosecutions against FCPA defendants that had resolved international bribery cases with US authorities.\textsuperscript{111} First, Royal Dutch Shell Plc (“Shell”) paid $10 million to Nigerian authorities in December 2010\textsuperscript{112} after already having paid $48.15 million in criminal fines, disgorgement of profits, and interest to US authorities in November 2010.\textsuperscript{113} Second, Siemens AG paid $46.5

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[109]{DOJ, Press Release, JGC Corporation Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation (cited in note 84) (stating that JGC Corporation was charged with one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and a second count of aiding and abetting an FCPA violation).}
\footnotetext[110]{Id.}
\footnotetext[111]{In addition to the enforcement actions brought by Nigerian authorities described above, there is believed to be at least one remaining open carbon copy Nigerian-led investigation. See Sokenu, 43 BNA Sec Reg & L Rep 12 (cited in note 51), citing Joe Palazzolo, 2011: The Year of the FCPA Piggyback?, Corruption Currents Blog (Wall Street Journal Dec 29, 2010), online at http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2010/12/29/2011-the-year-of-the-fera-piggyback/?KEYWORDS=2011+the+year+of+the+fera+piggyback (visited Sept 10, 2012) (“Panalpina itself is under investigation in Nigeria for bribery, after paying $82 million in civil and criminal penalties to settle bribery allegations in the U.S.”). Panalpina, as part of its plea agreement in the US, has already agreed to “co-operate with the Department and with any other federal, state, local, or foreign law enforcement agency subject to and consistent with any applicable laws and regulations.” See Plea Agreement, United States v Panalpina, Case No 10-CR-765, *5 (SD Tex filed Nov 4, 2010) (available on Westlaw at 2010 WL 4523728). It has also “consent[ed] to any and all disclosures consistent with applicable law and regulation to other governmental authorities, including United States authorities and those of a foreign government, of such materials as the Department, in its sole discretion, shall deem appropriate.” Id.}
\footnotetext[113]{See DOJ, Press Release, Oil Services Companies and a Freight Forwarding Com-}
\end{footnotes}
million to Nigerian authorities in November 2010\textsuperscript{114} after having paid $800 million to US authorities to resolve the largest-ever FCPA matter in US history and $569 million to the Munich, Germany, Public Prosecutor’s Office—for a total combined payment of nearly $1.4 billion—in December 2008.\textsuperscript{115}

Indeed, Siemens has been the subject of a variety of other anticorruption carbon copy enforcement actions and debarment proceedings besides its resolutions with US, German, and Nigerian authorities. For example, on March 9, 2009, Siemens was notified by the Vendor Review Committee of the United Nations Secretariat Procurement Division (UNPD) that it was being suspended from the UNPD vendor database for a minimum period of six months.\textsuperscript{116} Siemens’ suspension “stemmed from [its] guilty

\textit{pany Agree to Resolve Foreign Bribery Investigations and to Pay More Than $156 Million in Criminal Penalties} (Nov 4, 2010), online at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/November/10-crm-1251.html (visited Sept 10, 2012). Shell’s deferred prosecution agreement obliged it to:

At the request of the Department, and consistent with applicable law and regulations … cooperate fully with other domestic or foreign law enforcement authorities and agencies as well as the Multilateral Development Banks (“MDBs”), in any investigation of [Shell], or any of its present and former directors, employees, agents, consultants, contractors, subcontractors, subsidiaries, affiliates, or any other party, in any and all matters relating to corrupt payments and related false books, records, and inadequate internal controls.

See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, \textit{United States v Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company}, No 10-CR-767, *4–7 (SD Tex filed Nov 4, 2010). Shell’s deferred prosecution agreement also contained a consent provision that provided that Shell “consent[ed] to any and all disclosures consistent with applicable law and regulation to other governmental authorities, including United States authorities and those of a foreign government, and the MDBs, of such materials as the Department, in its sole discretion, shall deem appropriate.” Id at *6–7. BizJet International Sales and Support, Inc.’s FCPA-predicated deferred prosecution agreement with the DOJ contains another more recent—yet virtually identical—cooperation obligation. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, \textit{United States v BizJet International Sales and Support, Inc}, Case No 12-CR-61, *3–5 (ND Okla filed Mar 14, 2012).


