ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Staff at the American Bar Association Center for Human Rights drafted this report. The American Bar Association (ABA) is the largest voluntary association of lawyers and legal professionals in the world. As the national voice of the legal profession, the ABA works to improve the administration of justice, promotes programs that assist lawyers and judges in their work, accredits law schools, provides continuing legal education, and works to build public understanding around the world of the importance of the rule of law. The ABA Center for Human Rights has monitored trials and provided pro bono assistance to at-risk human rights defenders in over 60 countries. It is an implementing partner in the Clooney Foundation for Justice’s TrialWatch initiative.

The Center would like to thank Walter H. White, Natalia Nikonova, and Elizaveta Kurkina Oka for their assistance with analysis and drafting. Walter H. White is a member and past chairman of the board of the Center for Human Rights as well as a former partner and managing director of Steptoe & Johnson International in Moscow. He has extensive experience in Eurasia. Mr. White previously chaired the Central Asian American Enterprise Fund and has argued cases before the Supreme Arbitrage Court of the Russian Federation. Natalia Nikonova is a practicing Russian lawyer who formerly worked for Steptoe & Johnson International in Moscow. Ms. Oka is a staff attorney at the law firm Burdelov and Partners, where she represents clients in civil and criminal proceedings, including cases of domestic violence. Both Ms. Nikonova and Ms. Oka assisted with the translation of the report.

ABOUT THE CLOONEY FOUNDATION FOR JUSTICE’S TRIALWATCH INITIATIVE

The Clooney Foundation for Justice’s TrialWatch initiative monitors and grades the fairness of trials of vulnerable people around the world, including journalists, women and girls, religious minorities, LGBTQ persons and human rights defenders. Using this data, TrialWatch advocates for victims and is developing a Global Justice Ranking measuring national courts’ compliance with international human rights standards.

The statements and analysis expressed have not been approved by the House of Delegates or the Board of Governors of the American Bar Association, and do not represent the position or policy of the American Bar Association. Furthermore, nothing in this report should be considered legal advice for specific cases. Additionally, the views expressed in this report are not necessarily those of the Clooney Foundation for Justice.
From February to March 2020, the American Bar Association (ABA) Center for Human Rights monitored the criminal trial of Gulzhan Pasanova in the Kyrgyz Republic (Kyrgyzstan) as part of the Clooney Foundation for Justice’s TrialWatch initiative. Ms. Pasanova was prosecuted for and convicted of the offense of grievous bodily harm for fatally injuring her husband. Ms. Pasanova, who had been subjected to long-term domestic abuse by her husband, claimed she acted in self-defense.

The proceedings against Ms. Pasanova were marred by serious fair trial violations: in particular, violations of the right to call and examine witnesses, the right to be presumed innocent, the right to an impartial tribunal, the right to appeal, and the right to be free from discrimination. In particular, Ms. Pasanova presented significant, credible evidence that she had been subjected to years of domestic violence at the hands of her husband. This evidence was ignored and additional relevant evidence as to her state of mind at the time of the incident was excluded. Because a review of the trial monitors’ notes and the record show that these violations affected the outcome of the trial and/or resulted in significant harm to Ms. Pasanova, who was convicted and sentenced to a nine-year jail term, the trial has been assigned a “D” under the grading methodology described in the Annex.

For Ms. Gulzhan Pasanova is a 29-year old woman (as of April 2020) from Osh, the second largest city in Kyrgyzstan. At the time of the alleged offense, Ms. Pasanova was living with her husband, Mr. Umutbek Akdhzigitovich Isakov, and their children. The testimony of witnesses, corroborated by Ms. Pasanova’s medical records, indicates that she was subjected to prolonged physical and psychological abuse at the hands of Mr. Isakov.

In the days leading up to his death, Mr. Isakov had accused Ms. Pasanova of having an affair and confiscated her phone. On the night of November 19, 2019, Mr. Isakov and Ms. Pasanova got into an argument over Mr. Isakov’s suspicions. Ms. Pasanova alleges that Mr. Isakov threw a knife at her, threatened her, and hit her. According to Ms. Pasanova, she grabbed a reinforcing rod from an adjoining room and, out of fear for her wellbeing,
struck Mr. Isakov on the head. She subsequently sought assistance from Mr. Isakov’s brother, who called an ambulance. Mr. Isakov died at the hospital. On November 20, 2019, Ms. Pasanova was arrested. That same day, an investigating judge ordered that she be detained pending trial.

The decision to impose pretrial detention appears to have been unjustified. Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) requires courts to undertake an individualized assessment of the necessity of pretrial detention, which should always be an exceptional measure. According to Ms. Pasanova’s counsel, the court ordered pretrial detention solely based on the severity of the crime, without reference to Ms. Pasanova’s specific circumstances. This type of categorical justification does not comport with the ICCPR.

At the trial stage, violations persisted. Defense counsel argued that Ms. Pasanova had acted in self-defense or in a state of “extreme emotional distress” stemming from long-term abuse, thereby diminishing her criminal responsibility. In support of these theories, the defense requested to call witnesses, including neighbors who were familiar with the history of abuse and ambulance workers who attended the scene and could speak to Ms. Pasanova’s demeanor. The court, however, denied all such requests, deeming the proposed witnesses irrelevant to the case.

The defense also requested a psychiatric examination to evaluate Ms. Pasanova’s mental state at the time of the alleged offense. The court denied this request, stating that the psychiatric examination conducted during the investigation - which focused exclusively on Ms. Pasanova’s fitness to stand trial without assessing the potential effects of long-term abuse on her mental state at the time of the incident - was sufficient. By precluding the testimony of key fact witnesses as well as an expert examination central to the defense case, the court violated Ms. Pasanova’s right to call and examine witnesses, protected by Article 14(3) of the ICCPR.

The aforementioned decisions disadvantaged the defense in relation to the prosecution, contravening the principle of equality of arms. The rulings, all to the detriment of the defense, likewise evinced the court’s lack of impartiality - in violation of Article 14(1) of the ICCPR. The court’s bias was further demonstrated by the judgment convicting Ms. Pasanova, which failed to address the defense arguments that Ms. Pasanova acted in self-defense or, at the very least, in a state of “extreme emotional distress.”

Instead, in finding Ms. Pasanova guilty of grievous bodily harm, the court limited its assessment to evidence that Ms. Pasanova fatally injured her husband - an issue that was never disputed. The key factual question raised at trial was not whether Ms. Pasanova fatally injured her husband, but why she did so. In bypassing the crux of the case, the court violated Ms. Pasanova’s right to appeal under Article 14(5) of the ICCPR,
the exercise of which necessitates a duly reasoned judgment. Absent sufficient rationale for a conviction, a defendant cannot effectively challenge the decision before a higher tribunal.

Notably, Ms. Pasanova was confined in a metal cage for the duration of courtroom proceedings. This presentation to the court, indicating that Ms. Pasanova was a dangerous criminal, violated the presumption of innocence protected by Article 14(2) of the ICCPR. The injustice therein was exacerbated by the fact that, trapped in the cage, Ms. Pasanova was forced to endure a continuous barrage of insults and curses directed at her by Mr. Isakov’s relatives.

In addition to the fair trial violations set forth above, the prosecution’s behavior raised serious concerns. Over the course of the trial, the prosecutor repeatedly used inappropriate language, spoke out of turn, and screamed at the defense attorneys and Ms. Pasanova, breaching ethical standards that require prosecutors to act with integrity and professionalism.

