Introduction

If “information is the currency of democracy,”1 nowhere in our system of governance is that coin more valuable than in federal criminal cases. In nearly every criminal case, information is at a premium for both sides. The defendant is anxious to understand what the government’s case at trial will look like so that it can seek to impeach the government’s witnesses and present the best defense to the charges. The government, for its part, wants to know the defendant’s theory of the defense so that it can tailor its own case-in-chief to anticipate that theory.

The rare value of information in a criminal case lies partly in its inaccessibility, as the parties’ right to discovery is relatively narrow, particularly when compared to the quantity of information available as a matter of right to litigants in civil cases. Because discovery rights in charged criminal cases are limited, the parties often litigate vigorously—and sometimes creatively—to obtain significant information.

For purposes of this book, we define “federal criminal discovery” to be any method by which the government or the defense may demand production of materials or information in a charged federal criminal case. Our definition of federal criminal discovery includes materials such as recordings, documents, electronic data, or tangible objects. It also includes unwritten information such as witness statements that

1. This quotation is commonly attributed to Thomas Jefferson but, according to the Thomas Jefferson Foundation (http://www.monticello.org/site/jefferson/information-currency-democracy-quotation), he never said it. We are indebted to its author, whomever that may be.
have not been recorded or memorialized in writing. In addition to what the government and the defense may obtain from each other, our definition of federal criminal discovery includes materials and information that may be obtained from third parties after a case has been charged. We do not include in our definition of federal criminal discovery what the government may obtain by search warrant or grand jury subpoena before charging a case. The government’s pre-indictment investigative power is immense and, while we may allude to it on occasion, a full discussion is beyond the scope of this book.

We are not aware of any books devoted to the topic of federal criminal discovery. By contrast, many books are devoted to federal civil discovery. That may be because there is much more discovery in civil cases than in criminal cases. In fact, a criminal defendant had no right to any discovery at all from the federal government until a modest version of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was first adopted in 1946.

On one level, the notion that far more discovery is available in federal civil cases than in federal criminal cases makes little sense. A report of the American College of Trial Lawyers observed: “It is anomalous that in civil cases, where generally only money is at stake, access to information is assured; while, on the contrary, in criminal cases, where liberty is at issue, the defense is provided far less information.”

On another level, criminal cases also implicate other principles that may press against broad discovery. For one, the defendant has constitutional rights such as the Fifth Amendment privilege not to be a witness against oneself. For another, the public has a particular interest in seeing that the guilty are held accountable for criminal conduct. Many influential citizens, including judges, have spoken forcefully over the years against discovery being made available to criminal defendants. Judge Learned Hand wrote this in 1923:

Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage. While the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, [the accused] need not disclose the barest outline of his defense. He

---

is immune from question or comment on his silence; he cannot be convicted when there is the least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve. Why in addition he should in advance have the whole evidence against him to pick over at his leisure, and make his defense, fairly or fouly, I have never been able to see. . . . Our dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we need to fear is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecution of crime.3

Judge Hand remains one of the most venerated jurists in American history, and rightly so. But it cannot reasonably be denied today that Judge Hand’s “unreal dream” of “the innocent man convicted” was in fact quite real. The invention and acceptance of DNA testing has proved as much. Led by the Innocence Project at Cardozo Law School, DNA evidence has been used to exonerate hundreds of wrongly convicted defendants,4 many of whom were awaiting execution on death row.5 In one case, Arizona v. Youngblood, an innocent defendant’s conviction was actually affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court before DNA evidence exonerated him.6

DNA’s illumination of wrongful convictions has engendered support for expanded pretrial disclosure of evidence to criminal defendants. But long before the arrival of DNA evidence, the law was moving

5. Best-selling author John Grisham wrote a nonfiction book about one such defendant. In it, Grisham tells the story of Ron Williamson, who was convicted in Oklahoma of a murder committed by somebody else. DNA evidence exonerated Williamson and identified the real killer, but not until Williamson had served 11 years in prison. See Grisham, The Innocent Man (2006). See also Dennis Fritz, Journey Towards Justice (2006), written by Williamson’s co-defendant, Dennis Fritz, who was also wrongly convicted for the same murder before being exonerated.
toward greater criminal discovery. In an influential 1963 speech,\(^7\) Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. argued that the ends of justice would be served through greater disclosure of evidence to the defense. Justice Brennan organized his speech to respond to the arguments against discovery that had been articulated by Chief Justice Vanderbilt of the New Jersey Supreme Court, with whom Justice Brennan had served before being appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The arguments Justice Brennan describes—on both sides—resonate to this day.