\textsuperscript{115} See DOJ, Press Release, \textit{Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines} (Dec 15, 2008), online at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html (visited Sept 10, 2012). Specifically, Siemens agreed to pay a criminal fine of $450 million to the Department of Justice and $350 million in disgorgement of profits to the SEC. In the German prosecution, Siemens agreed to pay €395 million (approximately $569 million), in addition to the €201 million (approximately $287 million) it paid in October 2007 to settle another related enforcement action brought by the Munich Public Prosecutor. Id.

plea in December 2008 to violations of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.”

Although Siemens sought to lift the suspension on December 22, 2009, it remained disqualified from United Nations contracting opportunities until January 14, 2011, at which point Siemens was invited to re-register with the UNPD.

Similarly, on July 2, 2009, “in the wake of the company’s acknowledged past misconduct in its global business,” Siemens entered into global settlement with the World Bank Group in which it agreed to pay $100 million over the next fifteen years to support anticorruption work. Siemens also agreed to up to a four-year debarment for its Russian subsidiary and a voluntary two-year cease-and-desist from bidding on World Bank business for Siemens AG and all of its consolidated subsidiaries and affiliates.

In addition, in February 2012, Siemens agreed to pay the Greek government €270 million (approximately $336 million) to resolve bribes dating back to the 1990s. The Greek Parliament approved the settlement on April 5, 2012. Despite the fact that Siemens has resolved the above matters, it continues to “remain[] subject to corruption-related investigations in several jurisdictions around the world.”

III. CARBON COPY PROSECUTIONS: EVALUATING THE COST-BENEFIT CONSIDERATIONS

The recent trend towards transnational carbon copy prosecutions has created some unavoidable forks in the road for those mired in internal investigations and follow-on government-led

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117 Id.
118 Id.
120 Id.
122 Siemens AG, Press Release, Siemens and the Hellenic Republic Reach a Settlement (cited in note 121).
actions. At the initial stage of disclosure, for example, companies now must evaluate not only whether to voluntarily disclose potential FCPA violations to US authorities, but they must also consider whether, and to what extent, to make simultaneous—or nearly simultaneous—*front-end* self-disclosures to foreign authorities. Of course, real costs and benefits inform this analysis.

A. Potential Benefits of Early Multi-Sovereign Disclosures to US and Foreign Authorities

1. Front-end considerations.

On one side of the ledger, simultaneous multi disclosures to US and foreign officials ensure that the very entity that presumably benefited from the improper payments, or on whose behalf the improper payments were made, promptly and directly delivers the bad news to interested government authorities. Multi-sovereign disclosures also ensure that foreign governments are—or, at least, can be said to be—treated equally to the US government. Indeed, early multi disclosures are an acknowledgement at some level that the foreign jurisdiction that is the site of the crime, and whose government officials may have actually been corrupted, has at least an equally great interest in vindicating its own local laws.