Further, the conduct of both the prosecutor and the court violated Ms. Pasanova’s right to freedom from discrimination, as established by the ICCPR and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. The prosecution, for example, relied on archaic gender stereotypes to make its case, suggesting, among other things, that Ms. Pasanova was lying about domestic violence, that she would not have stayed with Mr. Isakov if she had truly been abused, and that any abuse that did occur was Ms. Pasanova’s fault. The court failed to intervene and, correspondingly, treated the issue of long-term abuse as irrelevant to the case, omitting any mention of domestic violence in determining Ms. Pasanova’s guilt and the appropriate sentence.

The devaluing of domestic violence survivors’ experiences is a widespread problem in Kyrgyzstan, as evidenced by the lack of institutional support for survivors, the rarity of investigation and prosecution of domestic violence complaints, the shaming of survivors who speak out, and the many obstacles that survivors face in the judicial system. That Ms. Pasanova’s experiences were discounted at every stage of the criminal proceedings against her thus reflects a larger pattern of victim-blaming and marginalization.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION

A. POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT

The arrest, detention and prosecution of Ms. Gulzhan Pasanova is consistent with a broader pattern of gender discrimination, victim blaming, and due process violations in Kyrgyzstan.

Gender Discrimination and Violence

Gender inequality is a significant issue in Kyrgyzstan. As documented by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), “[p]atriarchal attitudes” are pervasive. These “[t]raditional and cultural norms make it more difficult for women to gain access to public services, markets and institutions, social protection, and decent employment opportunities.” 56% of women are employed compared with 80% of men, with “[w]omen engaged in unpaid productive work and women outside the labor force account[ing] for 72% of the total working age population living below [the] poverty line.”

While Kyrgyz law “provides for the same legal status and rights for” both genders, women who are employed are paid substantially less than men. In the political realm, although “women constitute more than 40 percent of public servants,” the majority work at the middle or lower levels. Kyrgyz women’s voices are thus “largely excluded from decision-making.”

Gender inequality, stemming from deeply held patriarchal norms, has led to widespread violence against women. According to UNDP, up to 83% of Kyrgyz women “suffer from

2 Id.
4 UNDP 2018 at pg. 7.
6 Id at pg. 28.
9 See Saltanat Childress, “Plates and Dishes Smash; Married Couples Clash’: Cultural and Social Barriers to Help-Seeking Among Women Domestic Violence Survivors in Kyrgyzstan”, SAGE: Violence Against
various forms of violence,” including sexual violence, forced marriages, and domestic violence.\textsuperscript{10} As noted by the U.S. State Department in its most recent human rights report on Kyrgyzstan, “violence against women and girls remain[s] a significant … problem.”\textsuperscript{11}

**Underreporting of Domestic Violence: Societal and Institutional Failures**

Domestic violence is “commonplace” in Kyrgyzstan,\textsuperscript{12} with husbands the abusers in the vast majority of cases.\textsuperscript{13} However, such incidents are severely under-reported.\textsuperscript{14} A survey conducted by Kyrgyzstan’s Health Ministry found that “only 5 percent of women and girls who sought help for any type of physical or sexual violence reported going to police.”\textsuperscript{15} This reluctance to notify the authorities of abuse stems from a range of societal and systemic failures.

First, speaking out about domestic violence means risking stigmatization. An Amnesty International report, for example, concluded that domestic violence survivors avoided contacting the police due to, among other things, “social stigma [and] discriminatory attitudes.”\textsuperscript{16} Abuse is typically viewed as the woman’s fault, particularly if the victim is married and/or has a family.\textsuperscript{17} According to Human Rights Watch, “[w]omen who complain

\textsuperscript{10} United Nations Development Program, “Gender equality in the Kyrgyz Republic.”

\textsuperscript{11} Dep’t of State 2019 Report at pg. 19.


\textsuperscript{14} HRW 2020; Dep’t of State 2019 Report at pg. 19; Open Democracy, “Why domestic violence is flourishing in Kyrgyzstan - and how it could stop”, February 21, 2020. See also Pacific Standard Magazine, “Domestic Violence and Murder in Kyrgyzstan”, November 8, 2017 (“A survey by the Health Ministry shows that a quarter of the women in the country experience domestic violence over their lifetimes, but the overwhelming majority never speak out”).

\textsuperscript{15} Human Rights Watch, “’Call Me When He Tries to Kill You’: State Response to Domestic Violence in Kyrgyzstan”, 2015, pg. 48 [hereinafter “HRW 2015”]. Available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/10/28/call-me-when-he-tries-kill-you/state-response-domestic-violence-kyrgyzstan (As stated by a judge in Osh, the same city in which Ms. Pasanova was prosecuted, “only one out of 1,000 women call the police”).


\textsuperscript{17} HRW 2015 at pgs. 23, 26. See also Saltanat Childress, “‘Plates and Dishes Smash; Married Couples Clash’: Cultural and Social Barriers to Help-Seeking Among Women Domestic Violence Survivors in Kyrgyzstan”, SAGE: Violence Against Women, 2017, pgs. 3, 8, 11.
about violence in the home or leave abusive partners are perceived as destroying the family, leaving their children as ‘orphans’ subject to immoral upbringing, and bringing disgrace onto themselves and their extended family.”

It is not uncommon for a woman’s own family to refuse to take her in after she leaves her husband, reflecting the reality that there is “widespread acceptance of intimate partner violence.”

Second, victims are often economically dependent on their abusers. As discussed above, women in Kyrgyzstan have significantly fewer job and educational opportunities than men, narrowing their exit options and making “it difficult for [them] to leave abusive relationships and live independently.”

This problem is exacerbated by the dearth of shelters, crisis centers, and other social services.

Third, as stated by UNDP, the “justice system and law enforcement bodies do not respond adequately to women’s rights.” Kyrgyzstan passed a new misdemeanor law criminalizing domestic violence in 2019 (domestic violence had previously been prosecuted as an administrative offense) and a new Family Violence Law in 2017. However, “gaps in these laws and their implementation leave women at risk.” While the 2017 Family Violence Law led to an increase in protection orders, such “orders are rarely enforced and violations are rarely punished,” leaving victims vulnerable to retaliation.

Correspondingly, the new misdemeanor legislation eliminated the possibility of administrative arrest, which many domestic violence victims had relied on for protection, and replaced it with fines and community service. Again, victims who contact the police are exposed to reprisals, further undermining the effectiveness of the reforms.

The infrequency of investigations and prosecutions initiated as the result of complaints is likewise discouraging. Although a reported 6,145 domestic violence cases were initiated in 2019, police issued nearly 5,400 protection orders in 2019, but government data shows only 18 registered misdemeanors for failure to comply.

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18 HRW 2015 at pg. 23.
20 Saltanat Childress & Darald Hanusa, “‘All the system is simply a soap bubble’: Legal help-seeking for domestic violence among women in Kyrgyzstan”, Journal of Family Violence, pg. 148.
21 HRW 2015 at pgs. 27-28; Saltanat Childress, “‘Plates and Dishes Smash; Married Couples Clash’: Cultural and Social Barriers to Help-Seeking Among Women Domestic Violence Survivors in Kyrgyzstan”, SAGE: Violence Against Women, 2017, pg. 3.
26 Id (“Police issued nearly 5,400 protection orders in 2019, but government data shows only 18 registered misdemeanors for failure to comply”); HRW 2019.
27 Id.
registered with the police in 2019, “only 649 resulted in criminal cases.”\textsuperscript{28} Between 2011 and 2018, just 1,712 out of 32,357 reported domestic violence cases were investigated.\textsuperscript{29} Police, the majority of whom have yet to receive specialized training on domestic violence,\textsuperscript{30} often characterize abuse as a family matter outside the purview of law enforcement.\textsuperscript{31} Consequently, as documented by Human Rights Watch, officers discourage victims from pursuing criminal complaints.\textsuperscript{32} Criminal legislation permits the authorities to close cases in the event of reconciliation between the perpetrator and victim, an outcome for which police officers advocate.\textsuperscript{33} One survivor who reached out to the police recounted her experience: “They said ‘Did he use a knife? Did he try to kill you?’ I would say, ‘No,’ and they would say, ‘Okay, you call me when he tries to kill you, because we have more important things to do.’”\textsuperscript{34}

