Formal Opinion 491  
April 29, 2020

Obligations Under Rule 1.2(d) to Avoid Counseling or Assisting in a Crime or Fraud in Non-Litigation Settings

Model Rule 1.2(d) prohibits a lawyer from advising or assisting a client in conduct the lawyer “knows” is criminal or fraudulent. That knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances, including a lawyer’s willful blindness to or conscious avoidance of facts. Accordingly, where facts known to the lawyer establish a high probability that a client seeks to use the lawyer’s services for criminal or fraudulent activity, the lawyer has a duty to inquire further to avoid advising or assisting such activity. Even if information learned in the course of a preliminary interview or during a representation is insufficient to establish “knowledge” under Rule 1.2(d), other rules may require the lawyer to inquire further in order to help the client avoid crime or fraud, to avoid professional misconduct, and to advance the client’s legitimate interests. These include the duties of competence, diligence, communication, and honesty under Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.13, 1.16, and 8.4. If the client or prospective client refuses to provide information necessary to assess the legality of the proposed transaction, the lawyer must ordinarily decline the representation or withdraw under Rule 1.16. A lawyer’s reasonable evaluation after inquiry and based on information reasonably available at the time does not violate the rules. This opinion does not address the application of these rules in the representation of a client or prospective client who requests legal services in connection with litigation.¹

I. Introduction

In the wake of media reports,² disciplinary proceedings,³ criminal prosecutions,⁴ and reports on international counter-terrorism enforcement and efforts to combat money-laundering, the legal profession has become increasingly alert to the risk that a client or prospective client⁵ might try to retain a lawyer for a transaction or other non-litigation matter that could be

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¹ This opinion is based on the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct as amended by the ABA House of Delegates through August 2019. The laws, court rules, regulations, rules of professional conduct, and opinions promulgated in individual jurisdictions are controlling.
⁵ “Client” refers hereinafter to “client and prospective client” unless otherwise indicated.
legitimate but which further inquiry would reveal to be criminal or fraudulent. For example, a client might seek legal assistance for a series of purchases and sales of properties that will be used to launder money. Or a client might propose an all-cash deal in large amounts and ask that the proceeds be deposited in a bank located in a jurisdiction where transactions of this kind are commonly used to conceal terrorist financing or other illegal activities. On the other hand, further inquiry may dispel the lawyer’s concerns.

This opinion addresses a lawyer’s obligation to inquire when faced with a client who may be seeking to use the lawyer’s services in a transaction to commit a crime or fraud. Ascertaining whether a client seeks to use the lawyer’s services for prohibited ends can be delicate. Clients are generally entitled to be believed rather than doubted, and in some contexts investigations can be both costly and time-consuming. At the same time, clients benefit greatly from having informed assistance of counsel. A lawyer’s obligation to inquire when faced with circumstances addressed in this opinion is well-grounded in authority interpreting Rule 1.2(d) and in the rules on competence, diligence, communication, honesty, and withdrawal.

As set forth in Section II of this opinion, a lawyer who has knowledge of facts that create a high probability that a client is seeking the lawyer’s services in a transaction to further criminal or fraudulent activity has a duty to inquire further to avoid assisting that activity under Rule 1.2(d). Failure to make a reasonable inquiry is willful blindness punishable under the actual knowledge standard of the Rule. Whether the facts known to the lawyer require further inquiry will depend on the circumstances. As discussed in Section III, even where Rule 1.2(d) does not require further inquiry, other Rules may. These Rules include the duty of competence under Rule 1.1, the duty of diligence under Rule 1.3, the duty of communication under Rule 1.4, the duty to protect the best interests of an organizational client under Rule 1.13, the duties of honesty and integrity under Rules 8.4(b) and (c), and the duty to withdraw under Rule 1.16(a). Further inquiry under these Rules serves important ends. It ensures that the lawyer is in a position to provide the informed advice and assistance to which the client is entitled, that the representation will not result in professional misconduct, and that the representation will not involve counseling or assisting a crime or fraud. Section IV addresses a lawyer’s obligations in responding to a client who either agrees or does not agree to provide information necessary to satisfy the duty to inquire. Finally, Section V examines hypothetical scenarios in which the duty to inquire would be triggered, as well as instances in which it would not.

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6 Hereinafter, “transaction” refers both to transactions and other non-litigation matters unless otherwise indicated. This opinion does not address the application of rules triggering a duty to inquire where a client requests legal services in connection with litigation. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1470 (1981), discusses how a lawyer not involved in the past misconduct of a client should handle the circumstance of a proposed transaction arising from or relating to the past misconduct.