125 For example, Nigerian-based SERAP asked the SEC “to establish a process enabling foreign government entities victimized by FCPA violations, on a case-by-case basis, to apply for some or all of the [FCPA] civil penalties and disgorgement proceeds companies agree to pay to settle SEC investigations.” Alexander W. Sierck, *African NGO Asks for Distribution of FCPA Recoveries*, The FCPA Blog (Mar 16, 2012), online at http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/3/16/african-ngo-asks-for-distribution-of-fcpa-recoveries.html (visited Sept 10, 2012), citing Alexander W. Sierck, *Letter to Robert S. Khuzami re FCPA Civil Penalty and Disgorgement Proceeds* *1. According to SERAP, “victimized foreign government entities bear the cost of bribery and corruption of their officials.” Sierck, *Letter to Robert S. Khuzami* at *2. As such, in its request, SERAP proposed a variant of the carbon copy prosecution concept: “[A]fter, and only after, public notice of an FCPA settlement agreement, the victim foreign government entity ... [should be allowed] to file a request that the Enforcement Division pay some or all of the agreed payment proceeds to or for the benefit of the victim government entity or to a home country-based or US-based NGO.” Id at *4. In SERAP’s own words, its “proposal would only come into play after an FCPA matter has been resolved, typically as a result of a settlement with
Moreover, US authorities may favorably view such transnational disclosures. Such disclosures demonstrate a corporate commitment to making aggrieved sovereigns whole, or, at a minimum, reflect respect for the local jurisdictions. Prompt and direct local disclosures also avoid a scenario in which foreign governments are caught off guard with headline-grabbing news of corrupt conduct committed by their own officials. Multi-front disclosures enable local governments to get ahead of a potential media crisis and are likely to place the company in better stead with the local jurisdictions. In short, early disclosures empower local authorities to gain control of a situation; to remove or otherwise contain corrupt public officials earlier rather than later in the process; and to respond proactively to allegations of government corruption.

Multi-front disclosures also tend to reduce the likelihood of duplicative investigatory work, both for law enforcement authorities and private counsel, and thus have the potential to lead to economies of scale. Early multi-sovereign disclosures ensure that potentially interested foreign and domestic governments are consulted from the beginning on matters relating to the investigation, including, for example, how the investigation can be conducted; what additional follow-up items might be pursued; and what local legal or factual concerns should be addressed during an otherwise US-focused investigation. Such disclosures also make it more likely that foreign governments will be willing to cooperate and coordinate both with US authorities and with company counsel in their collective efforts to interview witnesses, obtain permission to enter the local jurisdictions, and otherwise obtain and export relevant material from the local jurisdictions to the United States.


2. Back-end considerations.

At the back-end, early multi-sovereign disclosures are also more likely to lead to global settlements, with the benefits of coordinated resolutions and across-the-board finality. For example, coordinated worldwide disclosures and ensuing investigations generally increase the likelihood that a corporation can successfully petition US authorities for one-for-one credit for any compensatory or penal payment made to local authorities as part of a global resolution. The converse is also true; by cooperating and complying with local authorities from the beginning of an investigation, a company might be more successful in its effort to dissuade a foreign government, even the United States, from bringing a carbon copy prosecution. Even beyond questions of prosecutorial discretion, however, the substantive laws of other nations and other related treaty obligations may well create serious advantages that favor—or disadvantages that cut against—early front-end multi-sovereign disclosures.

3. International double jeopardy as a consideration.

As a matter of US law, “[t]he Constitution of the United States has not adopted the doctrine of international double jeopardy.” That is, “prosecution by a foreign sovereign does not
preclude the United States from bringing criminal charges,"\textsuperscript{132} nor does the Double Jeopardy Clause “prevent extradition from the United States for the purpose of a foreign prosecution following prosecution in the United States for the same offense.”\textsuperscript{133} But the same rule does not hold true in other nations—“[t]here are [] limitations on multiple prosecutions by different sovereign jurisdictions established by treaty or [foreign] domestic laws.”\textsuperscript{134}

For example, Richard Alderman, while still the Director of the United Kingdom’s Serious Fraud Office (SFO), discussed key differences between the US and the UK approaches to the double jeopardy doctrine, as well as the doctrine’s effects on the UK’s ability to bring a carbon copy prosecution.\textsuperscript{135} Using the BAE enforcement action to expound upon the operation and application of the UK double jeopardy doctrine, Director Alderman candidly explained that when BAE “agreed to plead guilty to offences brought by the US Department of Justice[,] [t]hat plea of guilty had consequences so far as the SFO’s investigation was concerned.”\textsuperscript{136} According to Director Alderman, because BAE “plead-

\textsuperscript{132} \textit{United States v Richardson}, 580 F2d 946, 947 (9th Cir 1978). As the Supreme Court stated in the context of successive state-state prosecutions, “[w]hen a defendant in a single act violates the peace and dignity of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he has committed two distinct offences,” and as such, “it cannot be truly averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same offence; but only that by one act he has committed two offences, for each of which he is justly punishable.” \textit{Heath v Alabama}, 474 US 82, 93 (1985).