Notably, local organizations have been active in raising awareness about the issue of domestic violence and pushing for reform. On March 8, International Women’s Day, a coalition of Kyrgyz activists organized a peaceful march to call attention to gender-based violence.\textsuperscript{35} A mob of masked men attacked the marchers, injuring many.\textsuperscript{36} Instead of intervening, the authorities arrested and detained approximately 70 protesters.\textsuperscript{37} Those who advocate for domestic violence survivors face - if not the violence displayed on March 8 - an uphill battle.\textsuperscript{38}

\textit{Prosecutions of Domestic Violence Victims}

With respect to women prosecuted for taking violent action against their abusers, Kyrgyzstan stands out. As documented by a study conducted by Penal Reform International in 2014, 20% of all female prisoners in Kyrgyzstan had been convicted of causing the death of a male family member - a high number in comparison with other

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[28]{HRW 2020.}\
\footnotetext[29]{Open Democracy, “Why domestic violence is flourishing in Kyrgyzstan - and how it could stop”, February 21, 2020.}\
\footnotetext[30]{See id.}\
\footnotetext[32]{HRW 2015 at pgs. 47-49.}\
\footnotetext[33]{HRW 2019.}\
\footnotetext[34]{HRW 2015 at pg. 48.}\
\footnotetext[36]{Id.}\
\footnotetext[37]{Id.}\

countries.\textsuperscript{39} A United Nations Population Fund report further found that 70\% of Kyrgyz women convicted of killing their husbands or other family members had experienced a “longstanding pattern of physical abuse or forced economic dependence.”\textsuperscript{40} The Kyrgyz government has referenced an even higher figure in this regard, stating that 89 percent of female prisoners convicted of murder or attempted murder have been subjected to domestic violence.\textsuperscript{41}

In addition to the sheer prevalence of domestic violence, these numbers reflect the high conviction rate and heavy prison sentences imposed in cases in which domestic violence victims have killed their abusers.\textsuperscript{42} Although Kyrgyz legislation permits courts to acquit or impose lesser punishments on victims of domestic violence, such outcomes are rare.

Article 49(1) of the Kyrgyz Criminal Code exempts individuals who act in self-defense from criminal liability where there is an “immediate threat of violence” that endangers their lives or health. Article 49(6) of the Code further states that regardless of the severity of the damage caused, defense against an armed attack never “exceeds the limits of necessary defense.”

Meanwhile, Kyrgyz legislation penalizes as separate offenses acts perpetrated in “excessive self-defense” or as the result of “extreme emotional distress,”\textsuperscript{43} both of which carry lighter penalties than classic homicide or grievous bodily harm and both of which could apply to cases where victims harm their abusers. With respect to mitigating factors, the list enumerated in the criminal code is non-exhaustive, affording courts discretion to consider domestic violence in determining the sentences of victims convicted of killing their partners.

This legislation notwithstanding, prosecutors tend to charge offenses carrying the highest penalty in such cases and courts tend to reject defense arguments to acquit the accused or reduce the punishment.\textsuperscript{44} As noted in a report by a coalition of local organizations, “criminal proceedings against women are generally in connection with the murders of spouses/cohabitants, from whom these women have suffered violence over a long period of time. However, in practice, this provision is not taken into account by judges as a


\textsuperscript{43} Kyrgyz Criminal Code, Articles 131, 132, 140, 141.

\textsuperscript{44} Institute for War and Peace Reporting, “Kyrgyzstan: Failing Victims of Domestic Violence”, September 18, 2019.

According to Human Rights Watch, the victim-blaming that pervades society extends to the courtroom, which may explain judicial resistance to applying Kyrgyz laws on self-defense, lesser offenses, and mitigating factors. Human Rights Watch has, for example, identified a number of instances in which judges and prosecutors have relied on archaic gender stereotypes in proceedings relating to domestic violence.\footnote{HRW 2015 at pgs. 26-27.}

More broadly, fair trial violations are a significant problem in criminal trials in Kyrgyzstan. The U.S. State Department’s 2019 human rights report on Kyrgyzstan, for instance, recounted abuses such as “intimidation of trial judges by victims’ relatives and friends”; the use of bribes; coerced confessions; denial of access to counsel; the caging of defendants during trials; and convictions unsupported by the evidence.\footnote{Dep’t of State 2019 Report at pgs. 6-8.} Freedom House has likewise expressed concern about judicial independence and the violation of fair trial rights - particularly the presumption of innocence.\footnote{Freedom House 2019.}

As will be discussed below, Ms. Pasanova’s case reflects the aforementioned pattern: although there was evidence that Ms. Pasanova was subjected to prolonged domestic violence and struck Mr. Isakov in self-defense, the prosecution brought charges carrying the highest possible penalty; there were numerous violations of Ms. Pasanova’s right to a fair trial, including the right to the presumption of innocence, the right to call and examine witnesses, and the right to judicial impartiality; and the prosecution and judge relied on gender stereotypes throughout the proceedings, refusing to acknowledge Ms. Pasanova’s experience as a survivor of domestic violence and thereby discriminating against her.

B. CASE HISTORY

Ms. Gulzhan Pasanova (“Ms. Pasanova”) is a 29-year old woman (as of April 2020) from Osh, the second largest city in the Kyrgyz Republic. At the time of the alleged offense, Ms. Pasanova was living with her husband, Mr. Umutbek Akdhzigitovich Isakov, and their four children (the two oldest are Ms Pasanova’s stepchildren).

Evidence presented at trial demonstrated that Ms. Pasanova had been subjected to long-term abuse. A forensic examination conducted as part of the investigation, for example,
found bruises and a scar on Ms. Pasanova’s body from previous incidents. Correspondingly, the findings of psychiatric experts appointed by the state noted: “in 2017, the examinee [Ms. Pasanova] suffered an injury with loss of consciousness and vomit due to beatings inflicted by her husband. She underwent in-patient treatment at a private health care facility. Afterwards, she had repeated micro traumas. The examinee feels bad in crowded and noisy places.”

One of the primary prosecution witnesses, Ms. Pasanova’s brother, testified that Mr. Isakov had recounted an incident in which he “hit Ms. Pasanova.” In Ms. Pasanova’s words: “My husband and I often had fights, he liked to drink, and he frequently battered me, so that I was embarrassed to leave home with scratches and bruises and at times did not go out for months. I was hospitalized once and had a concussion … My husband was very jealous.” In contrast, Mr. Isakov’s siblings, who participated in the trial as injured parties, claimed to have never heard of fights or physical abuse.

With respect to the lead-up to the alleged offense, Ms. Pasanova’s stepson and stepdaughter corroborated Ms. Pasanova’s account of events. They testified that in the days preceding the incident, Mr. Isakov was angry with Ms. Pasanova because he suspected her of having an affair. According to the stepdaughter, Mr. Isakov had confiscated Ms. Pasanova’s phone.

On the night of November 19, 2019, Ms. Pasanova was home with her children. Mr. Isakov was late to dinner. He told Ms. Pasanova that his car had broken down. Mr. Isakov did not arrive at the family apartment until 10 or 11 pm, at which point the children were still awake. To Ms. Pasanova, he appeared intoxicated.