7 See AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON GATEKEEPER REGULATION AND THE PROFESSION, VOLUNTARY GOOD PRACTICES GUIDANCE FOR LAWYERS TO DETECT AND COMBAT MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING 15–16 (2010) (hereinafter GOOD PRACTICES GUIDANCE) (describing institutions, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the U.S. Department of State, believed to be “credible sources” for information regarding risks in different jurisdictions); id. at 24 (noting the “higher risk situation” when a client offers to pay in cash).
II. The Duty to Inquire Under Rule 1.2(d)

Rule 1.2(d) states that a lawyer “shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.” A duty to inquire to avoid knowingly counseling or assisting a crime or fraud may arise under this Rule in two ways. First, Rule 1.0(f) states that to “know[]” means to have “actual knowledge of the fact in question.” When facts already known to the lawyer are so strong as to constitute “actual knowledge” of criminal or fraudulent activity, the lawyer must “consult with the client regarding the limitations on the lawyer’s conduct.” This consultation will ordinarily include inquiry into whether there is some misapprehension regarding the relevant facts. If there is no misunderstanding and the client persists, the lawyer must withdraw.

In In re Blatt, for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court disciplined a lawyer for participation in a real estate transaction where “[o]n their face the [transaction] documents suggest[ed] impropriety if not outright illegality.” Addressing the lawyer’s duties, the court wrote:

A lawyer may not follow the directions of a client without first satisfying himself that the latter is seeking a legitimate and proper goal and intends to employ legal means to attain it. . . . The propriety of any proposed course of action must be initially considered by the attorney, and it may be thereafter pursued only if the lawyer is completely satisfied that it involves no ethical compromise. . . . [The lawyer’s] duty, upon being requested to draft the aforementioned agreements, was to learn all the details of the proposed transaction. Only then, upon being satisfied that he had indeed learned all the facts, and that his client’s proposed course of conduct was proper, would he have been at liberty to pursue the matter further.

Additionally, if facts before the lawyer indicate a high probability that a client seeks to use the lawyer’s services for criminal or fraudulent activity, a lawyer’s conscious, deliberate failure to inquire amounts to knowing assistance of criminal or fraudulent conduct. Rule 1.0(f) refers to “actual knowledge” and provides that “[a] person’s knowledge may be inferred

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8 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. [13] [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
9 See MODEL RULES R. 1.16(a)(1); Section IV, infra. Rule 1.2(d) nevertheless permits a lawyer to “discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.”
11 Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
12 Id. at 18–19; see also In re Evans, 759 N.E.2d 1064 (Ind. 2001) (mem.) (three-year suspension for filing fraudulent federal tax returns knowingly misrepresenting sale proceeds from real estate transaction); In re Harlow, 2004 WL 5215045, at *2 (Mass. State Bar Disciplinary Bd. 2004) (suspending lawyer for violation of 1.2(d) for assisting client in knowing manipulation of state licensing agency’s escrow account requirements); State ex rel. Counsel for Discipline of Nebraska Supreme Court v. Mills, 671 N.W.2d 765 (Neb. 2003) (two-year suspension for participating in illegal scheme to avoid estate taxes by knowingly backdating and preparing false documents); accord N.C. State Bar, Formal Op. 12, 2001 WL 1949450 (2001).
from circumstances.” Substantial authority confirms that a lawyer may not ignore the obvious.13

The obligation to inquire is well established in ethics opinions. Nearly forty years ago, prior to the adoption of the Model Rules, ABA Informal Opinion 1470 (1981) declared that “a lawyer should not undertake representation in disregard of facts suggesting that the representation might aid the client in perpetrating a fraud or otherwise committing a crime . . . A lawyer cannot escape responsibility by avoiding inquiry. A lawyer must be satisfied, on the facts before him and readily available to him, that he can perform the requested services without abetting fraudulent or criminal conduct . . . .”14

Relying on ABA Informal Opinion 1470, the Legal Ethics Committee of the Indiana State Bar Association concluded in 2001 that “[a] lawyer should not undertake representation without making further inquiry if the facts presented by a prospective client suggest that the representation might aid the client in perpetrating a fraud or otherwise committing a crime.”15 The opinion reasoned that an attorney asked to create a “new” sole power of attorney for a prospective client on behalf of her wealthy grandfather in matters concerning his estate has a duty to inquire further. The opinion emphasized the possibility that the granddaughter could fraudulently use the power of attorney to benefit herself rather than serve the interests of her grandfather, whom the attorney had not consulted, the possibility that the grandfather would not wish to grant sole power of attorney to his granddaughter, and the possibility that the grandfather might lack the capacity to consent to such an arrangement (made likely by the fact that the lawyer’s paralegal observed the grandfather’s deteriorated condition). Thus, although it is possible that the granddaughter’s representation of the facts was accurate and therefore consistent with Rule 1.2(d), “the fact that a proposed client in drafting a power of attorney was the agent and not a frail principal should have suggested to [the lawyer] the possibility that the client’s real objective might be fraud. [The lawyer] then had an ethical responsibility to find out whether the proposal was above-board before performing the services. By failing to make further inquiry, [the lawyer] violated Rule 1.2.”16