\textsuperscript{133} \textit{Elcock v United States}, 80 F Supp 2d 70, 75 (EDNY 2000). See also \textit{In re Ryan}, 360 F Supp 270, 274 (EDNY 1973), affd 478 F2d 1397 (2d Cir 1973) (“There is no constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy resulting from extradition to the demanding country.”).


Protection against successive prosecution under United Kingdom law is afforded in two different ways: first, there is a core “same-elements” protection that is based on the pleas of antrefois acquit and autrefois convict; second, this narrow protection is supplemented by a broad judicial discretion to stay successive prosecutions under the doctrine of “abuse of process.”


ed guilty in the US to offences relating to Central and Eastern Europe[,] under the UK law of double jeopardy, it was no longer possible for the SFO investigation relating to Central and Eastern Europe to continue.” 137 Given that “the law on double jeopardy differs as between the US and the UK,” Director Alderman stated rather explicitly that “the SFO needed to terminate the investigations relating to Central and Eastern Europe once [BAE’s] plea of guilty was entered in the US.” 138

Director Alderman next explained that the UK double jeopardy analysis depends not on the offense charged by the original charging jurisdiction, but rather on the underlying facts used to support the offense, regardless of the offense itself. 139 Specifically, Director Alderman responded as follows when presented with a question regarding the SFO’s prosecution of BAE after BAE entered into its resolution with US authorities:

[Question]: As to the double jeopardy issue, the offense BAE pleaded guilty to in the U.S. was not a corruption offense, but rather a charge of conspiracy to make false statements to the U.S. government including as to its compliance with the provisions of the FCPA…. Certain of the factual allegations supporting this non-corruption offense related to Central and Eastern Europe. Are you suggesting that simply because facts are alleged in a U.S. prosecution to support a non-corruption charge, that the U.K. is thereby prohibited from bringing a corruption charge as to those facts?

[Director Alderman’s Answer]: Yes. [The UK] double jeopardy law looks at the facts in issue in the other jurisdiction and not the precise offence. Our law does not allow someone to be prosecuted here in relation to a set of facts if that person has been in jeopardy of a conviction in relation to those facts in another jurisdiction. As a result I could not continue to consider whether to prosecute BAE for an offence relating to Central and Eastern Europe once BAE had pleaded guilty in the US. 140

the interview).

137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
Thus, in deciding whether to make front-end or back-end multi-sovereign disclosures, careful consideration should be given to the double jeopardy doctrine and practices of the local jurisdiction (and of any other interested nation with extraterritorial anticorruption jurisdictional reach).

B. Potential Costs of Early Multi-Sovereign Disclosures to US and Foreign Authorities

Early multi-sovereign disclosures—and the cascading consequences that flow from them—are also not without distinct potential drawbacks. To state the obvious, such disclosures have the prospect of exponentially complicating investigations. They could necessitate that resources be allocated across different continents, with teams of professionals simultaneously interacting with different government personalities, constituents, cultures, and priorities. They could require organizations to staff and coordinate worldwide investigations moving at different paces, with different scopes and focuses, and responding to varying levels of governmental sophistication.