The account that follows is based on Ms. Pasanova’s statements. There were no other direct witnesses, as the children had gone to sleep. Mr. Isakov accused Ms. Pasanova of

49 Osh Regional Forensic Bureau, Forensic Examination of Gulzhan Pasanova, November 20, 2019 (unofficial translation).
50 The Center for Mental Health of Osh Region, Forensic Mental Health Assessment of Gulzhan Pasanova, November 26, 2019 (unofficial translation).
51 Monitor’s Notes, February 24, 2020.
52 Monitor’s Notes, February 11, 2020.
53 Under Article 41 of the Kyrgyz Criminal Code, injured parties have the right, among other things, to be represented by counsel, participate in trials, and speak during hearings.
54 Monitor’s Notes, March 4, 2020; Monitor’s Notes, March 5, 2020.
55 Monitor’s Notes, February 11, 2020 (Ms. Pasanova testified that Mr. Isakov was angry with her because of his suspicions of the affair and had taken away her phone).
57 Id.
58 Osh City Prosecutor’s Office, Pasanova Indictment, December 23, 2019 (pretrial statements of Ms. Pasanova’s stepdaughter and stepson) (unofficial translation).
59 Id; Monitor’s Notes, February 11, 2020.
60 Id. To note, the autopsy of the accused found no alcohol in his blood.
infidelity and “began to hurl insults at [her] and threatened [her] at knifepoint.” Mr. Isakov subsequently threw a knife at Ms. Pasanova, which glanced off a wall and fell to the ground. He stated: “And now I will lay my hands upon you. Just wait and you’ll see ... I have to destroy you.” Mr. Isakov then hit Ms. Pasanova on the head. Ms. Pasanova ran to the balcony adjoining the room and came across a reinforcing rod. “[S]cared” and “afraid [he] would beat her again,” she struck Mr. Isakov several times with the reinforcing rod, and he fell down.

In shock, Ms. Pasanova saw Mr. Isakov bleeding on the ground. She rushed out of her apartment building to seek assistance but could not find anyone. Mr. Isakov’s brother, Mukanbet, lived on the second floor of her apartment building. While outside, Ms. Pasanova saw a light on in Mukanbet’s apartment and returned to the building to ask him for help.

The following account is corroborated by multiple sources. Ms. Pasanova told Mukanbet that his brother had been injured in a street fight. They went to Ms. Pasanova’s apartment, where Mukanbet called an ambulance. Mr. Isakov was taken to the Osh City Hospital, accompanied by Ms. Pasanova and Mukanbet. Mr. Isakov later died in the hospital.

On November 20, at Mr. Isakov’s funeral, the police arrested Ms. Pasanova. That same day, an investigating judge ordered that she be detained pending trial. On December 23, 2019, the prosecution formally indicted Ms. Pasanova with grievous bodily harm

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61 Osh City Prosecutor’s Office, Pasanova Indictment, December 23, 2019.
62 Id.
63 Monitor’s Notes, February 11, 2020; Osh City Prosecutor’s Office, Pasanova Indictment, December 23, 2019; Osh City Court, Pasanova Judgment, March 5, 2020 (unofficial translation).
64 Osh City Prosecutor’s Office, Pasanova Indictment, December 23, 2019.
65 Id.
66 Monitor’s Notes, February 11, 2020; Osh City Prosecutor’s Office, Pasanova Indictment, December 23, 2019; Osh City Court, Pasanova Judgment, March 5, 2020.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Monitor’s Notes, February 11, 2020; Osh City Prosecutor’s Office, Pasanova Indictment, December 23, 2019; Osh City Court, Pasanova Judgment, March 5, 2020.
71 Osh City Prosecutor’s Office, Pasanova Indictment, December 23, 2019.
72 Id.
73 Osh City Prosecutor’s Office, Pasanova Indictment, December 23, 2019; Osh City Court, Pasanova Judgment, March 5, 2020.
74 Monitor’s Notes, February 11, 2019; Osh City Prosecutor’s Office, Pasanova Indictment, December 23, 2019; Osh City Court, Pasanova Judgment, March 5, 2020.
75 Id.
76 Monitor’s Notes, February 11, 2020; Osh City Prosecutor’s Office, Pasanova Indictment, December 23, 2019; Osh City Court, Pasanova Judgment, March 5, 2020. There are discrepancies between Ms. Pasanova’s statements regarding whether she and Mukanbet drove Mr. Isakov to the hospital or whether the ambulance did.
77 Interview with Defense Counsel, April 6, 2020; Osh City Court, Pasanova Judgment, March 5, 2020.
resulting in death under Article 138(3)(1) of the Kyrgyz criminal code.78 (Ms. Pasanova was charged with grievous bodily harm as opposed to homicide because Mr. Isakov did not die immediately but hours later - at the hospital). During Ms. Pasanova’s detention, state psychiatric experts examined her.79 Though the assessment was purportedly aimed at assessing both Ms. Pasanova’s state of mind at the time of the alleged offense and her competence to stand trial, it focused on the latter (as will be detailed below).

The trial began before the Osh City Court on February 11, 2020. Ms. Pasanova was confined in a metal cage for the duration of the courtroom proceedings. While in the cage, she was subjected to verbal attacks by Mr. Isakov’s relatives, who yelled and cursed at her about her alleged affair and responsibility for Mr. Isakov’s death.80

The prosecution argued that Mr. Isakov had not abused Ms. Pasanova and that her actions warranted the highest possible penalty under Article 138(3)(1): 10 years imprisonment.81 The defense argued both that Ms. Pasanova had acted in self-defense under Article 49 and that her actions should be requalified under Article 141 of the criminal code, which proscribes grievous bodily harm committed due to “extreme emotional distress” and carries a much lighter sentence: a maximum of two years and six months.82 Kyrgyz courts are permitted to requalify more serious offenses to lesser offenses at the verdict stage.83

At hearings held on February 11, February 24, and March 4, witnesses, the accused, and the injured parties (Mr. Isakov’s siblings) testified. At the hearing on February 11, the defense requested to call several witnesses, including Ms. Pasanova’s neighbors and ambulance workers who attended to Mr. Isakov.84 Given that the neighbors were familiar with Mr. Isakov’s abuse of Ms. Pasanova and the ambulance workers had interacted with Ms. Pasanova on the night of the alleged offense, their proposed testimony was probative of whether Ms. Pasanova had acted due to “extreme emotional distress.” The court rejected the defense request on the grounds that the proposed testimony was irrelevant.85

On March 4, the defense requested an additional psychiatric examination, stating that the initial examination had focused exclusively on Ms. Pasanova’s competence to stand trial, not her mental state at the time of the incident: the key to the defense’s “extreme emotional distress.”

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78 Osh City Prosecutor’s Office, Pasanova Indictment, December 23, 2019.
79 The Center for Mental Health of Osh Region, Forensic Mental Health Assessment of Gulzhan Pasanova, November 26, 2019.
80 Monitor’s Notes, February 11, 2020; Monitor’s Notes, March 4, 2020; Monitor’s Notes, March 5, 2020.
81 Monitor’s Notes, March 5, 2020.
82 Id. To note, defense counsel presented different arguments during closing arguments. One lawyer argued that Ms. Pasanova should be acquitted under Article 49 and the other argued that the offense should be requalified under Article 141.
83 Kyrgyz Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 290(2).
84 Interview with Defense Counsel, April 6, 2020.
85 Id.
emotional distress” theory. The judge rejected the defense request, deeming the initial investigation sufficient.

On March 5, the parties gave their closing arguments. That same day, the court issued its judgment, convicting Ms. Pasanova under Article 138(3)(1). She was sentenced to nine years in prison and a fine of 90,000 som: the equivalent of approximately 1,100 U.S. dollars.