Similarly, New York City Ethics Opinion 2018-4 concluded that lawyers must inquire when “retained to assist an individual client in a transaction that appears to the lawyer to be suspicious.”17 The opinion explains that “[i]n general, assisting in a suspicious transaction is not competent where a reasonable lawyer prompted by serious doubts would have refrained

13 In the words of Charles Wolfram, “as in the criminal law, a lawyer’s studied ignorance of a readily ascertainable fact by consciously avoiding it is the functional equivalent of knowledge of the fact . . . . As a lawyer, one may not avoid the bright light of a clear fact by averting one’s eyes or turning one’s back.” CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 696 (1986); see also ELLEN J. BENNETT & HELEN W. GUNNARSSON, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 47 (9th ed. 2019) (“[a] lawyer’s assistance in unlawful conduct is not excused by a failure to inquire into the client’s objectives”); id. (gathering cases).
14 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1470 (1981) (emphasis added) (interpreting the analogous ABA Model Code provision 7-102(A)(7), which provides that a lawyer must not “[c]ounsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent”).
16 Id. at 4 (emphasis added). The Opinion reaches the same conclusion if the grandfather is considered to be the true client. Id. at 6–7. Accord N.C. State Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 7 (2003).
from providing assistance or would have investigated to allay suspicions before rendering or continuing to render legal assistance. . . . What constitutes a suspicion sufficient to trigger inquiry will depend on the circumstances.”18 Failure to inquire may constitute “conscious avoidance” when, for example, “the lawyer is aware of serious questions about the legality of the transaction and renders assistance without considering readily available facts that would have confirmed the wrongfulness of the transaction.”19

Courts imposing discipline are generally in accord. When a lawyer deliberately or consciously avoids knowledge that a client is or may be using the lawyer’s services to further a crime or fraud, discipline is imposed.20 Some courts have applied the even broader standard set out in Comment [13] to Rule 1.2, which requires a lawyer to consult with the client when the lawyer “comes to know or reasonably should know that [the] client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct . . . .” (Emphasis added.) For example, in In re Dobson,21 the South Carolina Supreme Court identified facts showing that the lawyer “knew” or “should have known” that he was furthering a client’s illegal scheme, and added, “[w]e also find that respondent deliberately evaded knowledge of facts which tended to implicate him in a fraudulent scheme. This Court will not countenance the conscious avoidance of one’s ethical duties as an attorney.”22

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19 Id. Hypotheticals in Section V of this opinion, infra, identify circumstances that should prompt further inquiry.
20 See In re Bloom, 745 P.2d 61 (Cal. 1987) (affirming disbarment of lawyer who assisted client in sale and transport of explosives to Libya; categorically rejecting lawyer’s defense that he believed in good faith that transaction was authorized by national security officials); In re Albrecht, 42 P.3d 887, 898–99 (Or. 2002) (“suspicious nature” of transactions, combined with other facts, support inference that lawyer must have known his participation in scheme constituted money laundering; upholding disbarment for knowingly assisting crime or fraud and rejecting defense that lawyer was “an unwitting dupe to a talented con man”); see also ELLEN BENNETT & HELEN GUNNARSSON, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 47 (9th ed.) (“[a] lawyer’s assistance in unlawful conduct is not excused by a failure to inquire into the client’s objectives”). But see Iowa Supreme Court Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ouderkerk, 845 N.W. 2d 31, 45–48 (Iowa 2014) (declining to infer knowledge of client’s fraud despite what disciplinary counsel argued were “highly suspicious” circumstances where sophisticated, longstanding client who typically relied on the lawyer exclusively to prepare final paperwork deceived the lawyer about a fraudulent transfer to avoid creditors).
22 Id. at 427 (emphasis added); see also Florida Bar v. Brown, 790 So.2d 1081, 1088 (Fla. 2001) (suspension for soliciting illegal campaign contributions from employees and others for political candidates viewed as favorable to business interests of major client of firm; lawyer “should have known” conduct was criminal or fraudulent under Florida version of Rule 1.2(d) which expressly incorporates this standard); In re Siegel, 471 N.Y.S. 2d 591, 592 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (attorney “knew or should have known that at the very least, his conduct was a breach of trust, if not illegal”) (emphasis added). Other jurisdictions have rejected a negligence standard for Rule 1.2(d). See In re Tocco, 984 P.2d 539, 543 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc) (declining to read a should have known standard into Arizona Rule 1.2(d); “While actual knowledge can be proven by circumstantial evidence, a mere showing that the attorney reasonably should have known her conduct was in violation of the rules, without more, is insufficient.”); accord Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof’l Ethics and Conduct v. Jones, 606 N.W.2d 5, 7–8 (Iowa 2000).