Chief Justice Vanderbilt believed that providing discovery to criminal defendants would facilitate perjury and falsification of evidence. Not so, countered Justice Brennan, who argued that “[this] fallacy has been starkly exposed through the extensive and analogous experience in civil causes where liberal discovery has been allowed and perjury has not been fostered. Indeed, this experience has suggested that liberal discovery, far from abetting, actually deters perjury and fabrication.”\(^8\)

Chief Justice Vanderbilt also feared that criminal defendants would inappropriately interfere with and perhaps harm government witnesses if discovery were provided. Justice Brennan’s response: “Dangers and other abuses of this kind are clearly a matter of legitimate concern—they argue however not for wholesale prohibition of criminal discovery but only for circumspection and for appropriate sanctions tailored to dealing with apprehended abuses in the particular case.”\(^9\)

Echoing Judge Hand, Chief Justice Vanderbilt argued that providing discovery to a criminal defendant was not appropriate, because the defendant was already given great advantages in our system of justice. Chief Justice Vanderbilt believed that the requirement that the government convince a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt, together with the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege not to be a witness against himself, tilted the playing field steeply in favor of the defendant. He argued in particular that the Fifth Amendment would make criminal discovery a one-way street: That is, the


\(^8\) *Id.* at 289, 291.

\(^9\) *Id.* at 289, 292.
government would have to produce information to the defense, but the defense would not have to produce information to the government.\textsuperscript{10}

While it is true that the government cannot compel a criminal defendant to testify against herself, the government has ample resources to obtain materials and information. Before indictment, the government may utilize grand jury subpoenas for testimony and materials; a potential criminal defendant has no corresponding right. The government may obtain and execute warrants to search for and seize evidence; a criminal defendant may not. The federal government has the greatest investigative agency in history—the Federal Bureau of Investigation—often with an unlimited budget available to it; a criminal defendant does not. The government may deceive witnesses to convince them to cooperate; defense counsel is not allowed to do so. The government may provide benefits to witnesses, including cash rewards and freedom to felons facing prison; a defense lawyer would be guilty of a criminal act if he or she provided such incentives to witnesses. Justice Brennan simply stated, “[I]t overstates the fact to say that we don’t need to extend criminal discovery procedures to the accused because the scales are already distorted in his favor. . . .\textsuperscript{11}"

Finally, Chief Justice Vanderbilt argued that the problem of criminal conduct was worse in the United States than in countries such as Canada that provided more criminal discovery. Justice Brennan suggested, on the contrary, that given Canada’s satisfaction with discovery in criminal cases and its lower crime rate, what worked in Canada might also work in the United States.\textsuperscript{12}

Justice Brennan’s view prevailed, at least in part, as the last fifty-five years have seen an expansion of criminal discovery rights—though nowhere near at the level of civil discovery. In 1970, Justice White wrote for a majority of the Supreme Court approving a Florida system of reciprocal discovery regarding alibi witnesses. He explained that such discovery is “designed to enhance the search for truth in the criminal trial by insuring both the defendant and the State ample opportunity to investigate certain facts crucial to the determination of

\begin{itemize}
  \item 10. \textit{Id.} at 289.
  \item 11. \textit{Id.} at 293.
  \item 12. \textit{Id.} at 293.
\end{itemize}
guilt or innocence.” 13 Three years later, Justice Marshall wrote for an eight-justice majority that the “ends of justice will best be served by a system of liberal discovery which gives both parties the maximum possible amount of information with which to prepare their cases and thereby reduces the possibility of surprise at trial.” 14 The growth of liberal “discovery devices is a salutary development which, by increasing the evidence available to both parties, enhances the fairness of the adversary system.” 15

Thus, while there is “no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case,” 16 Congress and the courts have developed more specific, limited rights, sometimes mandated by the Constitution but far more often as a matter of policy. Over the years, numerous proposals for expanded discovery have been advanced, often accompanied by vigorous debate. Many such proposals were accepted; others were not. Here are some of the most significant milestones:

- In 1946, the first formal discovery rule was implemented when the Supreme Court amended the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to provide for limited discovery by court order. The original Rule 16 authorized the district court to order the government to allow the defendant to inspect the documents obtained by the government from the defendant, or obtained from others by seizure or process.