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87 Osh City Court, Ruling Against an Additional Psychiatric Examination, March 5, 2020.
88 Osh City Court, Pasanova Judgment, March 5, 2020.
METHODOLOGY

A. THE MONITORING PHASE

As part of the Clooney Foundation for Justice’s TrialWatch initiative, the ABA Center for Human Rights deployed a monitor to the trial of Gulzhan Pasanova before the Osh City Court in Osh, Kyrgyzstan. The trial was in Kyrgyz and the monitor was able to follow the proceedings. Prior to the trial, the Center conducted background research and consulted with country experts.

The monitor did not experience any impediments in entering the courtroom and was present for the entirety of the trial.

B. THE ASSESSMENT PHASE

To evaluate the trial’s fairness and arrive at a grade, ABA Center staff who are members of the TrialWatch Experts Panel reviewed court documents and notes taken during the proceedings. Center staff found that the trial failed to conform to numerous binding international law standards. As relayed by defense counsel, Ms. Pasanova was unjustifiably detained pretrial. Once the proceedings started, the court consistently issued unsupported rulings to the detriment of the defense, violating, among other things, the right to call and examine witnesses and the right to judicial impartiality. Further, the conduct of both the court and prosecutor breached Ms. Pasanova’s right to be free from discrimination.
A N A L Y S I S

A. APPLICABLE LAW

This report draws upon the following sources: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the “ICCPR”); jurisprudence from the United Nations Human Rights Committee, the body tasked with monitoring implementation of the ICCPR; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); jurisprudence from the United Nations Committee to Eliminate Discrimination Against Women, the body tasked with monitoring implementation of the CEDAW; commentary from United Nations Special Procedures; and best practices in the field of prosecutorial ethics. Kyrgyzstan acceded to the ICCPR in 1994 and to the CEDAW in 1997.

B. INVESTIGATION AND PRETRIAL STAGE VIOLATIONS

Pretrial Detention

Article 9(1) of the ICCPR stipulates that “[e]veryone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.”

The United Nations Human Rights Committee has noted that with respect to detention, the concept of “arbitrariness” must be “interpreted broadly, to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law as well as elements of reasonableness, necessity and proportionality.”89 Not only should pretrial detention be the exception and as short as possible, but detention must be “lawful” (in accordance with domestic law) and “reasonable and necessary in all circumstances.”90 This means that pretrial detention is appropriate for only a limited number of purposes: namely, to prevent flight, interference with evidence, and the recurrence of serious crime.91

In support of these potential justifications for pretrial detention, the prosecution must present an adequately substantiated rationale as to why pretrial detention is required for the particular accused.92 Reference to the severity of the charges is insufficient.

by the Committee, “[p]retrial detention should not be mandatory for all defendants charged with a particular crime, without regard to individual circumstances.”

According to defense counsel, the investigating judge who ordered that Ms. Pasanova be detained pretrial relied solely on the gravity of the crime with which she had been charged. This type of categorical reasoning belies the individualized assessment required by Article 9(1). As such, based on the information provided by defense counsel, Ms. Pasanova was subjected to arbitrary detention.

C. VIOLATIONS AT TRIAL

Right to Obtain the Attendance and Examination of Witnesses

Under Article 14(3)(e) of the ICCPR, all persons accused of a crime are entitled “to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on [their] behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against [them].” In the words of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, this provision “is important for ensuring an effective defence by the accused and their counsel and thus guarantees the accused the same legal powers of compelling the attendance of witnesses and of examining or cross-examining any witnesses as are available to the prosecution.” Article 14(3)(e) does not establish an absolute right to call and examine witnesses but a right to call witnesses who are relevant, if proposed in a timely manner in compliance with procedural requirements.

In Allaberdiev v. Uzbekistan, the Committee considered a case in which the accused was charged and convicted of drug-related offenses. Defense counsel requested to call, among others, individuals involved with the investigation and individuals whom the accused alleged had planted the drugs. Although these witnesses were central to the defense theory that the case was fabricated, the court rejected the request, deeming the proposed testimony irrelevant. The Committee found a breach of Article 14(3)(e). Similarly, in Saidov v. Tajikistan, the Committee found a violation of Article 14(3)(e) where

94 CHR did not have access to the detention order.
99 Id at para. 3.5.
100 Id at para. 3.5.
101 Id at paras. 8.8-8.9.
the court, "stating that the witnesses requested were too close to the accused and were interested in the outcome," prevented the accused from calling 11 witnesses.  

**Motion to Call Witnesses**

As discussed above, Ms. Pasanova’s lawyers argued that she had either acted in self-defense, warranting an acquittal, or that the alleged crime should be requalified as a violation of Article 141 of the criminal code, which criminalizes “grave harm to health inflicted in a state of sudden extreme emotional distress arising from unlawful violence or great insult from the victim, other unlawful actions of the victim, as well as a long-standing psycho-traumatic condition arising from the systematic unlawful or immoral conduct of the victim.” While a conviction under Article 138(3)(1) carries a sentence of up to ten years, a conviction under Article 141 carries a sentence of up to two years and six months.

On February 11, the start of the trial, defense counsel moved to call several of Ms. Pasanova’s neighbors as witnesses. Counsel believed that the neighbors would testify that Mr. Isakov had regularly abused Ms. Pasanova: according to counsel, the neighbors had heard sounds of fighting and screaming coming from Ms. Pasanova’s apartment on a number of occasions. This evidence of prolonged abuse would have heightened the likelihood that Mr. Isakov attacked Ms. Pasanova on the night of the incident, supporting the self-defense argument, and likewise would have supported the argument that Ms. Pasanova’s recurrent exposure to violence had engendered “extreme emotional distress.” The court rejected the defense motion on the ground that the neighbors’ testimony was irrelevant.

Defense counsel also requested to call the ambulance workers who attended to Mr. Isakov on the night of the alleged offense. In line with the “extreme emotional distress” argument, defense hoped that these witnesses would provide further information about Ms. Pasanova’s state of mind at the time of the incident based on their observations of her physical appearance and demeanor. The court, again stating that the testimony was irrelevant to the case, denied the motion.

This explanation, as in *Saidov* and *Allaberdiev*, was inadequate. Ms. Pasanova was entitled to call all witnesses relevant to the defense under Article 14(3)(e). The proposed witnesses possessed knowledge that was probative of central defense theories and were

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103 To note, there were no allegations that counsel failed to comply with any procedural requirements with respect to requests to call and examine witnesses.
104 Monitor’s Notes, March 5, 2020; Interview with Defense Counsel, April 6, 2020.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
thus clearly relevant. The court’s preclusion of their testimony violated Ms. Pasanova’s right to call and examine witnesses.

**Expert Examination**

Article 14(3)(e) encompasses the right to call relevant expert witnesses and commission relevant expert examinations. In *Khomidova v. Tajikistan*, for example, the UN Human Rights Committee found a violation where the court rejected the defense’s request for a medical examination of the accused to determine whether the authorities had subjected him to torture.\(^\text{108}\) In *Pustovalov v. Russian Federation*, the Committee examined a case in which the petitioner had been convicted for, among other things, raping several women.\(^\text{109}\) The petitioner requested an expert examination to prove that he was unable to have children: an effort to show that he could not have been the perpetrator with respect to one of the victims, who had become pregnant following the alleged assault.\(^\text{110}\) The trial court declined this request.\(^\text{111}\) As a result, the Committee concluded that the defendant’s rights under Article 14(3)(e) had been violated.\(^\text{112}\)

The UN Human Rights Committee has also found violations where courts have refused defense requests to appoint new experts to challenge opinions and evidence obtained during the investigation. In *Litvin v. Ukraine*, the Committee evaluated a case in which the petitioner had been charged with and convicted of the rape and murder of his sister-in-law.\(^\text{113}\) During the investigation, the authorities ordered an examination of the petitioner’s clothes, which were found to be stained with the victim’s blood.\(^\text{114}\) The defense disputed this finding and asked for an additional expert examination.\(^\text{115}\) The court denied the request, explaining - in part - that the initial examination provided an "exhaustive response."\(^\text{116}\) The Committee determined that the court’s conduct contravened the guarantee established by Article 14(3)(e).\(^\text{117}\)

As noted above, one of the defense’s primary arguments was that Ms. Pasanova acted in “extreme emotional distress” due to long-term abuse, a situation explicitly envisioned

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\(^{110}\) Id at para. 2.4.