The Committee acknowledges the tension between the “actual knowledge” standard of Model Rule 1.2(d), on the one hand, and those authorities applying a reasonably should know standard. This opinion concludes only that the standard of actual knowledge set out in the text of Model Rules 1.2(d) and 1.0(f) is met by appropriate evidence of willful blindness. When the Model Rules intend a lower threshold of scienter, such as “reasonably should know,” the text generally makes this explicit. See, e.g., MODEL RULES R. 2.3(b), 2.4(b), 4.3.
Criminal cases treat deliberate ignorance or willful blindness as equivalent to actual knowledge.\textsuperscript{23} As the Supreme Court recently summarized:

The doctrine of willful blindness is well established in criminal law. Many criminal statutes require proof that a defendant acted knowingly or willfully, and courts applying the doctrine of willful blindness hold that defendants cannot escape the reach of these statutes by deliberately shielding themselves from clear evidence of critical facts that are strongly suggested by the circumstances. . . . [The Model Penal Code defines] “knowledge of the existence of a particular fact” to include a situation in which “a person is aware of a high probability of [the fact’s] existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist.” Our Court has used the Code’s definition as a guide . . . [a]nd every Court of Appeals—with the possible exception of the District of Columbia Circuit—has fully embraced willful blindness, applying the doctrine to a wide range of criminal statutes.\textsuperscript{24}

A lawyer may accordingly face criminal charges or civil liability, in addition to bar discipline, for deliberately or consciously avoiding knowledge that a client is or may be using the lawyer’s services to further a crime or fraud.\textsuperscript{25} To prevent these outcomes, a lawyer must inquire further when the facts before the lawyer create a high probability that a client seeks to use the lawyer’s services for criminal or fraudulent activity.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{23} United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 189 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[A]ctual knowledge and deliberate avoidance of knowledge are the same thing.”).

\textsuperscript{24} Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB USA, 563 U.S. 754, 767 (2011) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (applying willful blindness standard to statute prohibiting knowing inducement of patent infringement).

\textsuperscript{25} See United States v. Cavin, 39 F.3d 1299, 1310 (5th Cir. 1994) (upholding deliberate ignorance jury instruction in prosecution of a lawyer); United States v. Scott, 37 F.3d 1564, 1578 (10th Cir. 1994) (affirming use of deliberate ignorance instruction against an attorney convicted of conspiracy to defraud the IRS); Wyle v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 585, 590 (9th Cir. 1983) (upholding deliberate ignorance finding against law firm in antitrust suit because firm was aware of high probability that client made illegal payments and failed to investigate); United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 862 (2d Cir. 1964) (a lawyer may be held liable in a securities fraud suit if the lawyer has “deliberately closed his eyes to the facts he had a duty to see”); Harrell v. Crystal, 611 N.E. 2d 908, 914 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (affirming finding of liability in malpractice action for lawyer’s failure to investigate sham tax shelters); Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 2003-104 (2003) (where facts suggested property transfer to client from relative was to conceal assets from creditors, lawyer handling sale of property to a third party “must evaluate whether the transfer of reality to your client was ‘fraudulent’” under state law); cf. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 94, Reporter’s Note, cmt. g. at 17 (Am. Law Inst. 2000) (“the preferable rule is that proof of a lawyer’s conscious disregard of facts is relevant evidence which, together with other evidence bearing on the question, may warrant a finding of actual knowledge”).

\textsuperscript{26} As the authorities and analysis in this Section make clear, the duty to inquire under Model Rule 1.2(d) is tied to the circumstances and the lawyer’s state of knowledge. It is not a free-standing, blanket obligation to scrutinize every client for illicit ends irrespective of the nature of the specific matter and the attorney-client relationship. See United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877, 881 (2d Cir. 1972) (“[C]onstruing ‘knowingly’ in a criminal statute to include willful blindness . . . is no radical concept in the law,” but the standard does not mean that an attorney has a general duty to “investigate the truth of his client’s assertions’ or risk going to jail”; upholding criminal conviction of lawyer who actively aided in immigration related marriage fraud); Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 2001-26 (“Generally, a lawyer has no obligation to inquire or otherwise uncover facts that are not necessary to enable the lawyer to fulfill his or her obligations with respect to the representation”; warning nevertheless that Rule 1.2(d) applies to filing of worker’s compensation claims and leaving attorney to determine relevance of client’s fatal condition to client’s specific claim) (emphasis added). However, the
III. The Duty To Inquire Under Other Rules