- In 1957, the Supreme Court held in Jencks v. United States 17 that the government is required to give witness statements to the defense. That same year, Congress reacted by passing the so-called Jencks Act, 18 which provides that the government need not turn over such statements until after the witness has testified.

- Also in 1957, the Supreme Court held in Roviaro v. United States 19 that the government must disclose information about

15. Id. at 474.
confidential informants “[w]here the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause.”

- In 1963, the same year as Justice Brennan’s speech, the Supreme Court in *Brady v. Maryland* held for the first time that due process requires the government to disclose to the accused evidence that is exculpatory and material to guilt or punishment.

- In 1966, and again in 1975, Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was greatly expanded. By 1975, the new Rule 16 made discovery automatic and reciprocal. A defendant now was entitled, upon request and without a court order, to obtain his own statement; his own grand jury testimony; results or reports of examinations, tests, or experiments; and documents and tangible objects material to the defense. Government work product was exempted from discovery, and witness statements remained subject to disclosure only as provided in the Jencks Act. The amended Rule 16 also called for reciprocal discovery from the defense, once the government had met its discovery obligations, of documents and tangible objects, and results or reports of examinations, tests, or experiments, that the defendant intended to introduce at trial.

- In 1993, Rule 16 was amended to require the government to provide a summary of its expected experts’ testimony upon the defendant’s request. If the defendant made such a request and the government complied, the defendant was then required to provide a summary of his expected experts’ testimony upon the government’s request.

In the debate over expanded criminal discovery, many controversial issues have arisen, some of which are unresolved to this day. One such issue is whether a defendant should be entitled to know before trial the identity of the witnesses against him. In 1974, the Supreme

20. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The *Brady* decision was authored by Justice Douglas and announced by Justice Brennan.
Court proposed a rule that would have required the government and
the defense to identify its witnesses in advance of trial. Congress vetoed
it. Recent cases have addressed whether a trial judge nonetheless has
discretion to order the government to disclose its witnesses. We will
attempt to address that issue and other criminal discovery controversies
throughout this book.

* * * * *

In the chapters that follow, we describe and discuss each of the dif-
ferent methods of discovery available to the parties in federal criminal
cases. We begin, in chapter 1, with the defendant’s constitutional right
to obtain exculpatory evidence under *Brady v. Maryland.*

*Brady* held that a criminal defendant is entitled upon request to “evidence favorable
to an accused . . . where the evidence is material either to guilt or punish-
ment. . . .” Several additional Supreme Court cases, which we will
discuss, have followed and expanded on *Brady.* We will also consider
significant issues that the Supreme Court has not addressed, including
how *Brady* issues should be handled at the trial court level.

After examining the constitutional rule of *Brady,* we turn in chapter
2 to the cornerstone of federal criminal discovery, Rule 16 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 16 requires the government to make
substantial disclosures to the defendant, if the defendant requests them,
and by so requesting, the defendant in most instances obligates himself
to provide reciprocal discovery to the government. Rule 16 is nuanced
and its requirements are often litigated. By necessity, therefore, chapter
2 is by far the longest chapter in this book.

We then consider, in chapter 3, the discoverability of witness state-
ments under the Supreme Court’s *Jencks* decision, the Jencks Act, and
the corresponding Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure, Rule 26.2. Wit-
ness statements, defined as substantially verbatim statements made or
adopted by a witness, are required to be disclosed by the party offering

21. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16, advisory committee’s notes, 1975 enactment; see
also id., 1974 amend.
23. Id. at 87.
the witness’s testimony at trial—but no disclosure is required until after
the witness has testified on direct examination. As this procedure raises
obvious inefficiencies, we discuss possible alternatives.