\(^{111}\) Id.

\(^{112}\) Id at para. 8.4.


\(^{114}\) Id at paras. 2.17-2.18.

\(^{115}\) Id.

\(^{116}\) Id.

\(^{117}\) Id at para. 10.4. See also European Court of Human Rights, Stoimenov v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App. No. 17995/2, April 5, 2007, paras. 38-43.
by Article 141 of the Kyrgyz criminal code. As such, her mental condition at the time of the offense was central to the defense case.

Despite the importance of expert psychiatric testimony to Ms. Pasanova’s defense, the court denied defense counsel’s motion for an expert examination addressing Ms. Pasanova’s state of mind at the time of the incident.\textsuperscript{118} According to the court, such an assessment would duplicate the psychiatric report that the state had produced: there was “no need for a second comprehensive forensic psychological and psychiatric examination to resolve new issues.”\textsuperscript{119}

The state’s report, however, focuses not on whether Ms. Pasanova fatally injured her husband because of “extreme emotional distress” but on whether she was suffering from a mental disorder or any other ailment that would render her incompetent to stand trial.\textsuperscript{120} It notes, for example: “the examinee is fairly well-groomed; her state of consciousness is unaltered. She is correctly oriented to person, place and time; talkative, answers questions to keep up the conversation. The examinee has no serious bodily complaint. Her attention is sustained, her span of attention and alertness are sufficient. Her thinking is slow and sequential.”\textsuperscript{121}

With respect to what occurred on the night in question, the report merely repeats the accused’s account of events - that to “to defend [her]self, [she] struck him on the head with a reinforcing rod twice” - and concludes: “[a]t the time of the alleged offence, she had no temporary painful mental disorder. At the time of the alleged offence, the examinee was able to understand the nature and consequence of her actions and control them.”\textsuperscript{122} There is no information or explanation as to the basis of this determination beyond the accused’s description of events. There is likewise no analysis of whether the long-term abuse that Ms. Pasanova suffered at the hands of Mr. Isakov might have triggered her conduct.

As discussed above, the UN Human Rights Committee has made it clear that defendants are entitled to use expert witnesses where relevant, including to challenge expert examinations performed during the pretrial investigation. In Ms. Pasanova’s case, the defense’s request was clearly relevant, aimed at acquiring information on key issues left unaddressed by the initial findings. The judge’s response mirrored that in \textit{Litvin v. Ukraine}, where the court explained its denial of the defense request by deeming the pretrial examination an “exhaustive response.” Consequently, as in \textit{Litvin v. Ukraine}, the court’s ruling constituted a violation of Article 14(3)(e).

\textsuperscript{118} Osh City Court, Ruling Against an Additional Psychiatric Examination, March 5, 2020.
\textsuperscript{119} Id.
\textsuperscript{120} The Center for Mental Health of Osh Region, Forensic Mental Health Assessment of Gulzhan Pasanova, November 26, 2019.
\textsuperscript{121} Id.
\textsuperscript{122} Id.
Equality of Arms

The right to call and examine witnesses also relates to the principle of equality of arms, under which “the procedural conditions at trial and sentencing must be the same for all parties” and there must be a “‘fair balance’ between the parties, requiring that each party should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present the case under conditions that do not place her/him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis the opponent.”

In the proceedings against Ms. Pasanova, the court prevented the defense from calling key fact witnesses and also denied the defense motion for an expert examination central to the defense case. In contrast, the court granted all requests for witnesses submitted by the prosecution and admitted the aforementioned state psychiatric examination into evidence. The defense was thereby “place[d] ... at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis” the prosecution, in contravention of the principle of equality of arms.

Presumption of Innocence

Ms. Pasanova was confined within a metal cage for the duration of the courtroom proceedings, violating her right to the presumption of innocence - guaranteed by Article 14(2) of the ICCPR.

Under the ICCPR, the presumption can be breached through conduct suggesting that the accused is guilty. The UN Human Rights Committee, for example, has stated that “defendants should normally not be shackled or kept in cages during trials or otherwise presented to the court in a manner indicating that they may be dangerous criminals.” If a defendant is caged, the state must offer some justification for this restriction.

In Pustovoit v. Ukraine, the Committee found a violation of Article 14(2) where the court “failed to demonstrate that placing the author in a metal cage during the public trial at the Supreme Court, with his hands handcuffed behind his back, was necessary for the purpose of security or the administration of justice, and that no alternative arrangements could have been made consistent with the human dignity of the author and with the need to avoid presenting him to the court in a manner indicating that he was a dangerous criminal.”

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In the present case, there was no explanation for the necessity of placing Ms. Pasanova in a metal cage. This measure thus contravened her right to the presumption of innocence. The injustice of Ms. Pasanova’s confinement was exacerbated by the fact that, trapped in the cage, she was forced to endure a continuous barrage of insults and curses directed at her by Mr. Isakov’s relatives.

**Right to an Impartial Tribunal**

Article 14(1) of the ICCPR mandates judicial impartiality. As stated by the United Nations Human Rights Committee: “judges must not allow their judgement to be influenced by personal bias or prejudice, nor harbour preconceptions about the particular case before them, nor act in ways that improperly promote the interests of one of the parties to the detriment of the other. … [T]he tribunal must also appear impartial to a reasonable observer.”\(^{127}\) The Committee has held that unreasonable decision-making can violate Article 14(1).

In *Khostikoev v. Tajikistan*, the Committee found an Article 14(1) violation due to rulings that hindered the preparation of an effective defense, such as “ignor[ing] [counsel's] objections” and “refus[al] to allow the possibility for the author to adduce relevant evidence.”\(^{128}\) Similarly, in *Toshev v. Tajikistan*, the Committee concluded that the court lacked impartiality where “several of the lawyers' requests were not given due consideration.”\(^{129}\)

In the present case, the court rejected several defense requests, including for a comprehensive psychiatric examination and for the examination of witnesses who could offer testimony relevant to her defense. As in *Toshev* and *Khostikoev*, these decisions contravened baseline fair trial standards, evincing the court’s partiality.

Additionally, the UN Human Rights Committee has found violations of Article 14(1) where courts have failed to address central defense arguments in issuing convictions.\(^{130}\) As discussed in more depth below, the judgment in Ms. Pasanova’s case omits any mention of the argument that she acted in self-defense or - at the least - that her actions should

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be requalified under Article 141. In overlooking the core of the defense case, the judgment provides further basis for finding that the court violated the principle of judicial impartiality.

Right to Appeal: Duly Reasoned Judgment

Article 14(5) of the ICCPR establishes the right to appeal. As stated by the United Nations Human Rights Committee, exercise of the right to appeal necessitates a “duly reasoned” written judgment: if a court does not provide sufficient rationale for a conviction, a defendant cannot effectively challenge the decision before a higher tribunal. In Van Hulst v. The Netherlands, for example, the Committee, considering an Article 14(5) claim, indicated that courts must give “reasons” for dismissing a defense.

In the proceedings against Ms. Pasanova, the judgment fell short of the Article 14(5) standard because it failed to explain its dismissal of Ms. Pasanova’s defense. There was no doubt that Ms. Pasanova fatally injured her husband. The matter under dispute was her mental state at the time: whether she acted to defend herself, in reasonable fear for her life, or whether she acted in a state of “extreme emotional distress,” which would require that the crime be requalified under Article 141.

