ADMIRALTY
Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd., DBA Kirby Engineering et al.
Docket No. 02-1028
Reversed: The Elevetnh Circuit

Argued: October 6, 2004
Decided: November 9, 2004
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 4

Can Norfolk take shelter in the liability limitations contained in two liability limitations contained in maritime contracts that upstream carriers negotiated for the delivery of machinery that was damaged when a Norfolk train derailed?

Yes. The Court held that Norfolk is entitled to the protection of the liability limitations in two bills of lading at issue.

From the opinion by Justice O'Connor (for a unanimous Court):

The expansive contract language corresponds to the fact that various modes of transportation would be involved in performing the contract. Kirby and ICC contracted for the transportation of machinery from Australia to Huntsville, Alabama, and, as the crow flies, Huntsville is some 366 miles inland from the port of discharge. See G. Fitzpatrick & M. Modlin, Direct-Line Distances 168 (1986). Thus, the parties must have anticipated that a land carrier's services would be necessary for the contract's performance. It is clear to us that a railroad like Norfolk was an intended beneficiary of the ICC bill's broadly written Himalaya Clause. Accordingly, Norfolk's liability is limited by the terms of that clause.

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ADMIRALTY
Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.
Docket No. 03-1388
Reversed: The Fifth Circuit

Argued: February 28, 2005
Decided: June 6, 2005
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 260

Does the Americans with Disabilities Act apply to foreign-flagged cruise ships?

Yes. The Court held that except insofar as Title III of the Act regulates a vessel's internal affairs—a category that is not always well defined and that may require further judicial elaboration—the statute is applicable to foreign ships in United States waters to the same extent that it is applicable to American ships in those waters.

From the opinion by Justice Kennedy (announcing the judgment of the Court and delivering the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-A-1, and II-B-2, in which Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined; an opinion with respect to Parts II-A-2, II-B-1, II-B-3, and III-B, in which Justices Stevens and Souter joined; and an opinion with respect to Part III-A, in which Justices Stevens, Souter, and Thomas joined):

Our cases hold that a clear statement of congressional intent is necessary before a general statutory requirement can interfere with matters that concern a foreign-flag vessel's internal affairs and operations, as contrasted with statutory requirements that concern the security and well-being of United States citizens or territory. While the clear statement rule could limit Title III's application to foreign-flag cruise ships in some instances, when it requires removal of physical barriers, it would appear the rule is inapplicable to many other duties Title III might impose. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that the ADA is altogether inapplicable to foreign vessels; and we remand for further proceedings.

Concurring in part and concurring in the judgment: Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justice Breyer)
Concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment in part: Justice Thomas
Dissenting: Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, and joined by Justice Thomas with respect to Part I-A)

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Argued: November 1, 2004
Decided: February 22, 2005
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 69

Does a dredge constitute a "vessel" for the purpose of establishing a negligence claim under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA)?

Yes. The Court decided that a dredge, a floating platform with a bucket that removes silt from the ocean floor and dumps it onto adjacent scows, is a vessel under the LHWCA.

From the opinion by Justice Thomas (joined by all other members except Chief Justice Rehnquist, who took no part in the decision):

At the time that Congress enacted the LHWCA and since, Rev. Stat. §3, now 1 U. S. C. §3, has defined the term "vessel" in the LHWCA. Under §3, a "vessel" is any watercraft practically capable of maritime transportation, regardless of its primary purpose or state of transit at a particular moment. Because the [dredge] Super Scoop was engaged in maritime transportation at the time of Stewart's injury, it was a vessel within the meaning of 1 U. S. C. §3. Despite the seeming incongruity of grouping dredges alongside more traditional seafaring vessels under the maritime statutes, Congress and the courts have long done precisely that. …

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Argued: November 3, 2004
Decided: March 30, 2005
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 98

Are disparate impact claims cognizable under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)?

Yes. The ADEA permits disparate impact claims; however, the petitioners in this case failed to set forth a valid disparate impact claim.

From the opinion by by Justice Stevens (joined with respect to Parts I, II, and IV by Justices Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer and joined with respect to Part III by Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer):

Two textual differences between the ADEA and Title VII make it clear that even though both statutes authorize recovery on a disparate-impact theory, the scope of disparate-impact liability under ADEA is narrower than under Title VII… In this case not only did petitioners… err by failing to identify the relevant [employment] practice [that led to disparate impact], but it is also clear from the record that the City's plan was based on reasonable factors other than age… Accordingly, while we do not agree with the Court of Appeals' holding that that the disparate-impact theory of recovery is never available under the ADEA, we affirm its judgment.

Concurring in part and concurring in the judgment: Justice Scalia
Concurring in the judgment: Justice O'Connor (joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas)
Taking no part: Chief Justice Rehnquist