In chapter 4, we address the availability of subpoenas to obtain evi-
dence before trial in criminal cases. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 17(c), either party may serve a subpoena on the other party or,
more commonly, on a third party, to obtain evidence for trial. The utility
of this procedure is limited, however, as the weight of authority follow-
ing United States v. Nixon24 holds that subpoenas are not for discovery
and may seek only specific relevant and evidentiary documents.

While the above rules and requirements are perhaps the most fund-
damental and widely used means of obtaining information by right in
criminal cases, many other federal rules and statutes also contain discov-
ery rights and obligations. To our knowledge, these have never been dis-
cussed in one place until now. Chapter 5 attempts that task. It includes
a discussion of Criminal Procedure Rules 12.1, 12.2, and 12.3, which
require reciprocal disclosure of information concerning certain defenses;
Rule 12(b)(4), which requires the government to disclose upon request
whether it intends to offer certain evidence at trial; Rule 6(e), which
governs disclosure of grand jury information; the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act as it relates to criminal cases; certain disclosure provisions of
Title III, the wiretapping statute; and, finally, various Evidence Rules
that contain disclosure requirements attendant to the use of particular
types of evidence at trial.

Having exhausted the statutory and constitutional bases for discov-
ery, we turn in chapter 6 to the court’s inherent power to order dis-
cover in criminal cases. While the scope of inherent authority is not
clearly defined or understood, the thrust of the case law suggests that
a federal court at least sometimes can order discovery that the Rules
do not otherwise require—assuming that the Rules do not forbid the
discovery. We will attempt to make sense of the rather vague standards
available in this area.

In chapters 7 and 8, respectively, we discuss ethical rules and Jus-
tice Department policies that impact the federal prosecutor’s disclosure
obligations. There are differences between ethical rules and Department

of Justice policies, on the one hand, and the rules, statutes, and cases addressing federal criminal discovery, on the other hand. We compare and contrast these different sources of discovery duties.

Following that, in chapter 9, we discuss certain considerations that may merit restricting criminal discovery in appropriate cases: specifically, witness safety and national security as embodied in the Classified Information Procedures Act,25 or CIPA. We suggest solutions to these potential problems.

We address some remedies for discovery violations in substantive chapters, but chapter 10 is devoted entirely to the remedies a court may (or must) order in the event of a discovery violation. The court has at its disposal many potential sanctions, both remedial and punitive. The appropriate remedy will depend on the nature and severity of the violation and its effect on the underlying criminal case.

We will also survey the discovery practices in the various U.S. district courts around the country. There is no uniform approach to discovery in our federal district courts, but chapter 11 describes the local rules of those districts that have adopted them and seeks to identify common themes.

Chapter 12, finally, is devoted to reform. The past few years have seen a number of cases in which courts found that the government failed to provide required discovery. Along with several of our colleagues, the authors of this book were defense counsel in one of those cases, United States v. Stevens. There, Judge Sullivan of the U.S. district court for the District of Columbia found that despite "repeated defense requests and the Court’s repeated admonitions to provide exculpatory information" to the defense, the government failed to produce "information that the government was constitutionally required to provide to the defense for use at trial" until "nearly five months after trial."26 After dismissing the charges, Judge Sullivan wrote to the Criminal Rules Advisory Committee asking that it recommend amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to mandate more complete discovery of exculpatory informa-

The Department of Justice has opposed Judge Sullivan’s request but has issued new “guidance” for its prosecutors regarding their discovery obligations and has devoted substantial resources to preventing discovery failures in the future. A healthy debate exists over whether reform recommended by Judge Sullivan and others should take place. We devote the final chapter of this book to those reform proposals.

* * * * *

We are defense lawyers, and we acknowledge that we write from that perspective. With that knowledge, however, we have made a conscious effort to describe existing law fairly and to see both sides of any issues for which we may recommend changes or clarification in the law.

Our hope is that this book will be a helpful tool for judges, academics, prosecutors, and defense lawyers. We also hope it may provide a useful framework for policy makers considering changes to the law of federal criminal discovery.

We are very proud to call Williams & Connolly our professional home. Our colleagues have set the finest professional examples we could imagine, and they have taught us what we know. That said, the views we express in this book are entirely our own.