The extent of the court’s assessment of these issues is the following sentence: “the testimony of the accused during the trial that she committed it in a state of passion … does not exempt her from criminal liability.” The judgment does not address the self-defense argument, notwithstanding the fact that it recounts in detail Ms. Pasanova’s testimony that Mr. Isakov threatened her with a knife. There is likewise no analysis of whether Ms. Pasanova was experiencing “extreme emotional distress,” which would not “exempt[ed] her from criminal liability,” but would have reduced her potential punishment.

As such, the judgment is not “duly reasoned.” It would be difficult for a defense lawyer reading the judgment to ascertain the reasoning behind the finding of guilt and the characterization of the crime, in violation of the Article 14(5) right to appeal.

D. OTHER FAIRNESS CONCERNS

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133 Osh City Court, Pasanova Judgment, March 5, 2020.
Prosecutorial Misconduct

The prosecution’s actions in the case against Ms. Pasanova breached best practices on prosecutorial ethics.

Under the United Nations Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, prosecutors must “at all times maintain the honour and dignity of their profession” and “respect and protect human dignity.” Guidelnes produced by the International Association of Prosecutors similarly require prosecutors to “always conduct themselves professionally, in accordance with the law and the rules and ethics of their profession,” “at all times exercis[ing] the highest standards of integrity and care.” The Consultative Council of European Prosecutors’ Norms and Principles further note: “[p]rosecutors must earn the trust of the public by demonstrating in all circumstances an exemplary behaviour. They must treat people fairly, equally, respectfully and politely, and they must at all times adhere to the highest professional standards and maintain the honour and dignity of their profession, always conducting themselves with integrity and care.”

In the present case, the prosecutor insulted and screamed at Ms. Pasanova and her attorneys throughout the proceedings. On March 4, for example, after the defendant’s alleged lover was examined, the prosecutor initiated a verbal exchange with Ms. Pasanova outside of the framework of legal procedure: she was not on the witness stand at the time. The prosecutor yelled: “Is what he said true? You saying you were not married? Why did you call him?”

On that same day, defense counsel asked the judge to read aloud the state psychiatric report, which included references to Ms. Pasanova’s hospitalization as the result of abuse. The prosecutor began to argue with defense counsel about this request, screaming: “complain to whoever you want.” According to defense counsel, the prosecutor additionally yelled: “Who are you? Shut up, it’s done. So shut up.”

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138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Interview with Defense Counsel, April 6, 2020.
counsel complained about this behavior, the prosecutor responded: “Who are you? Who brought you here? Shut up.”

As documented by the monitor, the dispute over the psychiatric examination was reflective of the prosecution’s comportment throughout the trial. Although the judge at times intervened, ordering the prosecution to cease the yelling and insults, the prosecution continued to behave inappropriately.

In contravention of best practices, this conduct cannot be said to comply with the prosecution’s responsibility to act “professionally” and with “honour” and “dignity.”

**Right to Freedom from Discrimination**

*Domestic Violence and Its Effects*

Understanding of domestic violence and its effects has advanced over the past several decades, including with respect to why victims may stay with and ultimately kill their partners. Courts worldwide are thus increasingly relying on expert testimony about how the unique and ongoing nature of domestic violence impacts victims.142

Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) posits that domestic violence victims exist in a state of learned helplessness, meaning that the prolonged nature of abuse and its traumatic impact render victims passive: they do not leave.143 The decision to stay is informed by “cycles of violence,” which consist of a period of escalation, during which tensions increase; a burst of violence, during which physical abuse is perpetrated; and a period of apology and penance, during which the abuser attempts to atone for his or her actions and promises they will not recur.144 Due to the constant anxiety and fear engendered by this cycle, domestic violence victims can be triggered to violence by acts that might not provoke others.145

In addition, criminal justice experts have noted that courts evaluating the reasonableness of victims’ actions against their abusers should consider the concrete dangers and obstacles faced by victims subjected to prolonged violence.146 A high number of domestic

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141 Id.
145 Id at pg. 938.
violence victims, for example, are ultimately murdered by their partners: the threat of death is not illusory. Victims’ children may also be at risk for serious harm or loss of life. In many cases, victims have repeatedly attempted to reach out to social services or the police to no avail. Consequently, victims who stay with their partners and subsequently take violent action may be responding not on the basis of pathology but on the basis of their immediate circumstances.\textsuperscript{147}

As discussed below, these theories should inform how judicial actors handle such cases, ensuring that prosecutions of domestic violence victims do not violate States’ obligations under international human rights treaties, including the obligation to treat women equally.

\textit{Conduct of the Court and Prosecutor}

Article 2 of the ICCPR mandates that States Parties treat all individuals equally, regardless of distinctions such as “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” Article 3 requires States Parties to “undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present Covenant,” while Article 14(1) provides that “[a]ll persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals.”

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) complements the right to equality set forth in the ICCPR. Article 2 obliges States to eliminate discriminatory practices by, among other things, “establish[ing] legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and … ensur[ing] through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of women against any act of discrimination”; “refrain[ing] from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and … ensur[ing] that public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation”; “tak[ing] all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise”; and “tak[ing] all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women.”\textsuperscript{148} Article 5(a) requires States Parties to eliminate prejudices as well as practices based on stereotypes.

The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women has characterized state actors’ lack of gender sensitivity and use of gender stereotypes in legal proceedings as a breach of Article 2 and Article 5(a).\textsuperscript{149} In \textit{Belousova v. Kazakhstan},

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{147} Id.\textsuperscript{148} CEDAW, Article 2(c)(d)(e)(f).\textsuperscript{149} See Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, V.K. v. Bulgaria, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/49/D/20/2008, September 27, 2011, paras. 9.11-9.12. To note, the Committee does not always clearly distinguish between which specific acts are violations of Article 2 and which specific acts are violations of Article 5(a).}
for example, the Committee considered a case in which a woman alleged that her employer had sexually harassed her. The authorities failed to adequately investigate the claim, which ultimately resulted in the woman’s employer initiating a defamation suit against her.\textsuperscript{150} The Committee noted that the presiding court, which ultimately ruled in favor of the employer, “referred to the fact that [the woman] did not complain about the alleged sexual harassment while she was still employed, but only after her dismissal, as a circumstance rendering her allegation less credible.”\textsuperscript{151} This reasoning, derived from stereotypical conceptions of how a sexual harassment victim should act, displayed a disregard for the woman’s “vulnerable position as a solo female wage earner subordinate to [the alleged perpetrator].”\textsuperscript{152} Taking into account the above circumstances, the Committee found that national institutions’ insensitivity and reliance on gender stereotypes in handling the case violated Article 2 and Article 5(a).\textsuperscript{153} Notably, the failure of courts to intervene when parties rely on gender-based stereotypes can also violate the Convention.\textsuperscript{154}

The Committee has further specified that state actors’ failure to give due consideration to accounts of gender-based violence (often fueled by the stereotypes discussed above) violates Articles 2 and 5(a). In \textit{S.T. v. Russia}, the Committee evaluated a case in which a woman subjected to long-term abuse by her husband was severely injured after he attacked her with an axe.\textsuperscript{155} The prosecution pursued a light penalty, “reducing the classification of the crime with which the defendant was charged from attempted murder to inflicting serious bodily harm in a state of temporary insanity.”\textsuperscript{156} In turn, the court overlooked the history of domestic violence, affording excessive credence to the statements of individuals testifying on the defendant’s behalf (who alleged that the victim had provoked the defendant) and insufficient “weight to testimonies of witnesses supporting the [domestic violence victim’s] version of events.”\textsuperscript{157} Instead of considering the axe attack part of a broader pattern of abuse, the court found the defendant guilty of “inflicting serious bodily harm in a state of temporary insanity” and sentenced him to just nine months in prison.\textsuperscript{158} The Committee subsequently determined that the conduct of the prosecutor and court in discounting the history of domestic violence violated Articles 2 and 5(a).\textsuperscript{159}