Rule 1.2(d) is not the only source of a lawyer’s duty to inquire. A lawyer may be obliged to inquire further in order to meet duties of competence, diligence, communication, honesty, and withdrawal under Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.13, 1.16, and 8.4. The kinds of facts and circumstances that would trigger a duty to inquire under these rules include, for example, (i) the identity of the client, (ii) the lawyer’s familiarity with the client, (iii) the nature of the matter (particularly whether such matters are frequently associated with criminal or fraudulent activity), (iv) the relevant jurisdictions (especially whether any jurisdiction is classified as high risk by credible sources), (v) the likelihood and gravity of harm associated with the proposed activity, (vi) the nature and depth of the lawyer’s expertise in the relevant field of practice, (vii) other facts going to the reasonableness of reposing trust in the client, and (viii) any other factors traditionally associated with providing competent representation in the field.

First, Rule 8.4(b) makes it professional misconduct for a lawyer to “commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” Rule 8.4(c) makes it professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” Providing legal services could violate Rules 8.4(b) and (c) where the relevant law on criminal or fraudulent conduct defines the lawyer’s state of mind as culpable even without proof of actual knowledge. In such a situation, the lawyer must conduct further investigation to protect the client, advance the client’s legitimate interests, and prevent the crime or fraud.

Second, and more broadly, the lawyer’s duty of competence, diligence, and communication under Rules 1.1, 1.3, and 1.4 may require the lawyer, prior to advising or assisting in a course of action, to develop sufficient knowledge of the facts and the law to understand the client’s objectives, identify means to meet the client’s lawful interests, to probe further, and, if necessary, persuade the client not to pursue conduct that could lead to criminal liability or liability for fraud. Comment [5] of Rule 1.1 states that “[c]ompetent handling of a particular matter requires inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem.”

Committee rejects the view that the actual knowledge standard of Rule 1.2(d) relieves the lawyer of a duty to inquire further where the lawyer is aware of facts creating a high probability that the representation would further a crime or fraud. Cf. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 94 cmt. g. at 11 (“Under the actual knowledge standard . . . a lawyer is not required to make a particular kind of investigation in order to ascertain more clearly what the facts are, although it will often be prudent for the lawyer to do so.”); id. § 51 cmt. h., ill. 6 at 366; George M. Cohen, The State of Lawyer Knowledge Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 3 Am. U. Bus. L. Rev. 115, 116 (2014) (discussing association of willful blindness with recklessness, without citing to Global-Tech Appliances, and analyzing assumption that “the actual knowledge standard aims to exclude a duty to inquire”). For facts that can undermine the reasonableness of reposing trust, see the discussion of “risk categories” provided by the Good Practices Guidance, supra note 7, at 15–36.

See In re Berman, 769 P.2d 984, 989 (Cal. 1989) (en banc) (holding, in disciplinary proceeding for aiding a money laundering scheme, that attorney’s “belief that the financial statements contained false information reflects sufficient indicia of fraudulent intent to constitute moral turpitude”). The same conduct would require the lawyer’s withdrawal under Rule 1.16(a)(1).

See also Iowa Supreme Court Disciplinary Bd. v. Wright, 840 N.W.2d 295, 301 (Iowa 2013) (failure to conduct even preliminary research on overseas internet scam violates Rule 1.1); In re Winkel, 577 N.W.2d 9 (Wis. 1998) (failure to obtain information on trust funds of clients’ business prior to surrendering clients’ assets to bank). See also Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 52 cmt. c at 377 (“[A] lawyer must perform tasks reasonably appropriate to the representation, including, where appropriate, inquiry into the facts.”).
The duty of diligence under Rule 1.3 requires that a lawyer ascertain the relevant facts and law in a timely and appropriately thorough manner.\(^3\) Rule 1.4(a)(5), which requires consultation with the client regarding “any relevant limitation on the lawyer’s conduct” arising from the client’s expectation of assistance that is not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law, may require investigation of the relevant facts and law. Rule 1.4(b) requires the lawyer to give the client explanations sufficient to enable the client to make informed decisions about the representation.

Rule 1.13 imposes a duty to inquire in entity representations. Rule 1.13(a) provides that a lawyer “employed or retained by the organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.” Determining the interests of the organization will often require further inquiry to clarify any ambiguity about who has authority and what the organization’s priorities are. Under Rule 1.13(b), once the lawyer learns of action, omission, or planned activity on the part of an “officer, employee, or other person associated with the organization . . . that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interests of the organization.” Even if the underlying facts regarding the violation or potential violation are already well established and require no additional inquiry, determining what is “reasonably necessary” and in the “best interest of the organization” will commonly involve additional communication and investigation.\(^3\)

Recent ABA guidance and opinions support this approach. Concern that individuals might use the services of U.S. lawyers for money-laundering and terrorist financing prompted the ABA House of Delegates to adopt in 2010 the ABA Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (“Good Practices Guidance”). The Good Practices Guidance advocates a “risk-based approach” to avoid assisting in money laundering or terrorist financing, according to guidelines developed by the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (“FATF”).\(^3\) Recommended measures

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\(^3\) See In re Konnor, 694 N.W. 2d 376 (Wis. 2005) (failure to investigate concern that rents owed to estate were being misappropriated).