Parallel cross-border investigations can also implicate conflicting substantive laws, procedural rules, modes of evidence gathering, and data privacy rights. They can expose persons—not just companies—to sequential prosecutions by multiple sovereigns, absent a treaty or local law to the contrary. They could lead foreign sovereigns to charge—and seek the extradition of—US executives or non-US personnel before the completion of the US investigation. They have the potential to cause local persons implicated in the underlying conduct—or even material witnesses with relevant information—not to cooperate with a joint US-local sovereign investigation. And, in the view of some, early disclosures to—and coordinated efforts on the part of—foreign governments may all but ensure that foreign sovereigns bring their own tagalong enforcement actions, as proof positive of their commitment to fight corruption and to secure concrete, tangible results for their early involvement in, and assistance with, the US investigation. In fact, in investigations of potentially improp-

141 See United States v Jeong, 624 F3d 706, 711–12 (5th Cir 2010) (upholding a defendant’s sequential US-based conviction following his South Korean conviction for the same conduct and holding that Article 4.3 of the OECD’s Anti-Bribery Convention “does not prohibit two signatory countries [such as the United States and South Korea] from prosecuting the same offense” because the OECD Convention only requires countries with concurrent jurisdiction to consult with one another upon request).
er payments in multiple jurisdictions, one foreign government might choose to break away from the pack and strike first, insisting on settling its matters first, even in those cases where the global investigation is, as a whole, far from complete.  

Quarterbacking these myriad issues—much less doing so in a seamless and efficient manner—poses serious challenges at a variety of levels. As one practitioner summarized, “[i]nterest from law enforcement agencies from other countries significantly increases the complexities surrounding when, and to whom, to self-report, how and when to conduct internal investigations, what to do with the results of the internal investigation, and how to structure global settlements with multiple countries with conflicting legal jurisprudence.”  

IV. NOT TO BE OVERLOOKED: THE POTENTIAL COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS

The critical issue of the potential collateral estoppel effects of carbon copy prosecutions often receives inadequate attention. By way of illustration, assume a company’s employee brings a whistleblower retaliation action in India. The case is fully and fairly litigated between the company and the employee, and the employee prevails. There is a very real chance that—barring something improper about the India-based litigation—if the employee also brings a whistleblower action in a US court, key factual disputes may be deemed to have been resolved in the foreign litigation.

A. The Nuts and Bolts of Collateral Estoppel

Collateral estoppel, also known as “issue preclusion,” is a common law estoppel doctrine that prevents a party from relitigating an issue. Put another way, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of the same issue in a different suit involving the parties to the first case. In contrast, res judicata, also

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142 Alcatel-Lucent’s resolution with Costa Rican authorities, which occurred nearly a year before Alcatel-Lucent settled its FCPA case with US authorities, might be one such example. See note 67.

143 Sokenu, 43 BNA Sec Reg & L Rep 12 (cited in note 51).

144 See Muegler v Bening, 413 F3d 980 (9th Cir 2005) (holding that collateral estoppel can be used to prevent a debtor from re-litigating the issue of fraud in a nondischargeability action in bankruptcy court).
known as “claim preclusion,” bars litigation of the same case between the same parties.\textsuperscript{145}

Collateral estoppel can also apply to criminal cases.\textsuperscript{146} Unlike double jeopardy, which generally requires a prior acquittal or conviction to preclude the proceedings, collateral estoppel is not similarly limited. To the contrary, “collateral estoppel is applicable in criminal cases only when double jeopardy is not.”\textsuperscript{147} And in respect of issues resolved in foreign proceedings, provided the foreign proceedings were fair, impartial, and compatible with US conceptions of due process of law, facts resolved in foreign courts can have a preclusive effect on subsequent proceedings in US courts.\textsuperscript{148} What follows is a brief discussion of the steps involved in determining whether the relitigation of a particular issue is likely to be collaterally estopped.

\textsuperscript{145} See \textit{Allen v McCurry}, 449 US 90, 94 (1980). As the Court explained:

\begin{quote}
Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action. Under collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case.
\end{quote}

\textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{146} See, for example, \textit{Ashe v Swenson}, 397 US 436, 443–46 (1970) (holding that the state, which prosecuted the defendant for multiple robberies, was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of identity). See also \textit{United States v Bailin}, 977 F2d 270, 275–76 (7th Cir 1992) (applying the principle of collateral estoppel to a criminal case).

