Court Cases by IndianaBrown v. State
659 N.E. 2d 671 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)
Brown was convicted of two murders, and sentenced to 50 years in prison on each. On appeal he argued that the trial judge had failed to consider his FAS as a mitigating factor. 659 N.E. 2d at 674.
The sentencing judge did expressly consider eleven mitigating factors. The appellate court described one of those as being the fact that "Brown had a significant history of psychiatric referrals and diagnoses due to his behavioral problems." (659 N.E. 2d at 675). It is unclear whether this was a general mitigating factor that would have included FAS, or whether the sentencing judge did not expressly consider the FAS issue. If the latter, then it is unclear whether the appellate court did not recognize that that issue had been ignored, or merely felt that the judge's decision was otherwise so thorough that it should not be reversed merely because the opinion did not expressly mention a twelfth mitigating factor.
Davies v. State
758 N.E. 2d 981 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)
Davies pled guilty to murder and several other crimes. We was sentenced to consecutive terms in prison totalling 108 years. He appealed the length of the sentence.
Davies argued that he should have received a shorter sentence because he had FAE. Indiana Law states that one of the mitigating factors at sentencing is whether "the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of the defendant's conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect." 758 N.E. 2d at 988 (Emphasis added).
The sentencing judge recognized that Davies had FAE, but gave that factor only minimal weight in his sentencing decision. The sentencing judge explained that the FAE was
758 N.E. 2d at 983. The report of Davies' expert
Davies' expert witness was a Dr. Paul Guastadisegni, who was described as a "neuropsychologist who frequently works with children suffering from fetal alcohol syndrome and FAE." 758 N.E. 2d at 988 n. 10.
The court of appeals concluded that the sentencing judge did not abuse his discretion in giving only minimal weight to FAE as a mitigator.
In the Matter of the Adoption of T.J.F.
798 N.E. 2d 867 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)
The court's findings of fact included the following:
798 N.E. 2d at 870.