\(^3\) See MODEL RULES R. 1.13 cmts. [3] & [4]. Rule 1.13(b) was added after a series of high profile financial accounting scandals in the early 2000s. AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (2003), reprinted in 59 BUS. LAW. 145, 166-70 (2003). Other law may also create a duty to inquire. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 creates a duty for the “chief legal officer” to conduct an “appropriate” investigation in response to another lawyer’s report of “evidence of a material violation” by the company. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(2) (2012); see also In re Kern, 816 S.E. 2d 574 (S.C. 2018) (discussing obligations of securities lawyers); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 9-28.720 (quality of internal investigation can affect eligibility for “cooperation credit”); Cohen, supra note 26, at 129–30 (discussing obligations of securities lawyers).

\(^3\) See GOOD PRACTICES GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 2. A “risk-based approach” is generally “intended to ensure that measures to prevent or mitigate money laundering and terrorist financing are commensurate with the risks identified . . . [H]igher risk areas should be subject to enhanced procedures, such as enhanced client due diligence (“CDD”) . . . .” Id. at 8. The report continues: “This paper identifies the risk categories and offer[s] voluntary good practices designed to assist lawyers in detecting money laundering while satisfying their professional obligations.” Id.
include “examining the nature of the legal work involved, and where the [client’s] business is taking place.”

ABA Formal Opinion 463 addresses efforts to require U.S. lawyers to perform “gatekeeping” duties to protect the international financing system from criminal activity arising out of worldwide money-laundering and terrorist financing activities. Observing that “the Rules do not mandate that a lawyer perform a ‘gatekeeper’ role,” especially in regards to “mandatory reporting” to public authorities “of suspicion about a client,” Opinion 463 nevertheless identifies the Good Practices Guidance as a resource “consistent with the Model Rules” and with Informal Opinion 1470. It also reinforces the duty to investigate in appropriate circumstances. Specifically, Opinion 463 states that “[i]t would be prudent for lawyers to undertake Client Due Diligence (“CDD”) in appropriate circumstances to avoid facilitating illegal activity or being drawn unwittingly into a criminal activity. . . . [P]ursuant to a lawyer’s ethical obligation to act competently, a duty to inquire further may also arise. An appropriate assessment of the client and the client’s objectives, and the means for obtaining those objectives, are essential prerequisites for accepting a new matter or continuing a representation as new facts unfold.”

A lawyer’s reasonable judgment under the circumstances presented, especially the information known and reasonably available to the lawyer at the time, does not violate the rules. Nor should a lawyer be subject to discipline because a course of action, objectively reasonable at the time it was chosen, turned out to be wrong with hindsight.

IV. Other Obligations Incident to the Duty to Inquire

If the client refuses to provide information or asks the lawyer not to evaluate the legality of a transaction the lawyer should explain to the client that the lawyer cannot undertake the representation unless an appropriate inquiry is made. If the client does not agree to provide

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34 Id.
35 Id. at 2–3 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2 n.10 (“The Good Practices Guidance encourages all lawyers to perform basic CDD by (1) identifying and verifying the identity of each client; (2) identifying and verifying the identity of any ‘beneficial owner’ of the client, defined as the natural person(s) with ultimate control of a client, when such an analysis is warranted from a risk-based standpoint; and (3) obtaining enough information to understand a client’s circumstances, business, and objectives.”).
36 In numerous contexts of evaluating attorney conduct, courts and regulators have warned against hindsight bias. See Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 930 (6th Cir. 1980) (“[E]very losing litigant would be able to sue his attorney if he could find another attorney who was willing to second guess the decisions of the first attorney with the advantage of hindsight.”); In re Claussen, 14 P.3d 586, 593–94 (Or. 2000) (en banc) (declining to discipline lawyer who aided client in converting insurance policy to cash while client’s bankruptcy petition was pending; lawyer did not know client would abscond with money and cannot be judged by a standard of “clairvoyance” that reflects the knowledge of “hindsight”); N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-4 (2018) (“Under the knowledge standard of Rule 1.2(d), a lawyer is not deemed to ‘know’ facts, or the significance of facts, that become evident only with the benefit of hindsight.”); N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2005-05 (2005) (in handling of “thrust upon” concurrent client conflicts a lawyer who does balance the relevant considerations in good faith should not be subject to discipline for getting it wrong in hindsight”); Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 2001-100 (2001) (the propriety of accepting stock as payment of legal fees for a start-up “should be made based on the information available at the time of the transaction and not with the benefit of hindsight”).
information, then the lawyer must decline the representation or withdraw.\textsuperscript{37} If the client agrees, but then temporizes and fails to provide the requested information, or provides incomplete information, the lawyer must remonstrate with the client. If that fails to rectify the information deficit, the lawyer must withdraw. Indeed, proceeding in a transaction without the requested information may, depending on the circumstances, be evidence of the lawyer’s willful blindness under Rule 1.2(d).\textsuperscript{38} If the client agrees, provides additional information, and the lawyer concludes that the requested services would amount to assisting in a crime or fraud, the lawyer must either discuss the matter further with the client, decline the representation, or seek to withdraw under Rule 1.16(a).\textsuperscript{39}