\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Bailin}, 977 F2d at 275. See also \textit{United States v Stauffer Chemical Company}, 464 US 165 (1984) (applying collateral estoppel to bar contempt proceeding where parties had litigated identical issues in prior proceeding to quash a warrant); \textit{United States v Shenberg}, 89 F3d 1461, 1479 (11th Cir 1996) (“We agree with the Seventh Circuit and hold that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not limit the application of collateral estoppel to only cases in which double jeopardy applies.”); \textit{Kraushaar v Flanigan}, 45 F3d 1040, 1050 (7th Cir 1995) (discussing the application of collateral estoppel where a state court judge had previously dismissed criminal charges for lack of probable cause).

\textsuperscript{148} See \textit{Gabbanelli Accordions & Imports, LLC v Gabbanelli}, 575 F3d 693, 697 (7th Cir 2009) (“It is true that American courts apply the American doctrine of res judicata even to a foreign judgment of a nation like Italy that would not treat an American judgment the same way.”). See also \textit{Oncon Corporation v Raychem Corporation}, 20 F Supp 2d 1233, 1242–43 (ND Ill 1998) (“The UK decision itself demonstrates that the issues [sought to be relitigated in US District Court] were actually decided and necessary for the final decision. Lastly, neither this court nor the parties question the fairness of the proceedings in the United Kingdom.”); \textit{Northlake Marketing & Supply, Inc v Glaverbel SA}, 986 F Supp 471, 475–76 (ND Ill 1997) (applying collateral estoppel based on the factual finding of a Belgian court because Belgian procedures were “fundamentally fair” and the accused patent infringer had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the factual issues).
B. “Standard” Two-Stage Collateral Estoppel Analysis

The question of whether collateral estoppel bars relitigation of certain factual disputes requires two analytical steps.

1. Does the US recognize the foreign judgment?

In US courts, the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the US Constitution dictates whether a court in one state will recognize the judgment issued in the court of another state.149 Judgments of foreign nations’ courts and tribunals, in contrast, can potentially be recognized domestically under federal law by resorting to the (somewhat “squishy”) doctrine of comity—a principle more akin to courtesy than compulsion.150 Judge Posner, in the recent case of United States v Kashamu,151 summarized the concept of comity as “a doctrine of deference based on respect for the judicial decisions of foreign sovereigns (or of US states, which are quasi-sovereigns).”152 But commentators, as well as Supreme Court decisions, have criticized the doctrine of comity because of its elusive definition.

Under the doctrine of comity, foreign judgments are entitled to recognition if they:

- Were made upon appropriate notice;
- Presented the opportunity for a full and fair presentation of evidence;
- Were before a foreign court of competent jurisdiction, which operated in a legal system likely to provide for the impartial administration of justice in disputes between the citizens of that foreign nation and other nations; and

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149 See Williams v North Carolina, 325 US 226, 229 (1945) (“In short, the Full Faith and Credit Clause puts the Constitution behind a judgment, instead of the too fluid, ill-defined concept of ‘comity.’”).

150 See, for example, Verlinden BV v Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 US 480, 486 (1983) (“Foreign sovereign immunity is a matter of grace and comity.”). See also National City Bank of New York v Republic of China, 348 US 356, 362 n 7 (1955) (explaining that foreign sovereign immunity derives from “standards of public morality, fair dealing, reciprocal self-interest, and respect for the power and dignity of the foreign sovereign”) (internal quotations omitted).

151 656 F3d 679 (7th Cir 2011).

152 Id at 683.
• Did not prejudice the litigants’ rights as US citizens or otherwise contravene US public policy.\textsuperscript{153}

Conversely, then, reasons for not recognizing a foreign judgment include:

• The rendering foreign court lacked jurisdiction;
• The judgment offended US public policy;
• The judgment was tainted by fraud; or
• The judgment prejudiced the rights of US citizen-litigants by failing to accord them due process or to adhere to generally accepted notions of jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{154}

Once a litigant has cleared the foreign-judgment-recognition hurdle, the inquiry shifts to whether the scope of the preclusive effect of the foreign judgment is governed by the laws of the rendering foreign state, the US, or its states. The Restatement, commentators, and courts have been unable to reach consensus on this question.