\textsuperscript{151} Id at para. 10.10.
\textsuperscript{152} Id.
\textsuperscript{153} Id at paras. 10.8-10.10.
\textsuperscript{156} Id at para. 3.11.
\textsuperscript{157} Id at paras. 9.6-9.7.
\textsuperscript{158} Id at paras. 2.18, 9.6-9.7.
\textsuperscript{159} Id at paras. 9.6-9.7, 9.12.
In the present case, the prosecutor relied on gender stereotypes and the court did not intervene, in violation of Articles 2 and 5(a) of the Convention and, more broadly, the overarching right to be free from discrimination as provided by CEDAW and Articles 2,3, and 14 of the ICCPR. During closing arguments, for example, the prosecutor, claiming that Ms. Pasanova had in fact not been subjected to domestic violence, asked: “how could Gulzhan live with him and bear his children if she speaks so badly of him?” This comment reflects a stereotypical conception of domestic violence victims, ignoring the reality that survivors often stay with their partners for the range of reasons discussed above, including BWS and limited access to institutional support.

The prosecutor likewise stated that Ms. Pasanova could not have been undergoing “extreme emotional distress” at the time of the incident due to the fact that such heightened states “last only one minute.” Again, this assumption regarding how domestic violence victims react to long-term abuse has been directly contradicted by domestic violence experts: as established by BWS and other theories, victims often operate in perpetual anxiety and fear, a state far from fleeting.

At times, the prosecutor appeared to engage in victim-blaming. She stated with reference to the alleged abuse, “[n]o one forced Pasanova to give herself away, she chose Mr. Isakov herself.” She further argued: “If you do not want to live with your husband, get a divorce. Why kill him then? All this led to your result.”

Meanwhile, the court and prosecutor’s disregard for the abuse suffered by Ms. Pasanova violated Articles 2 and 5(a) of the Convention and, more broadly, the overarching right to be free from discrimination as provided by CEDAW and Articles 2,3, and 14 of the ICCPR. The prosecutor charged the offense with the highest possible penalty despite extensive evidence that Ms. Pasanova had been subjected to prolonged abuse and, if not acting in self-defense, had at the very least acted on the basis of “extreme emotional distress.” Correspondingly, as discussed above, the court did not even mention the history of domestic abuse in its judgement, entirely discounting the possibility that Ms. Pasanova had been attacked on the night in question or psychologically affected by the violence.

The actions of the prosecutor and court thus fall far short of the obligations established by Articles 2, 3, and 14 of the ICCPR and Articles 2 and 5(a) of the CEDAW, violating Ms. Pasanova’s right to freedom from discrimination.

**Criminal Responsibility**

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160 Monitor’s Notes, March 5, 2020.
161 Monitor’s Notes, March 4, 2020; Monitor’s Notes, March 5, 2020.
162 Text of Audio Recording of Hearing, March 5, 2020.
163 Id.
Courts should take prolonged domestic violence into account in determining guilt and appropriate sentences in cases where victims have harmed their abusers.

The United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders, adopted by the General Assembly, state: “[w]hen sentencing women offenders, courts shall have the power to consider mitigating factors such as lack of criminal history and relative non-severity and nature of the criminal conduct, in the light of women’s caretaking responsibilities and typical backgrounds.”\(^{164}\)

The reference to the “nature” of criminal conduct and women’s “typical backgrounds” means that a history of domestic violence should qualify as a mitigating factor.\(^{165}\)

The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes, and Consequences has echoed this assessment, noting: “[w]hile recognizing the gravity of their crimes, women’s criminality under situations of extreme abuse and violence needs to be treated with diligence, and their cases must be assessed in light of mitigating circumstances.”\(^{166}\) In the Rapporteür’s words, “[t]he ‘battered women’ syndrome/defence may shed light into the circumstances in which a violent act was committed. Courts in a number of countries have acknowledged that battered women use force or kill as a way to defend themselves or respond to provocation. As a result, courts have given out more lenient sentences.”\(^{167}\)

Other UN bodies have gone a step further, stating that long-term abuse should serve as a complete defense when women employ violence preventatively. Several UN Special Rapporteürs took this position in a case in which a female Iranian national - Razia Ebrahimi - killed her husband in his sleep in response to prolonged physical and psychological abuse. Ms. Ebrahimi was subsequently prosecuted for and convicted of murder. The Rapporteürs said: “In domestic violence, the threat of violence by a persistently violent male partner has a cumulative impact as part of a pattern of behavior and a woman’s violent response should be interpreted as a defensive response to the cumulative acts of violence.”\(^{168}\) In a subsequent communication to the United States, the Rapporteürs reiterated this stance, stating that it was unreasonable to expect women


\(^{167}\) Id at fn. 43.


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subjected to “persistent domestic violence” to wait to suffer grievous bodily harm before defending themselves.169

In the present case, the court did not consider the long-term abuse inflicted on Ms. Pasanova either a mitigating factor or a complete defense. It is unclear if the court found the history of violence irrelevant or if it relied on the prosecutor’s misguided assumption that a victim would not have stayed with her abuser, thereby overlooking testimony and other evidence that Mr. Isakov had consistently harmed Ms. Pasanova. In any event, the court’s inattention to this abuse contravened international standards.

169 Id.
The criminal proceedings against Ms. Pasanova were compromised by serious fair trial violations that directly impacted the outcome of her case. In particular, she was unable to present key expert and lay witness testimony. Additionally, neither the prosecutor nor court took Ms. Pasanova’s experiences as a domestic violence survivor into account. As such, Ms. Pasanova’s conviction and sentence contravene international law. With her case proceeding to appeal, Kyrgyz courts must comply with their obligations under the ICCPR and Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.

GRADE: D
GRADING METHODOLOGY

Experts should assign a grade of A, B, C, D, or F to the trial reflecting their view of whether and the extent to which the trial complied with relevant international human rights law, taking into account, *inter alia*:

- The severity of the violation(s) that occurred;
- Whether the violation(s) affected the outcome of the trial;
- Whether the charges were brought in whole or in part for improper motives, including political motives, economic motives, discrimination, such as on the basis of “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status,”\(^{170}\) and retaliation for human rights advocacy (even if the defendant was ultimately acquitted);
- The extent of the harm related to the charges (including but not limited to whether the defendant was unjustly convicted and, if so, the sentence imposed; whether the defendant was kept in unjustified pretrial detention, even if the defendant was ultimately acquitted at trial; whether the defendant was mistreated in connection with the charges or trial; and/or the extent to which the defendant’s reputation was harmed by virtue of the bringing of charges); and
- The compatibility of the law and procedure pursuant to which the defendant was prosecuted with international human rights law.

**Grading Levels**

- **A**: A trial that, based on the monitoring, appeared to comply with international standards.
- **B**: A trial that appeared to generally comply with relevant human rights standards excepting minor violations, and where the violation(s) had no effect on the outcome and did not result in significant harm.
- **C**: A trial that did not meet international standards, but where the violation(s) had no effect on the outcome and did not result in significant harm.
- **D**: A trial characterized by one or more violations of international standards that affected the outcome and/or resulted in significant harm.
- **F**: A trial that entailed a gross violation of international standards that affected the outcome and/or resulted in significant harm.

\(^{170}\) ICCPR, Article 26.