In general, a lawyer should not assume that a client will be unresponsive to remonstration. However, if the client insists on proceeding with the proposed course of action despite the lawyer’s remonstration, the lawyer must decline the representation or withdraw.\textsuperscript{40} The lawyer may have discretion to disclose information relating to the representation under Model Rule 1.6(b)(1)-(3).\textsuperscript{41}

If the lawyer needs information from sources other than the prospective client and can obtain that information without disclosing information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.18, the information should be sought. If the lawyer needs to disclose protected information in order to analyze the transaction, the lawyer must seek the client’s informed consent in advance.\textsuperscript{42} If the client will not consent or the lawyer believes that seeking consent will lead to criminal or fraudulent activity, the lawyer must decline the representation or withdraw.\textsuperscript{43}

If an inquiry would result in expenses that the client refuses to pay, the lawyer may choose to conduct the inquiry without payment or to decline or discontinue the representation.

Overall, as long as the lawyer conducts a reasonable inquiry, it is ordinarily proper to credit an otherwise trustworthy client where information gathered from other sources fails to resolve the issue, even if some doubt remains.\textsuperscript{44} This conclusion may be reasonable in a variety of

\textsuperscript{37} As discussed below, under Rule 1.2(c) a lawyer cannot assent to an unreasonable limitation on the representation even if the client seeks or insists upon such a limitation and offers consent.
\textsuperscript{38} See also N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-4 at 5 (“[A] client’s refusal to authorize and assist in an inquiry into the lawfulness of the client’s proposed conduct will ordinarily constitute an additional, and very significant, ‘red flag.’”).
\textsuperscript{39} MODEL RULES R. 1.2 cmt. [13] (“If a lawyer comes to know or reasonably should know that a client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law . . . the lawyer must consult with the client regarding the limitations on the lawyer’s conduct.”).
\textsuperscript{40} See also N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-4 at 6 (“If it becomes clear during a lawyer’s representation that the client has failed to take necessary corrective action, and the lawyer’s continued representation would assist client conduct that is illegal or fraudulent, Rule 1.16(b)(1) mandates that the lawyer withdraw from representation.”). For a discussion of the obligation to withdraw upon learning that a lawyer’s services have been used to further a fraud, see ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992).
\textsuperscript{41} N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-4 at 6.
\textsuperscript{42} MODEL RULES R. 1.0(e) (“‘Informed consent’ denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.”).
\textsuperscript{43} MODEL RULES R. 1.16(c)(2).
\textsuperscript{44} See N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-4 at 5.
circumstances. For example, the lawyer may have represented the client in many other matters. The lawyer may know the client personally, professionally, or socially. The business arrangements and other individuals or parties involved in the transaction may be familiar to the lawyer.

Finally, Rule 1.2(c) permits a lawyer to “limit the scope of [a] representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.” Permitted scope limitations include, for example, that the client has limited but lawful objectives for the representation, or that certain available means to accomplish the client’s objectives are too costly for the client or repugnant to the lawyer. Any limitation, however, must “accord with the Rules of Professional Conduct and other law,” including the lawyer’s duty to provide competent representation. In the circumstances addressed by this opinion, a lawyer may not agree to exclude inquiry into the legality of the transaction.

V. Hypotheticals

The following hypotheticals are intended to clarify when circumstances might require further inquiry because of risk factors known to the lawyer. Some are drawn from the Good Practices Guidance, an important resource for transactional lawyers detailing how to conduct proper due diligence as well as how to identify and address risk factors in the most common scenarios in which a lawyer’s assistance might be sought in criminal or fraudulent transactions.

Further inquiry would be required in the first two examples because the combination of risk factors known to the lawyer creates a high probability that the client is engaged in criminal or fraudulent activity.