2. What is the scope of the judgment’s preclusive effect?

The decision concerning which jurisdiction’s collateral estoppel rules apply to a foreign judgment is complicated by the fact that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel the outcome. Some courts avoid answering this difficult conflict of laws question altogether, either by finding a perceived conflict or by adopting the parties’ choice of law (the latter, for obvious reasons, making this step particularly easy).

\textit{a) Minority practice: default to rendering state’s issue preclusion law.} The minority practice is simply to default to the rendering foreign state’s issue preclusion law. Reasons support-

\textsuperscript{153} See \textit{Hilton v Guyot}, 159 US 113, 202–03 (1895) (holding that, where “comity of this nation” calls for recognition of a judgment rendered abroad, “the merits of the case should not … be tried afresh … upon the mere assertion … that the judgment was erroneous in law or in fact”). See also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §106 (1969) (“A judgment will be recognized and enforced in other states even though an error of fact or of law was made in the proceedings before judgment.”); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §106, Comment a (“This rule is … applicable to judgments rendered in foreign nations.”).

ing this approach include that it treats the foreign court no differently than one domestic court would treat another domestic court and that it prevents unfair surprises to litigants who formed their expectations based on litigation in a particular legal regime.\footnote{See Robert C. Casad, \textit{Issue Preclusion and Foreign Country Judgments: Whose Law?}, 70 Iowa L Rev 53, 70 (1984).}

\textit{b) Majority practice: apply US collateral estoppel rules to the foreign judgment.} There are valuable benefits from applying US rules of collateral estoppel to foreign judgments. Applying US issue preclusion rules is administratively easier for US courts and arguably less costly for parties. To the extent that US rules are broader than foreign rules of issue preclusion, moreover, the US rules better advance the underlying rationale for claim and issue preclusion.\footnote{See Scott A. Storey, \textit{Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel in Multi-State Litigation: An Evaluation of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws}, 35 Wash & Lee L Rev 993, 1003 (1978).} Finally, application of domestic preclusion rules protects the interests of US citizens, who might have been involuntarily hauled into, and successfully defended against a case filed in, a foreign court.\footnote{See \textit{Alfadda v Fenn}, 966 F Supp 1317, 1329 (SDNY 1997) (concluding that a federal court “should normally apply” US federal or state law to decide the scope of the preclusive effect of a foreign judgment, but recognizing additional factors that are particularly relevant to determining the preclusive effect of foreign judgments). See also \textit{Hurst v The Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya}, 474 F Supp 2d 19, 32–33 (DDC 2007).}

C. The Collateral Estoppel Take-Away

In order to avoid costly collateral estoppel mistakes or oversights, practitioners should understand the complex and intricate collateral estoppel principles of the rendering foreign state, and should concurrently evaluate the possible follow-on impact of foreign litigation and any potentially applicable collateral estoppel rules. Regardless of whether a US court follows the minority or prevailing approach to evaluating the collateral estoppel effects of foreign judgments, the practitioner should be prepared to explain precisely how adopting or declining to follow the collateral estoppel principles of a rendering foreign jurisdiction advances the underlying rationales of collateral estoppel, res judicata, comity, and US public policy.
V. CONCLUSION

The phenomenon of carbon copy prosecutions appears to be here to stay. A country’s incentive to vindicate its own laws is not insubstantial, especially when a company or individual has already admitted, in a foreign proceeding, to violating local law. Accordingly, both named parties and non-parties implicated in a resolution in one country ought to give due consideration to the potential impact of that resolution in another territory, especially in light of recent trends pointing to coordinated multinational cooperation and successive enforcement proceedings. The days of one dimensional government investigations appear to be over. Duplicative, serial enforcement actions are now part and parcel of the enforcement landscape, despite a healthy ongoing debate over the need for, and fairness of, serial enforcements. Our prediction is that, as globalization makes the world smaller, what we call carbon copy prosecutions will increase in frequency, size, scope, and force.