#1: A prospective client has significant business connections and interests abroad. The client has received substantial payments from sources other than his employer. The client holds these funds outside the US and wants to bring them into the US through a transaction that minimizes US tax liability. The client says: (i) he is “employed” outside the US but will not say how; (ii) the money is in a “foreign bank” in the name of a foreign corporation but the client will not identify the bank or the corporation; (iii) he has not disclosed the payments to

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45 See MODEL RULES R. 1.2 cmt. [6] (“A limited representation may be appropriate because the client has limited objectives for the representation. In addition, the terms upon which representation is undertaken may exclude specific means that might otherwise be used to accomplish the client’s objectives. Such limitations may exclude actions that the client thinks are too costly or that the lawyer regards as repugnant or imprudent.”)

46 See id. cmt. [7] (“an agreement for a limited representation does not exempt a lawyer from the duty to provide competent representation”); id. cmt. [8] (“All agreements concerning a lawyer’s representation of a client must accord with the Rules of Professional Conduct and other law.”).

47 The analysis of the hypotheticals that follows draws on the GOOD PRACTICES GUIDANCE but should not be read to support the conclusion that any isolated risk factor identified in the GOOD PRACTICES GUIDANCE necessarily creates a duty to inquire in all matters in which it may be present. The question is whether a reasonable lawyer under the specific circumstances would be obliged to conduct further inquiry. The Committee further cautions that circumstances that render a specific jurisdiction or other factor “high risk” can change. On the one hand, if new circumstances presenting a greater risk arise the lawyer should take appropriate action, and may need to seek advice on what, if any, action is required. On the other hand, new circumstances may support acceptance or continuation of the representation by showing that, upon inquiry, the high-risk designation is inaccurate or inapplicable to the matter.
his employer or any governmental authority or to anyone else; and (iv) he has not included the amounts in his US income tax returns.  

#2: A prospective client tells a lawyer he is an agent for a minister or other government official from a “high risk” jurisdiction who wishes to remain anonymous and would like to purchase an expensive property in the United States. The property would be owned through corporations that have undisclosed beneficial owners. The prospective client says that large amounts of money will be involved in the purchase but is vague about the source of the funds, or the funds appear to come from “questionable” sources.

If, on the same facts as #2, the client assures the lawyer that information will be provided but does not follow through, the lawyer must either withdraw or again discuss with the client the need for the information to continue in the representation, seek an explanation for the delay, and withdraw if the explanation the client offers is unsatisfactory. If the information provided is incomplete — e.g., information that leaves the identity of the actual funding sources opaque — the lawyer must follow the same course: withdraw or again discuss with the client the need for the information to continue in the representation, seek an explanation for the delay, and withdraw if the explanation offered is unsatisfactory.

In examples #3 through #5 below, the duty to inquire depends on contextual factors, most significantly, the lawyer’s familiarity with the client and the jurisdiction.

#3: A general practitioner in rural North Dakota receives a call from a long-term client asking her to form a limited liability company for the purpose of buying a ranch.

#4: The general practitioner in rural North Dakota receives a call from a new and unknown prospective client saying that the client just won several million dollars in Las Vegas and needs the lawyer to form a limited liability company to buy a ranch.

#5: A prospective client in New York City asks a general practitioner in a mid-size town in rural Georgia to provide legal services for the acquisition of several farms in rural Georgia. The prospective client tells the lawyer that he has made a lot of money in hedge funds and now wants to diversify his investments by purchasing these farms but says he doesn’t want his purchases to cause a wave of land speculation and artificially inflate local prices. He wants...
to wire money into the law firm’s trust account over time for the purchases. He asks the lawyer to create a series of LLCs to make strategic (and apparently unrelated) acquisitions.\textsuperscript{54}

VI. Conclusion

Model Rule 1.2(d) prohibits a lawyer from advising or assisting a client in a transaction or other non-litigation matter the lawyer “knows” is criminal or fraudulent. That knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances, including a lawyer’s willful blindness or conscious disregard of available facts. Accordingly, where there is a high probability that a client seeks to use the lawyer’s services for criminal or fraudulent activity, the lawyer must inquire further to avoid advising or assisting such activity. Even if information learned in the course of a preliminary interview or during a representation is insufficient to establish “knowledge” under Rule 1.2(d), other rules may require further inquiry to help the client avoid crime or fraud, to advance the client’s legitimate interests, and to avoid professional misconduct. These include the duties of competence, diligence, communication, and honesty under Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.13, 1.16, and 8.4. If the client or prospective client refuses to provide information necessary to assess the legality of the proposed transaction, the lawyer must ordinarily decline the representation or withdraw under Rule 1.16. A lawyer’s reasonable evaluation after that inquiry based on information reasonably available at the time does not violate the rules.

\textsuperscript{54} This hypothetical is drawn from \textsc{American Law Institute, Anti-Money Laundering Rules and Other Ethics Issues} 450-51 (2017) and requires further inquiry.